IR 05000317/2002012
| ML023610554 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 12/27/2002 |
| From: | David Lew Division of Reactor Safety I |
| To: | Katz P Constellation Energy Group |
| References | |
| IR-02-012 | |
| Download: ML023610554 (19) | |
Text
ber 27, 2002
SUBJECT:
CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-317/02-12, 50-318/02-12
Dear Mr. Katz:
On November 22, 2002, the NRC completed an inspection at your Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 & 2. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on November 22 with you and other members of your staff.
This inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to the identification and resolution of problems, and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations, and with the conditions of your license. Within these areas, the inspection involved examination of selected procedures and representative records, observation of activities, and interviews with personnel.
On the basis of the sample selected for review, the team concluded that in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated and corrected. Notwithstanding, the team identified a Green finding concerning ineffective corrective actions in response to weld deficiencies in the support systems for the reactor coolant pumps.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
David C. Lew, Chief Performance Evaluation Branch Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos: 50-317, 50-318
Peter License Nos: DPR-53, DPR-69
Enclosures:
Inspection Report 50-317/02-012 and 50-318/02-012 Attachment 1 - Supplementary Information
REGION I==
Docket Nos: 50-317, 50-318 License Nos: DPR-53, DPR-69 Report Nos: 50-317/02-012, 50-318/02-012 Licensee: Constellation Generation Group Facility: Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 Location: 1650 Calvert Cliffs Parkway Lusby, MD 20657-4702 Dates: November 4 - 8, 2002 November 18 - 22, 2002 Inspectors: Joseph Schoppy, Senior Resident Inspector (Team Leader)
Rick Bennett, NRC Contractor Mel Gray, Senior Reactor Inspector Paulette Torres, Reactor Engineer Approved by: David C. Lew, Chief Performance Evaluation Branch Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IR 05000317-02-012, 05000318-02-012; on 11/04 - 22/2002; Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2; biennial baseline inspection of the identification and resolution of problems.
A finding was identified in the area of Effectiveness of Corrective Actions.
This inspection was conducted by two regional inspectors, a senior resident inspector, and an NRC contractor. One Green finding of very low safety significance was identified during the inspection. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review.
The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.
Identification and Resolution of Problems Based on the sample selected for review, the team concluded that the implementation of the Constellation Energy Group (CEG) corrective action program was adequate. In general, personnel identified problems and entered them into the corrective action program at an appropriate threshold. However, the team identified several minor valve packing and pump seal leaks within the Unit 1 and Unit 2 emergency core cooling system (ECCS) pump rooms that were not identified and captured in CEGs corrective action program.
CEG generally prioritized and completed evaluations in a timely fashion and evaluated problems in adequate detail commensurate with the safety significance. The evaluations reasonably identified the causes of the problem, the extent of the condition, and provided for corrective actions to address the causes. The evaluations of equipment problems generally included operability assessments of sufficient depth to conclude that equipment remained capable of performing its safety functions. CEG also assessed reportability requirements appropriately.
CEG corrective actions and improvement initiatives were generally effective in improving equipment reliability and human performance. However, inadequate corrective action follow through for a Unit 2 reactor coolant pump (RCP) support system weld deficiency contributed to a Unit 1 reactor trip. The team also noted that CEG was not fully effective in resolving some recurrent equipment deficiencies. CEGs self-assessments and corrective action program audits identified similar findings.
Cornerstone: Initiating Events
Green. CEG did not adequately complete identified corrective actions in response to a weld deficiency in the component cooling water (CCW) line to a Unit 2 reactor coolant pump (RCP) in October 2001. The incomplete corrective actions, due to missed inspections of some welds in the RCP support systems, contributed to a failed weld in a lube oil line to a RCP and a Unit 1 reactor trip in July 2002.
ii
This performance deficiency, although identified by CEG, was self-revealed through a plant trip. While no violation of NRC requirements was identified relative to the nonsafety-related RCP support systems, the issue was more than minor since it resulted in a reactor trip. The finding was of very low safety significance because it did not increase the likelihood of a loss of coolant accident, mitigating equipment unavailability, a fire, or a flooding condition.
(Section 4OA2.c)
iii
Report Details 4. OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems a. Effectiveness of Problem Identification (1) Inspection Scope The team reviewed the procedures describing CEGs corrective action process and determined that CEG identified problems primarily through the initiation of issue reports (IRs). The team also noted that CEGs process required the initiation of maintenance orders (MOs) for IRs associated with equipment deficiencies. Team members attended the daily IR Review Group (IRRG) meetings, where IRs were reviewed for screening and assignment, to better understand CEGs threshold for identifying and entering problems into their corrective action process. Team members also attended management meetings, maintenance Plan of the Day meetings, and a Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) meeting to assess managements role in CEGs corrective action process.
The team selected a sample of IRs for review to determine whether CEG was identifying, accurately characterizing, and entering problems into the corrective action process at an appropriate threshold. The IRs selected covered the period from the last NRC problem identification inspection in May 2001 to the present. The team selected the IRs to cover the seven cornerstones of safety identified in the NRC Reactor Oversight Process (ROP). In addition, the team considered risk insights from CEGs Individual Plant Examination (IPE) reports and probabilistic risk assessment to help focus the IR sample and system walkdowns on risk significant plant equipment.
Attachment 1 lists the IRs selected for review.
The team also interviewed selected plant staff to understand whether other processes were used to address problems. The team conducted a walkdown of control room panels and selected plant equipment and observed portions of several surveillances to independently assess whether problems were being adequately addressed.
Additionally, the team toured the Central Alarm Station and the Secondary Alarm Station, interviewed guards, and walked down the protected area perimeter to assess securitys identification of problems.
The team selected items from CEGs maintenance, operations, engineering, and oversight processes to verify that CEG appropriately considered problems identified in these processes for entry into the corrective action program. Specifically, the team reviewed a sample of engineering service packages (ESPs), operator log entries, control room deficiency and workaround lists, maintenance orders, operability determinations, engineering system health reports, Gold Cards (observations below the IR threshold), procurement related deficiencies, completed surveillances, installed temporary modification packages, quality assessment reports, and departmental self-assessments. The team reviewed issues identified in these documents (see Attachment 1) to ensure underlying problems associated with each issue were appropriately considered for identification and resolution via the corrective action process.
(2) Findings Based on the sample reviewed, the team concluded that CEG set an acceptable threshold for identifying problems and entering them into their corrective action process.
The IRs reviewed adequately described and characterized problems, and generally identified prior similar occurrences. In addition, the team concluded that personnel initiated corrective action IRs for problems identified in other CEG processes that met the IR threshold.
Based on control room and safety-related equipment walkdowns, the team determined that CEG generally recognized problems, initiated IRs, and labeled deficient components. The team noted that CEG had identified approximately 14 minor valve packing and pump seal leaks within the Unit 1 and Unit 2 ECCS pump rooms. However, the team identified 14 additional minor leaks (based on boric acid residue) within the ECCS pump rooms that were not identified and captured in CEGs corrective action program. In response to the teams observation, CEG initiated IRs and maintenance orders for these deficiencies. A subsequent CEG NDE inspector walkdown and exam determined that the leaks were not active and did not affect any carbon steel parts on the components or the adjacent structures, systems, and components (SSCs). The team concluded that these minor leaks did not render any equipment inoperable.
b. Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues (1) Inspection Scope The team reviewed the IRs listed in Attachment 1 to determine whether CEG adequately evaluated and prioritized problems. The review included the appropriateness of the assigned significance, the timeliness of resolutions, and the scope and depth of the root cause analyses (or causal analyses). The IRs reviewed encompassed the full range of CEG evaluations, including root and apparent cause evaluations. The team selected the IRs to cover the seven cornerstones of safety identified in the NRC ROP. The team also considered risk insights from CEGs IPE reports and probabilistic risk assessment to help focus the IR sample. Additionally, the team attended the IRRG meetings to observe the review process and to understand the basis for assigned significance levels (Category I, II, or III).
The team also selected a sample of IRs associated with previous NRC non-cited violations (NCV) to determine whether CEG evaluated and resolved problems associated with compliance to applicable regulatory requirements. The team reviewed CEGs evaluation of industry operating experience (OE) information for applicability to their facility. The team also reviewed the CEGs assessment of equipment operability, reportability requirements, and the potential extent of the problem. The team further reviewed equipment performance results and assessments recorded in completed surveillance procedures, operator log entries, and system engineer trending data to determine whether CEGs evaluation of equipment performance was technically adequate to identify degrading or non-conforming equipment.
(2) Findings
The team concluded that CEG generally prioritized and completed evaluations in a timely manner and evaluated problems in adequate detail commensurate with the safety significance. The evaluations reasonably identified the causes of the problem, the extent of the condition, and provided for corrective actions to address these causes.
The evaluations of equipment problems generally included operability assessments of sufficient depth to conclude that equipment remained capable of performing its safety functions. CEG also assessed reportability requirements appropriately.
The team identified some minor instances where documentation was informal or lacking for equipment evaluations.
- The team reviewed IR3-082-665 which documented that dowel pins, credited in the seismic qualification of all four turbine driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW)
pumps, were missing. In May 2002, CEG engineering performed an informal calculation to show that the holddown bolts would assure seismic qualification.
Based on concerns for adversely impacting AFW pump operability, CEG decided not to physically verify the holddown bolt torque. However, the team noted that engineering did not document their engineering judgment in this regard within their corrective action process. In addition, engineering did not perform a follow-up operability determination to validate their initial informal calculation. As a result of inspector questions, engineering completed ES200200855 on November 21 to formalize their previous calculation. The team reviewed the informal and formal calculations and determined that they accurately calculated the required holddown bolt torque to maintain seismic qualification. While these calculations proved to be accurate and the seismic qualification and operability thus maintained, the team noted that CEG did not demonstrate engineering rigor commensurate with the potential safety significance of the issue.
- The team reviewed IR3-083-183 associated with high pressure safety injection suction piping that was subjected to pressure greater than the design pressure during a quarterly check valve surveillance. The team identified that while the initial and follow-up operability determinations in IR3-083-183 provided a technical basis for operability, CEG did not complete walkdowns for gasket leaks as recommended in the evaluation. However, the team determined that CEG had not identified any active leaks in this piping during subsequent testing. In addition, team members conducted walkdowns of this piping and did not identify any leaks from piping joints. CEG completed the cause evaluation of this problem in a lower level (CAT III) issue report (IR3-076-822) which did not require formal documentation, even though this condition had occurred previously in 1997. However, the team concluded that the corrective action to revise the surveillance procedure to provide more continuous venting appeared to be effective based on subsequent surveillance performance.
- The team noted an instance where CEG did not properly prioritize and evaluate a degraded condition. During a Unit 1 ECCS pump room walkdown, the team identified that CEG had not repaired a leaking plug on a shutdown cooling isolation motor operated valve (1-MOV-658) bonnet that they had identified on January 10, 1997. The associated maintenance order (MO 1199700129) had been scheduled to be worked on several occasions since 1997 but was deferred.
The team was concerned with the potential for boric acid corrosion to occur undetected due to insulation surrounding the valve. Once highlighted by the team on November 8, CEG took action to remove the insulation that potentially masked boric acid corrosion, and to inspect and evaluate the valve. An NDE inspector determined that the valve had an active leak but found no valve wastage of the valves carbon steel components, only light surface rust. CEG planned to repair the valve during the next refueling outage.
c. Effectiveness of Corrective Actions (1) Inspection Scope The team reviewed CEGs corrective actions associated with selected IRs from Attachment 1 to determine whether the actions addressed the identified causes of the problems. The team also reviewed CEGs timeliness in implementing corrective actions and their effectiveness in preventing recurrence of significant conditions adverse to quality. Furthermore, the team assessed the backlog of corrective actions to determine if any, individually or collectively, represented an increased risk due to the delay in implementation.
(2) Findings CEG corrective actions and improvement initiatives were generally effective in improving equipment reliability and human performance. However, inadequate corrective action follow through for a Unit 2 RCP support system weld deficiency contributed to a Unit 1 reactor trip. The team determined that CEG was not fully effective in resolving several recurrent equipment deficiencies, such as emergency preparedness sirens; switchgear room HVAC; and RCP oil level transmitters. These issues were either previously reviewed or documented by the NRC. The team also noted that CEGs self-assessments and corrective action program audits identified similar findings and that increased management attention had been directed to address these shortcomings.
Reactor Coolant Pump Piping Weld Deficiency CEG identified that they did not adequately complete all identified corrective actions in response to an October 2001 Unit 2 RCP CCW weld issue. The failure to complete all corrective actions contributed to a Unit 1 reactor trip in July 2002.
The team reviewed IR3-081-324 regarding a failed RCP CCW pipe weld that resulted in a forced shutdown of Unit 2 in October 2001. CEG personnel evaluated the weld failure on the non-safety related, non-ASME B&PV code, CCW pipe that provides cooling water to the 22A RCP motor upper bearing, and concluded that the weld failed after approximately 20 years of service due to stress fatigue, with a contributing cause being the design did not provide for a full penetration weld. The original equipment manufacturer supplied the piping as part of the skid mounted equipment. This non-safety related and non-ASME code piping did not require a non-destructive examination (NDE) during construction. CEG personnel identified similar welds in CCW and bearing oil piping on each Unit 1 and 2 RCP motor skid that may have been subject to the same failure mode, and initiated corrective actions to inspect and repair the welds as necessary, during the next refueling outage. Personnel also considered whether vendor supplied piping welds on other non-safety, operationally critical balance of plant equipment were susceptible. CEG completed these actions for Unit 1 during a refueling outage in February 2002. However, one bearing oil pipe weld on each RCP motor was not identified to be inspected. Subsequently, on July 24, 2002, this weld on the Unit 1 11A RCP failed, and resulted in operators manually tripping the reactor after observing decreasing bearing oil level and an increase in the 11A RCP thrust bearing temperature.
CEG reported this event to the NRC in License Event Report (LER) 317/2002-003-00.
CEG personnel evaluated this condition in detail in IR3-061-964 and concluded that the Unit 1 RCP motor weld failure was physically similar to the previous Unit 2 RCP weld failure. However, engineering had not inspected this failed weld during the previous refueling outage because the personnel who reviewed the vendor drawings in preparing the weld inspection plan did not identify this weld location. CEG concluded this human error occurred due to lack of a systematic method for identifying all susceptible RCP motor welds. Corrective actions included ensuring these missed welds will be inspected on all RCPs during the next refueling outage for both units. Human performance causal factors were addressed in detail by developing formal event free tools for engineering personnel, similar to tools used by operations and maintenance personnel, and training personnel in their use. In addition, CEG implemented corrective actions to have supervisors observe and reinforce the use of these tools weekly during normal engineering activities. CEG personnel continued to evaluate the reliability of the non-safety related RCP bearing oil level indicating system via IR4-002-077.
The inspector determined that CEGs failure to adequately complete all identified corrective actions represented a performance deficiency in that CEG did not meet the standard of ensuring reliable equipment and safe plant operation. Given their identification of the weld issue in October 2001, this issue was reasonably within CEGs ability to foresee and correct and should have been prevented. Although CEG identified this issue, it manifested itself through a self-revealing event. This issue affected the initiating events cornerstone due to the manual reactor trip. Consistent with example 4.b of IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, this finding was considered more than minor, because the missed weld inspection resulted in the need for a manual reactor trip. Phase 1 of the At-Power Reactor Safety SDP screened this finding to Green (very low safety significance)
because it did not increase the likelihood of a LOCA, mitigating equipment unavailability, a fire, or a flooding condition. The inspectors determined that there were no associated
NRC violations as the failed pipe welds were not safety related or subject to ASME code requirements. (FIN 50-317; 50-318/02-012-01)
d. Assessment of Safety Conscious Work Environment (1) Inspection Scope Team members interviewed plant staff, observed various activities throughout the plant, and attended a cross section of meetings to determine if conditions existed that would result in personnel being hesitant to raise safety concerns to their management and/or the NRC.
(2) Findings No findings of significance were identified.
4OA3 Event Follow-up (Closed) LER 317/2002-003: Reactor Trip Due to Loss of Reactor Pump Motor Oil.
This LER discussed the failure of a butt weld on the 11A RCP motor oil cooler line that resulted in a Unit 1 manual trip on July 24, 2002. The inspectors documented this issue in Section 4OA2.c of this report and determined that this LER was complete and accurate.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit The team presented the inspection results to Mr. and other members of CEG management on November 22, 2002. CEG management acknowledged the results presented. No proprietary information was identified during the inspection.
ATTACHMENT 1 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Partial List of Persons Contacted (Alphabetically)
R. Cameron, Component Engineer J. Carroll, POSRC Chairman and Plant General Managers Assistant A. Drake, Design Engineer P. Fatka, System Engineer M. Gahan, CEG - Supervisor, Issues Assessment G. Gwiazdowski, CEG - Director, Nuclear Security/Emergency Planning M. Hunter, System Manager, Auxiliary Feed Water System P. Katz, CEG - Site Vice President K. Neitmann, CEG - Plant General Manager R. Szoch, CEG - General Supervisor, Plant Engineering LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Closed 50-317/2002-003-00 LER Reactor Trip Due to Loss of Reactor Pump Motor Oil. (Section 4OA3)
Opened and Closed 50-317; 50-318/02-012-01 FIN Failure to take adequate corrective actions for poor quality welds on reactor coolant pump support systems. (Section 4OA2.c)
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Procedures C OC Diesel Generator (OI - 21C)
C HPSI and LPSI PP CKV Closure Test (STP-O-65-2)
C Control of Maintenance Activities (MN-1-101)
C Integrated Work Planning (MN-1-123)
C Managing System Performance (MN-1-112)
C Conduct of the Corrective Action Review Board (QL-2-105)
C Causal Analysis (QL-2-101)
C Functional Evaluation/Operability Determination (NO-1-106)
C Self Assessment/Corrective Action Program (QL-2)
C Issue Reporting and Assessment (QL-2-100)
C Safety Injection and Containment Spray (OI-3A)
C Westinghouse DS-416 Circuit Breaker and Cubicle Inspection (FTE-52)
C Individual Plant Examination Summary Report, dated December 1993 C Individual Plant Examination of External Events Summary Report, dated August 1997 C Calvert Cliffs Probabilistic Risk Assessment Appendix 1 Internal Events Results, dated 10/11/01 Audits and Self-Assessments C SA 200100354, Corrective Action Review Board Performance Assessment C SA 200100268, Self-Assessment of Site Self-Assessment Program C SA 200100270, Self-Assessment on the IR Process C SA 200000197, Self-Assessment of Self Assessment of the IR Closure Process C SA 200100242, Calvert Cliffs Operating Experience Program C SA 200100192, Self Assessment of Effectiveness Reviews C SA 200100336, SA Trending Self-Assessment C SA 200100335, Maintenance Issue Resolution Critiques Self-Assessment C SA 200000303 C SA 200100036 C SA 200100334 C SA 200100302 C SA 200200179 C Nuclear Performance Assessment Department 2001-01 Audit Report August 30, 2001 C Nuclear Performance Assessment Department 2001-02 Audit Report February 7, 2002 C Quality and Performance Assessment 2002-01 Audit Report of the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant February 1, 2002 - July 31, 2002 CARB, OSSRC, and POSRC Meeting Minutes C Corrective Action Review Board Meeting Minutes, dated 10/17/02, 10/3/02, 9/26/02, 9/12/02, 8/29/02, 8/22/02, 8/1/02, 7/11/02, 6/20/02, 6/20/02, 2/28/02 C Off-Site Safety Review Committee Meeting Nos. 01-03, 02-03, 02-04 C Plant Operations and Safety Review Committee Meeting Nos.02-054 through 02-073 Non-Cited Violations NCV 01-12-03 (IR3-080-027)
NCV 01-12-04 (IR3-014-145)
NCV 01-03-01 (IR3 041-440)
NCV 01-09-03 (IR3-041-445)
NCV 01-09-01 (IR3-059-095)
NCV 01-12-05 (IR3-072-016)
NCV 01-12-06 (IR3-059-464)
NCV 01-14-01 (IR3-072-901)
Issue Reports IR1-040-744 IR3-050-066 IR3-062-370 IR3-077-340 IR3-000-855 IR3-050-196 IR3-063-429 IR3-077-405 IR3-003-580 IR3-050-408 IR3-063-440 IR3-077-457 IR3-003-747 IR3-050-446 IR3-063-684 IR3-077-718 IR3-003-880 IR3-050-784 IR3-064-227 IR3-077-722 IR3-004-594 IR3-050-789 IR3-064-402 IR3-077-727 IR3-007-892 IR3-050-794 IR3-064-801 IR3-077-783 IR3-007-976 IR3-050-799 IR3-065-117 IR3-077-932 IR3-013-067 IR3-050-810 IR3-065-680 IR3-078-203 IR3-014-116 IR3-050-812 IR3-070-122 IR3-078-581 IR3-014-145 IR3-050-814 IR3-070-145 IR3-078-611 IR3-020-174 IR3-051-040 IR3-070-168 IR3-078-641 IR3-026-939 IR3-052-133 IR3-070-458 IR3-078-828 IR3-028-372 IR3-052-135 IR3-070-471 IR3-079-555 IR3-030-793 IR3-052-140 IR3-070-498 IR3-079-556 IR3-030-796 IR3-052-198 IR3-070-813 IR3-079-681 IR3-031-104 IR3-052-199 IR3-071-250 IR3-080-025 IR3-032-391 IR3-052-671 IR3-071-967 IR3-080-027 IR3-033-953 IR3-052-672 IR3-072-016 IR3-080-051 IR3-034-319 IR3-052-673 IR3-072-400 IR3-080-056 IR3-034-364 IR3-053-297 IR3-072-406 IR3-080-066 IR3-036-022 IR3-053-887 IR3-072-832 IR3-080-290 IR3-037-763 IR3-054-080 IR3-072-901 IR3-080-676 IR3-038-621 IR3-054-354 IR3-073-028 IR3-081-145 IR3-040-727 IR3-054-449 IR3-073-329 IR3-081-258 IR3-041-393 IR3-055-324 IR3-074-192 IR3-081-268 IR3-041-407 IR3-056-268 IR3-074-412 IR3-081-280 IR3-041-440 IR3-058-444 IR3-075-061 IR3-081-324 IR3-041-441 IR3-058-933 IR3-075-135 IR3-081-424 IR3-041-480 IR3-059-099 IR3-075-552 IR3-081-461 IR3-041-483 IR3-059-444 IR3-075-581 IR3-081-587 IR3-043-204 IR3-059-464 IR3-075-589 IR3-081-883 IR3-043-206 IR3-059-915 IR3-075-648 IR3-081-940 IR3-044-693 IR3-060-614 IR3-075-703 IR3-081-975 IR3-044-992 IR3-060-666 IR3-075-796 IR3-081-986 IR3-044-995 IR3-061-275 IR3-076-253 IR3-081-993 IR3-045-346 IR3-061-502 IR3-076-365 IR3-082-109 IR3-045-473 IR3-061-720 IR3-076-820 IR3-082-111 IR3-045-656 IR3-061-808 IR3-076-821 IR3-082-112 IR3-045-663 IR3-061-907 IR3-076-822 IR3-082-403 IR3-045-757 IR3-061-964 IR3-077-073 IR3-082-409 IR3-045-904 IR3-062-037 IR3-077-124 IR3-082-550 IR3-045-939 IR3-062-117 IR3-077-137 IR3-082-577 IR3-046-008 IR3-062-136 IR3-077-176 IR3-082-617 IR3-048-102 IR3-062-151 IR3-077-300 IR3-082-665 IR3-048-794 IR3-062-362 IR3-077-328 IR3-082-866 IR3-049-773 IR3-062-364 IR3-077-337 IR3-082-880
IR3-082-883 IR3-084-640 IR4-001-511 IR4-004-652 IR3-083-183 IR3-084-710 IR4-002-077 IR4-007-933 IR3-083-252 IR3-084-717 IR4-002-654 IR4-007-976 IR3-083-871 IR3-479-858 IR4-003-259 IR4-009-229 IR3-083-986 IR4-000-351 IR4-003-261 IR4-013-976 IR3-084-007 IR4-000-995 IR4-003-576 IR5-023-257 IR3-084-178 IR4-001-405 IR4-003-880 Maintenance Orders:
M0 2200102726 MO 1199704283 MO 2200102078 MO 2200103699 MO 1200200885 MO 2199705185 MO 2200104075 MO 1200104573 MO 1199800447 MO 2199705186 MO 1200202684 MO 2200103862 MO 2200103281 MO 1200100920 MO 1200200921 MO 1200201687 MO 1200001176 MO 1200200280 MO 1200100970 MO 1200101147 MO 2200003056 MO 1199704283 MO 1199601834 MO 2199904745 MO 1199700129 MO 2700203709 MO 2199904668 MO 2200102726 MO 2199703890 Engineering Service Packages:
ES 199601674 ES 199701808 ES 200100767 ES 200200488 ES 199602220 ES 199800981 ES 200200015 ES 200200574 ES 199602294 ES 199801528 ES 200200115 ES 200200591 ES 199602324 ES 199900948 ES 200200212 ES 200200855 ES 199700894 ES 200000948 ES 200200438 ES 199701368 ES 200100626 Operating Experience Related Action Items:
AIT IR199701521 AIT IR200100481 AIT IR200100548 AIT IR200100889 AIT IR200100890 AIT IR200203030 Procurement Related Deficiencies 01-RHO-93 01-RHO-167 02-RHO-5 02-RHO-32 02-RHO-78 02-RHO-132 02-RHO-147
Surveillance Tests C Test of 2B DG and 4 KV Bus 24 LOCI Sequencer (STP O-8B-2), dated 5/6/02 &
10/21/02 C Test of 2A DG and 4 KV Bus 21 LOCI Sequencer (STP O-8A-2), dated 5/20/02 &
11/4/02 C Test of 1B DG and 14 4 4KV Bus LOCI Sequencer (STP O-8B-1), dated 5/24/02 &
10/13/02 C Test of 1A DG and 11 4 KV Bus LOCI Sequencer (STP O-8A-1), dated 6/2/02 &
10/28/02 Miscellaneous C Shift Turnover Information Sheet, dated 11/6/02 C Operations Performance Evaluation Requirements for a timed emerging start and load of the SBO diesel generator on 12/12/01 and a slow start on 10/23/02 C Steam Generator Blowdown (Functional Evaluation 01-015)
C 12 Charging Pump Degraded Discharge Check Valve (Functional Evaluation 02-011)
C Unit 1 and Unit 2 Containments - Vertical Tendons (Functional Evaluation 99-011)
C Unit 2 Spent Fuel Racks (Functional Evaluation 01-018)
C Calvert Cliffs Site Operational Initiative (Non-equipment Site-wide Issues), dated 08/02 C Top Ten Equipment Issues, dated 08/02 C Procurement Deficiency (RH0) Screening from 5/28/01 - 10/28/01 C All Gold Cards initiated 7/1/02 - 9/30/02 C (a)(1) Evaluation, Corrective Action, and Goal Setting Plan for 2A EDG, dated 3/19/02 C 2B EDG Maintenance/ST History 4/96 - 9/02 C Leaders Role in Human Performance: Recognition and Prevention Training Plan September 2002 C Calvert Cliffs 1 3Q/2002 Performance Summary C Calvert Cliffs 2 3Q/2002 Performance Summary C Maintenance Rule System Unavailability Hours October 2002 C Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Maintenance Rule Indicator - (a)(1) SSCs C CCNPP Work Management Performance Measures C Safety Injection System Health Report May 2002 - August 2002 C Service Water System Health Report 3rd Quarter 2002 C Salt Water System Health Report 3rd Quarter 2002 C Auxiliary Feedwater System Health Report 3rd Quarter 2002 C Diesel Generators System Health Report 3rd Quarter 2002 C Leaders Role in Human Performance For the Supervisor Training Program at the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant (Training Lesson Plan)
C Calvert Cliffs Plant Engineering Human Performance Improvement Plan C Temporary Modification No. 1-02-0042 C Flood Height Resulting from a Pipe Break in the Intake Structure (Calculation M-90-192, Revision 0, September 1991)
C Equipment Reliability Improvement Project (ERIP) Plan Operating Experience
C Emergency Diesel Generator Failure Resulting from Inadequate Performance Monitoring and Inadequate Response to Symptoms of Impending Failure (SER 2-01),
dated 3/13/01 C Recurring Event, Emergency Diesel Generator Catastrophic Failure (SEN 140), dated 10/16/96 LIST OF ACRONYMS USED AFW Auxiliary Feedwater ASME B&PV American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel CARB Corrective Action Review Board Cat Category (i.e., level of significance for Irs)
CCW Component Cooling Water CEG Constellation Energy Group CFR Code of Federal Regulations ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System ESP Engineering Service Package HVAC Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning IAU Issue Assessment Unit (i.e., corrective action department)
IMC Inspection Manual Chapter IPE Individual Plant Examination IR Issue Report (i.e., deficiency document)
IRRG Issue Report Review Group LER Licensee Event Report LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident MO Maintenance Order NCV Non-Cited Violation NDE Non-Destructive Examination NPAD Nuclear Performance Assessment Department (i.e., quality assurance)
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission OE Operating experience OSSRC Off-Site Safety Review Committee PI&R Problem Identification and Resolution POSRC Plant Operations and Safety Review Committee QPA Quality and Performance Assessment RCA Root Cause Analysis RCP Reactor Coolant Pump RHO Receiving Hold Order ROP Reactor Oversight Process SDP Significance Determination Process SSCs Structures, Systems, and Components