IR 05000280/1980039
| ML18139A990 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 11/25/1980 |
| From: | Burke D, Kellogg P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18139A986 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-80-39, 50-281-80-43, NUDOCS 8101160706 | |
| Download: ML18139A990 (10) | |
Text
UNITED ST/4.TES f'IUCLE/\\R REGUU\\TCRY COMMISSION REGlON I!
101 MARIETTA ST., IJ.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 Report Nos. 50-280/80-39 and 50-281/80-43 Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company Richmond, VA 23261 Facility Name:
Surry Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-280 and 50-281 License Nos. DPR-32 and DPR-37 Inspection at Surry site near. Surry, Virginia SUMMARY Inspection on September 2 - October 3, 1980 Areas Inspected This inspection involved 98 (resident) inspector-hours on site in the areas of plant operations and operating records, plant modifications, maintenance and testing, refueling activities, Licensee Event Reports, and plant securit Results Of the six areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in four areas; two items of noncompliance were found in two areas, (Infraction -
failure to properly evaluate and document installation of a jumper hose on sump piping - paragraph 6.a, Infraction - failure to properly seal Unit 1 containment door during refueling - paragraph 5.b).
- DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- J. L. Wilson, Station Manager
- G. Kane, Superintendent, Operations
- T. A. Peebles, Superintendent, Technical Services
- R. F. Saunders, Assistant Station Manager L. A. Johnson, Superintendent, Maintenance R. M. Smith, Supervisor, Health Physics F. L. Rentz, Resident QC Engineer D. J. Fortin, Engine~ring Services Superintendent Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included control room operators, shift supervisors, QC, HP, plant maintenance, security, engineering, chemistry, administrative, and contractor personne *Attended exit interview Management Interviews The inspection scope and findings were summarized on a biweekly basis with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 abov.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspector Findings Not inspecte.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve noncompliance or deviation New unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in Paragraph.
Unit 1 Operations Unit 1 operated at reduced power in an end of core life coastdown condition until September 14, 1980, when the Unit 1 was shutdown from 75% of full power due to increasing steam generator tube leakag During the the reporting period, the inspector routinely toured the Unit 1 control room and other plant areas to verify that the plant operations, testing, and maintenance were being conducted in accordance with the Technical Specifi-cations (TS) and facility procedure Specific areas of inspection and review included the following:
-2-Unit 1 was returned to operation on August 13, 1980, following steam generator (SG) repairs after the July 31, 1980, shutdown due to increasing SG tube leakag On September 13, 1980, the licensee detected increasing tube leakage on the lB SG, when the leakage increased to some 0.3 gpm on September 14, 1980, the Unit was shutdown in accordance with the Technical Specification The SG replacement outage for Unit 1 began on the following day, September 15, 1980, and is expected to last some 11 month The inspector observed certain Unit 1 defueling (refueling)
activities on September 24, 1980, to verify that the activities were being conducted in accordance with the plant Technical Specifica-tions (TS).
Appropriate licensed personnel were utilized during fuel movement and direct communication was maintained between the control room and the refueling area; the boron samples were within TS 3.10 limits and the source range detector was in servic The periodic tests (PT's) required prior to defueling such as PT 20.1, "Fuel
"Fuel Handling System, PT 26.4, "Radiation Monitoring Equipment Tests",
and PT 32. 1 "HEPA Charcoal Filter Tests", were reviewed and no dis-crepancies were found by the inspector. While witnessing fuel movement, the inspector noted that the refueling cavity water level appeared to be approximately one foot below the 27 foot mark on the reactor refueling cavity wall. Although the cavity water level is not addressed in the TS, Operating Procedure 4.1, "Controlling Procedure for Re-fueling", step 4.7, states that any time fuel is being moved, a depth of 27 feet+ 6 inches of water must be maintained as read at the reactor cavit The SRO and Shift Supervisor took immediate action to raise the reactor cavity water level for subsequent fuel movement. Radiation measurements in the area did not vary with the water level chang While touring the Unit 1 containment on September 24, 1980, the inspec-tor observed that the Unit 1 containment equipment door (hatch) was not properly closed during refueling conditions; the escape airlock hatch was not installed in the equipment door and the door and the the blank metal flange installed on the equipment floor to substitute for the escape hatch was not properly seale About half of the flange bolts were in place and tight, but several were not and outside
"daylight" was observed between the metal to metal seal in areas where the blank flange appeared warped or ben This is contrary to TS 3.10.A.1, and is an infraction (280/80-30-01).
The inspector reviewed the refueling containment integrity checklist (Attachment 4 to OP-4.1), and noted that step 1, which verifies that the equipment hatch and escape trunk are properly closed, was signed-off but no remarks or deviations were note The licensee took corrective action to temporarily resolve the improper seal for defueling, and is reviewing OP-4-While reviewing Unit 1 control room instrumentation, the inspector observed flow variations in the recirculation spray (RS) heat exchanger exchanger service water flow instrumentation display The RS water service water isolation valves (SW-103, A, B, C, and D) were opened *
-3-on September 17, 1980, and remained open for several day During this time, the instrument display of service water flow through certain of the RS heat exchangers (A, B, C, and D) randomly varied from zero to some 5,000 gp This item remains open pending licensee evaluation and determination of the cause of the flow anomalie (280/80-39-02). Licensee inspection of the low pressure (LP) turbines determined that the recent increased turbine vibration was the result of the loss of an L-1 row shroud piece from the generator end of LP-2; the turbines will be rebuilt by Westinghouse during the outag Unit 2 Operations Unit 2 operated at power from September 5 through October 3, 1980:
The Unit tripped from 97% power on September 4, 1980, due to low steam generator A level caused by a broken instrument air line to the A feedwater regulating valve which reduced the feedwater flo During the reporting period, the inspector routinely toured the Unit 2 control room and other plant areas to verify that the plant operations, testing, and maintenance were being conducted in accordance with the Technical Specifications (TS)
and facility procedure Specific areas of inspection and review included the following: While reviewing safety-related valve alignments and positions on September 12, 1980, in the Unit 2 safeguards building, the inspector observed several feet of standing water in the valve pit or basement of the buildin On September 15, 1980, several inches of water were also observed in the auxiliary building basement and on the basement floors of Unit 1 and Unit 2 containment The licensee took action to remove and process the water from these areas over the ensuing weeks (due to the large volume) and eliminated the standing wate At the request of the inspector, the licensee analyzed the water in the containments and the Unit 2 safeguards valve pit; the following results were obtained (activities in ucuries/ml and rounded to the nearest whole number):
Sample Csl34 Cs137 Co58 Co60 Il31 A-'* "
lE-4 lE-5 4E-5 4E-5 lE-3 C*
2E-5 3E-5 5E-6 2E-5 2E-4 n**A..
- Sample A taken 9/15, 1645, from Unit 2 valve pit
- ',Sample B taken 9/16, 0755, from Unit 2 valve pit
- Sample C taken 9/16, 0755, Unit 2 containment
- Sample D taken 9/16, 1637, Unit 1 containment I133 Xe133 2E-4 8E-5 2E-4 3E-4 3E-6 3E-5 3E-4 2E-4 Chemical anslyses of the Unit 2 valve pit water on 9/15/80 showed:
ph
= 7.8, conductivity= 620 umhos, chlorides= 205 ppm, and boron con = 82 pp * The water in the Unit 2 valve pit appeared to have come from the Unit 1 and 2 containment sump On September 16, 1980, the inspector observed that the Unit 2 Safeguards valve pit sump piping had been modified by the installation of a jumper hose on the piping to the valve 2-DA-43, and no record, safety evaluation, procedure, or jumper log entry for the installation had been complete The jumper, with 2-DA-43 open, apparently led to the inadvertent diversion of Unit 1 and 2 containment sump water into the Unit 2 Safeguards building valve pit (basement), where several reet of radioactive standing water was previously observe The installation of the jumper without proper evaluation or documentation is contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 and Section 14 of the VEPCO NPS QA Manual, and is an infraction (280/80-43-01).
While reviewing the Unit 2 Control Room Operator (CRO) logs, the inspector inquired about the increased RCS leakage (approx. 1 gpm)
which occurred on 9/20/8 A containment walkdown of RCS components and piping was performed by operations personnel with satisfactory *
results. The RCS leak rate determination was reperformed with acceptable, reduced results (less than 1 gpm unidentified leakage); a few minor leaks were identified during system walkdowns, and corrective action was take The licensee implemented the more comprehensive procedure OP-5.3.1 for RCS leak rate determination and continued investigation of the leakage; no increase in containment gaseous or particulate activity was observe On 9/23/80, the licensee found an instrument drain line open on the A reactor coolant pump seal water injection flow transmitter (FT-2-120A).
When the three-eighths inch drain line was isolated, RCS leakage decreased by some 0.7 gp While in the condensate-polishing control room, the inspector observed that operating and annunicator alarm response procedures were available for the C-P system Open item 280/80-37-06 is close The inspector noted that certain protection channel alarms such as feedwater flow mismatch with steam flow, and steamline to header delta P (pressure)
still occur every few days in the Unit 2 reactor control room; the licensee is investigating and evaluating the continued occurrence of these alarm spike At the end of September, the licensee discovered that the bottom stoplogs were inadvertently left in the Unit 2 high level intake structure screenwells A, B, and D (none left in C).
Four gate-type stoplogs, each 9 foot, 2 inches high are used to isolate each 36 foot deep screenwell intake to the main condenser pipin TS 3.14. requires the high level intake canal to be at least + 18 feet elevation prior to unit op*eration. The inspector determined that the minimum recorded canal level since the startup of Unit 2 was some 25 feet, which indicates that the required 18 foot elevation of water may have been jeopardized when the stoplogs were in plac The licensee is evaluating the level and depth measurement The high level canal is used for long term cooling of vital service water subsystems such as the recirculation spray and charging pump cooling systems. In *
-5-addition, the licensee could not locate two portable pumps (4 inch discharge) which were left in the 2A screenwell following the Unit 2 SGR The use of the stoplogs and possible location and effects of the portable pumps on the intake and service water systems is an unresolved item (281/80-43-02) pending completion of the licensee evaluations and NRC review of the On 9/30/80, the licensee manually closed motor operated valve (MOV)
2535 due to valve closure problems identified during stroke testing of the MO MOV-2535 isolates the pressurizer power operated relief valve PCV-245 The alternate Unit 2 PORV (PCV-2455C) was previously closed due to valve leakage. The safety relief valves are operable to reliev and protect the primary system; the inspector had no further questions at this tim The licensee performed testing of the Process Vent System knock-out (water trap) drum to verify valve and level instrument operability, with acceptable result Review of Reportable Occurrences The inspector reviewed the Reportable Occurrence (RO) reports listed below to ascertain that NRC reporting requirements were being met and to determine the appropriateness of corrective action taken and planne Certain Licensee Event Reports (LER) were reviewed in greater detail to verify corrective action and determine compliance with the Technical Specifications and other regulatory requirements. The review included examination of log books, internal correspondence and records, review of SNSOC meeting minutes, and discussions with various staff member Within the areas inspected no items of noncompliance were identifie LER 280/80-1 concerned snubber l-WFPD-HSS-14 which was found with an empty reservior and declared inoperapl The snubber was replaced with an operable one. This LER is close LER 280/80-2 concerned Flow recorder (FR-LW-104A) malfunction duirng release of LWTT #80-95 when the chart paper drive gears disengaged from the paper rolle The operators were instructed to observe recorder operation before releases. This LER is close LER 280/80-3 concerned the failure of a feedwater bypass valve to close on loss of air pressure due to a dirty and sticking pilot valv The pilot valve was cleaned and the bypass valve retested satisfactorily. This LER is close LER 280/80-4 concerned the failure of check valve 1-FW-89 in a discharge line of the Auxiliary Feedwater pumps to close. During internal inspection described in LER 280/80-23 the valve disc was subsequently found to be detatche The valve was repaire LER 280/80-4 is closed; a supplement to LER 280/ 80-23 will be submitte *
-6-LER 280/80-5 concerned the failure of a heat tracing circuit due to a failed thermosta The thermostat was replace This LER is close LER 280/80-6 concerned a circulation pump between two liquid waste tanks that was left on during a liquid waste release. Personnel have been reinstructed in the use of appropriate procedure This LER is close LER 280/80-7 concerned heat tracing failure due to water penetration damag The heat tracing was replace This LER is close LER 280/80-8 concered the discharge valve (1-CH-83) from the Unit 1 Boric Acid Filter being inadvertently closed for three hours due to a tagging report error. Procedures and administra-tive controls have been revised to prevent reoccurrenc This LER is close LER 280/80-9 concerned the failure of Boric Acid Transfer pump 1-CH-P-2A due to pump shaft failur A new shaft was installed. This LER is closed. LER 280/80-10 concerned an overstressed condition on line 18-CC-9-121 that theoretically could occur in the event of a Design Basis Earthquak An additional constraint was installe A supplement to correct the system code on the LER is under revie LER 280/80-11 concerned a heat tracing failure. The heat tracing tape was replaced. This LER is close.
LER 280/80-12 concerned another failed heat tracing tape, which was replace The licensee plans to implement major changes to the heat tracing systems as a result of engineering analyses and revie This LER is close LER 280/80-13 addressed the accumulator tank 1-SI-TK-lA level and pressure deviation due to control valve HCV-1852A sticking open until reclose The tank was restored to within limits and the valve has operated satisfactorily since the even The licensee will review the system and cause codes on the LER, and submit a supplement to the LE LER 280/80-15 concerned a radiation monitor in the component cooling system; the setpoint was found above the established limit during routine daily periodic tests. The RM-CC-106 monitor was recalibrated and the setpoint adjusted. This LER is close LER 280/80-16 concerned an inadvertent release from Liquid Waste Test Tank, 1-LW-TK-llb prior to sampling due to operator error. This LER is close *
-7-LER 280/80-17 concerned the improper tagging of the vacuum pump for process vent monitors RM-GW-101 and RM-GW-10 No releases from the waste gas decay tanks were made during the pump inoperabilit Operations personnel were reinstructed in the use of appropriate proceudres. This LER is close LER 280/80-18 concerned excessive stess on IE Bulletin 79-14 lines in containment in the event of a Design Basis Accident. Extra constraints have been installed. This LER is close LER 280/80-19 concerned incorrect volumes being used for contaminated drain tanks. This LER is close LER 280/80-20 concerned the inadvertent tagging of all three heat tracing circuits for the Boric Acid Filter Syste The licensee was requested to correct the cause code in a supplement to the LE LER 280/80-21 concerned a snubber with a low fluid level in the reservoir. The snubber was repaired. This LER is close LER 280/80-22 concerned two snubbers installed improperly with the reservior below the valve block. The snubbers were purged and installed properl The licensee was requested to correct the cause in a supple-ment to the LE LER 280/80-23 addressed the failure of auxiliary feedwater (AFW) check valves 1-FW-27 and 8 A followup report will be submitted on 1-FW-27; the licensee will also review LER 280/80-4 and determine if the following sentence in LER 280/80-23 is appropriate: Since the problem occurred after the plant was brought to cold shutdown, the health and safety of the general public was not affecte LER 280/80-24 concerned ECCS water gravity dilution of the RCS from some 3090 ppm to 2570 ppm boron without containment integrity. The periodic test was revised to prevent recurrenc (See Inspection Report 50-280/80-19). This LER is close LER 280/80-25 concerned high leak rates on containment isolation valves during PT 16. The valves were repaired and tested satisfactorily prior to startup. This LER is close LER 280/80-26 concerned an axial flux difference deviation caused by an unscheduled boron addition. Reactor power was reduced as require This LER is close LER 280/80-27 concerned an unsampled Liquid Test Tank discharge due to an open discharge valv OP 22.9 was revised to prevent recurrence.
This LER is close a LER 280/80-28 concerned a gaseous waste tank inadvertent release when the tank inlet valve was left ope The procedure was revised to prevent recurrence. This LER is close '
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,.,
-8-b LER 280/80-29 concerned a vital bus sola transformer failure that resulted in a reactor trip and safety injectio (See Inspection Report 50-280/80-20). This LER is close c LER 280/80-31 concerned a heat tracing failure caused by a defective circuit breaker. The breaker was replaced. This LER is close d LER 280/80-32 concerned air ejector divert valves TV-SV-102/202 being under rated for the control air pressure supplie The solenoid valves were replaced with the correct model. This LER is close e LER 280/80-33 concerned a non-conservative assumption in the interim NPSH analysis for the recirculation spray pumps which would possibly cause excessive temperature and pressure in containment under accident condition A technical specifications change for Unit 2 has been approved and implemente The technical specification change for Unit 1 will be implemented after the steam generator replacement outage prior to Unit 1 startu (See Inspection Report 50-280/80-20).
This LER is close f LER 280/80-34 concerned heat tracing failure due to excessive hea The heat tracing tape was replaced and a design change initiated to prevent overheating. This LER is closed.
g LER 280/80-35 concerned defective heat tracing tape which has been replaced. This LER is close h LER 280/80-37 concerned the identification, during periodic testing of an inoperative radiation monitor on the air ejector discharge lin The monitor was repaired and returned to service. This LER is close i LER 280/80-38 concerned an unsampled release from l-BR-TK-2B due to a leaking isolation valv The valve was repaired and a program of routine inspection of valves is in effect. This LER is close j LER 280/80-40 concerned steam generator lC tube leakag The leaking tubes were plugged, and the unit is currently undergoing steam generator replacement. This LER is close k LER 280/80-41 concerned excessive stress on pipe supports in the component cooling syste Modifications to the affected lines were made. This LER is close.
LER 280/80-43 concerned a condenser inlet valve that would not close when operated from the control roo The valve motor was repaired and similar motors were inspected. This LER is close m LER 280/80-44 concerned a breaker for a diesel fuel oil transfer pump being found open; the alternate flow path and pum)? were operabl This LER is close..
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-9-n LER 280/80-45 concerned an unsampled Boron Recovery Test Tank release due to a leaking valve diaphrag The valve was repaired and controls have been established to sample both tanks prior to release This LER is close o LER 280/80-47 concerned low flow on the process vent radiation monitoring equipment due to crimped tubin The tubing was repaire This LER is close p LERs 280/80-48, 49 and 50 concerned heat tracing failure In each case the failed tape was replaced. These LERs are close.
Plant Physical Protection The inspector verified the following by observation: Gates and doors in protected and vital area barriers were closed and locked when not attende Isolation zones described in the physical security plans were not compromised or obstructe Personnel were properly identified, searched, authorized, badged and escorted as necessary for plant access control.