IR 05000280/1980034
| ML18139B046 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 10/17/1980 |
| From: | Burke D, Kellogg P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18139B041 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-80-34, 50-281-80-37, NUDOCS 8102050386 | |
| Download: ML18139B046 (7) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 Report Nos. 50-280/80-34 and 50-281/80-37 Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company Richmond, Virginia 23261 Facility Name:
Surry Units 1 and 2 I
Docket Nos. 50-280 and 50-281 License Nos. DPR-32 and DPR-37 Inspection at Surry site near Surry, Virginia SUMMARY Inspection on July 7 - August 29, 1980 Areas Inspected This routine inspection by the resident inspector involved 190 inspector-hours on site in the areas of plant operations and operating records, plant modifications, maintenance and testing, Licensee Event Reports, and plant securit Results Of the four areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were found in three areas; four items of noncompliance were found in one area (Infraction -
failure to maintain certain SI instrumentation operable as required by TS 3.7; Infraction - failure to follow procedures for removing safety related equipment from service; Deficiency - failure to report the inoperable SI instrumentation to the NRC within one hour in accordance with 10 CFR 50. 72 (a)(6); and Infraction -
failure to revise instrument surveillance procedures following instrument setpoint changes - Paragraph 6). Of the four noncompliances the license did not agree with the deficiency - failure to report the inoperable SI instrumentation to the NRC with one hour in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(a)(6).
. --* -...
..
--*
-. - - - - -
.
..
-**---~--- - **- -. - -*- - --**
- -..
- -**,-,-** ' *,,.
- 'r, -..-
- *,- *-~
DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- J. L. Wilson, Station Manager
- G. Kane, Superintendent, Operations
- T. A. Peebles, Superintendent, Technical Services
- R. F. Saunders, Assistant Station Manager
- L.A. Johnson, Superintendent, Maintenance R. M. Smith, Supervisor, Health Physics
- F. L. Rentz, Resident QC Engineer D. J. Fortin, Engineering Services Superintendent Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included control room operators, shift supervisors, QC, HP, plant maintenance, security, engineering, chemistry, administrative, and contractor personne *Attended exit interview Management Interviews The inspection scope and findings were summarized on a biweekly basis with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above; items of noncompliance were specifically discussed with the licensee when identifie.
Licensee Action on Previous Findings Not inspected. _ Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspectio.
Unit 1 Operations
/
The inspector routinely toured the Unit 1 control room and other plant areas to verify that the operations and maintenance activities were being conducted in accordance with the Technical Specifications (TS) and facility procedure Plant logs, records and tests were also reviewed. Within the areas reviewed, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie Specific areas of inspection and review included: Review of the July 19, 1980 boration of the reactor coolant system (RCS) due to boric acid leakage by the emergency borate valve MOV-135 Power was reduced from 100% to about 25%, and the axial flux deviated
..
-2-from the target band, requin.ng restricted power operation (below 50%).
A spare valve disc for }IOV-1350 was not available, so the valve was blank flange Two boration paths, in addition to the RWST, are available in accordance with TS 3. Inspection of activities concerning the Unit 1 steam generator tube leak which exceeded 0.3 gpm on July 31, 1980; the Unit was taken to the cold shutdown condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> as required by the license condition Tube plugging operations were completed and Unit 1 was returned to operation on August 10, 198 On August 13, 1980, the low pressure turbine bearing No. 5 vibration increased from 2 to 9 mils, and has been stable since that tim The licensee plans an end-of-life coastdown on Unit 1 until September 19, 198 Inspection of maintenance on certain safety-related heat tracing, valves, and pump.
Unit 2 Operations The inspector reviewed certain Unit 2 periodic testing and plant evolutions to verify that they were conducted in accordance with the plant Technical Specifications, licensee committments, and facility procedures. Unit 2 was taken critical on August 14, 1980, and is currently at 50% of powe Specific areas of inspection and review included: Review of various perio.dic and startup tests completed prior to Unit 2 startup; tests without specific acceptance criteria were reviewed by engineering personnel to determine acceptability, and many of the tests were repeated to assure a~ceptable baseline data for the ISI progra Review of the Unit 2 return to criticality following the 18 month steam generator replacement outage. The reactor was taken critical at 12:08 on August 14, 198 The inspector noted that the reactor went critical near the rod insertion limits of TS 3.12.A.2 because the most recent reac.tor coolant system boron concentration was not used in the ECP calculation, which was completed on the previous day to prepare for startup. However, the licensee did utilize inverse multiplication graphs for the approach to criticality, and ECP revisions were made during the startu Within the areas inspected, no items of noncom-pliance were identifie Review of the reactor trips and manual shutdowns that occurred between August 14 and August.28, 198 One reactor shutdown was initiated when the Unit 2 refueling water storage tank (RWST) and chemical addition tank (CAT) were observed to be below TS 3.4.2.A.3 and 4 minimum levels. The inspector noted that Periodic Test 36, "Instrument Surveillance", which the operators use twice per shift to verify and
-3-document that instrument indications comply with the Technical Specifi-cations (TS),
was not appropriately revised to reflect the current TS RWST and CAT levels of 96% and 97% respectivel In addition, the RWST low level alarm apparently did not annunciate when the borated water level dropped below 96%.
Failure to revise PT 36 prior to Unit 2 startup is contrary to TS 6.4.A, and is an infraction (281/80-37-01). Review of the Unit 2 main steamline flow instruments (FL 2474, 2475, 2484, 2485, 2494, and 2495) which were found isolated and inoperabl At 12:30 on August 19, 1980, licensee personnel noted that the steamline flow instrumentation was not responding with the Unit at 12%
power (The instrumentation displays steam flow in millions of pounds per hour and normally comes on scale between 10 and 15% power).
The licensee stated that the six channels were placed in the conservative trip mode approximately one hour after the discovery at 12:30 One out of two high steamline flow channels in two our of three steam-lines in coincidence with low tavg or low steamline pressure initiates safety injection (SI) and steam line isolation. Although the tripped channels could have presented a challenge to the SI system, low tavg or steam line pressure did not occur; reactor power was increased to a more stable plateau (approx. 35%) by 2:00 The electrical power fuses were found to have been removed, isolating power to the steam flow instruments, and the flow transmitters were isolated (valved out)
from the steamlines, although the root valves were open. Electrical power was restored and the transmitters valved in at approximately 4:15 on August 19, 1980, during a containment entry. The above times were estimates used by the inspector from discussions with plant personnel and review of strip charts; documentation of the above events were minimal in the Shift Supervisors Log and not entered in the Control Room Operators Lo The licensee stated that the logging of significant events will be discussed again with the operating staff. Subsequent reviews determined that the steam flow instrumenta-tion was calibrated and left operable per Periodic Test (PT) 2.9.A on March 18, 198 The instrument valves were apparently closed after the unsuccessful Type A containment integrated leak rate test in April 1980; various flow paths were isolated to identify containment leakage paths. Due to the generic possibility of additional instrumen-tation isolations on normally quiescent system (e.g., SI flow, auxiliary feedwater flow, etc.) the licensee verified instrument operability on a variety of these systems. Reviews also determined that the electrical fuses were pulled on August 9, 1980 (approx.) in preparation for performing the monthly steam flow instrument calibration (PT 2. 9);
however, the procedure nor proper tagging were used to identify these action As a result of the above, the following items of noncompliance were identifie (1)
Contrary to Technical Specification 3.7.2, the high steam line -
flow instrumentation for actuation of SI was not operable during - -_ :-*
Unit 2 reactor operation. (Infraction 281/80-37-02).
I-4-(2)
Contrary to TS 6.4.D and Section 14 of the VEPCO NPS QA Manual, appropriate tagging was not performed nor were appropriate procedures (PT 2.9 and 2.9A) followed as required when electrical fuses were removed and the transmitters isolated on the six main steam line flow instruments. (Infraction 281/80-37-03).
(3)
Contrary to 10 CFR 50.72(a)(6), the safety related flow instru-mentation isolation, when discovered, was not promptly reported to the NRC (within one hour).
(Deficiency 2_81/80-37-04) Review of Unit 2 Safety Injections. At 5:36 p.m. * on August 22, 1980, Unit 2 was tripped from 75% by initiation of Safety Injection (SI)
from high differential pressure between a main steam line and the steam line header. The SI system performed as require The delta P signal was in for only a fraction of a second before it cleared, and appears to have been ~aused by a momentary pressure drop and spike in the feedwater pump suction pressure due to the introduction of air or gas into the condensate system from the new condensate-polishing equipmen At the time of occurrence, strong vibrations were noted in areas near the main feedwater line A similar SI occurred at 10:05 on August 26, 1980, while Unit 2 was at 75% powe The delta P signal was so short in duration (appro msec) that all trains of SI relays were not able to seal in and remain energize The reactor tripped and the SI train B components initiated, however, certain train A equipment (e LHSI pump A) did not initate or star Vibrations were again noted on the feedwater lines, and some slight damage such as piping insulation falling off and cracking in the grout under the pipe supports was observed on the feedwater lines in the service building machinery space. The damage is being repaire The licensee also examined the feedwater lines, removed certain automatic actions from condensate bypass valve AOV-222, increased the SI delta P setpoint to 120 psid (TS<l50 psid), recalibrated the feedwater control system, performed testing on the condensate polishing system, and has implemented a program for reviewing and evaluating the cause and effect of the vibrations. Unit 2 is currently at 50% power until the review is complete Following thetrain B SI on August 26, 1980, the inspector noted that the Boron Injection Tank (BIT) contents were not injected into the reactor coolant syste The operators had terminated the tank injection after the SI signal cleared and a determination was made which verified that an inadvertent SI had occurred; all systems_
indicated normal during event recurrence at 75% powe The licensee issued instruc.tions to the licensed operators to assure that. safety systems will not be over ridden unless continued operation will result in unsafe plant conditions. Retraining will aiso be conducted on the operation of safety systems during inadvertent safeguards actuation Review and tours of the condensate-polishing (C-P) control room and pipin Stone and Webster and VEPCO engineers are reviewing the C-P systems to determine if air or gas is being entrained in the condensate I
-5-feed to the feedwater system. While inspecting instruments and alarms in the C-P control room, the inspector noted that operating and annuncia-tor alarm response procedures were not available for the C-P system The licensee had required the stationing of a knowledgable engineer at the site 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day to respond to alarms or problems that occur in the C-P system The licensee also committed to have the operating procedures completed and reviewed by September 15, 198 (Item 281/80-37-06) Review of Reportable Occurrences
---*-
~..
.... -*
-
.
..
.. *
.
- .
The inspector reviewed the Reportable Occurrence (RO) reports listed below to ascertain that NRC reporting requirements were being met and to determine the appropriateness of corrective action taken and planned. Certain Licensee Event Reports (LER) were reviewed in greater detail to verify corrective action and determine complia_nce with the Technical Specifications and other regulatory requirement The review included examination of log books, internal correspondence and records, review of SNSOC meeting minutes and discussions with various staff member Within the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were identifie LER 281/80-01 concerned a deficiency in Periodic Test 28.9 that caused deviations from the allowable delta flux bandwidt A change was issued on May 14, 1980 to PT 28.9 to correctly calibrate control board delta flux meter This LER is close LER 281/80-02 concerned eight 1/4 inch boles drilled through the containment liner to install a RT The holes have been repaired and satisfactorily leak tested.--'* *--'*.... _:.... This LER is close LER 281/80-03 concerned the failure to MOV-CW-200B to close electrically due to mechanical repair in progress on the limitorque operator. The valve operated properly following completion of repair~
The licensee agreed to re-examine the CAUSE CODE AND CAUSE SUBCODE (items 12 and 13 on the LER Form) to determine if a supplemental LER is require This LER is close LER 281/80-04 concerned the inoperability of. the Overpressure Mitigating Sy~tem due to an improper valve lineup during shutdow This LER is close....
., _____ -- ---*--***-,-* __,
. -*-** --
- - *--
- - *- -*** -
.... -
-
---*~ -*-- --------
.-.... **-*
.
*-- ---......... *-*** -*-
-**-**. ----- ----- *--~-------------- *-***--** *-**- ------ -- - --------
. ----------**-** **-*-*
.....
- ---~------
-*...... -~--
~--- -*-.
'*:,*.
* **------
*-- --- ---*
..
....
- ------- -----~------- --- - -*----------*-**. LER 281/80-05 concerned leakage through Recirculation Spray Heat Exchanger diaphragm plate seal weld crack The defects were repaired and the heat exhangers were fitted with gaskets between the diaphragm plate and heat exchanger cove The heat exchanger were pressure tested by MOP 7. 1 This LER is close LER 281/80-06 concerned pressurizer level exceeding 33% without over-pressure mitigation protection during depressurization after TYPE "A" containment testin The licensee is reviewing possible actions to prevent recurrence of this inciden This item remains ope LER 281/80-07 concerned loss of power to Unit 2 smoke detectors due to a power supply breaker being ope Affected areas were walked down and the breaker shu This LER is close LER 281/80-08 concerned a high alarm stepoint on the Air Ejector Radiation monitor cuased by instrument drif The monitor was recalibrate This LER is close LER 281/80-09 concerned a Westinghouse reanalysis of fuel clad burst model analysis. The LER form item 13 cause subcode was discussed with the licensee. The LER will be reviewed to determine if a supplemental LER is neede The LER remains open. - Plant Physical Protection
. - -- --
- -----* ---*- -.. *-*...
The inspector verified the following by observation: Gates and doors in protected and vital area barriers were closed -
and locked when not attende Isolation zones described in the physical security plans were not compromised or obstructe,~-...... ~.
.*.**..>--- **' *--
--***
Personnel were properly identified, searched, authorized, badged_
and escorted as necessary for plant access controL* ~-~>
~---~-------
.::. *- _-__ -_-. '... _ :-----:=-:.--: ~ ::-_.;*;.;---;:; _ -::... ~~-=----:-~.:;.-:.:.:=:~_:--;:: -~-:;:: -:~:;:::-~t;:.
-~~~ :---:-::: _-: -.- ~ ::.*.".-:::* ---~~--: _ *-* -::.~= ~:. -: =~::-: ::.::~ ~-~ '::":.. :-=:.--~ :,:~:--.::_:.::-::~.. - -** ---- *- -*. - - *--*--. ----::-_-_ ::-*::.:.:**.::-:-:.: ---_ ~.:::-: