ML20077M187
| ML20077M187 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 03/20/2020 |
| From: | Glenn Dentel NRC Region 1 |
| To: | Carr E Public Service Enterprise Group |
| References | |
| IR 2020010 | |
| Download: ML20077M187 (10) | |
See also: IR 05000354/2020010
Text
March 20, 2020
Mr. Eric Carr
President and Chief Nuclear Officer
P.O. Box 236
Hancock's Bridge, NJ 08038
SUBJECT: HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION - TEMPORARY INSTRUCTION
2515/194 REPORT 05000354/2020010
Dear Mr. Carr:
On March 5, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at
Hope Creek Generating Station and discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Steven
Poorman, Plant Manager and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are
documented in the enclosed report.
No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified during this inspection.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection
and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document
Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public
Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
X /RA/
Signed by: Glenn T. Dentel
Glenn T. Dentel, Chief
Engineering Branch 2
Division of Reactor Safety
Docket No. 05000354
License No. NPF-57
Enclosure:
As stated
cc w/ encl: Distribution via LISTSERV
Non-Sensitive Publicly Available
SUNSI Review
Sensitive Non-Publicly Available
OFFICE RI/DRS RI/DRP RI/DRS
NAME CHobbs per email BBickett GDentel
DATE 3/18/20 3/19/20 3/20/20
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Inspection Report
Docket Number: 05000354
License Number: NPF-57
Report Number: 05000354/2020010
Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-010-0012
Facility: Hope Creek Generating Station
Location: Hancock's Bridge, NJ 08038
Inspection Dates: March 2, 2020 to March 5, 2020
Inspectors: C. Hobbs, Reactor Inspector
J. Patel, Senior Resident Inspector
Approved By: Glenn T. Dentel, Chief
Engineering Branch 2
Division of Reactor Safety
Enclosure
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees
performance by conducting a Temporary Instruction 2515/194 at Hope Creek Generating
Station , in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is
the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors.
Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
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INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in
effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with
their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-
rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared
complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met
consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection
Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records,
observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance
with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL
2515/194 - Inspection of the Licensees Implementation of Industry Initiative Associated with the
Open Phase Condition Design Vulnerabilities in Electric Power Systems (NRC Bulletin 2012-01)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of the Nuclear Energy Institute
Voluntary Industry Initiative, (ADAMS Accession No. ML15075A454) dated March 16,
2015. This included reviewing how the licensee updated their licensing basis to reflect the need
to protect against open phase conditions.
Inspection of the Licensees Implementation of Industry Initiative Associated with the Open
Phase Condition Design Vulnerabilities in Electric Power Systems (NRC Bulletin 2012-01)
(1 Sample)
(1) Hope Creek electrical power distribution system is divided into four voltage levels:
500 kV, 13 kV, 7 kV, and 4kV. The offsite electrical power system consists of the
500 kV and 13 kV voltage levels which are contained inside the Hope Creek
switchyard, while the onsite electrical power distribution system consists of the 7 kV
system and the 4 kV system, outside of the Hope Creek switchyard. Electrical power
enters the Hope Creek switchyard at the 500 kV system which consists of a 500 kV
ring bus with two seperate offsite power transmission lines supplying power to
different sections of the 500 kV ring bus. In addition, there is a third connection which
is an inter-tie to the Salem 500 kV switchyard that is normally open. The 500 kV ring
bus supplies power to four Station Power Transformers (SPTs) which step the voltage
down to 13 kV. There are eight Station Service Transformers (SSTs) which then step
down the voltage to either 7 kV or 4 kV. Two SSTs supply two 7.2 kV buses that
supply large auxiliary loads such as motor generator sets for reactor recirculation
pumps and condensate pumps. Two SSTs supply power to four vital 4 kV buses that
supply power to Engineered Safeguard Features (ESF) 480 V loads that are
necessary for safe shutdown of the nuclear unit. The other four SSTs supply power
to various non-vital 4 kV buses. The plant electrical distribution is such that each vital
and non-vital 4 kV bus is supplied from two SSTs, so that there is a redundant power
source to each 4 kV bus in the electrical distribution system. Normal configuration is
for 500 kV SPT T1 to feed 13 kV SST 1BX501 which is the normal source of power
for 4 kV vital buses 10A402 and 10A404, and the alternate source of power for 4 kV
vital buses 10A401 and 10A403. 500 kV SPT T4 normally feeds 13 kV SST 1AX501
which is the normal source of power for 4 kV vital buses 10A401 and 10A403 and the
alternate source of power for 4 kV vital buses 10A402 and 10A404.
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In the event the normal source of offsite power is lost to the SST supplying any non-
vital 7kV or 4 kV bus, an automatic fast transfer will occur to the alternate SST power
source. In the event the normal source of offsite power is lost to either individual SST
1AX501 or 1BX501 supplying the vital 4 kV buses, an automatic fast transfer will
occur to the alternate 13 kV SST. Each 4 kV vital bus is equipped with a standby
diesel generator that is capable of automatically starting and sequencing onto its
respective 4 kV vital bus within 10 seconds. In the event both sources of offsite
power are lost to a vital 4 kV bus, its respective standby diesel generator will start and
sequence onto its respective 4 kV vital bus. For safe plant shutdown, three out the
four 4 kV vital buses are necessary. The extra fourth 4 kV vital bus is for
redundancy.
The Open Phase Protection (OPP) system utilized at Hope Creek consists of a hybrid
design with protection at both the 500 kV level and protection at the 13 kV level. At
the 500 kV level, the OPP system utilizes the Power Systems Sentinel Technologies,
LLC (PSSTech) design. This design consists of a neutral current injection method, in
which a small neutral current is injected to the primary (high) side neutral bushing.
Changes in the neutral impedance are then monitored to determine if an open phase
condition exists. This method of protection is designed to work in both high and low
transformer loading conditions. At Hope Creek Generating Station, each PSSTech
system control cabinet contains single channel protection, with one Schweitzer
Engineering Laboratories (SEL) protection relay. One PSSTech system control
cabinet is installed at each of the four 500 kV transformers (SPTs T1, T2, T3, and T4)
in the Hope Creek switchyard. The active trip capability on each control cabinet
would open the upstream 500 kV switchyard breaker supplying power to that 500 kV
SPT in the event an Open Phase Condition (OPC) was detected. The PSSTech
system was functioning in alarm only mode at the time of inspection, with the active
trip feature disabled by hand switch on the front of the control cabinet.
At the 13 kV level, OPP is provided by SEL-751 multifunction negative sequence
relays (59Q) that monitor vital 4 kV bus infeed through potential transformers. Eight
relays total, four for SST 1AX501, and four for SST 1BX501. In order to actuate the
lockout relay for one of the two SSTs, each group of four relays must have an active
trip signal on two of the 59Q relays, in a one-out-of-two-taken-twice coincidence logic.
This coincidence relay logic prevents spurious actuations of the active trip portion of
the system. Relay settings have been adjusted to account for normal system grid
imbalance. If the coincidence logic is met, the SST lockout relay will open the
upstream 13 kV breakers feeding either 1AX501 or 1BX501. At the time of the
inspection, the 59Q relays were operating in alarm function only, with the active trip
feature disabled by the opening of knife switches located next to the relays.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Detection, Alarms, General, and Protective Actions Criteria 2515/194
Based on discussion with PSEG staff, review of design and testing documentation, and
walkdowns of installed equipment, the inspectors had reasonable assurance that PSEG is
appropriately implementing, with noted exceptions discussed below, the Voluntary Industry
Initiative at Hope Creek Generating Station. The inspectors determined that:
03.01(a)(1) Open Phase Conditions are detected and alarmed in the main control room at
Hope Creek Generating Station.
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03.01(a)(2) Open Phase Condition detection circuits are sensitive enough to identify an OPC
for all credited transformer loading conditions (high and low loading). In addition, enhanced
monitoring criteria have been proceduralized for taking an OPP PSST panel out of service,
as well as for non-functional SEL-751 relays.
03.01(a)(3) Open Phase Condition design schemes minimize misoperation and spurious
operation in the range of voltage unbalance normally expected in the transmission system.
Misoperation and spurious operation have been accounted for in calculation, implemented
through protective relay settings and utilization of coincidence logic at the 13 kV level of the
system.
03.01(a)(4) No Class-1E circuits were replaced with non-Class-1E circuits during the
implementation of the OPC modification.
03.01(a)(5) The Hope Creek UFSAR was updated to discuss the design features and
protection schemes for the OPP system under UFSAR change notice 18-003.
03.01(b)(1) Hope Creek Generating Station has determined that an OPC is a credible failure
and has installed an Open Phase Protection system.
03.01(b)(2) With an OPC occurence and no accident condition signal present, an OPC will
not adversely affect the function of important-to-safety SSCs. The OPP system at Hope
Creek is designed to actuate an existing transformer lockout relay at both the 500 kV and
13 kV level if the active trip feature of the system is enabled. The trip function, if enabled,
would provide an additional input to the associated transformer lockout relays, however, the
credited plant response is unaffected and will be the same regardless of the conditions that
generated the lockout of the transformer.
No findings were identified.
Protective Actions Exceptions 2515/194
03.01(b)(3) With an OPC occurrence and an accident condition signal present, the inspectors
could not verify that automatic detection and actuation will transfer loads as required to
mitigate postulated accidents to an alternate source and ensure safety functions are
preserved. At the time of the inspection, the OPP system at Hope Creek was operating in
alarm mode only with the active trip features of the system disabled. Alarm response
procedures are in place to have operators manually separate the station from offsite power if
it is determined that an OPC exists. The OPP system was still in the 24 month monitoring
period described in the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Voluntary Industry Initiative (VII). The
monitoring period is scheduled to end in December 2020, at which time the station will decide
to enable active trip features of the system or adopt the risk informed operator manual action
methodology described in NEI technical report 19-02. This exception was documented in
NOTF 20846124.
03.01(b)(4) Periodic tests, calibrations, and setpoint verifications had not been established for
the OPP system at the time of the inspection. This exception was identified in the station self
assessment conducted prior to the start of the inspection and documented in NOTFs
20845340 and 20846125.
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EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On March 5, 2020, the inspectors presented the Temporary Instruction 2515/194 results
to Mr. Steven Poorman, Plant Manager and other members of the licensee staff.
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DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
2515/194 Calculations E-15.17 Hope Creek Open Phase Protection Analysis 0
E-15.19(Q) Hope Creek 1E Motor Operability Analysis for Unbalanced 0
Voltage
Corrective Action NOTFs
Documents 20844710,
20840066,
20840428,
20840429,
20844603,
20845002,
20845013,
20845014
Corrective Action NOTFs
Documents 20845340,
Resulting from 20846124,
Inspection 20846125
Drawings E-0001-0 (Q)-25 Hope Creek Generating Station - Single Line Diagram 25
E-0046-1-8 Hope Creek Generating Station - Schematic Meter & Relay 8
Diagram - 4.16 kV Class 1E Station Power System
Switchgears 10A401 & 10A403
E-0047-1-7 Hope Creek Generating Station - Schematic Meter & Relay 7
Diagram - 4.16 kV Class 1E Station Power System
Switchgears 10A402 & 10A404
Engineering HCN 18-003 Hope Creek UFSAR change notice for Open Phase 01/10/18
Changes Condition protection system
Engineering DCP 80119206 50.59 Review Hope Creek Unit 1 Open Phase Protection 0
Evaluations
Procedures HC.OP-AR.ZZ- Window Location E1-C4 - 500 kV System Open Phase 33
0015(Q)
HC.OP-AR.ZZ- Window Location E3-F1 - 4.16 kV System Open Phase Trip 15
0016(Q)
HC.OP-DL.ZZ- Hope Creek Control Console Log 3 - Condition 1, 2, and 3 94
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Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
0003(Q)
HC.OP-DL.ZZ- Hope Creek Auxiliary Building Log 6 30
0006-F1
HC.OP-DL.ZZ- Hope Creek Switchyard Log 7 22
0007-F1
HC.OP-SO.PB- Hope Creek 4.16 kV System Operation 29
0001(Q)
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