IR 05000354/2021002

Integrated Inspection Report 05000354/2021002

ML21222A121
Person / Time
Site:	Hope Creek
Issue date:	08/10/2021
From:	Brice Bickett NRC/RGN-I/DORS
To:	Carr E Public Service Enterprise Group
References
IR 2021002
Download: ML21222A121 (16)

Text

August 10, 2021

SUBJECT:

HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000354/2021002

Dear Mr. Carr:

On June 30, 2021, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Hope Creek Generating Station. On July 14, 2021, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified during this inspection.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, Digitally signed by Brice Brice A. A. Bickett Date: 2021.08.10 Bickett 12:55:47 -04'00'

Brice A. Bickett, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket No. 05000354 License No. NPF-57

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Number: 05000354 License Number: NPF-57 Report Number: 05000354/2021002 Enterprise Identifier: I-2021-002-0003 Licensee: PSEG Nuclear, LLC Facility: Hope Creek Generating Station Location: Hancock's Bridge, NJ 08038 Inspection Dates: April 01, 2021 to June 30, 2021 Inspectors: M. Hardgrove, Senior Resident Inspector J. Patel, Senior Resident Inspector D. Beacon, Resident Inspector J. Kulp, Senior Reactor Inspector S. Wilson, Senior Health Physicist L. Grimes, Project Engineer Approved By: Brice A. Bickett, Chief Reactor Project Branch 3 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Hope Creek Generating Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.

Additional Tracking Items

None.

PLANT STATUS

The Hope Creek Generating Station (Hope Creek) began the inspection period at approximately 80 percent rated thermal power (RTP) for end-of-cycle coastdown. On April 21, Hope Creek commended a shutdown for scheduled refueling outage H1R23. Hope Creek remained offline for the refueling outage until May 14, when the unit began startup and reached 100 percent RTP on May 17. On May 24, Hope Creek commenced a shutdown for a maintenance outage to replace 'A' and 'B' recirculation pump seals following indications of degraded inner pump seals and replace the 'R' safety relief valve (SRV) assembly following indications of pilot valve leakage. Following the maintenance outage, Hope Creek returned to 100 percent RTP on May 29. On June 16, the 'B' reactor feedwater pump tripped due to a blown fuse, resulting in the 'A' and 'B' recirculation intermediate runback to 70 percent RTP as expected for the given condition. Following the corrective maintenance, Hope Creek returned to 100 percent RTP later that day. On June 27, Hope Creek commenced a shutdown and maintenance outage to replace the 'A' SRV following identification of pilot leakage. Hope Creek began startup on June 29 and were in power ascension until the end of the inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), resident and regional inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time, the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week, increasing the amount of time on site as local COVID-19 conditions permitted.

As part of their onsite activities, resident inspectors conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D; observed risk significant activities; and completed on site portions of IPs. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or a portion of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) 'A' and 'C' residual heat removal system for shutdown cooling during refueling outage H1R23 on April 23

(2) Emergency core cooling systems on May 13 and 14

(3) 'A' and 'C' emergency diesel generators (EDGs) during planned D EDG maintenance window on June 21

(4) 'A' and 'C' core spray pumps prior to B and D core spray pump in-service testing on

June 23 Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) B station service water and safety and auxiliaries cooling systems on May 19

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

(1) Emergency Diesel Generator fuel oil storage tank rooms for fire area FP-HC-3511 on April 16

(2) Reactor building and control building areas for pre-outage staging and storage of transients and combustible loads for fire area FP-HC-3436 on April 14 and 19

(3) Control, Equipment, Heating ventilation and air condition (HVAC), Inverter and Battery Rooms fire area FP-HC-3561 on June 2

(4) Residual heat removal (RHR) heat exchanger room and motor control (MCC) area for fire area FP-HC-3422 on June 10

(5) Control rod drive pumps are and motor control (MCC) area for fire area FP-HC-3421 on June 24

71111.07A - Heat Sink Performance

Annual Review (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated readiness and performance of:

(1) B safety and auxiliaries cooling system heat exchangers during refueling outage H1R23 on May 13

71111.08G - Inservice Inspection Activities (BWR)

BWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample - Nondestructive Examination and Welding

Activities (IP Section 03.01)

(1) The inspectors verified that the reactor coolant system boundary, reactor vessel internals, risk-significant piping system boundaries, and containment boundary are appropriately monitored for degradation and that repairs and replacements were appropriately fabricated, examined and accepted by reviewing the following activities from April 26. 2021 to May 4, 2021:

03.01.a - Nondestructive Examination and Welding Activities.

Ultrasonic Examination of Main Steam pipe to elbow butt weld 1-AB-2DBA-075-2 (HCGS-UT-21-023)2. Manual Phased Array Ultrasonic Examination RPV1-N5SE (Overlay) Core Spray Inlet (N5B Nozzle) at 240 Degrees (RPV-N5BSE-2021-H23)3. Ultrasonic Examination of High Pressure Coolant Injection steam pipe to elbow (butt weld) 1-FD-10DBA-001-13 (HCGS-UT-21-025)4. Magnetic Particle Examination of Core Spray System Lug 1-BE-12DLA-001-8LG (1-4) (HCGS-MT-21-002)5. Magnetic Particle Examination of Main Steam Pipe to Elbow socket weld HC-1-P-BB-276-15 (60141516-0060)6. General Visual Examination of External Drywell Surfaces H1-820012 (HCGS-VE-21-002)7. General Visual Examination of External Drywell Surfaces H1-820016 (HCGS-VE-21-001)8. General Visual Examination of Accessible Portions of the Suppression Chamber Interior Surface (HCGS-VE-21-003)9. N-11 and N-12 Nozzle Inspections (30340926)10. Review of Relevant Condition Accepted by Evaluation during Previous Outage:

a. Reactor Vessel Recirculation Inlet Nozzle N2G 12 Safe end to Nozzle Weld Embedded Flaw. (70209902)11. Repair/Replacement Activity a. Replacement of 1BB-V191 & 1 BB-V192 (60141565)

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01)

(2 Samples)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the main control room during plant shutdown for a planned refueling outage on April 21, and during reactor and plant startup on May 14

(2) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the main control room during plant shutdown for a maintenance outage on May 24, and during reactor and plant startup on May 27

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:

(1) Planned inoperability of B emergency diesel generator during maintenance window on April 13

(2) Yellow risk due to reduced inventory operations following shutdown for the refueling outage H1R23 on April 23

(3) Planned inoperability of B emergency diesel generator during the impending weather conditions between April 30 and May 3

(4) Emergent work control following 'H' safety relief valve (SRV) indication of pilot leakage before returning to stable conditions on June 11

(5) Elevated risk due to 'B' residual heat removal (RHR) maintenance window for RHR pump breaker planned maintenance window on June 14

(6) Emergent repairs to the 'B' reactor feedwater pump (RFP) following 'B' RFP trip on June 16

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) B emergency diesel generator following discovery of a cracked threaded connection in the intake air header on April 27

(2) Multiple control blades with higher than normal friction observed during shutdown on May 7

(3) Evidence of moisture discovered in reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) turbine governor EG-R actuator during planned maintenance window on June 8

(4) Reactor water cleanup NUMAC leak detection monitor low out of specification on June 22

71111.18 - Plant Modifications

Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02)

(2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:

(1) Reactor auxiliary cooling system primary containment isolation valves circuit modification to mitigate the single point vulnerability during week of April 26

(2) B station service water pump discharge spool piece temporary modification to repair instrument line leak on June 4

71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing

Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (8 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:

(1) Reactor core isolation cooling steam outboard isolation valve following packing leak on April 5

(2) B emergency diesel generator following cylinder liner maintenance on May 6

(3) Main steam isolation valves (F022A, F028A, and F022C) following in-body repairs on May 14

(4) 'A' main control room chiller repair window following multiple trips and chiller lube oil pump failed on May 25

(5) 'R' Safety relief valve replacement following increased tailpipe temperature following refueling outage on May 25

(6) B station service water pump following leak repair on June 3

(7) A and B reactor recirculation pump seals following replacement on June 8

(8) 'D' emergency diesel generator relay replacement and calibrations maintenance window on June 24

71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

(1) The inspectors evaluated refueling outage H1R23 activities from April 21 to May 14

(2) The inspectors evaluated maintenance outage activities from May 24 to May 28

(3) The inspectors evaluated maintenance outage activities from June 27 to June 30

71111.22 - Surveillance Testing

The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:

Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)

(1) HC.OP-ST.KJ-0006, integrated emergency diesel generator 1BG400 test on May 13

(2) HC.RE-ST.BF-0001, control rod scram time surveillance on May 14

(3) HC.OP-ST.BF-0006, scram discharge volume vent and drain functional test on

May 19 Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) HC.OP-ST.BC-0009, residual heat removal system heat exchanger performance test on April 19

Containment Isolation Valve Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) HC.OP-LR.AB-0001(2)(3)(4), main steam isolation valves local leak rate testing (as-found) on April 24

71114.06 - Drill Evaluation

Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated:

(1) The inspectors evaluated a simulator training evolution for licensed operators, with associated emergency preparedness drill and exercise performance criteria, on June

71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Radiological Hazard Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated how the licensee identifies the magnitude and extent of radiation levels and the concentrations and quantities of radioactive materials and how the licensee assesses radiological hazards.

Instructions to Workers (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated instructions to workers including radiation work permits used to access high radiation areas.

(1) The inspectors reviewed the following:

Radiation Work Packages

• Radiation Work Permit Number 1

• Radiation Work Permit Number 8

• Radiation Work Permit Number 14 Electronic Alarming Dosimeter Alarms

• No alarms occurred during the period of this inspection period.

Labeling of Containers

• Containers stored in the North storage area and the Northwest storage area outside of the building.

• Outage tooling shipping containers stored within the RCA.

Contamination and Radioactive Material Control (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated licensee processes for monitoring and controlling contamination and radioactive material.

(1) Observed licensee surveys of potentially contaminated material leaving the RCA.

(2) Observed workers exiting the RCA at Unit 1 during the refueling outage.

Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (IP Section 03.04) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated in-plant radiological conditions during facility walkdowns and observation of radiological work activities.

(1) The inspectors also reviewed the following radiological work package for areas with airborne radioactivity:

No work packages for areas with airborne radioactivity were available for review during this inspection.

(2) Radiological air sample results and contamination surveys of the equipment pit decontamination efforts were reviewed; however, no airborne radioactivity was noted. The licensee used surface wetting and air filtering ventilation as engineering controls to limit the possibility of contamination becoming airborne during decontamination efforts.

(3) Radiological air sample results, contamination surveys, and dose rate surveys of the drywell were reviewed for the initial drywell entry after plant shutdown for the refuel outage. No airborne radioactivity was identified during the initial survey. The drywell was posted Locked High Radiation Area, Contaminated Area.

(4) Radiological air sample results, contamination surveys, and dose rate surveys of the reactor head after removal and storage were reviewed after plant shutdown for the refuel outage. No airborne radioactivity was identified during the initial survey. The area under the reactor head in storage wss posted Airborne Radioactivity Area, High Radiation Area, High Contamination Area, Notify Radiation Protection for Entry.

High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls (IP Section 03.05) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated licensee controls of the following High Radiation Areas and Very High Radiation Areas:

(1) Drywell at power and during initial personnel entry after reactor shutdown.

(2) Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger room.

(3) Highly irradiated items stored in the fuel pool.

Radiation Worker Performance and Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency (IP Section 03.06) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance as it pertains to radiation protection requirements.

71124.02 - Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls

Radiological Work Planning (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensees radiological work planning.

(1) The inspectors reviewed the following activities:

• Radiation Work Permit Number 8; ALARA Plan 24 (2)

• Radiation Work Permit Number 9; ALARA Plan 25 (3)

• Radiation Work Permit Number 10; ALARA Plan 26 (4)

• Radiation Work Permit Number 17; ALARA Plan 33

Implementation of ALARA and Radiological Work Controls (IP Section 03.03) (3 Samples)

The inspectors reviewed as low as reasonably achievable practices and radiological work controls.

(1) The inspectors reviewed the following activities:

• Initial drywell entry after shutdown; RWP 14.

(2)

• Refuel floor drywell cover disassembly (install ventilation flange covers);

RWP 8.

(3)

• Equipment pit decontamination surveys; RWP 1.

Radiation Worker Performance (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance during:

(1) The initial entry into the drywell after the plant shutdown for the refuel outage. The technician surveyed for dose, airborne radioactivity, and loose contamination. The technician also escorted safety personnel and maintenance workers to perform initial habitability sampling and repair of the personnel hatch door respectively.

71124.08 - Radioactive Solid Waste Processing & Radioactive Material Handling, Storage, &

Transportation

Radioactive Material Storage (IP Section 03.01)

The inspectors evaluated the licensees performance in controlling, labelling, and securing radioactive materials. Specifically, the inspectors made the following observations:

(1) The inspectors observed radioactive materials containers in storage out of doors and within the low-level radioactive waste building.

(2) The inspectors observed the transfer of a high integrity container of waste sludge from Unit 1 Radwaste to the low-level radioactive waste building.

Radioactive Waste System Walkdown (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)

The inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the following systems and evaluated system configuration and functionality:

(1) Solid radioactive waste systems.

(2) Radioactive liquid processing systems.

Waste Characterization and Classification (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following shipments of radioactive waste including characterization and classification the waste:

(1) Mixed bed ion exchange resin shipment number 20-078. U.S. Department of Transportation

Description:

UN3321, Radioactive material 7, low specific activity (LSA-II), RQ, Fissile excepted. Waste Class B.

(2) Dry active waste and filter shipment number 20-080. U.S. Department of Transportation

Description:

UN3321, Radioactive material 7, low specific activity (LSA-II). Waste Class A Stable.

Shipment Preparation (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)

The inspectors observed the following shipment containing radioactive material:

(1) The inspectors observed shipment number 21-069, containing radioactive material (mixed resins and powdex) on June 16, 2021. U.S. Department of Transportation

Description:

UN3321, radioactive material 7, low specific activity (LSA II). Waste

===Class A Stable.

Shipping Records (IP Section 03.05) (4 Samples)===

The inspectors evaluated the following non-excepted radioactive material shipments through a record review:

(1) Waste classification and manifest for radioactive waste shipment number 20-078. U.S. Department of Transportation

Description:

UN3321, radioactive material 7, low specific activity (LSA II), fissile excepted, RQ - radionuclides. Waste Class B.

(2) Waste classification and manifest for radioactive waste shipment number 21-069. U.S. Department of Transportation

Description:

UN3321, radioactive material 7, low specific activity (LSA II). Waste Class A Stable.

(3) Manifest and vendor supplied software records for radioactive materials shipment number 20-080. U.S. Department of Transportation

Description:

UN3321, radioactive material 7, low specific activity (LSA II). Waste Class A Stable.

(4) Manifest and vendor supplied software records for radioactive materials shipment number 21-045. U.S. Department of Transportation

Description:

UN3321, radioactive material 7, low specific activity (LSA II).

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

MS05: Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs) Sample (IP Section 02.04) ===

(1) April 1, 2020 - March 31, 2021

MS06: Emergency AC Power Systems (IP Section 02.05) (1 Sample)

(1) April 1, 2020 - March 31, 2021 BI01: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity Sample (IP Section 02.10) (1 Sample)

(1) April 1, 2020 - March 31, 2021 on June 4

BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (IP Section 02.11) (1 Sample)

(1) April 1, 2020 - March 31, 2021 on June 4

71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution

Semiannual Trend Review (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors reviewed PSEGs corrective action program for trends that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue on June

INSPECTION RESULTS

Observation: Observation: Semi-Annual Trend Review for PSEGs CAP for 71152 trends that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue The inspectors reviewed Hope Creeks corrective action program (CAP) for trends that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed Significant Level 1 through Significant Level 5 notifications (NOTF) for the time period of November 1, 2020 through May 31, 2021.

The inspectors evaluated several NOTFs generated during this time period by departments that provide input to the quarterly trend reports. The inspectors determined that, in most cases, issues were appropriately evaluated by PSEG staff for potential trends and resolved within the scope of the CAP. However, the inspectors noted a few instances where PSEG did not recognize or consider, until prompted by inspectors, that potential adverse trends existed. Examples of this are documented below:

1) Multiple issues across Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs)

• NOTF 20864137 in December 2020 for A EDG lube oil breaker tripping, with follow on NOTFs 20867358 and 20864146.

• NOTF 20867194 in December 2020 A EDG jacket water temperature low alarm.

• NOTFs 20871675 and 20871962 in March 2021 for B EDG jacket water keep warm temperature high.

• NOTFs 20871719 and 20874405 in March and April 2021 for D EDG lube oil crankcase containing high water content.

• NOTF 20876482 in May 2021 for B EDG rocker arm lube oil (RALO) containing high silicon content.

2) Main Control Room Chiller Repetitive Issues

• NOTF 20868302 in January 2021 documented the preventive strategy for the A main control room chiller based on overall performance and subject matter expert feedback.

• NOTF 20875758 on April 25, 2021 for the AK400 chiller trending higher for chilled water outlet temperature compared to the setpoint. This was a repetitive NOTF to NOTF 20869541 from February 2021.

• NOTF 20875718 on April 27, 2021 for the AK400 chiller low oil pressure trip.

• NOTF 20872994 on April 28,2 021 for AK400 chiller tripping on high oil level following restoration from low oil pressure trip. The total oil removed from the system was 4.5 gallons. There were no documented corrective actions to determine why the 4.5 gallons of oil needed to be removed following a AK400 chiller trip on low oil level prior to the trip for high oil level.

• NOTF 20876449 on May 5, 2021 for A control room vent train, AK 400 chiller, tripped twice via the failure of the 1A-P-412 A control room chiller lube oil pump motor.

• NOTF 20876471 on May 6, 2021 for the BK400 chiller tripped on low evaporator pressure shortly after being placed in service. The BK400 chiller was previously identified as being low on refrigerant following a B control room vent train trip on March 25, 2021, with refrigerant added on March 26, 2021.

The inspectors reviewed LS-AA-125-1006, Revision 8, Integrated Performance Assessment, for how Hope Creek would capture trends in CAP. Specifically, Step 4.2.3 for SAP trend coding applies at least one applicable SAP trend code from a provided code group. Additionally, Step 4.2.6 states, submit notification for potential adverse trends identified through cognitive analysis. Currently, Hope Creek is not tracking an adverse trend in CAP for equipment performance on either the EDGs or main control room chillers. The inspectors review determined there is a potential adverse trend in equipment performance for the EDGs and main control room chillers. Specifically, the NOTFS for oil content on multiple EDGs and the multiple trips of the main control room chillers represent an adverse trend in equipment performance.

Hope Creek has been tracking and trending oil samples for the EDGs and capturing the moisture content intrusion via the referenced NOTFs. Hope Creek has performed multiple equipment reliability evaluations to determine the cause and impact of the water intrusion. Additionally, Hope Creek have or will implement planned corrective actions for these respective EDG oil reservoirs during scheduled maintenance windows.

Hope Creek also evaluated lessons learned from the chiller challenges documented in the referenced NOTFs. Hope Creek has implemented additional monitoring for the oil levels and oil-bearing temperatures based on the time of the year and additional operator alarms. Additionally, Hope Creek is assessing design changes to improve chiller performance and has in place a preventive maintenance strategy focusing on the labyrinth seals to improve oil migration.

The inspectors determined PSEGs overall response to the issues were commensurate with the safety significance and included appropriate corrective actions. The inspectors determined PSEGs corrective actions were reasonable and timely to evaluate and correct the conditions. The inspectors did not identify any performance deficiencies based on the review.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

• On April 23, 2021, the inspectors presented the Radiation Protection Inspection Debrief inspection results to Edward Casulli, Vice President and other members of the licensee staff.

• On May 4, 2021, the inspectors presented the HC ISI Debrief inspection results to Mr. D. Mannai and other members of the licensee staff.

• On June 17, 2021, the inspectors presented the Radioactive Waste Processing, Control, Handling and Transportation Inspection Debrief inspection results to James Priest, Operations Director and other members of the licensee staff.

• On July 14, 2021, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Edward Casulli and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

71111.08G Miscellaneous 20210422044 Gamma Spectrum Analysis: Smear N11D #6 04/22/2021

210502013 Gamma Spectrum Analysis - N11 'D' Nozzle Rags 05/02/2021

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