IR 05000313/1993099
| ML20057A564 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 09/08/1993 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20057A560 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-313-93-99, 50-368-93-99, NUDOCS 9309140406 | |
| Download: ML20057A564 (18) | |
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INITIAL SALP REPORT
i U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
REGION IV
SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE
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INSPECTION REPORT ,
50-313/93-99;50-368/93-99 ;
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Entergy Operations, In ,
Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2 March 1,1992, through July 10,1993 ;
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9309140406 930908 I DR ADDCK 05000313 PDR f$
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SUMMARY OF RESULTS !
l Overview ;
Strong management support and oversight contributed to a generally high level !
of performance in all functional areas with notable improvement in the Safety l Assessment and Quality Verification functional are ;
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Overall, performance with regard to the nuclear safety aspects of plant l operation continued to be excellent. Crew communications and teamwork were J significant contributors to that performance. Equipment status errors j identified late in the assessment period, while seen as a decline in ;
operations performance in one area, were not representative of operations l performance throughout the assessment period, but deserve added management ;
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attention.
l . i Performance in the radiation protection area was good, particularly in the as- t low-as-reasonably achievable (ALARA) area. However, problems were identified regarding the failure of workers to follow proper radiation protection l
requirements, j l The licensee established generally well developed and strong programs for the j maintenance / surveillance functional area, particularly the in-service }
inspection and test programs. However, further improvement in the quality of procedures, work instructions, and adherence to procedures is warrante Overall, the licensee maintained an excellent emergency preparedness response readiness which was, in large measure, a result of the licensee's strong-program of emergency response training and drill The overall security performance was excellent with both personnel and equipment maintained in a high state of response readines :
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Overall, engineering performance and technical support were good; however, i engineerirg resources were challenged by technical issues, such as responding j to Generic letter 89-10 regarding motor-operated valve While the design modification program was generally effective, weaknesses in installation of some of modifications adversely affected the operability of some safety- '!
related equipment. Training programs were strong and effective in 'all l functional areas. Corporate level assist groups (or Peer Groups) continued to provide effective support and directio i Safety Assessment / Quality Verification performance improve significantly and !
was excellent overall. The licensee's submittals for license amendments, ;
relief requests, and temporary waivers were notably improved with regard to !
timeliness, clarity, technical merit, and sensitivity to safety issues. .Self- l assessments and safety reviews continued to be effective, with rigorous :
applications of root cause analysis and human performance evaluations. The l operational experience feedback and corrective action programs, aided by a strong quality assurance audit program, also remained very effective. Plant ;
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personnel exhibited a conservative safety attitude regarding operability concerns and were aggressive to investigate equipment performance anomalie ;
Rating Last Period Rating This Period l Functional Area (12/01/90 to 02/29/92) (03/01/92 to 07/10/93)
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Plant Operations 1 1 l
Radiological Controls 21* 2
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- Maintenance / Surveillance l Emergency Preparedness 1 1 Security 1 I
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Engineering / Technical 2 2
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l Quality Verification
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- 1 Improving Trend - Licensee performance was determined to be improving during this assessment period. Continuation of the trend may result in a change in the performance ratin III. CRITERIA *
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The evaluation criteria, category definitions, and SALP process methodology ,
that were used, as applicable, to assess each functional area are described in
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l l detail in NRC Manual Chapter 0516 dated September 28, 199 This chapter is available in the Public Document Room files.
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IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS Plant Operations
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The assessment of this functional area consists chiefly of the control and
! execution of activities directly related to operating the plant. The previous l SALP report rated this functional area as Category I and made no specific '
recommendations to licensee managemen The nuclear safety aspects of plant operation were conducted in an excellent manner. Compensatory measures to avert problems during off normal situations i continued to be effective. For example, both units dedicated a licensed l
. operator to monitor shutdown cooling parameters during reduced inventory ;
I conditions. Operator attentiveness to control room indication and alarms l continued to be excellent. Frequently, subtle equipment anomalies were investigated prior to equipment failure occurring. The installation of a new plant computer for each unit contributed significantly to this process. As a result of this, management focus the units were operated reliably.
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While one plant transient was attributable to an operator error during the establishment of a clearance boundary, a number of transients and power reductions resulted from various equipment problems. Overall, however, fewer ;
transients occurred during this assessment period. The operating staffs of
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both units effectively responded to plant events that did occur. The licensee also continued to improve its ability to respond to potential emergency situations. For example, in the fall of 1992 Nitrogen-16 monitoring equipment >
was installed to enhance the Unit 2 capabilities to detect, quantify and trend !
primary-to-secondary steam generator leakage. The licensee's decision to enhance their capabilities was timely, considering the steam generator tube ,
repairs performed as a result of recent steam generator inspections, and was a strengt Management sensitivity to shutdown risk continued to be evident. Both units f improved their methods of controlling risk during shutdown. State-of-the-art !
computer models were used during outage planning to identify high risk i scenarios so that compensatory measures could be initiated. Both units had the ability to backfeed from the unit auxiliary transformer, which gave them three potential offsite power supplies during plant outages. Operations !
control of protected equipment during shutdown was excellent. As a result, !
decay heat removal was reliably maintained on both units during reduced
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inventory condition Equipment status was effectively maintained throughout most of the assessment
, period. However, late in the assessment period, improper system valve i
! alignments were identified in Unit 1. The improper valve alignments led to a !
degraded emergency feedwater pump, vulnerability to moisture intrusion in the emergency diesel generator air start system, and a degraded ability to emergency borate. Those conditions represented a decline in operations performance; however, they had minimal safety impact. Moreover, they were not I representative of operations performance during most of the assessment perio However, management attention is needed to improve performance in this are Staffing continued to be excellent. Operator training and qualification continued at a high level of effectiveness as demonstrated by a 100 percent ;
pass rate on initial examinations. Management aggressively pursued cross- '
training programs between operations and support organizations. Further, l licensed personnel continued to integrate, through rotations and career i opportunities, with other organizations. As a result, the control room crews ;
displayed general improvements in the areas of communications and team work, ,
both within the operating crew and with support organizations. Management :
frequently toced the control room and participated in the crew brief !
In summary, the nuclear safety aspects of plant operation continued to be conducted in an excellent manner. Management's aggressive commitment to ;
providing high quality training resulted in excellent communications and '
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teamwork. Safety decisions were conservative with sensitivity to operational and shutdown risk. While not indicative of overall performance, the ,
identified egipment status errors warrant management emphasi t i
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-5-1 Performance Rating The licensee is considered to be in Performance Category 1 in this functional are . Recommendations Non Radiological Controls Analysis This functional area consists of activities related to radiation protection, radioactive waste management, radiological effluent control and monitoring, radiological environmental monitoring, and transportation of radioactive materials. The previous SALP report rated this functional area as Category 2 with an improving trend and with no specific recommendation- to licensee managemen Management support for the radiation protection program was very good. The Radiation Protection department had established a good working relationship with other departments. Radiation protection supervisors spent an appropriate amount of time in the radiologically controlled area observing work activities. Excellent audits and surveillances were performed in this program area. The audits were comprehensive and included a team member with technical expertise on the audit team. Responses to audit findings were timely and effectiv Management involvement and support for the ALARA program was excellen The licensee's Five Year Strategic ALARA Plan identified very aggressive person-
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rem goals. Person-rem totals at both units in 1992 were above the national '
average; however, the licensee was under their total person-rem goal for the
! first half of 1993 and has made steady progress in reducing the exposure per l radiation work permit person-hour in each successive refueling outage. The l ALARA program used numerous effective techniques to lower annual person-rem, l
such as television cameras, telemetric dosimetry, quick erecting scaffolding, l mockup training, and steam generator man-way shields. Actions were also -
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implemented to reduce the source term at both units, which included early boration and hydrogen peroxide injection, hot spot flushing, and a stellite replacement program. ALARA packages were of good quality, and the use of i ALARA planners and coordinators allowed for early review of planned work activities. The ALARA suggestion program was very good and has helped to increase ALARA awareness. ALARA committee meeting attendance by designated members was poor at the beginning of the assessment period but was improved by the end of the period. Reductions were noted in the total contaminated areas at both units and in the number of personnel contamination event The routine implementation of the radiological protection program was in need of improvement. Radiation work permits incorporated sufficient radiological I
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controls; however, violations were identified throughout the assessment period regarding poor radiation work practices involving the failure to follow radiation work permit requirements and the failure to attend prejob briefing '
A good training program had been implemented regarding day-to-day activities for radiation workers and general employees. However, problems were identified concerning implementation of proper radiation protection practices ;
by some plant workers. There were several instances of failure to follow ,
step-off-pad procedures. Also, a sleeping worker was found inside containment during an outage. Other licensee identified problems included control of high radiation areas, inspection of respiratory equipment, release of contaminated material, and unauthorized entry into a high raaiation area.
l Staffing was maintained at appropriate levels in the radiation protection,
chemistry, radwaste, and environmental monitoring programs. The radiation l protection staff was supplemented with qualified contract personnel during refueling outages. An effective screening and training program was in place l for contract radiation protection technician Radiation protection training instructors were well qualifie Improved technical expertise among the :
radiation protection technicians was evidenced by the increased number of '
technicians that had become certified by the National Registry of Radiation Protection Technologist '
In summary, the radiation protection department maintained a good performance l
level. Management support for the radiological controls area was very good.
l Excellent performance was noted in the ALARA are However, several problems '
were identified regarding the failure of some workers to follow proper '
radiation protection requirement i
' Performance Rating The licensee is considered to be in Performance Category 2 in this functional are ! Recommendations Non i l
I Maintenance / Surveillance Analysis The assessment of this functional area included activities associated with !
predictive, preventive, and corrective maintenance; installation and testing of plant modifications; the conduct of surveillance testing; containment integrated leak rate testing; in-service inspections (ISI); and in-service testing activities. The previous SALP report rated this functional area as Category 2, with a recommendation to continue programs for procedure ;
improvement and enhanced procedure adherence.
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L-7-Management involvement in the maintenance area and oversight of maintenance activities was good. Management exhibited a strong commitment to the use of diagnostic maintenance tools, such as on-site oil analysis, vibration analysis, and thermography to enhance maintenance program effectiveness. An example of the positive benefit was observed when the inoperability of an emergency feedwater pump was identified while still undetectable through normal surveillance methods. Corrective maintenance backlog reduction was a further example of management's commitment to improve the material condition of the plan The licensee's administrative controls and procedures for preventive and corrective maintenance were adequate and generally effective. Procedure content and adherence improved during the assessment period. However, the need for improvement efforts in these areas still remains. Procedures and procedure adbarence inadequacies contributed to: the improper ir.staiiation of a reactor coolant pump anti-rotation device, damage to a high pressure safety injection valve stem, failure to establish a proper test boundary for safety-related coolers, and the inoperability of an emergency feedwater pump during plant operatio Outage planning continued to improve over the assessment period. The plans for both the Unit 2 refueling outage and the Unit 2 steam generator tube inspection outage were excellent. The plans were developed to coordinate and schedule activities to achieve a conservative approach to reducing risk during shutdow The preventive maintenance engineering evaluation process was commendabl The programmatic requirements for an operations impact statement in job orders and for an independent review of postmaintenance tests for safety-related job orders were program strength The ISI program required by ASME Section XI and the Technical Specifications was effectively implemented with the performance of good nondestructive examinations. The licensee's commitment to continuing the upgrade and improvement of the ISI program (as exemplified by their allocation of considerable resources to address past problems) was noteworthy. The administrative controls and implementation procedures for the Technical Specification snubber and in-service testing programs were well define These programs had been upgraded and were effectiv j The licensee performed a thorough evaluation of the Unit 2 steam generator tube leak that occurred in March 1992. The licensee upgraded the eddy current program requirements with respect to content of data analysis guidelines and formalized training and testing for data analysts. Contract personnel received additional specific training and performance testing. The laboratory examination of pulled tubes containing defect indications was outstanding with respect to scope and tec;.nologies use On occasion during the assessment period, the licensee's oversight of safety-related work performed by contractors was weak. A resulting problem occurred j
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-8-when contractors failed to conform to procedural requirements for controlling tools and equipment taken into steam generator Subsequently, the licensee's oversight of contractor activities appeared to be improving. For example, oversight of steam generator eddy current examinations and related activities that were performed late in the assessment period was goo Housekeeping and foreign material exclusion were generally good throughout the assessment period, with some notable exceptions. Three examples of foreign material entering into a system which degraded equipment performance were discovered during this period. A notable example was the degradation of electrical output capacity on a diesel generator because of a clogged fuel oil i foot valve. The licensee later established a well designed accountability program for foreign material exclusion during maintenance. Some additional weaknesses related to housekeeping issues around the spent fuel pool and over the reactor vessel were identified. The licensee strengthened their program to address these areas as well. However, a need for continued monitoring of program implementation was eviden Communication for both maintenance and surveillance activities was excellent during the cycle. For example, the licensee implemented a program for identifying infrequently performed tests and evolutions and specified special i briefing requirements. Good crew briefs prior to surveillance testing and major maintenance evolutions were noted. Systems engineering interaction with the surveillance program was also excellent. Additional testing was frequently recommended when reliability questions developed. Further, the systems engineers continued to function as a focal point for problem resolution following equipment failure or anomalous performanc The overall implementation of the surveillance program was excellent. The licensee routinely evaluated safety system performance data beyond the minimum surveillance acceptance criteria and dealt aggressively with the results. The most significant example was the licensee's discovery and subsequent resolution of a high-pressure safety injection flow imbalance. The analysis indicated that inadequate high pressure injection could have occurred under certain previously postulated accident condition .
In conclusion, licensee management support and involvement in maintenance activities has been commendable and produced measurable improvements. The licensee has established well developed and strong programs for the maintenance / surveillance functional area particularly the ISI and test programs. The implementation of program requirements was good; however, further improvement in the areas of pnocedures, work instructions, and adherence to procedures was neede . Performance Ratina The licensee is considered to be in Performance Category 2 in this functional '
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i Recommendations Non Emergency Preparedness Anal _ysis
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This functional area includes activities related to the establishment and implementation of the emergency plan and implementing procedures, onsite and i offsite plan development and coordination, support and training of emergency response organizations, licensee performance during exerciscs and actual events that test the emergency plans, and interactions with onsite and offsite emergency response organizations during planned exercises and actual event The previous SALP report rated this functional area as Category I with no recominendations to licensee managemen During tha assessment period, there were two emergency declarations associated with actual events, both at the Notification of Unusual Event classification level. Each event involved the transport offsite of a radiological contaminated injury victim. During the events, the licensee made proper notifications and effectively implemented applicable portions of the emergency pl a '
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Mixed performance results were noted during walk-through exercises wi^h three operating crews. The two of the three crews made proper and timely emergency event classifications and appropriate protective action recommendation However, all three crews failed to perform accurate and timely dose assessments from the control room following a simulated unmonitored radiological releas *
During the 1992 emergency exercise, three weaknesses were identified. The weaknesses involved discrepancies in the notification process, a poor briefing of the arriving NRC site response team, and inadequate radiological control measures to protect field survey teams. The licensee's scenario for the 1993 emergency exercise started from the shutdown condition. That scenario provided unique challenges for the plant staff. During that exercise, no weaknesses were identified and the licensee's staff demonstrated an excellent level of training and preparedness. The Federal Emergency Management Agency evaluated the responses of offsite response organizations during the 1992 l exercise and identified one deficiency. Remedial action was promptly taken l and its effectiveness demonstrated in a subsequent drill. During the cssessment period, the licensee continued to maintain a supportive and effective working relationship with offsite response organization Management demonstrated strong support for the emergency preparedness program.
l Emergency response facilities were maintained in an excellent state of I
- operational readiness. Comprehensive licensee audits of the emergency preparedness program were conducted. Appropriate numbers of trained personnel l
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were assigned to emergency response positions. An excellent program of emergency training drills and exercises was conducte .
In summary, the licensee maintained an excellent emergency preparedness -
program. The excellent level of emergency response readiness was, in part, a result of the licensee's strong program of emergency response training and drills. Management provided strong support for the emergency preparedness progra . Performance Rating The licensee is considered to be in Performance Category 1 in this are . Recommendations ,
i Non ! Security Analysis This functional area consists of activities associated with the security of ;
the plant, including all aspects of access authorization, access control, and :
protection of safeguards information. The previous SALP report rated this functional area as Category 1, with no specific recommendations to licensee ;
managemen Utility management provided strong support for the security program, and security management maintained effective oversight of programmatic and day-to-day activities. As a result, security system operability and performance were maximized through effective maintenance and test programs. Further, comprehensive, performance oriented, security audits were conducted and .
responses to identified problems were timely and effective. However, a .
weakness was identified concerning the failure to followup on access authorization audit findings provided by other utilities.
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The security organization exhibited strong professionalism and dedication and
! effectively performed routine security program activities. The security force was appropriately staffed to meet program requirements. The security training >
program improved in the areas of tactical and firing range training, which contributed to a well-trained and confident security forc In summary, the overall security oerformance was excellent. Security systems were well maintained and tested. Management provided excellent support and ;
oversight of the security progra Comprehensive quality assurance audits were generally effective.
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! Performance Ratinq The licensee is considered to be in Performance Category 1 in this functional are . Recommendations Non Engineering / Technical Support Analysis The evaluation of this functional area addresses the adequacy of engineering and technical support for all plant activities. This assessment includes all licensee activities associated with the engineering organizational structure and interfaces, resources and work backlogs, scheduling and prioritizing work
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activities, support of plant operations, training, and qualifications of
! personnel. The previous SALP report rated this functional area as Category 2-with no specific recommendations to licensee management.
l The licensee established a good motor-operated valve program which was able to I demonstrate the capabilities of their motor-operated valves subject to Generic
! Letter 89-10. However, the licensee was slow in establishing test acceptance criteria and in responding to some emergent issues. Those delays were partially attributed to the large number of motor-operated valves involved in the ANO program and other engineering priorities that challenged the *
licensee's engineering resource The licensee's self-assessment of the electrical distribution system on Unit I was consistent in scope and depth with the self-assessment performed on Unit 2 the previous evaluation period. The licensee successfully installed interim modifications to the 161 kV system to resolve previously identified weaknesses and continued development of a long-range corrective program. Throughout that ,
process, the high levels of knowledge and capability demonstrated by the ,
engineering personnel were program strength The overall process for controlling design modification and other engineering activities was very good. The modification packages and the safety evaluations were well prepared, and conservative engineering practices had been applied. Engineering and technical support for implementation of plant modifications and equipment maintenance was generally effective. However, some weaknesses were noted with regard to the controls and instructions for installation of modifications, some of which resulted in inadvertent '
deenergization and/or actuation of safety-related equipment. The temporary modification process was properly controlled and implemented. The engineering ,
dispositions of nonconformance reports showed conservative engineering judgment and comprehensive corrective actio >
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-12-The corporate level assist groups (Peer groups) continued to provide ,
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significant overall engineering direction for site improvement. The new plant computer with interface to the site personal computers provided many benefit Staffing levels were consistent with the workload. The relocation of design engineering to the site continued to improve the overall interface and working relationship with the plant. The " Total Quality Improvement" program and the associated " Quality Action Teams" were making significant improvements in the areas of modifications, welding, and preventive maintenance. The program for controlling and updating vendor technical manuals was excellen The design basis program was well defined, and adequate measures had been implemented to maintain the program documents current. The licensee properly reviewed and handled regulatory and industry correspondence. The engineering
" betterment" projects were positive initiatives with a long-term benefit for the licensee. The diversity and capability of the nuclear engineering design group was an overall strength for the licensee. The licensee's self-assessment process with regard to design engineering was a positie initiative and continued to demonstrate management attention to performanc Training support to the plant was excellent. The licensee has been successful in merging the training philosophies and methods of the Unit I and 2 training staffs so that they varied in only small c'egrees. Training personnel and
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programs were repeatedly noted for program improvements and program effectiveness. That was especially evident in the areas of training for j licensed operator requalification, ALARA work plannino, contract radiation
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protection technicians, the eddy current test and analysis program, site engineering, emergency preparedness organizations, security force personnel, j
and root cause analysi Engineering and technical support for plant operations was excellen For example, system engineering recommended supplemental testing on several
- occasions to demonstrate equipment reliability following repair. Operability
- determinations, which required engineering support, were performed conservatively end demonstrated good safety consciousness. Compensatory ,
measures were well thought out. Outage planning was excellent with the l licensee's program for controlling risk during shutdown being well thought out j
and well communicate i
In summary, the licensee had a strong and knowledgeable engineering group.
- Training programs were strong and effective in a broad range of functional
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areas. Technical support for operations was excellent. Corporate level assist groups (Peer groups) continued to provide effective corporate support and direction. However, engineering resources were challenged by technical issues, such as responding to Generic Letter 89-10 regarding motor-operated valve Further, weaknesses in the implementation of the design modification program affected the operability of some safety-related equipment.
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i-13- i l, Performance Ratinq !
The licensee is considered to be in Performance Category 2 in this functional are ; Recommendations Non Safety Assessment /0uality Verification j i Analysis ;
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This functional area consists of all licensee review activities associated with the implementation of licensee safety policies, including activities ;
related to amendment, exemption, and relief requests, and other regulatory ,
initiative In addition, it includes licensee activities related to the :
resolution of safety issues and performance of safety evaluations, safety !
committee and self-assessment activities, the identification and resolution of l equipment and programatic problems, and activities associated with quality !
verification functions. The previous SALP report rated this functional area '
as Category 2, with no specific recomendations to licensee managemen The licensee's self-assessment and safety review, capabilities were effective $
with the onsite and offsite committees carrying out the responsibilities ,
required by the facility's licenses with only minor weaknesses note .
Rigorous applications of the industry-recommended root cause analysis and l human performance evaluation techniques were evident, with an effective ,
training program in place for both areas ana indication of strong management support for these activities. The thorough review process integral to the corrective action system had the effect of enforcing correct assessment and evaluation for events, failures, or program reviews. The licensee's self- :
assessment process with regard to design engineering was a positive initiative '
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and continued to demonstrate management attention to performance. The licensee's 10 CFR 50.59 packages were generally commendable. Their determinations and evaluations were well prepared with appropriate detail and :
clearly defined logi j The operational experience feedback program was very effective. The licensee l l had two strong, complimentary organizational elements: one group dealt ;
! exclusively with in-house events, and the other with industry events. Both groups provided timely, comprehensive, effective evaluations of events and i produced apparently effective corrective action l
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The licensee was proactive in problem identification and implemented a very strong program for formulating and implementing corrective actions for :
conditions adverse to quality. The corrective action administrative program i established internal and external reporting requirements, required assessment of the safety significance of the reported condition, and provided for ,
assigning priorities. Significance and reportability were correctly l
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t determined. Generic concerns, root causes, and human performance considerations were effectively considered, with a particular strength in the ;
quality of the licensee's Human Performance Enhancement System. The quality !
assurance audit program was a strength in the licensee's overall corrective i action program. Corrective action items, though sometimes narrowly focused, l generally were effectively developed, evaluated, approved,. documented, !
assigned, tracked, and closed ou Plant personnel continued to exhibit a probing and conservative safety ;
attitude. That led to aggressive resolution of operability concerns, such as !
the discovery and correction of a long-standing flow imbalance in the high l'
pressure safety injection system, averting a condition which may have led to a main steam safety valve failing open, and identification of a failure in the i feedwater control circuitry prior to an actual transien [
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The licensee's various submittals to the NRC showed significant improvement.
l License amendment applications and requests for relief typically were timely, i and schedular reliefs were requested for good causes. The problem which !
contributed tc the untimely submittal of Unit 2 license amendment requests to j support the fall 1992 outage appeared to have been corrected, as evidenced by l the Unit I license amendment requests to support.the fall 1993 outage. The r licensee's submittals and amendment applications were typically clear and ;
well-supported and displayed a good understanding of the technical issues from j a safety standpoint. The amendment applications consistently presented good
"no significant hazards consideration determinations." Additionally, the i licensee's requests for temporary waivers were of high qualit ]
In summary, the licensee's self-assessment and safety review capabilities were ;
effective with evidence of rigorous applications of industry-recommended root !
cause analysis and human performance evaluation techniques. The operational l
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experience feedback program was very effective, with two strong, complimentary organizational elements. The licensee was proactive in problem identification i and established a very strong program for corrective action implementatio i The quality assurance audit program was a strength in the licensee's overall ;
corrective action program. Plant personnel exhibited a conservative safety !
attitude regarding operability concerns, and they maintained a questioning '
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attitude and aggressively investigated equipment performance anomalies. The licensee's amendment applications and other submittals improved significantly i and were typically clear and technically soun i Performance Ratinq ;
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The licensee is considered to be in Performance Category 1 in this functional i l
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, Recommendations Non ' SUPPORTING DATA AND SUMMARIES Major Licensee Activities t Major Outages I
The tenth refueling outage for Unit I was completed on May 13, 199 Significant work completed included 100 percent eddy current testing of once- i through steam generator tubes, sleeving of 302 once-through steam generator tubes, reactor coolant pump seal repair and replacement, low pressure Turbine B overhaul, generator internal repairs, and motor-operated valve testin ,
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Unit 2 experienced a forced outage from March 9 to May 3, 1992, due to excessive prinary-to-secondary steam generator tube leakag Unit 2 conducted its ninth refueling outage between September 5 and October 20, 1992. Major work completed included tube inspections on both :
steam generators, replacement of the reactor coolant Pump A motor, upgrade of the service water system, and repair of main condenser, water boxes, and hotwell ,
Unit 2 conducted a mini-outage May 1-16, 1993, primarily to perform steam ;
generator inspection ~ License Amendments
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During the SALP period, a total of 26 license amendments were issued for the licensee with 10 common, 4 for Unit 1 only, and 12 for Unit 2 onl . Major Modifications Installation of Nitrogen 16 detectors in the Unit 2 steam generator main steam lines was performed to enhance the ability to detect, quantify, and trend primary-to-secondary steam generator tube leakag The Unit 2 plant computer was upgraded to improve monitoring and trending ,
capabilitie )
l A series of modifications to improve the acceptability of the 161 kV transmission system were installed. These modifications included changing in- ,
plant transformer tap settings and installing new transmission system I capacitor bank l l
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-16- Direct inspection and Review Activities NRC inspecticn activity during the assessment period included 35 inspections. ,
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Approximately 5138 direct inspection hours were expended, which did not include operator licensing examinations or contractor hour t
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