IR 05000313/1993027
| ML20057F945 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 10/02/1993 |
| From: | Westerman T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20057F944 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-313-93-27, 50-368-93-27, GL-89-10, NUDOCS 9310200005 | |
| Download: ML20057F945 (10) | |
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APPENDIX U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Inspection Report:
50-313/93-27 50-368/93-27 Licenses:
DPR-51 NPF-6
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Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Route 3, Box 137G Russellville, Arkan:as Facility Name:
Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2
l Inspection At:
Russellville, Arkansas Inspection Conducted:
September 13-17, 1993 l
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l Inspectors:
C. J. Paulk, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Section Division of Reactor Safety P. A. Goldberg, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Section Division of Reactor Safety
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Approved:
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/(- L '/ 3 T. F. Westerman, Chief, Engineering Section Date Division of Reactor Safety Inspection Summary l
Areas Inspected (Units 1 and 2):
Routine, announced inspection of maintenance
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activities associated with motor-operated valves.
Results (Units 1 and 2):
The licensee has implemented a motor-operated valve maintenance program
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consistent with the commitment to Generic Letter 89-10, " Safety-Related Motor-0perated Valve Testing and Surveillance" (Section 3.3).
Condition reports were well written while job orders were weak in
documented information (Sections 3.2 and 3.3).
j The licensee's procedures addressed post-maintenance requirements for i
motor-operated valves in the Generic Letter 89-10 program (Section 3.3).
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9310200005 931014
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PDR ADOCK 05000313 G
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l-2-l A noncited violation was identified for the failure to have sufficient
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information to identify a safety-related strainer and its components (Section 3.3.1).
Summary of Inspection Findings:
Inspection Followup Item 313/9313-02; 368/9313-02 was closed
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(Section 2.1).
Inspection Followup Item 313/9313-06; 368/9313-06 was closed
(Section 2.2).
Inspection Followup Item 313/9313-07; 368/9313-07 was closed
(Section 2.3).
A noncited violation was identified (Section 3.3.1).
- Attachments:
Attachment - Persons Contacted and Exit Meeting
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DETAILS 1 PLANT STATUS During this inspection period, Unit I was in a refueling outage and Unit 2 was
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in Mode 1.
2 FOLLOWUP (92701)
2.1 (Closed) Inspection Followup Item 313/9313-02: 368/9313-02:
Revision of Standard MES-01, " Guideline for Preparing Motor-rperated Valve Setpoint
Calculations" l
During a previous inspection, inspectors found that the licensee used values for packing load that were less conservative than the measured values. The licensee stated that Standard MES-01 would be revised to require, when measured values were larger than estimated values, the measured value to be multiplied by 1.2 to allow for future adjustments to the packing.
The inspectors reviewed Standard Change Notice 1 to Standard MES-01, Revision 3.
The inspectors found that the licensee had revised the standard to address the use of measured packing load values in the calculations for required thrust and torque.
2.2 (Closed) Inspection Followup Item 313/9313-06: 368/9313-06:
Revision of Motor-Operated Valve Program for Second Engineer Review and Post-Test Evaluations of Diagnostic Data During the motor-operated valve inspection in May 1993, the inspectors l
reviewed a test package and noted that the average running force and the maximum thrust values were not consistently recorded on the analysis data sheets.
In addition, the inspectors found that the design-basis differential pressure was incorrectly transferred from the thrust calculation to the differential pressure data sheet. The licensee agreed to revise the motor-operated valve program to require a second engineer review of the data sheets and post-test evaluations of diagnostic data.
The inspectors reviewed Procedures 1403.038, " Unit I and Unit 2 MOV Testing and Maintenance of Limitorque SMB-000 Actuators," Revision 8; 1403.039,
" Unit 1 and Unit 2 MOV Testing and Maintenance of Limitorque SMB-00 Actuators," Revision 8; 1403.040, " Unit 1 and Unit 2 MOV Testing and Maintenance of Limitorque SMB-0 through 4 Actuators," Revision 7; 1403.014,
" Maintenance and Diagnostic Testing of Rotork Actuators," Revision 6; and, 1403.187, " Unit 1 and Unit 2 M0V Testing of Limitorque and Rotork Actuators Utilizing Movats Test System," Revision 0.
The inspectors found that each procedure had paragraphs added which required a second motor-operated valve coordinator / engineer to review the test data to ensure that the analysis was correct or to review the test data to ensure that the traces were marked correctly and conservatively.
The inspectors concluded that these revised procedures addressed the followup item.
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2.3 (Closed) Inspection Followup Item 313/9313-07: 368/9313-07:
Review of i
I Differential Pressure Traces During the motor-operated valve inspection in May 1993, the inspectors
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reviewed seven diagnostic traces generated from testing motor-operated valves.
The inspectors identified several instances where the licensee had placed software marks in incorrect or nonconservative positions.
The licensee
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committed to review all of the remaining differential pressure traces to identify any additional problems in the placement of the diagnostic marks.
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addition, the licensee committed to provide a second engineer review of diagnostic traces to ensure proper placement of software marks.
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The inspectors reviewed a licensee letter dated August 27, 1993, concerning the review of previously performed differential pressure test data.
The letter stated that maintenance engineering performed a review of all motor-operated valve test data acquired during differential pressure testing to ensure that all traces had been marked correctly and conservatively.
The results of the review changed the marks on 36 of the 46 gate and globe valve tests to the most conservative points.
The results of the review were transmitted to design engineering to determine the impact. The tabulated results of the review were attached to the letter. The licensee's commitment to provide a second engineer review of diagnostic traces was completed and was discussed in Section 2.2 of this report. The inspectors concluded that the review of the test traces and the procedure revisions adequately addressed this followup item.
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3 GENERIC LETTER 89-10 " SAFETY-RELATED MOTOR-0PERATED VALVE TESTING AND SURVEILLANCE" (TEMPORARY INSTRUCTION 2515/109)
3.1 Background On June 28, 1989, the NRC issued Generic Letter 89-10, " Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance," which requested licensees and construction permit holders to establish a program to ensure switch settings for safety-related motor-operated valves and certain other motor-operated valves in safety-related systems were selected, set, and maintained properly.
On January 14, 1991, the NRC issued Temporary Instruction 2515/109,
" Inspection Requirements for Generic Letter 89-10, Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance," to provide instructions for the inspection of the licensees' motor-operated valve programs. The temporary instruction was divided into two parts.
The first was for the inspection of the program development, and the second was for the inspection of the implementation of the program. The results of the Part 1 inspection are documented in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-313/92-18; 50-368/92-18. The results of the Part 2 inspection for diagnosis of test data are documented in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-313/93-13; 50-368/93-13.
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-5-During this inspection, the inspectors reviewed test procedures and post-maintenance test procedures, and also followed up on reports of failed valves.
i The inspectors used the guidance of Temporary Instruction 2515/109, Part 2, to perform this inspectf'n.
3.2 Condition Reports
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The inspectors reviewed 27 condition reports to evaluate the licensee's handling of conditions involving motor-operated valves that could impact the safe operation of the plant.
The inspectors reviewed Procedure 1000.104,
" Condition Reporting and Corrective Actions," Revision 10. The inspectors found that the condition reports were well written. The inspectors also
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considered the evaluations performed by the licensee to be appropriate in
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depth and scope and in accordance with established plant procedures.
The inspectors reviewed Condition Report C-92-038, dated May 5, 1993, concerning the licensee determination that the implementation of the preventive maintenance tasks for motor-operated valves was ineffective.
During the testing of motor-operated valves in Refueling Outage IR10, the licensee found several instances where valves were found with little or no
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lubrication on the threaded portion of the stems, high coefficients of friction in the stem / stem nut area, and dirty contacts.
Preventive
maintenance tasks had been previously performed on these valves.
One of the corrective action steps was to have a quality assurance audit performed on the motor-operated valve preventive maintenance program. At the time of this inspection, the audit had not been completed.
3.3 Job Orders The inspectors reviewed 36 job orders to evaluate the licensee's corrective
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actions for problems associated with motor-operated valves. The inspectors also reviewed Procedure 1000.024, " Control of Maintenance," Revision 41; Procedure 1025.003, " Conduct of Maintenance," Revision 39; Procedure 1025.011,
" Motor Operated Valve (MOV) Maintenance Program," Revision 3; and, Procedure 1025.033, " Control of Post Maintenance Testing," Revision 1.
The inspectors found that the procedures were well written. The licensee addressed post-maintenance test requirements for motor-operated valves in Procedure 1025.011. The inspectors considered the licensee's approach to maintenance activities (both corrective and preventive) and post-maintenance testing to have been in accordance with its commitment to Generic Letter 89-10 and industry standards.
The licensee is in the process of fully implementing their motor-operated valve maintenance program and have identified where improvements may be necessary as indicated in Section 3.2 above.
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-6-The inspectors considered the quality of information provided in the job orders for work performed and conditions found to be poor (see Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3).
This finding was similar to the licensee's concern regarding the quality of information provided in job orders. The licensee stated that actions were being planned and performed to improve the quality of information.
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3.3.1 Job Order 875121 The inspectors reviewed Job Order 875121 for a motor operated valve which apparently failed to modulate and caused a safety-related chiller to trip.
The inspectors were led to other job orders, a condition report, and eventually to a problem with a safety-related strainer.
The inspectors were informed on September 22 and 24, 1993, that the strainers had been installed in the system in 1979 with 80 mesh screens.
In 1979 and 1980, there were many job order', generated to clean the strainers.
In 1980, the job orders to clean the screens stopped, which led ANO to conclude that the 80 mesh screens had been removed without any documentation.
However, during the performance of preventive maintenance on March 19, 1992, the licensee noted that the " screening [was] torn and needs to be replaced." The licensee has indicated that the torn " screening" refers to the retainer basket. As a result of this finding, Job Order 866204 was initiated on March 19, 1992, and implemented on June 29, 1992. A new retainer basket with a 100 mesh screen insert was installed with this job order.
The licensee stated that the 100 mesh screen insert was utilized based on verbal information from the vendor.
Repeated trips of the cooler then resulted. Under the direction of Job Order 875121, dated July 8,1992, the licensee initiated trouble shooting and found that Valve CV-6036, " Service Water to Auxiliary Building Electrical Rooms Emergency Chiller VCH-48," was functioning; however, the control switch was labeled incorrectly. The licensee corrected the switch label, but the safety-related chiller continued to trip.
The licensee then performed additional troubleshooting to determine the cause for the chiller trips. Condition Report 1-92-437 was initiated on July 8, 1992, to determine the cause of the tripping of the chiller.
The problem was traced to the safety-related strainer, YSk'-602B, in the service water line.
The licensee also evaluated the adequacy of removing internal strainer parts via a job order, the preparation of a more formal evaluation, the determination if the mesh material was used in other improper applications, the revised the technical manual, the review of the data bases, and the review of the maintenance tasks. The licensee initiated Job Order 875210 on July 9, 1992, to clean and/or replace the strainer.
The 100 mesh screen was removed from the strainer as it was improper for a service water application. A telephone conversation memorandum was all that documented the engineering evaluatio '
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The inspectors found, in Condition Report 1-92-437, that the licensee did not
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know what model strainer was installed until after identifying the 100 mesh sirtd insert material was improper for service water application.
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l technical manual, TM M473.0010, had not contained information specific to YSW-6028 until May 6, 1993, a year after the discovery.
l The inspectors concluded that the wrong size mesh material was installed in
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the strainer because of inaccurnte vendor verbal information, and lack of l
technical manual information and design requirements for the strainer. The
inspectors noted that the licensee had corrected the technical manual in May 1993. The inspectors found that the licensee had taken all the actions
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discussed in Condition Report 1-92-437. Additionally, the licensee has contacted the strainer vendor to determine the appropriate size and type of material for the service water application.
The licenseo has recognized the need to strengthen their procedures to identify proper material on a sub-component level. A document checklist is
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i being considered that would ask the question that if documentation is not
found, whether there is a need to establish documentation.
In addition, the licensee removed an order of 100 mesh screen inserts from the qualified
replacement list which had been procured and were already in the warehouse.
The failure to have proper information to identify the strainer and its components, which resulted in the installation of the wrong sized strainer
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mesh material, is a violation of Criterion VIII of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50. However, the actions taken and proposed met the requirements of paragraph VII.B.1 of Appendix C to 10 CFR Part 2 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice;" therefore, this violation will not be cited.
3.3.2 Job Order 879568
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The inspectors reviewed Job Order 879568, dated September 8, 1992, concerning
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i Gaseous Radiological Waste Containment Vent Header Isolation Valve 2CV-2401-1.
The job order was written because the valve had failed its local leak rate test. The maintenance history printout for the valve indicated that the inspection of the valve revealed that the disc was found stuck in a position that allowed leakage and the valve stem was bent. The job orc'er categorized the root cause for the test failure as wear out of the disc without addressing
why the valve stem was bent.
In addition, the job order stated that both the
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valve disc and stem had been replaced. During a discussion of the job order, the licensee stated that the valve stem had been damaged during maintenance, not during operation. The inspectors considered the lack of an explanation of
the bent stem in the job order to be an example of poor documentation.
3.3.3 Job Order 873971 The inspectors reviewed Job Order 873971, dated May 14, 1992, concerning the Reactor Coolant System Pressurizer Spray Valve 2CV-4561.
The work description on the job order stated that the valve operator had been overthrusting the
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valve during closure. The job order stated that the disc had been replaced
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-8-during work performed on the job order. The root cause of the failure was specified as unknown.
The inspectors discussed the job order with the licensee's engineering personnel because of the lack of information in the job order. The engineers explained that the valve did not have a locking gear, which allowed the disc to back out. When the disc backed out, the torque switch relaxed and the
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actuator would hammer the disc back into the seat. The licensee stated that test traces indicated that the valve was within allowable torque and thrust values and there was not an overthrust condition as the job order stated.
In addition, they stated that there have been no problems with operation of the valves. The inspectors considered the lack of information in the job order to be an example of peor documentation.
3.3.4 Job Order 874084 The inspectors reviewed Job Order 874084, dated May 19, 1993, concerning the Reactor Coolant System Pressurizer Emergency Core Cooling Vent Valve 2CV-4698-1. The job order stated that the valve stem was to be replaced since engineering suspected the valve stem may have weakened due to long term exposure to excessive heat. The valve stem was replaced during performance of the job order.
In addition to the job order, the inspectors reviewed Calculation V-2EV-4740-01, Revision 0, dated April 20, 1992. The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the operability of a number of valves due to their 17-4 PH material valve stems being susceptible to becoming embrittled after long-term exposure to garating temperatures above 287.8*C (550 *F).
The licensee concluded that the valves were operable as installed but the stems should be upgraded during a future refueling outage. The inspectors considered the calculation to be a well engineered document.
3.4 Material Conditions of Motor-Operated Valves
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The inspectors performed an it spection of approximately 40 motor-operated
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valves in both units (20 per unit). The inspectors observed that the stem
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lubrication was not excessive. The inspectors found that the stems of the butterfly valves had accumulaw: corrosion products and dirt.
The inspectors attributed this condition.
p._ L to the fact that the butterfly valva had not been overhauled or te ad e er the Generic Letter 89-10 program. The accumulations observed on he v.sve stems would not affect the operation of the valves (the valve ste.
...y rotate), but was a housekeeping concern.
3.5 Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the licensee has implemented a maintenance program for motor-operated valves in accordance with its commitment to Generic Letter 89-10. The licensee has addressed post-maintenance testing of motor-operated valves for the Generic Letter 89-10 program in its procedures. The information provided in the job orders was considered weak while the condition
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reports were well written. A noncited violation was identified, which related to the failure to properly identify a service water strainer and its subcomponents which resulted in the installation of a wrong sized mesh.
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ATTACHMENT 1 PERSONS CONTACTED 1.1 Licensee Personnel
- S. Boncheff, Licensing Specialist
- M. Cooper, Licensing Specialist
- B. Day, Manager, Unit 1 System Engineering
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- R. Douet, Manager, Unit 1 Maintenance
- R. Gordon, Supervisor, Maintenance Engineering
- R. King, Supervisor, Licensing
- R. Lane, Director, Design Engineering
- D. Lomax, Manager, Engineering Programs
- T. Mitchell, System Engineer, Unit 2
- T. Ott, Supervisor, Design Engineering
- W. Rogers, Supervisor, Design Engineering
- M. Sellman, General Manager
- M. Spinelli, Design Engineer
- J. Vandergrift, Plant Manager, Unit 1
- J. Yelverton, Vice President Operations 1.2 NRC Personnel
- S. Campbell, Resident Inspector l
- L. Ellershaw, Reactor Inspector
- L. Gilbert, Reactor Inspector In addition to the personnel listed above, the inspectors contacted other personnel during this inspection period.
- Denotes personnel that attended the exit meeting.
2 EXIT MEETING An exit meeting was conducted on September 17, 1993. Daring this meeting, the inspectors reviewed the scope and findings of this report.
Followup telephone calls were made on September 22 and 24,1993. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any information provided to, or reviewed by, the inspectors.
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