IR 05000354/2004010
| ML043020025 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 10/27/2004 |
| From: | Rogge J NRC/RGN-I/DRS/EB |
| To: | Bakken A Public Service Enterprise Group |
| References | |
| -RFPFR IR-04-010 | |
| Download: ML043020025 (24) | |
Text
ber 27, 2004
SUBJECT:
HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION - NRC TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000354/2004010
Dear Mr. Bakken:
On October 7, 2004, the NRC completed a triennial fire protection inspection at your Hope Creek Generating Station facility. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings that were discussed on October 7, 2004, with Mr. J. Carlin, Vice President Nuclear Assessments, and other members of your staff.
This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations, and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection no findings of significance were identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARs) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
We appreciate your cooperation. Please contact me at 610-337-5146 if you have any questions regarding this letter.
Sincerely,
/RA/
John F. Rogge, Chief Electrical Branch Division of Reactor Safety Docket No. 50-354 License No. NPF-57
Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report 05000354/2004010 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
Mr. A. Christopher Bakken, III 2
REGION 1 Docket No: 50-354 License No: NPF-57 Report No: 05000354/2004010 Licensee: Public Service Electric & Gas Company Facility: Hope Creek Generating Station Location: Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey Inspection Period: September 13 - October 7, 2004 Inspectors: Keith Young, Senior Reactor Inspector, DRS (Team Leader)
John Richmond, Reactor Inspector, DRS David Werkheiser, Reactor Inspector, DRS Jorge Hernandez, Reactor Engineer, DRP Approved by: John F. Rogge, Chief Electrical Branch Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IR 05000354/2004-010; 09/13/2004 - 10/07/2004; Hope Creek Generating Station; Triennial Fire Protection Inspection.
The report covered a two week team inspection by specialist inspectors. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.
A. NRC-Identified Findings No findings of significance were identified.
B. Licensee-Identified Violations None ii Enclosure
Report Details Background This report presents the results of a triennial fire protection inspection conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.05, Fire Protection. The objective of the inspection was to assess whether Public Service Electric and Gas Company (PSEG) has implemented an adequate fire protection program and that post-fire safe shutdown capabilities have been established and are being properly maintained at the Hope Creek Generating Station. The following fire areas (FAs) were selected for detailed review based on risk insights from the Hope Creek Generating Station Individual Plant Examination (IPE)/ Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE):
C Division I Reactor Building (FA RB1)
Focus Areas; SACS Heat Exchanger & Pump Room MCC Area C RHR Pump Room C Cable Spreading Room (FA CD16)
C Control Equipment Room Mezzanine (FA CD35)
C Switchgear Room Channel A (FA CD82)
C Switchgear Room Channel B (FA CD62)
This inspection was a reduced scope inspection in accordance with the March 6, 2003, revision to IP 71111.05, Fire Protection. Issues regarding equipment malfunction due to fire-induced failures of associated circuits were not inspected. Criteria for review of fire-induced circuit failures are currently the subject of a voluntary industry initiative. The definition of associated circuits of concern used was that contained in the March 22, 1982, memorandum from Mattson to Eisenhut, which clarified the requests for information made in NRC Generic Letter 81-12.
1. REACTOR SAFETY Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems 1R05 Fire Protection 1. Fire Area Boundaries and Barriers a. Inspection Scope The team walked down accessible portions of the selected fire areas to observe material condition and the adequacy of design of fire area boundaries, fire doors, and fire dampers. The team reviewed engineering evaluations, as well as surveillance and functional test procedures for selected items. The team also reviewed the licensee submittals and NRC safety evaluation reports (SERs) associated with fire protection features at Hope Creek Generating Station. Additionally, the team reviewed the design and qualification testing of selected barriers and reviewed surveillance procedures for structural fire barriers, penetration seals and structural steel. These reviews were performed to ensure that the passive fire barriers were properly maintained and met the Enclosure
licensing and design bases as described in the licensee submittals, NRC SERs, and the Hope Creek Generating Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
2. Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Lighting and Communications a. Inspection Scope The team observed the placement and coverage area of eight-hour emergency lights throughout the selected fire areas, including the remote shutdown panel area, to evaluate their adequacy for illuminating access and egress pathways and any equipment requiring local operation for post-fire safe shutdown. The team also reviewed preventive maintenance procedures and various documents, including the vendor manual and surveillance tests, to determine if adequate surveillance testing and periodic battery replacements were in place to ensure reliable operation of the emergency lights.
The team reviewed radio repeater location, power sources and preventive maintenance procedures to ensure fire department and operator communications could be maintained for fire fighting and post-fire safe shutdown conditions. This also included review of surveillance activities for the sound powered phone system.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
3. Programmatic Controls a. Inspection Scope During tours of the facility, the team observed the material condition of fire protection systems and equipment, the storage of permanent and transient combustible materials, and control of ignition sources. The team also reviewed the procedures that controlled hot-work activities and combustibles at the site. Additionally, the team reviewed a sample of hot-work permits and combustible control permits. These reviews were accomplished to ensure that PSEG was maintaining the fire protection systems, controlling hot-work activities, and controlling combustible materials in accordance with the UFSAR, administrative procedures and other fire protection program procedures.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
Enclosure
4. Fire Detection Systems and Equipment a. Inspection Scope The team reviewed the adequacy of the fire detection systems in the selected plant fire areas. This included a walkdown of the systems and review of the type of installed detectors as shown per location drawings. The team also reviewed licensee submittals and the NRC SERs associated with the selected fire areas. These reviews were performed to ensure that the fire detection systems for the selected fire areas were installed in accordance with the design and licensing bases of the plant. Additionally, the team reviewed fire detection surveillance procedures to determine the adequacy of the fire detection component testing and to ensure that the detection systems would function as required.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
5. Fixed Fire Suppression Systems a. Inspection Scope Carbon Dioxide and Sprinkler Systems The team reviewed the adequacy of the control equipment room mezzanine (FA CD35)
total flooding carbon dioxide (CO2) systems by performing walkdowns of the systems and the room envelope. The team also reviewed the design and installation, NFPA 12, Standard on Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing Systems, initial discharge testing and the adequacy of surveillance procedures. Completed surveillance procedures were also reviewed to ensure periodic testing of the system was being accomplished. These reviews were performed to ensure that the total flooding CO2 system met the design and licensing bases as described in the licensee submittals, NRC SERs and the UFSAR and that the system could perform their intended function in the event of a fire in this area.
The team reviewed the adequacy of the cable spreading room (FA CD16) and the control equipment room mezzanine (FA CD35) sprinkler systems by performing walkdowns of the systems. The sprinkler system in the control equipment room mezzanine provides a manual backup to the automatic total flooding CO2 system. The team also reviewed the design and installation, NFPA 13, Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems, and the adequacy of surveillance procedures. Completed surveillance procedures were also reviewed to ensure periodic testing of the systems was being accomplished. These reviews were performed to ensure that the sprinkler systems met the design and licensing bases as described in the licensee submittals, NRC SERs and the UFSAR and that the system could perform its intended function in the event of a fire in this area.
Enclosure
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
6. Manual Fire Suppression Capability b. Inspection Scope The team assisted the resident inspectors assess an unannounced fire drill held on September 14, 2004. The drill was conducted in the 1E Inverter Room (FA FC060, room number 5448). The team observed timeliness in responding to the fire drill scenario, proper donning of turnout gear, proper use of self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), use of pre-fire plans, proper use of fire fighting strategies, proper use of communications equipment and implementation of smoke removal activities to determine readiness for fire fighting. The team also observed and reviewed the fire drill critique following the drill.
Additionally, the team walked down selected standpipe systems and observed portable extinguishers to determine the material condition of the manual fire fighting equipment and verify locations as specified in the fire fighting strategies and fire protection program documents. The team reviewed electric and diesel fire pump flow and pressure tests to ensure that the pumps were meeting their design requirements. The team also reviewed the fire main loop flow tests to ensure that the flow distribution circuits were able to meet the design requirements. The team inspected the fire brigades protective ensembles, SCBA, and various fire brigade equipment to determine operational readiness for fire fighting.
The team reviewed pre-fire plans and smoke removal plans for the selected fire areas to determine if appropriate information was provided to fire department members and plant operators to identify safe shutdown equipment and instrumentation, and to facilitate suppression of a fire that could impact safe shutdown.
The team performed in-plant walk downs to evaluate the physical configuration of electrical raceway and safe shutdown components in the selected fire areas to determine whether water from an inadvertent fire suppression system pipe rupture or from manual fire suppression activities in the selected areas could cause damage that could inhibit the ability to safely shutdown the plant. This included review of a flooding analysis.
The team reviewed fire department initial training and continuing training course materials to verify appropriate training was being conducted for the station firefighting personnel.
The team reviewed the qualifications of several fire department leaders and members to ensure that they had met and maintained the requirements to be fire department leaders and members.
Enclosure
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
7. Safe Shutdown Capability a. Inspection Scope The team reviewed the fire response procedures, alarm response procedures and operating procedures for the selected fire areas to evaluate the methods and equipment used to achieve safe shutdown following a fire. The team also reviewed piping and instrumentation drawings (P&ID) for post-fire safe shutdown systems to identify required components for establishing flow paths, to identify equipment required to isolate flow diversion paths, and to verify appropriate components were properly evaluated and included in the safe shutdown equipment list. The team also reviewed selected safe shutdown components and their power/control circuits to determine whether proper isolation was provided for remote shutdown capability, in the event of a fire affecting the control room or relay room. The team performed field walkdowns to evaluate equipment protection from the effects of fires, and reviewed selected remote shutdown equipment surveillance tests to assess whether periodic testing was adequate to ensure component operability and satisfied applicable surveillance requirements.
Post-fire shutdown procedures for the selected areas were also reviewed to determine if appropriate information was provided to plant operators to identify protected equipment and instrumentation and if recovery actions specified in post-fire shutdown procedures considered manpower needs for performing required actions. The team also reviewed training lesson plans for the alternative shutdown procedures, discussed training with licensed operators, reviewed selected remote shutdown equipment tests, reviewed the adequacy of shift manning, and evaluated the accessibility of the remote shutdown panel and required manual action locations.
The specific procedures reviewed for safe shutdown from outside the control room included:
C HC.FP-EO.ZZ-0001(Z), Control Room Fire Response C HC.OP-AB.HVAC-0002(Q), Control Room Environment C HC.OP-IO.ZZ-0008(Q), Shutdown From Outside Control Room C HC.OP-SO.BC-0002(Q), Decay Heat Removal Operation The team performed a walkdown of procedures for a main control room fire, evacuation, and plant shutdown form outside the main control room. In addition, the team observed a demonstration, by licensed operators, of a transfer of plant control to the remote shutdown panel, and a simulated plant shutdown to hot standby conditions. The team primarily focused on the portion of the procedures associated with achieving stable hot shutdown conditions, within the time frames assumed in the safe shutdown thermal hydraulic analysis. The team evaluated the approximate time for critical steps, such as Enclosure
establishing makeup flow to the reactor vessel, to assess the ability of operators to maintain plant parameters within the required limits.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
8. Safe Shutdown Circuits a. Inspection Scope The team reviewed the cable routing for post-fire safe shutdown components to confirm that cables subject to fire damage in the five selected fire areas were identified and adequately addressed. The team also reviewed cable raceway drawings for a sample of components required for post-fire safe shutdown to verify that cables were routed thru the appropriate fire areas.
The team reviewed circuit breaker coordination studies to ensure equipment needed to conduct post-fire safe shutdown activities would not be impacted due to a lack of coordination. The team confirmed that coordination studies had addressed multiple faults due to fire. Additionally, the team reviewed a sample of circuit breaker maintenance and records to verify that circuit breakers for components required for post-fire safe shutdown were properly maintained in accordance with procedural requirements.
The team reviewed the electrical isolation capability of selected equipment needed for post-fire safe shutdown to ensure that such equipment could be operated locally or from the alternate shutdown panels, if needed. The team also reviewed the surveillance test procedure and test records of the fire transfer switch panel to ensure that the functionality of the switch panel had been adequately demonstrated.
Due to the issuance of Change Notice 00-020 to Inspection Procedure 71111.05, Fire Protection, the team did not review associated circuit issues during this inspection.
This change notice has suspended this review pending completion of an industry initiative in this area.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES 4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems 1. Corrective Actions for Fire Protection Deficiencies Enclosure
a. Inspection Scope On August 23, 2004, the NRCs Executive Director for Operations approved a deviation from the NRCs Action Matrix to provide a greater level of oversight for the Salem/Hope Creek station than would typically be called for by the Action Matrix. One provision of the deviation memorandum provided for the enhancement of existing reactor oversight process (ROP) baseline inspections by adjusting inspection scopes to verify effectiveness of PSEGs improvement efforts for Safety Conscience Work Environment (SCWE) and related performance attributes. In accordance with this deviation, the following additional inspection activities were performed.
C The inspection was augmented with an additional inspector to assist in the review of SCWE related issues.
C The scope of review of notifications (corrective action documents) was increased to greater than fifty items. This included review of the associated work orders when issued.
C The scope of the inspection was expanded to include review of fire protection backlog and work management activities to ensure plans were in place to correct fire protection issues.
The team reviewed the open corrective maintenance work orders for fire protection and safe shutdown equipment, selected notifications for fire protection and safe shutdown issues, the fire impairment log and recent Hope Creek Generating Station fire protection systems health reports to evaluate the identification, prioritization for resolving fire protection related deficiencies and the effectiveness of corrective actions. The team also reviewed recent Quality Assurance (QA) Audits, self-assessments of the fire protection program and notifications to determine if PSEG was identifying program deficiencies and implementing appropriate corrective actions. Long standing open fire protection issues, fire protection backlog (engineering and maintenance), backlog reduction plans, work management review and effectiveness of work control for fire protection impairments were also reviewed to determine if identified issues were being corrected, and for issues that were not immediately corrected, proper compensatory measures were appropriately implemented.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit 1. Exit Meeting Summary The team presented their preliminary inspection results to Mr. J. Carlin, Vice President Nuclear Assessment, and other members of the Hope Creek Generating Station staff at an exit meeting on October 7, 2004. The team confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.
Enclosure
A-1 ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Public Service Electric & Gas Personnel:
J. Carlin Vice President Nuclear Assessments J. Hutton Hope Creek Plant Manager J. Balcita Electrical, Safe Shutdown Engineer J. Berg Emergency Operating Procedure Co-ordinator M. Bergman Systems Engineer J. Bisti Design Engineering B. Bowen System Engineering W. Buirch Fire Department Superintendent J. Carlin Fire Brigade Supervisor T. Catalano Operations Training Instructor K. Fleischer Electrical/I&C Design Supervisor T. MacEwen Operations, Control Room Supervisor J. Nagle Licensing Compliance P. Orsm QA Engineer E. Ortalan Engineering Programs M. Patti QA Auditor C. Perino Licensing Director S. Robitzski Engineering Programs S. Savar Systems Engineer D. Shumaker Fire Protection Programs D. Shuman Fire Protection Engineer M. Tadjalli Engineering Design Manager B. Thomas Licensing Engineer K. Wolf Fire Protection Systems Engineer Nuclear Regulatory Commission Personnel:
J. Rogge, Chief, Electrical Branch, Division of Reactor Safety M. Gray, Senior Resident Inspector, Hope Creek Generation Station M. Ferdas, Resident Inspector, Hope Creek Generation Station Other J. Humphreys State of NJ, DEP BNE LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened Attachment
A-2 None Closed None Discussed None LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Fire Protection Licensing Documents Hope Creek Generating Station, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Rev. 13 UFSAR Section 7.4.1.4, "Remote Shutdown System" UFSAR Section 9A Appendix-R Criteria III.L, "Alternate and Dedicated Shutdown Capability" UFSAR Section 9A.5, "Fire Hazards Analysis - Safe Shutdown Methods" UFSAR Section 9A NRC Generic Letter 81-12, "Appendix-R Criteria III.G.2 and G.3" Safety Evaluation Report Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report 2 Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report 5 Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report 6 Hope Creek Technical Specification 3/4.3.7.3, "Remote Shutdown System Instrumentation and Control" NRC SER Section 7.4, "Systems Required for Safe Shutdown" NRC SER Supplement 2, Section 9.5.1, "Fire Protection" NRC SER Supplement 5, Section 9.5.1.4, "Alternate and Dedicated Shutdown Capability" Hope Creek License NPF-57 Condition 2.C(7), "Fire Protection" Letter Dated May 13, 1986, Fire Detection Program Technical Specification Deletion Hope Creek Generating Station Docket No. 50-354 Letter Dated April 8, 1986, High Pressure - Low Pressure Interface Hope Creek Generating Station Docket No. 50-354 Calculations/Engineering Evaluations DE-PS.ZZ-0001(Q)-A7, Safe Shutdown Analysis E-7.4(Q), Class 1E 4.16kV System, Rev. 3 E-7.7(Q), Class 1E 480 Volt System, Rev. 3 E-26, Breaker to Fuse Coordination for Appendix R, Rev. 2 GE-NE-208-02-1092, Hope Creek Engineering Report, February 1993 General Electric Fire Protection Analysis for Hope Creek GR-0022, Loss of Ventilation during a Station Blackout (RCIC & HPCI rooms)
H-1-BCXX-MEE-0323, Engineering Evaluation of Low Pressure Suction of RHR and Core Spray Piping Subject to Spurious Valve Actuation due to Design Attachment
A-3 Basis Fire and Resultant Reactor Coolant Leakage during Power Operation, Rev. 0 H-1-KC-ECS-0037, Fire Detection Computer Replacement, Rev. 0 H-C-KC-MSE-0825, Safety Evaluation: Salem Generating Station Fire Water System adequate backup fire suppression system for Hope Creek Generating Station, Rev. 0 H-C-KC-MSE-0825, 10CFR50.59 Evaluation to Determine If Salem Generating Station Fire Water System is Adequate Backup for Hope Creek, Rev. 0 H-1-KC-MDC-1262, Use of Salem Fire Pump for Hope Creek Fire Protection System, Rev. 0 H-1-KC-NDC-1709, Minimum Fuel Supply For Hope Creek Diesel Fire Pump H-1-ZZ-MEE-1013, One Hour Rated Gypsum Board Penetration Seals In Two Hour & Three Hour Fire Rated Barriers, Rev. 0 H-1-ZZ-NEE-0400, Fire Barriers That Do Not Separate Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment Do Not Require Internal Smoke Seals, March 22, 1990\
H-1-ZZ-NEE-0477, Acceptability of Conduit Configurations, without internal Fire Seals, in rooms 4301 and 4317, Rev. 0 IN 83-41, Actuation of Fire Suppression System Causing Inoperability of Safety Related Equipment, June 22, 1983 11-92(Q), Reactor Building Flooding- EL. 54' and 77', Rev. 5 19-18(Q), Max Flood Levels In Control/Diesel Generator Areas, Rev. 4 645(Q)-1-10, Check Slab for Control Building EL. 117'-6" For Fire System Deluge Water Allowable Flood Level on Floor, Rev. 0 10855-D5.12, Design, Installation, and Test Specification for Remote Shutdown Station Operability Determinations August 3, 2004, Operability Determination, CO2 System in Control Equipment Room Mezzanine Initial Discharge Testing for Halon & CO2 Initial Discharge Test for CO2 in Control Equipment Room Mezzanine, 1985 Design Change Requests/Modifications DCP-7108, CO2 Test Mezzanine Room PSE-SE-E012, Temp Mod: 10C671 Fire Protection Computer - Class A Supervised Circuitry, Rev. 0 Procedures DE-PS.ZZ-0001(Q)-A7, PG&E Programmatic Standard For Fire Protection Appendix 7, Tech. Std., Hope Creek Safe Shutdown Analysis HC.DE-PS.ZZ-0021(F)-A1, PG&E, Hope Creek Penetration Seal Program, Appendix L, Barrier Separation Criteria Review, Rev. 0 HC.FP-PM.QB-0039(Q), Appendix R Standby Self Contained 8 Hour Battery Powered Emergency Light Unit Inspection & Preventive Maintenance, Rev.
Attachment
A-4 HC.IC-CC.BB-0039(Q), Nuclear Boiler - Division 4, Channel P-7853D, Reactor Vessel Pressure - Remote Shutdown Panel, Rev. 3 HC.IC-CC.BC-0024(Q), Nuclear Boiler - Division 2, Channel F-4435, RHR Return Coolant Flow - Remote Shutdown Panel, Rev. 3 HC.IC-SC.BB-0117(Q), Nuclear Boiler - Division 2, Channel L-7854-1, Reactor Vessel Level - Remote Shutdown Panel, Rev. 6 HC.IC-SC.BJ-0009(Q), HPCI - Division 1, Channel A, LT-4805-2, HPCI Suppression Pool Level - Remote Shutdown Panel, Rev. 6 HC.MD-CM.QB-0001(Q), Removal & Rework of Eight Hour Battery Operated Emergency Florescent & Sealed Beam Lights, Rev. 2 HC.MD-CM.PG-0002(Z), Low Voltage Breaker Overhaul and Repair (AKR-75), Rev. 5 HC.MD-PM.NA-0002(Z), 7.2kV Breaker Time Response, Rev. 3 HC.MD-PM.PB-0001(Q), 4.16kV Breaker Cleaning and P.M., Rev. 19 HC.MD-PM.PB-0002(Q), 4.16kV Breaker Time Response, Rev. 6 HC.MD-ST.PB-0007(Q), 18 Month Primary Containment Penetration Conductor 4.16kV Circuit Breaker Overcurrent Protective Device Channel Calibration and Integrated System Functional Test, Rev. 7 HC.MD-ST.ZZ-0006(Q), Low Voltage Type AKR Air Circuit Breaker Inspection and Preventive Maintenance, Rev. 16 HC.MD-ST.ZZ-0011(Q), Low Voltage Molded Case Circuit Breaker Overcurrent Trip Testing, Rev. 18 HC.OP-AB.HVAC-0002(Q), Control Room Environment, Rev. 0 HC.OP-AB.ZZ-0000(Q), Reactor Scram HC.OP-AB.ZZ-0130(Q), Control Room Evacuation, Rev. 7 HC.OP-AB.ZZ-0135(Q), Station Blackout/ Loss of Offsite Power/Diesel Generator Malfunction HC.OP-AR.QK-0001(F), Fire Protection Status Panel 10C671 Alarm Summary, Rev. 15 HC.OP-AR.QK-0002(F), Fire Protection Status Panel 10C671 Alarm Responses, Rev. 11 HC.OP-SO.BB-0002, Reactor Recirculation System Operation HC.OP-IO.ZZ-0004(Q), Shutdown from Rated Power to Cold Shutdown HC.OP-IO.ZZ-0006(Q), Power Changes during Operation HC.OP-IO.ZZ-0008(Q), Shutdown from Outside Control Room, Rev. 18 HC.OP-SO.BC-0002(Q), Decay Heat Removal Operation HC.FP-EO.ZZ-0001(Z), Control Room Fire Response NC.CC-AP-ZZ-0007(Q), Speciality Interface for Engineering Changes, Rev. 4 NC.CC-AP-ZZ-0080(Q), Engineering Change Process, Rev. 10 NC.DE-PS.ZZ-0001(Q), Programmatic Standard - Fire Protection, Rev. 3 NC.FP-AP.ZZ-0001(Q), Fire Protection Organizational Duties and Staffing, Rev. 3 NC.FP-AP.ZZ-0004(Q), Actions For In-Operable Fire Protection - Hope Creek Station, Rev. 9 NC.FP-AP.ZZ-0005(Q), Fire Protection Surveillance and Periodic Test Program, Rev. 9 NC.FP-AP.ZZ-0006(Q), Tracking Inaccessible Fire Protection Equipment For Testing, Rev. 3 NC.FP-AP.ZZ-0007(Q), Processing Nuclear Fire Protection Documents, Rev. 6 NC.FP-AP.ZZ-0009(Q), Fire Protection Training Program, Rev. 3 NC.FP-AP.ZZ-0010(Q), Fire Protection Impairment Program, Rev. 9 NC.FP-AP.ZZ-0012(Q), Safe Performance of Hot Work, Rev. 0 NC.FP-AP.ZZ-0020(Q), Compensatory Measure Firewatch Program, Rev. 0 Attachment
A-5 NC.FP-AP.ZZ-0025(Q), Precautions Against Fire, Rev. 2 NC.FP-AP.ZZ-0107(Q), Conduct of Shift Turnover, Rev. 0 NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0008(Q), Configuration Control Program, Rev. 19 NC.NA-AP-ZZ-0025(Q), Operational Fire Protection Program, Rev. 6 Surveillance Procedures HC.FP-PM.QB-0039(F), Appendix R Self Contained 8 Hour Battery Powered Emergency Light Unit Inspection & Preventive Maintenance, Rev. 2, Completed March 20, 2003, & May 14, 2004 HC.FP-ST.QB-0039(F), Standby Self Contained 8 Hour Battery Powered Emergency Light Unit Test and Inspection, Rev. 4 HC.FP-ST.QB-0039(F), Standby Self Contained 8 Hour Battery Powered Emergency Light Unit Test and Inspection, Rev. 3, Completed June 10, 2002, &
December 17, 2003 HC.FP-ST.QB-0070(F), Standby Self Contained 8 Hour Battery Powered Emergency Light
- 8 Hour Functional Test, Rev. 5 HC.FP-ST.QB-0070(F), Standby Self Contained 8 Hour Battery Powered Emergency Light
- 8 Hour Functional Test, Rev. 3, Completed March 10, 2002, &
August 18, 2003 HC.FP-ST.QK-0001(Z), Operation of PB-25 "A2-A5 Re-flash Defeat", Rev. 1 HC.FP-ST.QK-0029(F), Semi-annual Class 1 Fire Detection Functional Test October 20, 2003 (Attachment 1)
April 18, 2004 (Attachment 1)
January 14, 2004 (Attachment 2)
September 23, 2003 (Attachment 3)
March 18, 2004 (Attachment 3)
January 11, 2003 (Attachment 4)
July 11, 2004 (Attachment 4)
January 14, 2004 (Attachment 5)
July 27, 2003 (Attachment 6)
January 14, 2004 (Attachment 6)
November 15, 2003 (Attachment 7)
May 1, 2004 (Attachment 7)
July 10, 2003 (Attachment 8)
January 7, 2004 (Attachment 8)
HC.FP-ST.QK-0030(F), Supervised Circuit Operability Test, Rev. 1 November 16, 2003 May 15, 2004 HC.FP.-ST.QK-0069(F), Class 1 In-duct Smoke Detector Functional Test, Rev. 4 November 22, 2003 May 11, 2004 HC.FP-ST.QK-0090 (F), Service Water Intake Structure Incipient Fire Detector System Functional Test, Rev. 1 HC.FP-ST.ZZ-0031(F), Class 1 Fire Damper Functional Test, Rev. 1 & 2, Completed February 14, 2002, & May 26, 2003 HC.FP-ST.KC-0015(F), Class 1 Water Spray Deluge System Functional Test & Inspection Attachment
A-6 January 26, 2003 February 24, 2004 HC.FP-ST.KC-0016(F), Pre-action Sprinkler System Functional Test & Inspection, Rev. 1 January 27, 2003 December 27, 2003 HC.FP-ST.KC-0017(F), Pre-action Water Spray System Functional Test & Inspection, Rev. 1 May 1, 2003 February 4, 2004 HC.FP-ST.KC-0018(F), Triennial Deluge Sprinkler Air Flow Test March 25, 2003 HC.FP-SV.KC-0019(F), Class 1 CO2 System (17-Ton) Valve Lineup, Rev. 3 June 16, 2004 July 13, 2004 HC.FP-SV.KC-0021(F), CO2 Operability and Partial Discharge Pressure, Rev. 5 August 19, 2001 February 20, 2003 HC.FP-SV.KC-0023(F), Class 1 Fire Hose Station Detailed Inspection, Rev. 1 June 22, 2003 HC.FP-SV.KC-0025(F), Class 1 Fire Hose Station Hydrostatic Test, Rev. 2 October 1, 2001 HC.FP-ST.KC-0034(F), Wet Pipe Sprinkler System 0W56 Functional Test & Inspection January 12, 2003 February 2, 2004 HC.FP-SV.KC-0048(F), Halon System Air Flow Test, Rev. 2 May 1, 2003 February 11, 2004 HC.FP-ST.KC-0061(F), Deluge System 1D28 Functional Test & Inspection, Rev. 2 September 13, 2001 August 4, 2002 HC.FP-ST.KC-0068(F), Class 1 CO2 Fire System Supervised Valve Lineup, Rev. 1 June 9, 2004 July 6, 2004 HC.FP-SV.KC-0002(F), Electric Motor Driven Fire Pump Operational Test May 11, 2004 June 8, 2004 HC.FP-SV.KC-0003(F), Class 1 Fire Water Flowpath Verification May 20, 2004 June 16, 2004 HC.FP-SV.KC-0004(F), Class 1 Fire Suppression Water System Flush June 29, 2002 September 27, 2003 HC.FP-SV.KC-0006(F), Capacity Test March 13, 2002 March 19, 2002 HC.FP-SV.KC-0008 (F), Fire Main Flow Test April 20, 2002 April 5, 2003 Attachment
A-7 HC.FP-SV.KC-0009 (F), Diesel Driven Fire Pump Operational Test July 7, 2004 July 14, 2004 HC.FP-SV.ZZ-0026(F), Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection, Rev. 4, Completed July 24, 2002, & December 8, 2003 HC.FP-SV.ZZ-0027, Fire Doors December 30, 2003 June 13, 2004 HC.FP-SV.ZZ-0028(F), Class 1 Fire Damper Visual Inspection, Rev. 1, Completed July 8, 2002, & February 24, 2004 HC.FP-SV.ZZ-0049(F), Ventilation and Bus Duct Fire Wrap Inspection, Rev. 1 Completed January 26, 2002, & July 4, 2003 HC.FP-SV.ZZ-0055(F), Structural Steel Fire Proofing Inspection, Rev. 3, Completed August 16, 2001, & December 14, 2002 HC.FP-SV.ZZ-0056(F), Fire Barrier Inspection, Rev. 3, Completed April 24, 2002, &
September 9, 2003 HC.FP-SV.ZZ-0078(F), Drywall Fire Barrier Inspection, Rev. 2, Completed January 26, 2002, & July 24, 2003 HC.OP-IS.BC-0101(Q), RHR Subsystem A Valves, Inservice Test, September 12, 2004 HC.OP-IS.BC-0102(Q), RHR Subsystem B Valves, Inservice Test, August 3, 2004 HC.OP-ST.SV-0001(Q), Remote Shutdown Monitoring Instrumentation Channel Check -
Monthly, Rev. 19, Completed August 29, 2004 HC.OP-ST.SV-0002(Q), Remote Shutdown Control Operability - 18 Months RSP Transfer with "A" Shutdown Cooling in Service, Rev. 16, Completed May 6, 2003 HC.OP-ST.SV-0003(Q), Remote Shutdown Control Operability - 18 Months RSP Transfer with "B" Shutdown Cooling in Service, Rev. 7, Completed April 18, 2003 HC.OP-ST.SV-0004(Q), Remote Shutdown Control Operability - 18 Months RSP Transfer with No Shutdown Cooling in Service, Rev. 6, Completed April 22, 2003 Quality Assurance Audits, Self-Assessments and Field Observations QA Assessment Monitoring Feedback 2002-0055, Hope Creek Fire Pump Inoperability, March 15, 2002 QA Assessment Monitoring Feedback 2002-0190, Live Fire Training, June 28, 2002 QA Assessment Report 2002-0253, Operational Fire Protection Program, September 30, 2002 QA Assessment Monitoring Feedback 2002-0281, Fire Protection System Performance Monitoring, September 19, 2002 QA Assessment Monitoring Feedback 2002-0287, Planned/Backshift Fire Drill, September 26, 2002 QA Assessment Monitoring Feedback 2003-0062, Transient Combustible Control, March 31, 2003 QA Assessment Report 2003-0062, Transient Combustibles & Live Fire Training, July 3, 2003 Attachment
A-8 QA Assessment Report 2003-0220, Fire Protection Triennial Assessment, October 6, 2003 QA Assessment Monitoring Feedback 2003-0250, Fire Protection Organization Administration and Fire Hazards, September 15, 2003 QA Assessment Monitoring Feedback 2003-0255, Unannounced Drill, September 15, 2003 QA Assessment Monitoring Feedback 2003-0360, Off-site Assistance Fire Drill, December 23, 2003 QA Assessment Monitoring Feedback 2004-0107, Records Management & Document Control, June 29, 2004 Fire Qualification Test Reports BISCO Report 748-64, Fire Test Utilizing Bisco SF-20 In Both 6" 0PVC Duct Configurations, January 15, 1982 BISCO Report 748-79, Fire Test Embedded Conduit Sleeves, May 31, 1983 BISCO Report 745-134, BISCO Product Equivalency Fire Test, May 14, 1984 BISCO Report 745-140, Fire Test of Various Pipe and Sleeve Penetration Seal Configuration, June 22, 1984 BISCO Report 748-150, Procedure Test Configuration for SE-Foam Pressure Seal, July 19, 1984 BISCO Report 748-160, Air/Steam Pressure Test Cable Tray & Mechanical Pipe BISCOSEAL at a 3' Depth, December 21, 1984 BISCO Report 748-168, Pressure Test of SE-FOAM Configuration, October 1, 1984 Specifications NIBD23, Ruskin Vendor Data Sheet for Fire Dampers 10855-M-652A(F), Installing & Testing CO2 Systems For Hope Creek, Rev. 5 10855-M-716(Q), Technical Specification for Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning Fire Dampers and Fire Doors, Seismic Category I for Hope Creek Generating Station, Rev. 13 P&IDs and Drawings A-5569-0, Aux. Bldg. Control/Diesel Interior EL. (Design Exhaust Stack Encl.), Rev. 7 A-P700-0, Aux. Bldg. Control Areas Interior Wall EL. Wall No. 327 & 326, Rev. 4 A-P712-0, Floor Penetration Seals Aux, Bldg. - Control/Diesel, EL. 177'6" A-P713-0, Floor Penetration Seals Aux. Bldg. - Control/Diesel, EL. 117'6", Rev. 4 C-0303-0, Project Civil Stds. Typical Concrete Embedment, Rev. 34 C-1329-0, Aux. Bldg. - Control Area Floor Plan, El. 117'6", Area 26, Rev. 7 C-1338-0, Aux. Bldg. - Control Area Interior Wall, EL. Wall No. 327, Rev. 15 E-0012-1(Q)-30, Single Line Meter & Relay Diagrams 120 V AC Instrumentation & MISC System, Rev. 3 E-0208-0, sheet 2&4, SSW Pump 4.16kV Circuit Breaker Control Electrical Schematic E-0209-0, sheet 2&5, SACS Loop "B" Valve & Control Electrical Schematic E-0211-0, sheet 6, SSW HV-2198B&D Electrical Schematic E-0212-0, sheet 2&3, SSW HV-2197B&D and Strainer Controls Electrical Schematic E-1451-1, Lighting & Telephone Plan Reactor Building, Rev. 21 Attachment
A-9 E-1455-1, Lighting & Telephone Plan Reactor Building, Rev. 27 E-1475-1, UHF Radio System Riser Diagram, Rev. 8 E-1475-1, Radio System Equipment Location, Rev. 3 E-6231-0, sh. 2, RHR HV-F048A Electrical Schematic E-6084-0, sh. 4-7 & 11, RCIC MOV Schematics E-9003-1, UHF Radio Communications System Antenna Rack & Repeater Cabinet, Rev. 0 E-17001-1, VHF & UHF Radio Communications Systems, Rev. 0 M-08-0(Q), Condensate and Refueling Water Storage and Transfer M-10-1(Q), Service Water M-11-1(Q), Safety Auxiliaries Cooling - Reactor Building 22-0, Fire Protection - Fire Water Reactor & Auxiliary Building, Rev. 32 M-41-1(Q), Nuclear Boiler M-42-1(Q), Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrumentation M-43-1(Q), Reactor Recirculation M-49-1(Q), Reactor Core Isolation Cooling M-50-1(Q), RCIC Pump Turbine M-51-1(Q), Residual Heat Removal M-55-1(Q), High Pressure Coolant Injection M-56-1(Q), HPCI Pump Turbine 5001, Fire Protection & Detection, EL. 54', Rev. 15 5002, Fire Protection & Detection, EL. 77', Rev. 16 5003, Fire Protection & Detection, EL. 102', Rev. 17 5004, Fire Protection & Detection, EL. 120' & 132, Rev. 16 5111, BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Fire Barriers Fire Water Pump House Floor Plan, Rev. 2 5112, Fire Area Boundaries, EL. 54', Rev. 1 5113, Fire Area Boundaries, EL. 77', Rev. 3 5114, Fire Area Boundaries, EL. 102', Rev.1 5115, Fire Area Boundaries, EL. 120' & 132', Rev. 2 24, Typical High Pressure BISCO Seal, Rev. 6 38, Cable Tray Thru Fire Barrier, Rev. 1 40, Pipe Thru Fire Barrier, Rev. 3 41, Sleeve or Conduit With Cable Thru Fire Barrier, Rev. 4 10855-N1-E41-1040-62, sheets 1-14, HPCI Elementary Diagram 10855-N1-E51-1040-59, sheets 1-17, RCIC Elementary Diagram 10855-N1-E41-C002-54, section 8, HPCI Terry Turbine Governor Control System Electrical Drawings E-0006-1(Q), Single Line Meter and Relay Diagram, 4.16 kV Class 1E Power System, Sh. 1 &
E-0012-1(Q), Single Line Meter and Relay Diagram, 120VAC Instrumentation and MISC.
Systems, Sh. 1, Rev. 12; Sh. 3, Rev. 24 E-0085-0(Q), Electrical Schematic Diagram Class 1E 4.16KV Sta Pwr Sys Swgr Diesel Gen Circuit Brkr (1)52-40207, Rev. 11 E-0208-0(Q), 4.16kV Circuit Breaker Control Station Service Water Pump, Sh. 1 Rev. 13, Sh.
2 Rev. 12, Sh. 4 Rev. 10 E-0209-0(Q), Station Service Wtr Sys SACS Loop B HX Outlet Vlvs HV-2371B & HV-2355B, Sh. 2 Rev. 7, Sh. 4 Rev. 5 Attachment
A-10 E-0211-0(Q), Station Service Water System RACS HX Cooling Outlet MOV 1-HV-2346, Sh. 2 Rev. 5, Sh. 6 Rev. 11 E-0212-0(Q), Station Service Water Sys Strainer Main Backwash Valves HV-2197B & D, Sh. 2 Rev. 14, Sh. 3 Rev. 4 E-0217-0(Q), Electrical Schematic Diagram 4.16KV Circuit Breaker Control Safety Auxiliaries Cooling Pump, Sh. 5 & 6, Rev. 5 E-0219-0(Q), Electrical Schematic Diagram RHR Pump Seal & Motor Brg Clg Wtr Sply Sol Vlv ISV-2520B, Sh. 2, Rev. 7 E-0223-0(Q), Electrical Schematic Diagram Safety Auxiliary Cooling RHR Outlet Valve HV-2512A, Sh. 1, Rev. 5 E-1000-0, Electrical Cable Description, Rev. 13 E-1406-0(Q), Raceway Notes, Symbols and Details, Rev. 3 E-1407-0, Fire Detection & Alarm System Notes, Symbols & Details, Rev. 5 E-1412-0, Electrical Numbering System, Sh. 24 - 32 Rev. 5 E-6012-0(Q), Reactor Recirculation System Discharge MOVs, Sh. 2, Rev. 7 E-6231-0(Q), Residual Heat Removal System HX Shell Side Bypass Valve 1HV-F048A, Sh. 2 Rev. 5 E-6603-0(Q), Remote Shutdown Panel Transfer Switch Contact Utilization; Sh. 1, Rev. 6; Sh. 2, Rev. 1; Sh. 3, Rev. 0; Sh. 4, Rev. 0; Sh. 5, Rev. 1 E-6604-0(Q), Remote Shutdown Panel 10C399 Scheme Dwg. Index; Sh. A, Rev. 25; Sh. 1, Rev.
11; Sh. 3, Rev. 8; Sh. 4, Rev. 9 E-6754-0(Q), Main Control Room Annunciators, Station Service Water System; Sh. 5, Rev.1 Miscellaneous Drawings 791E403AC, Elem Diag: Auto Depressurization System, Sh. 1, 5, 6 Rev. 4 791E419AC, Elem Diag: Core Spray System, Sh. 6B Rev. 3 FSK-JD-1902-1-005(Q), Rack 10C027 and MISC. Instrs, Sh. 3 - 10 E-1410-0, Panel Schedule No. 10Y408, 15KVA, Sh. 162A Rev. 11, Sh. 162B Rev. 14 E-1732-0(Q), Raceway Plan Aux. Bldg Service Area 73, Plan at EL. 87- 0", Rev. 32 E-1752-0(Q), Raceway Plan Aux. Bldg Service Area 73, Plan at EL. 102- 0", Rev. 33 E-1767-0(Q), Raceway Plan Aux. Bldg Service Area 73, Plan at EL. 124- 0" , Rev. 25 E-1777-0(Q), Raceway Plan Aux. Bldg Service Area 73, Plan at EL. 137- 0", Rev. 23 E-2064-0(Q), Cable Block Diagram, ADS Logic Inputs & Isolator Power Ch. D, Sh. 1 Rev. 1, Sh. 2 Rev. 4 E-2231-0(Q), Cable Block Diagram, Residual Heat Removal System, Hx Shell Side Bypass Valve 1HV-F048A, Sh. 2 Rev. 3 E-2234-0(Q), Cable Block Diagram, Residual Heat Removal System, RHR Shell Side Bypass Valve, Sh. 2 Rev. 2 E-2243-0(Q), Cable Block Diagram, Residual Heat Removal System MOVs with RSP, Sh. A Rev. 16 E-2443-0(Q), Cable Block Diagram, RHR Pump IBP202, Rev. 4 E-2550-0(Q), Cable Block Diagram, Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer and Standby Pumps, Rev. 2 E-2551-0(Q), Cable Block Diagram, Diesel Generator Lube Oil & Rocker Arm Prelube Pumps, Rev. 2 E-2552-0(Q), Cable Block Diagram, D/G Jacket Water Keepwarm Pumps & Jacket Wtr.
Heaters, Rev. 2 Attachment
A-11 E-2553-0(Q), Cable Block Diagram, Diesel Generator Lube Oil Htrs and Space Htrs, Rev. 2 E-2556-0(Q), Cable Block Diagram, Diesel Eng. Cont. & Ind. Local Panel DC, Sh. 1 Rev. 7, Sh. 2 Rev. 1, Sh. 3 Rev. 6 E-2558-0(Q), Cable Block Diagram, Diesel Eng. Control Panel Annunciator, Rev. 1 E-2559-0(Q), Cable Block Diagram, Diesel Eng. RTDs & TCs MISC. Instrumentation, Rev. 2 E-2560-0(Q), Cable Block Diagram, Diesel Generator Control Power Distr., Rev. 3 E-4208-0(Q), Cable Block Diagram, Station Service Water Pump, Sh. 1 Rev. 5 E-4223-0(Q), Cable Block Diagram, Safety Auxiliaries Cooling RHR Outlet Vlave 1HV-2512A, Sh. 1 Rev. 1 J-10-0(Q), Logic Diagram, Station Service Water System, Sh. 3 Rev.14, Sh. 3 Rev. 10 J-11-0(Q), Logic Diagram, Safety Auxiliaries Cooling, Sh. 15 Rev. 5 J-51-0(Q), Logic Diagram, Residual Heat Removal, Sh. 7 Rev. 8 J-0399-0(Q), Remote Shutdown Panel, Sh. 1 Rev.12, Sh. 3 Rev. 6, Sh. 4 Rev. 8, Sh. 13 Rev.
3, Sh. 14 Rev. 0, Sh. 15 Rev. 8, Sh. 16 Rev. 4 J-4030-0, Loop Diagram, Diesel Engine Auxiliary Systems, Sh. 1 Rev. 3, Sh. 2 Rev. 1, Sh.
J-4042-0, Loop Diagram, Nuclear Boiler Vessel Level to RSP, LR-7854, Sh. 5 Rev. 4 Pre-Fire Plans FRH-II-413, Hope Creek Pre-Fire Plan HPCI Pump & Turbine Room, RHR Pump & Heat Exchanger Rooms, EL.: 54'-0", Rev. 3 FRH-II-424, MCC Area, EL.: 77'-0", Rev. 3 FRH-II-433, A SACS, Heat Exchanger & Pump Room EL.: 102'-0", Rev. 3 FRH-II-522, Cable Spreading Room, EL.: 77'-0", Rev. 5 FRH-II-541, Class 1E Switchgear Rooms, EL.: 130'-0", Rev. 6 FRH-II-542, Control Equipment Mezzanine, EL.: 117'-6" & 124'-0", Rev. 7 Fire Drills, Scenarios & Critiques S2UAD0914, Room 5448 1E Inverter Room, Completed September 14, 2004 50879060, Hope Creek Turbine, Completed February 18, 2004 50881845, A Building 2nd Floor, Completed March 1, 2004 50879061, A Building 2nd Floor, Completed February 24, 2004 50879713, In Front of Salem Admin. Building, Completed February 13, 2004 Drill Required Offsite Assistance, Aux. Guard House, December 9, 2003 Fire Brigade/Operator Training & Offsite Training Fire Brigade Training Matrix, 2004 Fire Brigade Qualification Cards, 2004 Fire Brigade SCBA Qualifications, 2004 Fire Brigade Lesson Plans NOH01FIRPRO-01, Hope Creek Non-Licensed/Licensed Operator Training, November 10, 2003 Attachment
A-12 NTLP-BNFF-PTLE-C, Power Tools & Lighting, January 20, 2000 NTLP-BNFF-SAFET-C, Fire Ground Safety, February 15, 2000 NTLP-BNFF-FBEHA-C, Fire Behavior, February 15, 2000 NTLP-BNFF-BA1-C, SCBA 1: Introduction, January 6, 2000 NTLP-BNFF-BA2-C, SCBA 2: Use & Maintenance, January 6, 2000 NTLP-BNFF-FFPPE-C, Personal Protective Clothing, February 13, 2000 NTLP-BNFF-PEXT-C, Portable Extinguishers, January 20, 2000 NTLP-BNFF-FC1-C, Fire Control 1, January 17, 2000 NTLP-BNFF-FC2-C, Fire Control 2, December 29, 1999 NTLP-BNFF-HOSEB-C, Fire Hose Basics, January 20, 2000 NTLP-BNFF-AHOS-C, Advancing Hoselines, January 20, 2000 NTLP-BNFF-STRMS-C, Fire Streams, February 13, 2000 NTLP-BNFF-DETEC-C, Fire Detection, Alarms & Communication, February 20, 2000 NTLP-BNFF-SPRIN-C, Sprinkler Systems, February 20, 2000 NTLP-BNFF-SSC, Site Specific Fire Hazards, Plans and Procedures, April 26, 2000 NTLP-BNFF-NPP, Fire Fighting in Nuclear Power Plants, October 11, 2000 Fire School, Camden County Fire Academy Lesson Plan, September 8, 2004 Operator Safe Shutdown Training Lesson Plan NOHO1REMS/D-01, Remote Shutdown Systems Lesson Plan NOH01IOP008-01, Shutdown from Outside Control Room OP-IO.ZZ-008 Simulator Scenario Guide SG-198, Loss of CRIDS, Control Room Evacuation, RSP Operations Simulator Scenario Guide SG-211, Toxic Gas, RSP Operation Simulator Scenario Guide SG-169, Control Room Evacuation, RSP Operations Job Performance Measure (JPM) BC-001-06, Locally Place "A" RHR in Suppression Pool Cooling to Support Shutdown from Outside the Control Room JPM.BC-009-06, Place "B" RHR in Suppression Pool Cooling from the RSP JPM.BC-010-05, Reduce Suppression Pool Water Level via the RSP JPM.BD-008-07, Place RCIC In-Service from RSP JPM.EA-001-05, Place "B" Service Water Loop In-Service from RSP JPM.EA-002-11, Place Service Water System In-Service Locally JPM.SB-005-05, Open RPS Circuit Breakers Ignition Source Permits Fire Prevention Permits Notifications 20052127 20054649 20058975 20063764 20065540 20067242 20067543 20069001 20070537 20073321 20088259 20096445 20099948 20113292 20113307 20113292 20113307 20123707 20130100 20133814 20134028 20138931 20138890 20139145 20141451 20143283 20151370 20152245 20155497 20156035 Attachment
A-13 20156036 20156643 20156584 20156815 20159204 20162712 20166777 20167190 20167189 20168150 20169726 20169727 20170351 20170352 20170353 20175309 20175409 20175414 20184888 20184951 20192651 20199671 20199674 20199675 20203672 20203844 20203863 20203939 20203999 20204072 20204075 20205142 20205143 20205320 20205355 20205462 CR970902209 Work Orders 50043978 50044915 50044947 50078213 60040382 60041241 60041382 60046450 70013824 70015191 70016305 70017805 70018160 70019042 70019298 70024987 70028526 70029474 70030724 70030814 70031272 70033161 70033190 70040888 70040889 80028380 980824241 DCP WO 8605300205 Miscellaneous Documents Cable Routing Report for 1CD484, Normal Pwr Supply for MISC Instr AC Sys, dated September 15, 2004 Cable Routing Report for BG400, B Diesel Generator, dated September 15, 2004 Cable Routing Report for BP202, B RHR Pump Motor at RSP, dated October 01, 2004 Cable Routing Report for FIC-4158, RCIC Flow & Control at RSP, dated September 15, 2004 Cable Routing Report for H1BB-1BBLR-7854, Reactor Water Level at RSP, dated September 15, 2004 Cable Routing Report for H1BC-1BCPT-N056D & N055H, RHR Pump CP202 Disch for ADS Cables, dated September 15, 2004 Cable Routing Report for H1BC-BC-HV-F048A, RHR Hx Shell Side Bypass, dated September 15, 2004 Cable Routing Report for H1EA-1EAAT-6359A, Station Svc Water Pump AP502 Mtr, dated September 15, 2004 Cable Routing Report for H1EG-EG-HV-2512A, RHR Hx 1AE 205 Out Remote S/D Xfr Sw.,
dated September 15, 2004 Cable Routing Report for HSS4410N, Ch. Non-1E Transfer at RSP, dated September 29, 2004 Cable Routing Report for HV-F048B, RHR Hx Bypass Loop B, dated October 15, 2004 Cable Routing Report for LR-4805-2, Suppression Chamber Level at RSP, dated October 15, 2004 Cable Routing Report for SI-4280, RCIC Turbine Speed, dated September 15, 2004 DE-CB.SV-0087(Q), Table T-10A, Remote Shutdown Panel - Electrical Equipment Bus Assignments, Remote Shutdown System, Rev. 0 Fire Protection Impairment Tracking Request, September 13, 2004 Fire Protection Program Health Report - From January 1, 2004, to June 30, 2004 Fire Protection System Health Report - From January 1, 2004, to March 31, 2004 Fire Protection System Health Report - From April 1, 2004, to June 30, 2004 Attachment
A-14 Hope Creek Event Classification Guide, Rev. 45 Hope Creek EAL/RAL Technical Basis, Rev. 1 NFPA 12-1980, Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing Systems PSE-E1-Z-008, Remote Shutdown System Engineering Test Instruction Transient Combustibles In Safety Related Areas Impairment Log, June-Sept., 2004 LIST OF ACRONYMS USED BTP Branch Technical Position CFR Code of Federal Regulations CO2 Carbon Dioxide DRS Division of Reactor Safety ELU Emergency Lighting Unit EOP Emergency Operating Procedure FA Fire Area IP Inspection Procedure IPE Individual Plant Examination IPEEE Individual Plant Examination of External Events IR Inspection Report NFPA National Fire Protection Association NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission PAR Publicly Available Records P&ID Piping and Instrumentation Drawing PSEG Public Service Electric & Gas Company QA Quality Assurance RHR Residual Heat Removal ROP Reactor Oversight Process RSP Remote Shutdown Panel SACS Safety Auxiliary Cooling System SCBA Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus SCWE Safety Conscience Work Environment SDP Significance Determination Process SER Safety Evaluation Report UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Attachment