IR 05000280/1979015

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IE Insp Repts 50-280/79-15 & 50-281/79-21 on 790205-0316. Noncompliance Noted:Failure to Follow Annunciator Procedure & Failure to Establish Fire Watch on Nonfunctional Electric Penetration Fire Barriers
ML19270G744
Person / Time
Site: Surry  Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 04/01/1979
From: Burke D, Cantrell F
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML19270G738 List:
References
50-280-79-15, 50-281-79-21, NUDOCS 7906190213
Download: ML19270G744 (5)


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UNITED STATES t ' 880 h

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Report Nos. 50-280/79-15 and 50-281/79-21 Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company P. O. Box 26666 Richmond, Virginia 23261 Facility Name: Surry Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-280 and 50-281 License Nos. DPR-32 and DPR-37 Inspection at Supy Site near Surry, Vir inia

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D. J. BurYe Date Sigried

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Approved by:

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S.' Cantrell, Acting" Chief, RONS Branch Date Signed SUMMARY Inspection on February 5 - March 16,1979 Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 210 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of plant operations, plant physical protection barriers, plant maintenance, including the Unit 2 steam generator replacement outage work, radiation protection, and followup of previously identified unresolved and open items.

Results Of the five areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in three areas; two apparent items of noncompliance were found in two areas (Infraction - Failure to follow annuniciator alarm procedure (280/79-15-01) - paragraph I-6; Inf raction - Failure to establish a fire watch on non-functional electrical penetration fire barriers (280/79-15-02)

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paragraph I-8).

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DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

  • W. L. Stewart, Station Manager A. L. Parrish, Project Manager, SGRP
  • J. L. Wilson, Superintendent Operations
  • T. A. Peebles, Superintendent - Technical Services
  • R. F. Saunders, Superintendent - Maintenance
  • R. M. Smith, Supervisor - Health Physics
  • R. L. Baldwin, Supervisor - Administrative Services G. Kane, Operating Supervisor H. W. Kibler, Electrical Supervisor J. W. Patrick, Mechanical Supervisor W. A. Thornton, Chemistry Supervisor
  • F. L. Rentz, Resident QC Engineer J. Fisher, Fire Marshall Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included control room operators, shift supervisors, QC, engineering, HP, plant maintenance, security and administrative personnel.

Other Organizations Daniel Construction Company J. C. Ard, Project Manager, SGRP H. O. Ford, Assistant Project Manager, SGRP Commonwealth of Virginia Bureau of Occupational Health A. C. McNeer, Radiation Specialist C. Price, Radiation Supervisor Department of Labor and Industry 344

.; , P. H. Haskins, Construction Safety Representative G. L. Weaver, Industrial Safety Representative

  • Attended exit interview.

2.

Management Interviews The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 9,16, 23, and March 2, 9, 16, 1979 with those persons indicated in paragraph 1

. . . . -2-above.

The licensee stated that prompt corrective action would be taken on the noncompliance identified. Several meetings with VEPCO and Daniels management members and entrance and exit interviews con-ducted with Region II inspectors were also attended by the resident inspector. The inspector also met on-site with members of the Common-wealth of Virginia Department of Health and the Department of Labor and Industry to discuss their inspections and findings.

3.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Unresolved Item (280/281/79-02-01): Adequacy of the paging system to provide coastant communication with personnel in high radia-tion areas as required by TS 6.4.B.I.F.

In a memorandum dated March 9, 1979, licensee management notified all station personnel that use of the " buddy system" described in the TS is required. Two individuals are required to sign out keys for access to the high radiation areas.

Thus the two individuals provide the constant communication required; the telephone paging system is not utilized.

4.

Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified daring this inspection.

5.

Order to Show Cause On March 13, 1979, the NRC issued an Order to Show Cause for the Surry Unit Nos. I and 2 requiring that Unit 1 be shutdown within 48 hours f rom the time of receipt of the Order, and that Unit 2, which is in the steam generator replacement outage, remain shutdown; both units will remain shutdown until further orders from the NRC. The Orders were issued because of potential piping deficiencies in certain safety related systems due to indicated errors in the computerized piping stress analyses, and require the licensee to show cause why reanalyses and any necessary modifications indicated by such reanalyses should not be performed.

The Order was received by the licensee at 8:40 p.m.

on March 13, 1979; the inspector verified that Unit I was in the cold shutdown condition ( 200 F) at noon on March 15, 1979, which was within 48 hours from receipt of the Order.

Unit 2 has been shutdown since February 4,1979, for steam generator replacement.

2344 ~;34 6.

Review of Plant Operations The inspector toured the Unit I and Unit 2 control rooms and certain plant areas to observe that monitoring equipment and plant instrumenta-tion was functioing as required, and that the facility operations were in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

Plant logs and

. . . . . -3-records were also reviewed. Within the areas inspected, one item of noncompliance was ideutified for failing to follow Unit I annuniciator alarm procedure IA-62.

(Infraction 280/79-15-01) Technical Specifica-tion 6.4.D requires the licensee to follow the detailed written proce-dures provided for actions to be taken for specific and unforseen malfunctions of systems or components including alarms. On February 20, 1979, the inspector observed Unit I alarm 1A-H-6 annunciated, which indicated water in the normally dry shell side of the recirculation spray heat exchanger. The inspector determined that the alarm occurred between February 16 and 20, 1979.

Licensee personnel subsequently responded to the alarm and entered Unit I containment on February 20, 1979, to determine the reason for the alarm, but did not sample the small amount of water found as required by annunciator procedure IA-62. The licensee believed the moisture to be condensation.

On February 16, 1979, the inspector entered Unit I containment and verified that the recirculation sump grating was in place and that a general containment cleanup was in progress.

The inspector also reviewed the Control Room Operator and Shif t Supervisor Logs for February,1979, verified that certain Unit 1 safety system valves and components were properly positioned and operable, and verified that the control rooms were manned in accordance with T.S. 6.1.B.

7.

Unit 2 Steam Generator Replacement Unit 2 shutdown on February 4,1979, for the Steam Generator Replacement Project (SGRP). The inspectcr observed certain initial reactor coolant system pipe cuts and verified that the gloveboxes or tents were in place and that the containment ventilation system was operating as required.

Due to questions from the construction work force concerning radiation and safety, the licensee is providing additional training in these areas to all station and contract personnel.

Some of the questions appeared to arise af ter several workers became temporarily ill while working in the Unit 2 condenser. The Commonwealth of Virginia Depart-ment of Health investigated the event and determined that the illness was metal fume fever caused by carbon are cutting of the copper-nickel condenser tubes.

The inspector subsequently verified on a routine basis that the tubes were cut according to the condenser rebuilding procedures (DC 78-21B) which prescribed cutting by mechanical means.

On one occassion (3/8/79) the inspector observed some flame cutting of carbon steel in the Unit 2 condenser area without a fire watch; although there were no vital areas nearby and little combustible material in the area, a fire watch was re-established for personnel protection.

The inspector had no further questions.

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- .. . . -4-8.

Plant Maintenance The inspector reviewed certain Unit I and 2 plant maintenance to verify that work was performed in accordance with the Technic 1 Speci-fications and the applicable procedures. Within the areas in.,ected, one item of noncompliance was identified. While reviewing elt..aical work in the auxiliary building on March 9,1979, the inspector found two 3 inch and one 2 inch unsealed and unattended electrical conduits with cabling pentrating the fire barrier wall between the auxiliary building and the cable vault area.

This is contrary to Technical Specification 3.21.G, and is an infraction.

(280/79-15-02).

The licensee established a fire watch until the cable conduits were sealed.

The inspector also observed the removal of Unit 2 service water valves 203 C and D, and the inspection of recirculation spray heat exchanges.

Although some silt was found in the piping to these components, no items of noncompliance were identified.

9.

Plant Physical Protection The inspector verified the following by observation: Gates and doors in protected and vital area barriers were closed a.

and locked when not attended.

b.

Isolation zones described in the physical security plans were not compromised or obstructed.

Personnel were properly identified, searched, authorized, badged, c.

and escorted as necessary for plant access control.

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