IR 05000280/1980043
| ML18139B189 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 02/06/1981 |
| From: | Burke D, Kellogg P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18139B185 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-80-43, 50-281-80-47, NUDOCS 8103240342 | |
| Download: ML18139B189 (8) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 Report Nos. 50-280/80-43 and 50-281/80-47 Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company Richmond, VA 23261 Facility Name:
Surry Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-280 and 50-281 License Nos. DPR-32 and DPR-37 Inspection at Surry site near Surry, Virginia Inspector: ~ *
~
D. J. Burke
.,
Approvedby:
/
/(,
P. J. Ke l]_o-94,::-See~t.--i-on-µi-i-e-f-,. RONS Branch
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...
SUMMARY Inspection on November 10-26, 1980 Areas Inspected Date Signed This inspection involved 70 resident inspector-hours on site in the areas of plant operations and operating records, plant maintenance and testing, followup on previous findings, and plant securit Results Within the four areas inspected, no violations were found in two areas; one violation was found in the plant operations area (Severity Level IV - failure to promptly identify and take corrective action on three conditions adverse to quality - paragraphs 6.b and 6.c; Severity Level V - failure to follow corrective maintenance procedures for reinsulating a heat-traced borated line - paragraph 6.e).
- DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- J. L. Wilson, Station Manager
- G. Kane, Superintendent, Operations
- R. F. Saunders, Acting Superintendent of Technical Services
- L.A. Johnson, Superintendent, Maintenance R. M. Smith, Health Physics Supervisor
- F. L. Rentz, Resident QC Engineer Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included control room operators, shift supervisors, QC, HP, p 1 ant maintenance, security, engineering, chemistry, administrative, records and contractor personne *Attended exit interview Management Interviews The inspection scope and findings were summarized on a biweekly basis with those persons indicated. in Paragraph 1 above; violations were specifically discussed with the licensee when identifie.
Licensee Action on Previous Findings (Closed) Noncompliance (281/80-19-01) Failure to follow test procedur The Unit 2 Containment Spray Chemical Addition Flow and LHSI Venturi Fl ow Verification Test was satisfactorily reconducted on April 30, 198 The fact that the above Verification Test was not considered a Speci a 1 Test or a Startup Test, which require SRO approva 1, but a Design Change final test, which is not specifically addressed in TS 6.4.E, should not prevent the SRO from reviewing and approving field changes to the test procedures prior to implementation, particularly when safety-related valves and equipment are teste (Closed) Noncompliance (281/80-20-01) Inadequate test procedure. The discrepancies have been corrected and the retraining provide (Closed) Noncompliance (280/80-20-01) Failure to follow procedure OP-1 The trash was promptly removed and the routine containment inspections should assure that trash does not.accumulat (Closed) Noncompliance (280/80-20-02) Inadequate design change control measure Appropriate station personnel are receiving correspondence and analysis from the AE and the corporate offic (Closed) Noncomp 1 i ance ( 281/80-21-01) RHR periodic test 30. 2 doc-umentation inadequate. This item was not an infraction as described in the Notice of Violation, but was a deficiency, as described in the
- report details, paragraph The NRC acknowledgement* letter of September 22, 1980, also confirmed the error in the Notice of Violatio (Closed) Noncompliance (280/80-23-01) Failure to follow procedures for electrical maintenanc The cable trays were cleared and cover installed a~ require Routine inspections of the areas should ensure complianc (Closed) Noncompliance (281/80-24-05) Inadequate test procedures data review. The licensee had identified the test discrepancies and retest-ing was in progress; retesting verified compliance with the require-ments.
. Unreso 1 ved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspectio.
Unit 1 SGRP Unit 1 was shutdown on September 14, 1980, for the Steam Generator Replace-ment Project (SGRP); the outage is expected to last some 11 month During the reporting period, the inspector routinely toured the Unit 1 control room and other plant areas to verify that the plant testing, maintenance,.and repairs were being conducted in accordance with the Technical Specification (TS) and facility procedure Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie Specific areas of inspection included: Observation of the first steam generator lower section moved from Unit 1 containment to the storage mausoleu All three Unit 1 steam generators (SG 1s) have been transported to the mausoleum; no problems were encountered during the move Followup on open item (280/80-30-02), regarding recirculation spray (RS) heat exchanger service water (SW) flow anomalies. Although the RS heat exchanger flow transmitters were properly calibrated, traces of seaweed were found in the instrument lines to the transmitters, and may have caused some of the SW flow anomalie In addition~ the F-SW-106A transmitter tubing was disoriented from its normal position; the transmitter support was removed during the installation of a SW piping support modification, and had not been properly reinstalle The inspector also inspected the inside of the Unit 1 RS heat exchangers when the 24 inch SW pipe e 1 bows were removed; seaweed and she 11 s appeared to be in and plugging some 10 to 20 percent of the SW side tubeshee In addition, the licensee is performing eday-current tube inspection in the RS heat exchangers (Hex); although the tubes appear intact and undergraded, the inspection probe could not be passes through some 50% of the tubes in the A RS Hex due to apparent blockage or obstruction _in the 3/4 inchs OD, 388 inch long tubes. The licensee
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plans to clean and inspect the copper-nickel tubes and determine the cause of the blockage during the current outag The licensee suspects that since the main condenser flow was isolated, and the high level intake screens were inoperable at times during the 2 to 3 weeks of SW flow through the RS Hex's, the seaweed and shells, accumulated in the Hex's during this time was abnorma The licensee is reviewing data and systems to determine the specific cause of the blockage and actions which may be necessary to prevent or a 11 evi ate recurrenc The inspector reviewed some of the ori gi na 1 construction (preoperational) testing performed in May, 1972, on the Unit 1 RS Hex' The RS Hex flows measured from some 8,000 to 12,000 gpm, depending on the intake canal level and the number of Hex' s in service; the design flow rate (minimum) is 6,000 gpm per He The inspector has recently observed abundant sea growth and life (seaweed, fish, crabs, etc) in the high level intake cana Item 280/80-30-02 remains open pending review of the 1 i censee I s evaluations and action Followup on the licensee identified Vascomax bolt break during removal of the Unit 1 SG The cap screw head broke off when it was being *
removed from the steam generator A support pad (foot); the cause of failure is under investigation -
stress corrosion cracking is suspecte An LER (80-63) has been submitte The Vascomax bolts will be replaced with more suitable materials during the outage; the Unit 2 bolts were replaced during the recent SGRP outage. The licensee also reported the discovery of rejectable porosity and inclusion defects (no cracking) in the steam generator main steamline nozzle to elbow welds, in all 3 Unit 1 steamline The original radiographs indicated the same defects; the Unit 2 welds were verified acceptable. The nozzles were replaced in Unit 2 and are being replaced in Unit 1.
. The SGRP is proceeding in a timely and well-organized manner. The preplanning and organization has contributed to the effective house-keeping and cleanliness in the Unit 1 containmen.
Unit 2 Operations
- Except for the Unit 2 reactor trip on November 1, 1980, as discussed below, the unit operated at full power durihg Novembe During this time, the inspector routinely toured the Unit 2 control room and other plant areas to verify that the plant operations, testing, and maintenance were being conducted in accordance with the facility Technical Specifications (TS) and procedures. Specific areas of inspection and review included the following: Review of the Unit 2 reactor trip at 1643 on 11/1/80, when a concrete jackhammer contacted one of the buried Reserve Station Service (RSS)
power line Construction personnel were using the jackhammer to prepare the turbine building basement floor prior to installation of *
new concrete pad for a storage tank. Design Change 77-19B-2, Makeup Water Treatment System Modifications for Unit 1 - Civil/Strucutral, was in use, and procedure precaution 3.4 stated, 11 Breaking into existing concrete should proceed with caution in case unknown pipes or con-ditions not shown on the drawings are encountered 11 *
DC 77-19B-2 and the procedures did not specifically state that the power cables from C RSS transformer were in the concrete. In addition, personnel jack-hammering were verbally instructed to penetrate to a maximum depth of 6 inches, since the construction prints indicated the power cables were located 15 inches below the concrete floor surface. However, certain C RSS cables were found to be only 6 to 8 inches below the concrete surfac When the jackhammer bit contacted the 4.160 volt AC power cab~e, the C RSS breaker opened to isolate the electrical fault, which de-energized the Unit 2J emergency bu The* jackhammer operator was electrically shocked and hospitalized for treatment and observation before returning to work. The #3 emergency diesel generator started and re-energized the 2J emergency bus; however, the momentary loss of power caused a turbine runback and shifted the C SG main feedwater regulating valve to manua This resulted in a turbine trip some 4 minutes later due to a high level in C S The licensee back-fed the F transfer bus from the shutdown Unit 1 until the damaged cable was replace The licensee also noted that certain anchor bolt drilling and pull testing was performed in the same floor area and found one additional PVC cable duct or conduit damaged; the buried PVC was repaired and all systems have been returned to norma During plant tours and valve position verification, the inspector observed significant rainwater leaking into the Unit 2 Safeguards Building (valve pit) on November 24, 1980. Since the rainwater was leaking through the building roof and roof plugs onto the A Low Head Safety Injection (LHSI) and Outside Recirculation Spray (ORS) pump motors and electrical equipment (eg-conduit and junction boxes)~ the licensee proceeded to electrically test the motors and electrical equipmen Periodic tests were satisfactorily completed on the B LHSI and ORS pumps before the A pumps were taken out of service for electrical checks. At 7 p.m. on 11/24/80, the power cable to LHSI pump 2~SI-P-1A was found wet and electrically shorted, rendering the pump inoperabl Water had accumulated in the electrical junction box between the power supply cable and the pump motor leads, shorting the cable connections. The A LHSI pump was last tested on 11/16/80 with no problems. The electrical breaker for the A LHSI pump motor heaters was also found open for no apparent reason. While work was proceeding to return the A LHSI pump to service, heat 1 amps and e 1 ectri ca 1 heaters were applied to the A ORS pump motor; when the A ORS electrical tests were performed some several hours later, no electrical problems were identified. The water leaks, which led to the above condition adverse to quality, appear to have existed since Unit 2 restart in August, 1980, without prompt identification and corrective action being taken as required by Criterion XVI of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50 and Section 16 of the Vepco NPS QA Manua This. is a Severity Level IV Violation (281/80-47-01). The building roof was subsequently temporarily
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repaired with sealing putty. Roof repairs are also in progress on the auxiliary, service, and turbine buildings to correct the rainwater leak Some of the rainwater flows into contaminated sumps which increases the amount of water (liquids) which must be inventored and processed through the liquid waste system and dispose While in the Unit 2 Safeguards Building (SB) valve pit on 11/24/80, the inspector observed that the 6 inch Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system piping from the containment penetration had a broken (unattached) floor suppor The RHR piping traverses the Safeguards Building on its way to the RWS This is a second example of the above Severity Level IV Violation (281/80-47-01).
The licensee is evaluating the piping and penetration to determine if overstresses may exis While in the Auxiliary Building basement on 11/24/80, the inspector observed several loose, missing or broken U-bolt pipe supports on the Unit 2 charging pump service water and component cooling water subsystems in the area of the 2-SW-E-lB heat exchanger and flow indicators. This is a third example of failure by the licensee to promptly identify and correct conditions adverse to quality, and is included in the *above violation (281/80-47-01).
The licensee is repairing or replacing the U-bolts on the Class I SW system and is reviewing the effects of the as found conditio On November 15, and i6, 1980, the licensee completed modifications to the emergency diesel generator output breakers to assure that the EDG 1 s would not close onto rotating equipment which may be out of phase with the EOG power; a 2 second time delay was added to the output breaker circuitr On November 24, 1980, the inspector observed that several feet of the Unit 2 heat traced Boron Injection Tank (BIT) reciruclation line (1 11 CH-230-152), upstream of TV-2884C was not insulate Corrective maintenance procedures EMP-C-HT-20 and MMP-C-017 require reinstallation of insulation removed during maintenanc This failure to adequately follow the above procedures is contrary to Technical Specification 6.4.A.7 and 6.4.0, and is a Severity Level V Violation (281/80-47-02).
BIT recirculation flow was verified to assure that boron precipitation or plugging did not occu While reviewing control room annunicator alarms, the inspector observed 2 of the 3 accumulator low pressure alarms annunicated on Unit Slight nitrogen leaks in the accumulators or piping requires near daily charging of the accumulators to maintain the TS minimum pressure of 600 psi a. The operators generally control pressure between 600 and 640 psig; however, once the low alarm is blocked and careful monitoring of the pressure is require The licensee stated that the accumulators will be properly repressurized when the low pressure alarm occurs, ~o clear the accumulator alarms.
6 General Items The inspector reviewed and closed the following 10 CFR Part 21 Reports:
(Closed) 10 CFR Part 21 Report dated 6/25/79 concerning the receipt *of Unit 2 type 304 stainless steel piping with a chemically analyzed low chromium content. The two lengths of non-compliant 3 inch 304SS piping were scrappe (Closed) 10 CFR Part 21 Report dated 8/10/79 concerning certain steam generator (SG) helicoil inserts which were found with inadequate bolt hole engagemen The SG bolt holes were repaired and new helicoils inserted as required in all six new SG 1 On 11/18/80, the inspector observed Unit 2 Radiation Monitor RM-220 in the high alarm conditio RM-220 monitors the Unit 2 Setvite Water (SW) and condenser effluent to the discharge carrel. Since all liquid disposals are made into the Unit 1 discharge, the licensee is inspect-ing RM-220 to determine if moisture or welding activity is causing the erratic RM behavior. Samples of the Unit 2 effluent determined that no detectable activity was present in the effluen On November 22, 1980, a fire was reported in the protective (anti-c)
clothing (PC) storage room under the Unit 1 containment equipment hatch entranc The PC 1s were apparently ingited by a portable electric heater in use near the clothing. The fire team responded to the-fire, extinguished it, and secured from the fire in some 15 minute One emp 1 oyee was subsequently treated for smoke i nha 1 at ion from the smoldering PC 1 A station deviation was also submitted on the potentially contaminated firewater runoff into the nearby storm drain, due to the unplanned releas Reactor cavity area and containment sump inspection:
The incore room sump pump has no control or verification of running from the control roo Pump operation is initiated by an attached_
float switch located in the 18 1 sum However, the sump pit has a high 1 eve 1 a 1 arm that annunciates in the contra 1 roo Review of civil drawings of the -27.9 1 level of the containment indicates that if sump pit pump malfunctions occur, wetting of the incore tubes could resul There exists no other*designed flowpaths from the cavity area other than the sump pit discharge pat A construction access port exists but contains a water tight plu There is no service water (open system) piping within the cavity are The containment sumps collect the drainage from the floor area outside of the cavity area via a troug The cavity area sump discharges to the containment sum There are 2 sump pumps with controllers in the control roo The sump has a high level alarm and level indication in the control roo The sump will over-flow to the recirculation sump where 2 additional level indicators are availabl The inspector had no further questions at this tim L 7 Plant Physical Protection The inspector verified the following by observation: Gates and doors in protected and vital area barriers were closed and locked when not attende b.. Isolation zones described in the physical security plans were not compromised or obstructe Personnel were properly identified, searched, authorized, badged and escorted as necessar~ for plant access control.