IR 05000280/1979022

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IE Insp Repts 50-280/79-22 & 50-281/79-34 on 790514-18.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Operator Training,Operating Procedures & Seismic Reanalysis of safety-related Piping
ML18116A360
Person / Time
Site: Surry  Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 06/08/1979
From: Elrod S, Kellogg P
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML18116A359 List:
References
50-280-79-22, 50-281-79-34, NUDOCS 7908160457
Download: ML18116A360 (6)


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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 Reports Nos. 50-280/79-22 and 50-281/79-34 Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company Richmond, Virginia 23261 (j.".i;/.**:f:,

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>Facility Name: Surry Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-280 and 50-281 License Nos. DPR-32 and DPR-37 SUMMARY Inspection on May 14-18, *1979

  • Areas Inspected Williamsburg, Virginia This routine unannounced inspection involved 37 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of licensee operator training; operating procedures review; and seismic reanalysis of safe5Y related pipin Results

{i'Of the 3 areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were

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e Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

  • W. L. Stewart, Station Manager DETAILS
  • J. L. Wilson, Superintendent of Operations
  • T. A. Peebles, Superintendent Technical Services
  • R. L. Baldwin, Supervisor Administrative Services
  • E. P. Dewandel, Staff Assistant
  • F. L. Rentz, Resident AC Engineer
  • H. L. Miller, Supervisor Nuclear Training
  • G. E. Kane, Operating Supervisor
  • T. J. Kenny, Engineering Supervisor D. Kildoo, QC Engineer NRC Resident Inspector
  • D. J. Burke
  • Attended exit intervie Exit Interview e

The inspection scope and findings were swmnarized on May 18, 1979 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 abov The items listed in Para-graphs 5-7 of this report were discusse * Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspecte.

Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspectio.

Licensee Operator Training (In response to IE Bulletins79-06A and 79-06A Rev. 1)

The inspector reviewed the operator training program established in response to the subject bulletins. This review included interviews with the Supervisor of Nuclear Training, attendance during a portion of the training for one shift, interviews with several Reactor Operators and review of the following literature:

a.

Standing Order dated April 19, 1979 (Guidance for Loss* of Reactor Coolant Pressure)

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  • e e-2-Operator Training Bulletin OTB #8 dated April 18, 1979 (Lessons to be learned from "Three Mile Island Incident on March 28, 1979")

Shift Order Book (Memorandum from Station Manger of May 8, 1979 -

Communication with NRC)

Operating Documents revised or added to incorporate lessons learned from the Three Mile Island inciden Lesson Plan for Retraining Session # Since both Units 1 and 2 at Surry are shut down for maintenance, the licensee is including., during the normally scheduled retraining program sessions, a package of training concerning events at Three Mile Island and subsequent actions taken at Surry. This package consists of: Retraining Session #3 (Reactor Coolant, Residual Heat Removal, and Chemical and Volume Control Systems) A presentation on the Babcox and Wilcox plant design and sequence of events at Three Mile Island A session on Surry' s response to bulletin 79-06A including Surry operational procedure changes, the Surry Standing Order referenced above, and Operator Training Bulletin #8 referenced abov I A simulator refresher session including failures of the feedwater system, instrumentation failures, Pressurizer Spray Valve failures, Reactor Coolant System leaks, and simulation of events at Three Mile Island as applied to Surry's reactor % of the Reactor Operators have attended session c above, 31% have at tended session a, b, and d. The remainder of the training is scheduled for the week of May 21-25, 1979

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This review of the training.program indicates that: Operators are receiving training on procedure changes initiated as a result of bulletin 79-06 Operators are being instructed on Surry's program to ensure engineered safety features undergoing maintenance are retested and properly returned to servic Operators are being instructed on specific measures to assure automatic actions of emergency safety equipment are not overridden except as permitted in the bulletin. A licensee review has shown that no plant automatic actions occur upon reset of engineered safety features that could effect the control of radioactive liquids or gasse *

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e e-3-Operators and supervisory personnel are being instructed in the provi-sions and directives for early NRC notification of serious event Surry has assigned the Reactor Operator of the unaffected unit to make this call. Long-lead telephones are available at both plant operating area Since this training. effort is not complete, this area will be further inspected in the near future (280/79-22-01; 281/79-34-01).

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in this are.

Operating Procedures Review The inspector reviewed those operating procedures modified as a result of IE Bulletin 79-06A. Pertinent comments are included in the paragraphs which follo Specific procedures reviewed were:

Procedure Number EP-1 EP-2 EP-3 EP-4 EP-5 EP-6 EP-8 EP-9 AP-9 AP-27 OP-OP-IB OP-2 Title Reactor Trip Loss of Reactor Coolant Main Steam Rupture Steam Generator Tube Rupture Loss of Reactor Coolant Flow Non-Recoverable Loss of Air Safety Injection Loss of Reactor Coolant Pressure Reactor Coolant Pump Vibration Emergency Cooldown of Primary System Unit Startup and Operation (Solid Plant Operation)

Containment Checklist *

"Transferring Waste Gas Decay Tanks to Unit 1 Containment Following Major Nuclear Accident" At Surry, the three centrifugal charging pumps are also used for high head safety injection. The licensee does not require one train actuation of safety injection (pump discharge through Boron Injection Tank) to assist in level control of the pressurizer during routine-ope~ation-event-induced pressurizer level transient However, Abnormal Procedure 16 (Excessive Primary Plant Leakage) requires the operator to "Start a standby charging pump if neceesary".

Under Non-Safety-Injection conditions, reactor coolant pumps would be secured under conditions of high vibration or various pump associated alarm Under Safety Injection conditions, at least two reactor coolant pumps are now required to operate as long as the pumps are providing forced flo Discussions with Reactor Operators indicated that those who have attended the recent training sessions concerning IE Bulletin 79-06A are specifically aware of this requirement. Others also appear to be aware of

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e e-4-it. Training for the remainder of the Reactor Operators is scheduled for the week of May 21-25, 197 Discussions with Reactor Operators who had completed the recent training sessions concerning IE Bulletin 79-06A indicated that all such operators interviewed were aware of the criteria for securing of safety injection once automatically initiate The licensee has no procedures for feeding dry steam generators.* Abnormal Procedure 21 (Loss of Feedwater) does say that auxiliary feedwater must feed the steam generator within 60 seconds from the loss of feed flo Tagging practices, as applied to control panels, were observed while on tours of the Control Roo The licensee indicated that, normally, tags are not applied to control panels. Small flags which do not appear to obscure vision are attached to the top of 4160V breaker control handles to indicate when they are tagged elsewher Notes taped to panels by Control Room Operators did not appear to have sufficient management control. Management immediately initiated steps to increase control in this area. Results will be verified during a subsequent inspection (280/79-22-02; 281/79-34-02).

Seismic Reanalysis of Safety Related Piping Project status was reviewed with responsible site manager A detailed procedure approved by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee is in effect for this activity. The inspector questioned Section III, Para-graph 2 which addresses the yet-to-be-started review of support load This paragraph says to use original drawings (called MSK's) yet licensee event report 79-010/031-0 indicates that some errors in location and confi-guration of supports appear on those drawings. It appears that the recently revised drawings (called MKS's) should be use The licensee agreed to resolve this comment. This will be followed up during a subsequent inspection (280/79-22-03).

As of the completion of this inspection the Licensee indicated that 48 of 119 drawings had been certified as accurate by VEPCO Quality Contro Licensee event Report (LER) 79-010/031-0 contains a commitment to, prior to Unit #1 start up, make all necessary repairs to safety related pipe supports (that were found to differ from the location or configuration shown in the original "as built" drawings).

An initial step in this process is the seismic reanalysis based on existing conditions to determine which, if any, need repair and to what extent. The licensee was requested to confirm that commitment in the light of their stated desire to start up early based on favorable conservatism being found in initial seismic reanalysis of piping system The licensee agreed to re-examine these apparantly conflicting position Subsequent to the inspection, the inspector verified that the NRC Division of Operating Reactors Surry Project Manager was aware of the LER commitment and requested Surry management to provide to him details concerning the systems affected and the extent of the discrepancies. Surry l

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e e-s-management agreed on May 21, 1979, to provide this information. This item will be readdressed during a subsequent inspection (280/ 79-22-04).

No items of noncompliance or deviations were observed in this area.

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