IR 05000369/1980029
| ML19345C949 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire  |
| Issue date: | 10/20/1980 |
| From: | Ang W, Herdt A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19345C942 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-369-80-29, NUDOCS 8012080656 | |
| Download: ML19345C949 (5) | |
Text
.__
.
.
.
'o UNITED STATES
4 /^\\ !
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION n
(/{
.E REGION 11 o,
'[
101 MARIETTA sT., N.W.. sulTE 3100
%
j'
ATLAJdTA. GEORGIA 30303
.
Report No. 50-369/F0-29 j
Licensee: Duke Pover Company
422 South Church Street ~
Charlottre, NC 28242 i
Facility Name: McGt. ire Unit 1
Docket No. 50-369
,
License No. CPPR-83
'
Inspection at McGuire Nuclear Station near Charlotte, North Carolina Inspector:
s
/0 / I'8"
,
W. P. Ang Date Signed
'
Approved by:
ff[/
/0 - 30 -[c
'
A. R. Herdt,' Section Chief, RC&ES Branch Date Signed SUMMARY
Inspection on September 24-26, 1980 i
Areas Inspection i
This routine, announced inspection involved 21 inspector-hours on sf/e in the j
areas of pipe support Po e plate designs using concrete expansion nehors (IEB 79-02); and seistaic analysis for as-built safety-related piping systems
.
j (IEB 79-14).
Results
,
Of the two areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
a
!
I J
i 8012080 d 57-
.
.
-
_.
.
..
..
,
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- J. C. Rogers, Pro ect Manager - Construction s
- J. R. Wells, Corporate QA Manager
- W. O. Henry, QA Manager - Construction
- T. E. Touchstone, Senior Construction Ergineer
- E. B. Miller, Senior QA Engineer
- M. S. Starnes, Senior QC Engineer
- A. P. Cobb, Design Engineer
- E. B. Abrams, Pro.iect Manager - Hangers
- G. B. Robinson, OA Engineer
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on September 26, 1980 with those persons indicated in Paragraph I above.
The unresolved items noted on paragraph 5 and 6 were.liscussed.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Licensee action on previous inspection f;ndings were inspected. Details of this inspection are included in paragrapu. 3 and 6.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve noncompliance or deviations.
New unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in paragraphs 5 and 6.
5.
Seismic Analysis for As-Built Safety-Related Piping Systems (IEB 79-14)
On September 5,1980, Duke Power Company (DPC) provided a response to the items of noncompliance noted on inspection report 50-369/80-18.
In addi-tion DPC also provided a discussion on the items of concern noted on inspection report 50-369/80-18.- An inspection was performed to verify DPC's action and commitments and to verify :ompliance with IEB 79-14 requirements.
DPC reinspected 214 pipe supports in connection with corrective actions concerning the termination of ten QC inspectors. Approximately 200 addi-tional discrepancies were noted in 92 pipe supports. All discrepancies were subsequently evsluated by DPC and found to be acceptable. A subsequent DPC itudy of the 214 supports plus 3 additional supports determined that they were-representative of the plants' total p!pe supports.
In addition, DPC leinspected 30 additional pipe supports /res*:raints whose stress levels
- -. -..
o G
,
.
-2-s were within 80 percent of allowable level. DPC subsequently concluded that all 30 pipe supports / restraints were structurally adequate. Of these 30 pipe supports / restraints the following were selected and inspected:
Boron Injection System - IMCA-NB-1256 Chemical and Volume Control System - IMCA-NV-379 Component Cooling System - IMCA-KC-1332 Nuclear Service Water System - IMCA-RN-2561 During the inspection, it was noted that the clearance between the pipe and restraint IMCA-KC-1332 did not comply with the restraint drawing requirements.
It was also noted that an adjacent pipe was hard against restraint IMCA-KC-1332.
The licensee had noted this condition during a previous piping walk-thru inspection but resolution of the noted condition was still to be accomplished.
IE Report number 50-369/80-18 Infraction 80-18-01, example 1, noted that support NIH210 was still installed on the piping but had been deleted from the applicable drawings. This condition had not been identified by the licensee's completed inspection. The licensee provided a response stating that; (1) the support had been removed, (2) inspection drawings were being reviewed and any necessary reinspection will be accomplished; and (3) detailed instructions will be provided for the inspections in Construction Procedure 309. The above licensee action was inspected. No similar conditions were noted.
The inspector had no further questions on this item.
IE Report number 50-369/80-18 noted that weld rods were found on three different supports. The licensee response states that:
(1) the weld rods have been properly disposed; (2) this was an isolated case; and (3) com-pliance with existing weld rod control requirements is being continued and no program changes were necessary. The above licensee response was in-spected. No additional similar conditions were identified. The inspector had no further questic7s on this item.
Infraction 80-18-02 " Failure to follow welding electrode control procedures" shall be closed.
Portions of the following piping stress analysis problems were inspected:
Chemical and Volume Control Syctem problem NVA.
Safety Injection System problem h7U Boron Injection System Problem NB 301 Nuclear Service Water Syst 2 Problem RN 312 Component Cooling Water System problem KC. 2 The following items were noted:
(a) The criteria for piping overlap modeling techn~que used for McGuire
'
Unit 1 does not take into consideration paragraphs 1.b., 1.c and 2 of the NRC letter to DPC dated October 3, 1978 on the same subject. This
, shall be identified as inspector follow-up item 80-29-01, " Piping overlap modeling technique".
-
..
.
.-
.
'
-3-(b) Support / restraint non-axial loads in the overlap regions are based on the envelope load rather than the sum of the loads from both problems.
This is identified as the second part of inspector follow-up item 80-29-01.
(c) Problem NB 301's seismic analysis used the modulus of elasticity for 70 degrees F temperature for the material rather than the materials modulus of elasticity at the 200 degrees F design termperature. The licensee committed to analyze the effect of the difference and to correct the analysis as required.
Pending licensee's reanalysis, this item shall be identified as unresolved item 80-29-02, " Stress analysis modulus of elesticity".
On July 23, 1980, the licensee reported that 1/2 kip size mechanical snubbers may have been damaged during installation.
The licensee further indicated that the snubbers would be reinspected. An inspection was performed to verify licensee compliatte with NRC requirements and licensee commitments. DPC nonconforming item report (NCR) 11544 identifies the conditions and provides the licensees corrective action.
The NRC further
,
j added the 1/4 kip size to the snubbers that required reinspection.
Snub-
,'
bers of pipe supports NI-0697 and NI-312 were inspected.
Inspection of all 1/2 kip and.1/4 kip mechanical snubbers by the licensee is still to be completed. Pending completion, this item shall be licensee identified item 80-29-04, " Damaged Mechanical snubbers", and shall remain open.
Pending licensee completion of IEB 79-14 requirements and licensee com-mitments the bulletin shall remain open. No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified 6.
Pipe Support Baseplate Designs Using Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts (IEB 79-02)
,
~
In response to IE Report 50-369/80-18 and IEB 79-02, on August 26, 1980 the licensee initiated a sampling reanalysis program to verify a 95% confidence level that less than 5% of McGuire Unit I sleeve and wedge tip? concrete expansion anchors have a safety factor of 4 or greater.
The licensee
,
sampling re-analysis program was inspected.
Calculations for concrete expansion anchors on c3pports IMCA-CA-H52 and H53 were reviewed.
It was noted that when the licensee verified the 95% confidence level that less than 5% of the pipe supports of a system had safety factors less than 4, the licensee did not intend to resolve the discrepancies on those b>1ts
]
identified within the 5% that had safety factors that were less than 4.
The licensee was informed that this was not in accordance with IEB 79-02 and that bolts identified with less than 4 safety factor required either an analytical resolution or repair. Pending licensee evaluation of this condition, this shall be identified as unresolved item 80-29-03, "Reso-
>
lution of concrete expansion anchor safety factor less than 4".
'
Pending licensee completion of IEB 79-02 requirements and licensee com-mitments, IEB 79-02 shall remain open. No items of noncompliance or
-.
-..
-
-
,
.- -
-
. _ _
- - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _.
-
...
..
s
-
-4-deviations were identified.
t i