IR 05000280/1979067
| ML18139A047 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 01/22/1980 |
| From: | Robert Lewis NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Proffitt W VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18139A046 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8003190844 | |
| Download: ML18139A047 (8) | |
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In Reply Refer To:
RII:DJB S0-280/79-67 50-281/79-89 e
UNITED STAl:-e°~
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 JAN 2 2 1s*,9 Virginia Electric and Power Company ATTN:
W. L. Proffitt Senior Vice President, Power P. 0. Box 26666 Richmond, VA 23261 Gentlemen:
e This refers to the inspection conducted by D. J. Burke of this office on November 1 - December 14, 1979, of activities authorized by NRC Operating License Nos. DPR-32 and DPR-37 for the Surry facility, and to the discussion of our findings held with W. L. Stewart at the conclusion of the inspectio Areas examined during the inspection and our findings are discussed in the enclosed inspection repor Within these areas*, the inspection consisted of selective examinations of procedures and representative records, interviews with personnel, and observations by the inspecto We have examined actions you have taken with regard to previously identified enforcement matters and unresolved item The status of these items is discussed in the enclosed repor During the inspection, it was found that certain activities under your license appear to be' in noncompliance with NRC requirements~
This item and references to pertinent requirements are listed in the Notice of Violation enclosed here-with as Appendix A.. This notice is sent to you pursuant to the provisions of Section 2.201 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulation Section 2.201 requires you to submit to this office, within 20 days of your receipt of this notice, a written statement or explanation in reply including:
(1) corrective steps which have been taken by you and the results achieved; (2) corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further noncom-pliance; and (3) the date when full compliance will be achieved.
In accordance with Section 2. 790 of the NRC' s Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and the enclosed inspection report will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Roo If this report contains any information that you (or your contractor) believe to be proprietary, it is necessary that you make a written application within 20 days to this office to withhold such information from public disclosur 'Any such application must include a full statement of the reasons on the basis of which it is claimed that the information is proprietary, and should be prepared so that proprietary information identified in the application is contained in a separate part of the documen If we do not hear from you in this regard within the specified period, the report will be placed in the Public Document Roo '
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e Virginia Electric and Power
.Company-2-e JAN 2 2 1979 Should you have any questions concerning this letter, we will be glad to discuss them with yo
Sincerely, R4e:~)f-~-
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Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch
Enclosures:
Appendix A, Notice of Violation Inspection Report Nos. 50-280/79-67 and 50-281/79-89
REGION II==
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 Report Nos. 50-280/79-67 and 50-281/79-89 Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company Richmond, Virginia 23261 Facility Name: Surry Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-280 and 50-281 License No DPR-32 and DPR-37 Inspection at SUMMARY Inspection on November 1 - December 14, * 1979 Areas Inspected e
ate Signed 2h~6t, Date S~gned This routine, announced inspection involved 120 inspector-hours onsite in the areas*of plant operations and operating records, plant maintenance, and plant securit Results Of the three areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or ueviations were
£ound in two areas; one apparent item of noncompliance was found in the remaining area (Infraction - failure to follow corrective maintenance procedures - paragraph 5.a.). Persons Contacted Licensee Employees e
DETAILS Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO)
- W. L. Stewart, Station Manager
- J. L. Wilson, Superintendent,Operations
- T. A. Peebles, Superintendent, Technical Services
- R. F. Saunders, Superintendent, Maintenance R. M. Smith, SUpervisor, Health Physics R. L. Baldwin, Supervisor, Administ.rative Services G. Kane, Operating Supervisor
- F. L. Rentz, Resident QC Engineer M. R. Kansler, Acting Engineering Supervisor e
Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included control room operators, shift supervisors, QC, HP, plant maintenance, security, engineering; and administrative personne *Attended exit interview Management Interviews The scope and findings were summarized on a weekly basis with those persons indicated in Paragraph l abov The item of noncompliance was discussed and licensee action to resolve the specific discrepancy was in progres.
Licensee Action on Previous Findings (Closed) Noncomplaince (280/78-21-03) -
Failure to take adequate corrective actions to reduce the high flux setpoint when significant differences between the calorimetric and nuclear power were observe The inspector verified that PT-35 was revised to specify that trip setpoint will be reduced by the ratio of the indicated to calculated power if gain adjustments cannot bring the nuclear instruments into agreement with calculated power. The inspector had no further question (Closed) Unresolved Item (280/281/78-21-0l) - Error in FQ (Z) equation in Technical Specification 3.12.B.1. The correct equation was included in TS change no 57, and appropriate TS amendments were issued by the NR The current TS 3.12.B.1 equation: is corn~c (Closed) Noncomplaince (280/79-55-01) - Failure to follow radiation control procedures for welding and grinding S/G A feedwater line; respirators required but not use The radiation and administrative controls detailed in the response letter have been implemented and have significantly improved the controls for radiation workers who
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e e-2-Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspectio.
Units 1 and 2 Operations and Maintenance Unit 1 has operated at or near full power since startup on October 24, 197 Unit 2 is in the SG replacement outag To conduct the operations inspections, the inspector routinely toured the Unit 1 and 2 control rooms and certain plant areas to verify that the plant operations were in accor-dance with the Technical Specifications (TS) and facility procedure Plant logs, maintenance records, equipment and instrumentation were also reviewe Specific areas of inspection and results included the following items:
a.
. CVCS Heat Tracing - The licensee has replaced nearly half of the heat tracing in the chemical and volume control system with a new tape which is more resistant to mechanical, chemical and heat damage; additional circuit separation and special testing is in progress and new electrical equipment and boric acid transfer pumps will be installe The results of the circuit testing due to annunicated heat tracing alarms** are documented in the PT-27 test series and the control room log While following up on tl:ie plugged emergency borate line on November 20, 1979, the inspector noted that some three feet of heat traced piping downstream of the emergency borate valve MOV-1350, had no insulation over the top of the pipe run, the bottom half of this two inch diameter pipe was insulate Since corrective maintenance procedures EMP-C-HT-20 and MMP-C-G-017 require reinstallation of insulation removed during maintenance, the procedures apparently were not followe This is an infraction (280/79-67-01) which may have aggravated or led to the emergency b9rate line pluggin At the request of the inspector, the licencsee flow tested the alternate (manual) emergency borate line and found it plugged also. One of the three flow paths from the boric acid tanks to the charging pumps was operable (normal makeup through. the blender) in accordance with TS 3.2.B.4, and a flow path from the RWST to the charging pumps was operable to establish at least two flow paths to the cor The licensee reinstalled the emergency borate line and determined by flow testing on November 26, 1979, that the line was no longer plugged; flow in the line is verified daily by cycling MOV-135 While the borate lines were out of service, a Standing Order supplemented the Abnormal Procedure (AP-3) for emergency boration~ Valve and Equipment Operability - The inspector reviewed the Deviation Report (79-236) concerning the removal of the blank flange from the Unit 1 containment suction piping to the hydrogen analyzers, without leak rate testing the isolation valves 1-GW-182 and 1-GW-183 outside containmen The valves were verified closed and had no leakage when tested; in addition, the licensee is verifying that the hydrogen sample system is a Class I, leaktight system (Open item 79-67~02).
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e e-3-The inspector also reviewed the Deviation Report 79-234 which involved the discovery during testing, of a small amount of foreign material on Unit 2 containment isolation valve 2-VP-1 Plant procedures speci-fically prohibit the use of any foreign materials on safety related valve internal Since some rust was noted on the valve internals during maintenance, maintenance personnel applied a thin film of silicone grease to inhibit rust on this vacuum priming valve which they considered non-safety related. Plant personnel were reinstructed on the use of grease or other materials on safety related valves, and a list of all containment isolation valves has been provided to main-tenance personnel to assure that appropriate maintenance procedures will be utilize The Unit was not operated with the grease on the valve, and the valve has been cleaned and leak teste The inspector reviewed Unit 1 containment temperatures and pressures, and the service water temperatures to verify that the parameters were within the more restrctive limits identified on November 28, 1979 as a result of the reduction in the analyzed containment spray effectiveness; the parameters were within the revised limit Snubbers - The inspector reviewed Unit 1 and 2 snubber data as a result of information regarding the scoring (or scratching) of the shafts and glands on large bore Bergen-Patterson (B-P) hydraulic snubber The licensee uses two large bore (12") B-P sriubbers on each re.actor coolant pump; althrough scoring had been noted, the snubbers were determined operable by visual inspections since they are too large to test (1 million lb., TS 4. 17. D).
Visual snub be rs inspections performed in accordance with PT-39 over the past year have verified no measurable leakage from the reservoirs or seal The licensee plans to func-tionally test these large snubbers at the* Wyle Laboratories facility prior to their reinstallation in Unit This matter remains open pending the results of this and other licensee's testing of the large B-P snubbers (281/79-89-01). Periodic Testing - the inspector reviewed certain periodic tests (PT)
and observed the performance of certain periodic testing to verify that the PT's and that the results were satisfactory. While observing the performance of 1-PT-17.1, Containment Spray Pump Operability testing on December 5; 1979, the inspector noted that when test personnel went to open valve CS 68, the valve was found ope CS 68 is a 3/ 4 inch normally closed valve from the CS pump discharge to the RWS A Deviation Report was submitted and the licensee determined that the open valve would not have affected the operability of the CS system; each CS pump discharges into a redundant 8 inch pipelin The inspector noted that CS 68 was verified closed on the Unit 1 startup checklist completed in October, 197 The licensee stated that the valve was apparently left open after the performance of the last monthly PT-17.1 conducted on November 4, 1979, although PT-17.1 contains a specific procedural step (5.2.*4) to close CS-68 and was signed-off. In addition, on December 14, 1979, the licensee found Unit 1 manual valves
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e e-4-CS-39 and CS-43 closed which isolate MOV-CS-102B, the ES valve which opens to deliver sodium hydroxide from the chemical addition tank to the RWST upon containment spray initiatio The redundant l1ne and MOV-CS-102A were operabl The licensee is submitting an LER on this occurrenc PT-19.1 also contains specific steps (5.3.5 and 5.3.6) to reopen CS-43 and CS-39, and was signed-of The licensee's review of the above items determined that the improper valve line-ups may have been the result of administrative control confusion by personnel performing the PT since the official PT is retained in the control room for valve timing and equipment operation, while the field copy is
"completed" at the equipment location and the data transferred to the official PT when field personnel return to the control roo Although the field personnel use a copy of the PT for conduct of the test, they are not required to sign off each step until they return to the control room and sign off the official P Thus, the step by step signoff of the PT in the control room may be dependent on field personnel recall or memory of the steps complete To correct this, the licensee reinstructed personnel to complete and sign-off each PT step in the field as it is performed and to transfer the data from the field copy to the official copy of the PT when the test is complet Sabotage is not suspecte The Unit 1 valve lineup checklists are being performed to verify valve position Radiation Monitors - while reviewing control room logs, the inspector noted that the Unit 1 containment particulate and gas monitors (RM-159 and RM-160) were out of service for approximately 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> on December 5, 1979, due to water condensation in the detector bo During this time, the manipulator crane monitor (RM-162) inside the containment was operable and air sampling indicated no increases in the containment activity; the licensee stated that containment air grab samples would be analyzed at least once per day when RM-159 and RM-160 are not operabl The licensee is also reviewing the use of heat-tracing and additional insulation to reduce condensation. The inspector had no further questions at this tim.
Plant Physical Protection The inspector verified the following by observation: Gates and doors in protected and vital area barriers were closed and locked when not attende Isolation zones described in the physical security plans were not compromised or obstructe Personnel were properly identified, searched, authorized, badged and escorted as necessary for plant access contro Within the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were identified.