IR 05000369/1980032
| ML19345G214 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire  |
| Issue date: | 01/14/1981 |
| From: | Donat T, Graham M, Martin R, Meyers D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19345G210 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-369-80-32, NUDOCS 8103170089 | |
| Download: ML19345G214 (10) | |
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o UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION n
<E REGION 11
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101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., St!ITE 3100 v
l ATLANTA, CEORGIA 30303
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Report No. 50-369/80-32 Licensee:
Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Facility Name: McGuire Nuclear Station Docket No. 50-369 License No. CPPR-83 Inspecticri at McGuire Nuclear Station O-
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Inspectors:
T. J. Donat
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Date Signed C-d
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M. J. Graham p
Dafte Signed C %4a J+-
Mv/n D. O. Meyerg/(October J4-17, 1980)
Dhta Signed Approved by:
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d. D. MarGh, Section Chief, RONS Branch D&te Signed SUMMARY Inspection on October 1-30, 1980 Areas Inspected This routine inspection involved 180 inspector-hours on site in the areas of Preoperational Test Procedure Review, Preoperational Test Results review, Followup en unresolved items, Previous Inspection Findings, and Licensee Identified Item. Operating Staff Training, and Monitoring of Plant activities.
Resul ts Of the seven areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in six areas; two items of noncompliance were found in one area (failure to follow procedures, paragraph 10, and ; failure to evaluate test results, paragraph 10).
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees M. D. McIntosh, Plant Manager
- D. Rains, Mainte.'ance Supervisor G. Cage, Operaticns Supervisor
- M. M. % mple, Licensing & Project Engineer
- 0. Lampke, Junior Licensing Engineer
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- L. Weaver, Performance Engineer M. Pacette, Test Engineer T. Parker, Training Coordinator
- M. McCoullough, Maintenance Engineer W. Messer, Instrumentation & Electrical Engineer Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, technicians, operators, mechanic, security force members, and office personnel.
NRC Resident Inspector T. Donat
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M. J. Graham
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were sumarized in meetings on l
October 17 and 24, 1980 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
The licensee acknowledged at the October 17 exit meeting the items of noncompliance but would not coment to a corrective action at that time.
As of this date no changes to the original preoperational l
test, TP/1/A/1250/05 have been made but a written note by the involved l
mechanical maintenance engineer had been added to the completed test package.
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Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
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Not instected.
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Followup on Previous Unresolved Items
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Closed - Unruolved Item 80-03-05 concerning diesel generator load sequencer circuit changes.
The inspector reviewed Design Change Authorization DCA-MSEAB-1-965, - 966, - 967.
These modifications consisted of (a) interlocking the load sequencing relays with the load l
i shedding relays; (b) changing the diesel generator speed switch used in the start circuit from a 50% of rated speed to 95% of rated speed, and
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(c) adding a test relay (TRA3) contact into the auxiliary load sequencer relay (TRA3X) circuit.
The effect of these changes was to:
require the loaa shedding to be completed prior to any load application; to allow the diesel to be restarted if its speed decreases below 95% of rated speed; and the test relay interlocking with the load sequencer test defeat relay prevented the relay race and chattering. This item is closed.
5.
Review of Previous Licensee Identified Items Licensee Identified Item 78-34-03 concerning Upper Head Closed
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Injection Preoperational Test deficicency on level oscillations.
The licensee, in conjunction with the NSSS vendor, modified the level instrumentation by removing the level standpipes and successfully retested the Upper Head system in preoperational test TP/1/A/1200/03H.
This item is closed.
Closed - Licensee Identified Item 79-22-01 concerning pressurizer power operated relief (POR) valve operation.
The inspector reviewed a test report on a test conducted by the licensee at their Marshall steam station.
In these tests they verified proper operation of the presently installed POR valves at rated pressure and flow condition.
This item is closed, i
Closed - Licensee Identified Item 80-10-09 concerning Westinghouse's Part 21 report on a control rod drive deficiency.
The item concerned the control rod guide tube pins which had not been properly heat treated at the original supplier.
After completion of the second hot functional test sequence, the NSSS vendor replaced the original guide tube pins with new ones which had been properly heat treated.
This item is closed.
Licensee Identified Item 80-10-11 concerning defects in Closed
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Cutler-Hammer relays.
The problem was caused by oversized contact block compression springs.
The inspector reviewed eight (8) of the fifteen (15) work requests generated in order to check all of the Cutler-Hammer relays used in Unit 1.
The inspector reviewed each work request for completeness. Six of the work requests were also checked in plant to verify that the relays were installed in the correct cabinets and had been modified if needed. This item is closed.
6.
Operator Staff Training l
The inspector verified that the licensees training program and Qualifica-tion guidelines as set forth in ANSI N18.1 paragraphs 5.4 and 4.2 were applied and documented for individuals in the following job classifications.
Chemistry Reactor operator candidates Maintenance technicians b
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Instrument and Electrical technicians Health Physics Technict' Staff members Training records were reviewed and individuals were interviewed to ensure documented training corresponded to that received by the employees.
In the area reviewed, no items of noncompliance or deviations were noted.
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Monitoring of Station Activities There were three major activities, during the month of October, which the resident inspectors monitored:
(a) the replacement of the Valcor Jolenoid valves, (b) the identification of the subcontractor hanger design deficiencies, (c)
the diesel generator battery and cable replacement.
The inspectors monitored the development of the Valcor solenoid valve problem which was traced to an incompatibility between the wire insulation and the bonding agent used in manufacturing the solenoid core.
The replacement solenoids use a different wire insulation and replacement solenoids have been installed and tested in the diesel generator air start system.
The diesel generators had their power cables replaced with higher capacity cables.when it was discovered that the original cables would be overloaded and could not supply the ESF loads in the event of a single line fault even though the equipment would operate on two phase The licensee also discovered that the diesel generator starting power.
batteries were not capable of rated charge.
The licensee obtained replacement batteries from the original vendor and has instituted a test program to verify battery capacity, discharge and recharge capability.
The problem was determined by the battery vendor to be a lack of battery use (discharge and recharge had not been performed in over the last two years).
The last problem was identified as a result of the licensee's attempting to develope material in response to an NRC inspector's questions.
The licensee noted that hanger calculations made in response to the NRC lnspector's inquiries were different from those used to design the final hanger installation. Subsequent investigation by the licensee determined that in many instances when the subcontractor submitted revised load values to the licensee via a letter versus a new drawing that the revised loads were not used by the licensee in developing the final hanger design.
The licensee is presently reviewing all hanger design models to ensure that only the revised load values are
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being used.
After that determination they will determine which hanger installations have to be modified.
The hanger redesign effort is
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j scheduled to be completed on 12/5/80, craft installation by 12/22/80 and final inspection and certification by 1/5/81. The inspectors have
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monitored, in conjunction with the regional inspectors, this effort.
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Followup on Previous Inspection Findings
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Closed
. 0 pen Item 79-17-01 concerning resolution of preoperational test descrepancies identified during tne initial Hot Functional Test
Sequence. The inspector reviewed the completed preoperational tests performed duririg the second Hot Functional Test sequence and verified i
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i that their successful completion constituted an acceptable retest of the deficiencies.
Based on the tests' successful completion, this item
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is closed.
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Closed - TMI item 80-R0-02 concerning the need to clearly define the
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shift supervisor's administrative duties.
The inspector reviewed
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revision to. Station Directive 3.1.4 Rev. I dated 11/7/80.
The Directive in section E clearly defines what are and what are not the shift supervisor's administrative duties. This-item is closed.
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. TMI item 80-RO-04 concerning the need for and NRC evahation L
of the licensee's organization and management structure. This evaluation
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was - documented in IE Inspection Report 50-369/80-16 dated August 28, 1980.
Final recommendations are included as part of addendum 4 to the
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McGuire SER. The ' item is closed.
Closed - Inspector - Followup Item 80-CI-11 concerning Diesel-Generator Lube Oil Cooler Failures.
The licensee has reviewed the Circular and
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determined that it is not. applicable to the.McGutre diesel generators.
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Closed - Inspector Fellowup Item 80-BU-16 concerning use of Rosemount
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Pressure Transmitters. - The licensee does not have any transmitters of i
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.this model installed at McGuire. This item is closed.
Closed Inspector' Followup Item 80-BU-19 concerning installation. of Mercury wetted matrix relays.- The licensee does not have any application
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of mercury wetted relays at the McGuire Nuclear station.
This item is closed.
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Closed ' - Inspector Followup Item 80-BU-20 cormernir.g installation of
. Westinghouse - Type : W-2 spring return to normal control. switches.
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licensee,has stated that no switches of this type are installed at the McGuire Nuclear Station. This ' item is closed.
Closed -: Inspector. Followup Item 80-CI-01 concerning GE Induction Disc Relays.
The -licensee stated that no relays of this tvw are used at-tb McGuire Nuclear Station.- The item is closed.
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Closed - Inspector Followup Item 79-8U-28 concerning possible malfunction
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of ~ NAMCO Model EA-188 limit switches.
The inspector verified the L
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completion of the work requests which replaced all of the top gaskets as required by the Bulletin.
This item is clcsed.
This also c'ioses followup item 80-03-02.
Closed - Inspector Followup Item 79-B0-03 concerning the presence of longitudinal Weld Defects in pipe ' rom Youngstown W&E Company and others. Based on a memorandum from regional inspector L. Modenos to A. Herdt that a satisfactory response has been received from the licensee and that no piping material has been used in areas experiencing greater than 75% of pipe material design stress levels, this item is considered closed.
Closed - Inspector Followu) Item 80-BU-06 concerning the need for ESF components to not automat'cally revert to their pre-SI configuration upon the clearing of the SI initiating condition.
The :nspector reviewed the modifications made to ESF equipment control circuits. The modification consisted of replacement of the original two position switch with a new switch which has only momentary contacts in tne non-SI position and the addition of a " seal in" limit switch around the momentary contacts. As now configured, when the switch is depresscd in the non-safety direction, the valve movement will close the limit switch and ensure completion of the valve travel.
Initiation of a Safety injection breaks this circuit causing - the valve to reposition itself in the safety position and causing the limit switch to open and breaks the " seal in". When the safety injection initiating event has disappeared and the signals have been reset, the valve remains unchanged until the mc.entary switch is depressed and the limit switch reclosed providing the " seal in" feature again.
Based on the review of the BB, KC, NF, RF, RN, RV, VQ, and SA system modification, this item is considered closed. This also closes I.F.I item 80-03-08.
j Closed - Inspector Followup Item 80-BU-09 concerning Hydramotor Actuator Deficiencies. The inspector reviewed the vendor report documenting the l
reevaluation of the ITT actuator used in their ventilation dampers installed at the McGuire Station. Based on the reanalysis, the inspector considers the Bulletin closed.
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Closed - Inspector Folliwup ltem 80-BU-15 concerning the possible loss l
of the ENS wNn offsite power is lost.
The inspector reviewed the l
licensee's power suppl" capabilities in the telephone switch room.
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Each section of the telephone switch is powered via a "Tepaz" line filter and a " Topaz" Uninterruptable Power Supply (UIPS).
In the event offsite power is lost the VIPS switches to a internal battery which l
I will supply power for at least twenty four hours.
The firal configu-I ration has not been established; and therefore, it is not known if ATT will locate the aecessary repeater amplifier at their Huntersville office or at the McGuire Station telephone switch room.
In either case, an uninterruptable power supply is available and the item is
closed.
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Closed - Inspector Followup Item 80-RD-05 concerning having a Resident Inspector at each site by October 1,1980. The Senior resident inspector reported onsite on August 4,1980 and the resident inspector reported onsite on September 30, 1980. This item is tlosed.
Closed - Inspector Followup Item 80-RD-26 concerning the independent measurement program during the cor.struction program.
Because of the completion of construction e.tivities on Unit ti. is item is not
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applicable and closed.
Closej - Inspector Followup Item 80-RD-27 concerning assignment of a msident construct'on inspector.
Since resident operations inspectors are already onsite this itent is Closed.
Closed - Inspector Followup Item 80-RD-28 concerning reviud construction deficiency reporting requirements to assure promptness and completeness.
The nearness of tne facility to receiving an Operating License, the consequent reporting of deficiencies via Licensee Event Reports, and the delay in issuing the new requirements are the basis for closing this item for unit 1 only.
Closed - Open Item 79-17-04 concerning classification of the Prcssurizer Power Operated Relief valves for inservice Inspection program.
The licensee has added stroke timing and leak tightness tests for pressurizer power operated relief valves to their Inservice Inspection program.
This item is closed.
Open Item 79-06-05 concerning the amount of information Cicsed
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contained in the control room operator's and supervisor's 4hift logs during the initial functional test sequence.
The inspectors reviewed the control room reactor operator's 4g and the shift supervisor's
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daily logs during and subsequent to the most recent hot functional test l
program.
The logs reviewed contained references to specific activities occarring within the plant, surveillance activities in progress, preoperational tests, etc. The logs were considered satisfactory and
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the item is closed.
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Closed - Inspector Followup Item 80-BU-18 concerning maintenance of adequate minimum flow through the centrifugal charging pumps.
The inspector reviewed the four plant ere wncy procedures EP/0/A/500/30, 31, 32, and 33.
In all procedure.
.a centrifugal charg5g pumps recirculation line valves 1NV-31 and INV-32 are positioned initially open and are closed by procedure, from the control room, once adequate flow has been e:tablished.
The procedures reopen the recirculation line isolation valves whenever pump discharge flow starts to decrease.
This corrective action corresponds to Westinghouse interim Solution II.
This item is closed.
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Review of Preoperational Test Procedures The inspector reviewed TP/1/A/1600/02, Nuclear Instrumentation System Functional Test for adequacy and conformance to Reg Guide 1.68 Rev. 0-Specific checks were made to verify that all trips and permissives v v listed in section 7.0 of the FSAR and section 3 (Instrumentation) of the Technical Specification.
The inspector noted that a change to tha procedure was planned for the testic.g of the axial flux tilt meter.
This change will be reviewed, when issued, and any findings will be discussed in a later report.
The findings are clear in this area.
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Review of Completed Preoperational Test Packages The inspectors reviewed completed preoperational test packages for compliance with the licensee's commitments as stated in section 14.1 of the FSAR; Statton Directives 5.2.1, 3.2.2, and 4.2.1, and Regulatory Guide 1.68 Rev. O, and 1.33 Rev. 1.
Specific items included in the review were:
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(a) verifying that all prerequisites and system status blanks had been signed or a temporary change notice (TCN) had been generated.
(M verifying that all change notices to the procedures had been reviewed to determine if they were or were not safety related and had been approved before implementation (c) verifying that all procedural steps had been signed and dated.
(d) verifying that the final data package included at least; the signed off procedure, a copy of all temporary change notices, a copy of all test deficiencies including their resolution, and a copy of the test chronological log.
(e) verifying that all data had been recorded and was within specifica-tion or that discrepancies had been identified by the licensee and were either resolved or being tracked as outstanding.
TP/1/A/1150/04A Pressurizer Preliminary Spray Flow Funct.
Test TP/1/A/1150/04C Pressurizer Preliminary Spray Flow Funct.
Test TP/1/A/1150/07 NL System Thermal Expansion and Restraint Test TP/1/A/1150/07A NC System Thermal Expansion and Restraint Test TP/1/Afl150/08 Thermal Expansion Testing on ASME Code Piping TP/1/A/1150/15 HFT of Pressurizer Pressure and Level Controls, Steam Generator Level Alarms, Power Operated Relief Valves, and NC Low Flow Alarms TP/1/A/1150/16 Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Isolation Valve Functional Test
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TP/1/A/1?00/05B NV Systems Functional Test (HOT)
TP/1/B/1200/09 Boron Thermal Regeneration System Hot Functional
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Test TP/1/A/1250/04 Auxiliary Feedwater System Functional Test TP/1/A/1250/05 Main Steam Safety Valve Setpoint Test TP/1/A/1250/06 Main Steam Isolation Valve Timing Functional Test TP/1/A/1250/09 Auxiliary Steam Pressure Control Tast TP/1/A/1650/01 Loss of Control Room Functional Test During HFT TP/1/A/1650/02, loss of Control Room Fundional Test During HFT-2 The inspectors tid no comments on fourteen (14) of the fifteen (15)
procedures reviewed.
The inspectors identified an item of noncompliance with respect to the preoperational test TP/1/A/1250/05, Main Steam Safety Valve Setpoht Test, in that procedures were not fcilowed to document a change to the procedure's prerequisite conditions, as required by the utility's Administrative Policy Manual.
During the review of data shects in er:losure 13.1 of TP/1/A/1250/05 (performed 7/1/80 - 7/2/80) the inspector noted that the system pressure at which Main Steam Code Safety Relkf Valve,15V2, setpoint test was to begin exceeded the limits prescribed by the procedure prerequisite 8.2 (1005 vs 920-990 psig).
Further review revaaled that for 11 of the 20 code safety relief valves tested by the procedure, the documented system pressure ranged from 1005 to 1025 psig.
There had been no changes to tha procedure documented, and the test log *as silent on this discrepancy.
Subsequent conversations with licensee personnel on 10/16/80 indicated that during the course of relief valve testing the mechanical maintenance engineer who wrote the test and a representative of the relief valve vendor were at the site during testing.
According to the licensee's
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lireit of tha band allowed by the procedure, an evaluation was made of the effects of the higher starting pressure on the outcome of the test.
Both the engineer and the vendor representative concurred tnat testing at a pressure higher than the prerequisite procedure pressure would
j have no effect on the setpoint of the components or on the accuracy of test equipment measurements.
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10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V requires that activities affecting
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quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions... and shall be l
accomplished in accordance with these instructions.
The accepted QA l
Program (Duke-1-A), Section 17.2.5 requires that with regard to specific operational activities associated with nuclear safety-related structures,
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systems and components, it is required that such activities be accomplished in accordance with crocedures... appropriate to the nature of the
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activity being performed.
Administrative Policy Manual, (APM) Section 4.2.4.1 requires that major changes (other than typographical or editorial) be documented.
TP/1/A/1250/05, Main Steam Safety Valve
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Setpoint Test, Prerequisite 8.2, requires main steam header pressure to be 955 + 35 psig.
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Contrary to the above, for the testing of 11 of 20 main steam safety valves, main steam header pressure ranged from 1005 to 1025 psig and no change was submitted or documented to TP/1/A/1250/05 as required by APM Section 4.2.4.1.
This is an itet of noncompliance (80-32-01).
Moreover, preoperational test TP/1/A/1250/05 as perfori.ud July 1980 did not have an acceptable verification of test completion and determination
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of acceptability of test results; in that, the test was performed at a
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pressure of 1005 to 1025 psig, while prerequisite 8.2 required a pressure of 955 + 35 psig. The test was signed off as being completed and acceptable 6y the test engineer and the maintenance supervisor.
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Failure to properly review and approve completed test results is another item of noncompliance (80-32-02).
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