IR 05000280/1979051
| ML18136A156 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 09/25/1979 |
| From: | Howell J, Tobin W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18136A155 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-79-51, NUDOCS 7911070149 | |
| Download: ML18136A156 (5) | |
Text
(
'
Report No. 50-280/79-51 Docket No. 50-280 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 SEP 2 6 1979 License No. DPR-32 Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company Post Office Box 26666 Richmond, Virginia 23261 Facility Name:
Surry Nuclear Station Inspection at:
Surry, Virginia and Barnwell, South Carolina Inspection conducted:
August 28-30, 1979 Date of Last Phys1cal Security Inspection Visit:
May 8 through June 19, 1979 Type Inspection Summary Areas Inspected:
ortation Security Inspection Security Included review of procedures utilized for shipment of low level radioactive waste and the details concerning a reported missing radioactive waste containe The inspection involved 15 inspector hours on site by one NRC inspecto The inspection was begun during a regular shift; three inspection hours were accom-plished during offshift period Results:
/
The licensee was found to be in compliance with NRC requirements within the two areas examined during the inspection.
- ,._ ? 9 11 0 7 0 } (/ (
.....
--*_.*
REPORT DETAILS I Key Persons Contacted Licensee Employees:
- W. L. Stewart, Station Manager J. A. Williams, Staff Investigator D. D. Coats, Investigator
- F. Briggins, Investigator R. M. Smith, Supervisor, Health Physics D. W. Greene, Health Physics Technician D.R. Compton, Health Physics Technician Trainee Other Organizations Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc.:
L. Hebbard, Site Manager J. Shuler, Customer Compliance Representative T. D. Creighton, Health Physics Technician United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
D. J. Burke, Resident Inspector, Surry Nuclear Station The inspector also interviewed several other licensee employee *Denotes those present at the exit intervie.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspecte.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 30, 1979 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 abov.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during,.this inspectio Summary of Inspection Findings This inspection was initiated following an August 22, 1979 telephone report
- of possible improprieties in transportation of low level radioactive waste from Surry Nuclear Station to the burial site in Barnwell, South Carolina.
- On that date, Region II was contacted by a newspaper reporter inquiring into the possibility that low activity waste being shipped to Barnwell,
- ---- --
-.-.. *.. ----*---- - ----.. __... _..,.. __,.__,..
~- *- -------,. - --- - --
J
-2-S.C. was being used as a means to illegally remove tools from Surr Region II's coordination efforts with the State of South Carolina and Commonwealth of Virginia resulted in inventories of shipment*s as they arrived at the burial site. One of three shipments arriving from Surry on August 22, 1979 was found to be missing one 55 gallon drum of low level radioactive wast Both the bill of lading and radioactive shipment form accompanying the shipment reflected a total of 35 drums and 4 boxes, however the transporting vehicle contained only 34 drums and 4 boxe This inspection has attributed the missing container to inconsi~tencies found in shipment documentation and ineffective practices in preparing waste for transpor The licensee has revised their waste preparation procedures to preclude recurrence and initiated a quality assurance in-spection program to verify adherenc The information regarding removal of tools by utilizing radioactive waste containers was not substantiated through observations, interviews, nor physical inspection,'
- DETAILS II INSPECTION CHRONOLOGY This special inspection was initiated to review the licensee's procedures for transportation of low level radioactive waste and to determine the fact and substance regarding a reported missing radioactive waste c-0ntai~e On August 28, 1979 the inspector reviewed records, conducted interviews and observed procedures at the radioactive waste burial site operated *by Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc., near Barnwell, South Carolina. It was found that while inventorying one of three shipments arriving from Surry Nuclear Station on August 22, 1979, a health physics technician discovered that one 55 gallon drum, listed on the radioactive shipment form as item number 2882, was not with the shipmen Accompanying documentation indicated that drum number 2882 was the 35th of 35 consectively numbered drums being transported. All other drums and boxes listed were found to be present. Upon arrival at the burial site, it was noted that the transporting vehicles cargo doors contained lead seals and no indication of tampering was eviden Subsequent shipments arriving from Surry were inspected by Chem-Nuclear personnel, however the missing container was not locate On August 29-30, 1979 the inspector conducted interviews, reviewed records and made personal observations at Surry Nuclear Station. It was determined that procedures for waste shipment had been reviewed and revised by the licensee immediately following notification of the missing containe Upon reviewing both the previous and revised procedures, the inspector noted that the old procedures had permitted a single technician to survey and mark each container, load the material on the transporting vehicle and complete all required docu-mentation certifying the shipment inventor An examination,of completed shipment forms revealed entries which could cause confusion and provided the possibility for inventory erro Some containers were found to have identical item numbers or numbers that were crossed out or marked over, and some forms were noted with item numbers that were not in a conventional numerical sequenc A Surry waste shipment arriving at the burial site on August 29, 1979 contained one drum that was originally numbered 2882; however, the first "8" had been marked over with a "9", making it read 2982. It was later determined that this container was not the 2882 drum missing from the earlier shipment; still, this situation does reflect the error potential of th~ previously used procedure The current procedures require a minimum of two technicians, each with specific tasks to accomplis Both individuals are required to verify shipment content Additionally, a quality assurance inspection program has been initiated to insure compliance with the revised procedures. All information developed during this inspection indicates the waste container "loss" was due to erroneous record entries and lack of adequate loading and inventory practices *. No evidence to the contrary was develope,
-2-The issue of radioactive waste as an avenue for theft of tools was not substan-tiate Interviews with pertinent individuals at both Surry and ~arnwell, in-spector observations, and physical inspections of waste containers revealed no information that the radioactive waste transportation system.was being used for such purpose,.,'