IR 05000280/1979033
| ML18130A505 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 06/29/1979 |
| From: | Kellogg P, Skolds J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18130A503 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-79-33, 50-281-79-51, NUDOCS 7908240326 | |
| Download: ML18130A505 (5) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 Report Nos. 50-280/79-33 and 50-281/79-51 Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company Richmond, Virginia 23261 Facility Name:
Surry Units 1 and 2 Docket No and 50-281 License No DPR-32 and DPR-37 SUMMARY Inspection on June 11-14, 1979 Areas Inspected near Williamsburg, Virginia This routine, unannounced inspection involved 28 inspector-hours onsite in the area of IE Bulletin followu Results Of the one area inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
3:2.<:;
,1908240 I
- DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- W. L. Stewart, Station Manager
- J. L. Wilson, Superintendent Operations
- R. L. Baldwin, Supervisor Administrative Services
- R. F. Saunders, Superintendent Maintenance
- F. L. Rentz, Resident QC Engineer
- E. P. Dewandel, Staff Assistant C. Crummy, Engineer M. Kansler, Engineer NRC Resident Inspector
- D. J. Burke
- Attended exit intervie.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 14, 1979, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 abov The item in paragraph 5 concerning the failure to list the 1000 series valves on the valve lineup was described as an item of noncompliance at the exit interview. Based on discussions with the regional office, this item was changed to unresolved and this information was transmitted to the residnent inspector on June 15, 197.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspecte.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve noncompliance or deviation New unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in paragraph.
IE Bulletin Followup a.
IE Bulletin 79-03, "Longitudinal Weld Defects in ASME SA-312 Type 304 Stainless Steel Pipe Spools Manufactured by Youngstown Welding and Engineering Company"
-2-This bulletin discussed defects found in longitudinal welds in ASME Section III class 2 pipe supplied by Youngstown Welding and Engineering Compan VEPCO's response dated April 16, 1979, indicated that 300 feet of Youngstown fusion welded type 304SS pipe was purchased from Albert Pipe Supply Company for modification to the Low Head Safety Insjection (LHSI) System in 197 In a supplemental response dated June 1, 1979, VEPCO indicated that further investigation revealed that the purchase order for this 300 feet of pipe required a 100% x-ray of all pipe delivered and therefore a program for volumetric examination of the pipe was not require Bulletin 79-03 discusses deficiencies in the ultrasonic testing program subcontracted by the Youngstown Compan The bulletin does not discuss the x-ray program of the Youngstown Compan Since the adequacy of the x-ray program has not been determined by the NRC, the adequacy of the piping in the LHSI cannot be determined at this time. The inspector noted that in addition to the 300 feet of piping, numerous fusion welded pipe elbows supplied by Youngstown were used in the design change on the LHSI syste Based on a telephone conversation held between the Resident Inspector and J. Skolds on June 22, 1979, the licensee was requested to issue a supplemental response to Bulletin 79-03 indicating the location of any Youngstown piping or elbows in the LHSI syste A determination of the adequacy of the x-ray techniques will be made at a future dat The bulletin remains ope IE Bulletin 79-04, "Incorrect Weights for Swing Check Valves Manufactured by Velan Engineering Corporation" This bulletin discussed the incorrect weights provided by Velan Engineering Corporation for various size valve VEPCO's response dated May 3, 1979, indicated that Velan swing check valves existed in the CVCS system and the safety injection syste The response also indicated that it was assumed that incorrect weights were used in computer analysis and that a reevaluation of these systems using the correct valve weight is currently in progress using the NUPIPE progra The inspector noted that Westinghouse provided VEPCO with a list of valves that were manufactured by Velan and were affected by this bulleti The licensee took the list from Westinghouse and converted it to a list using inplant valve nomenclature, i.e., 1-SI-224, et The inspector noted that the list generated by the licensee to be submitted to Stone and Webster contained some errors. The following valves were listed as 6" valves whereas the system prints indicated the valves are 3" valves:
1-SI-224,225,226, 227 and 2-SI-224, 225, 226, 22 Also, valves 1-SI-88, 2-SI-88, 1-SI-91 and 2-SI-91 were listed as 1-CH-88, 2-CH-88, 1-CH-91 and 2-CH-91. This bulletin remains open pending resolution of the seismic computer analysi i
- IE Bulletin 79-09, "Failures of GE Type AK-2 Circuit Breaker in Safety Related Systems" This bulletin discussed the failures of GE Type AK-2 Circuit Breaker The licensee's response dated May 23, 1979, indicated that none of these breakers are in use or planned for use at Surry. This bulletin is close IE Bulletin 79-10, "Requalification Training Program Statistics" This bulletin requested certain training program statistics from the licensee. VEPCO's response dated May 24, 1979, provided this informatio This bulletin is close IE Bulletin 79-06A, Revision No. 1, "Review of Operational Errors and System Misalignments Identified During the Three Mile Island Incident" The inspector performed part of TI2515/21, Section C.1, the review of valve/breaker/switch alignment procedures for all ESF systems against current P & ID' s to verify adequacy of alignment procedure The following P&ID' s were used:
Safety Injection FM89A&B Revis ion 11, Containment Spray - FM84A Revision 8, RlIR - FM87A Revision The following discrepancies were identifie )
Containment Spray The "Valve numbers" for the gage isolation valves for gages 1-CS-GA-130A, 130B, 131A and 131B are 1-CS-94, 92, 93 and 95 instead of 1-CS-130A, 130B, 131A and 131 Valves 1-CS-62 and 1-CS-63 were not indicated on the P&I Twelve valves indicated on the P&ID have no valve numbers labeled on the P&I These items will remain open (280/79-33-01 and 281/79-51-01)
pending future inspectio )
RlIR Valves 1-RH-44 and 1-RH-45 are not listed on the valve line-u )
Safety Injection The P&ID lists six valves as MOV 1866A thru F whereas the valve lineup lists these six valves as l-SI-336, 337, 338, 339, 340 and 341
-4-Valve 1-SI-213 is listed as 1-SI-231 on the valve lineup Valve 1-SI-234 was missing on the valve lineup The valve lineup calls for the lineup of valves 1-SI-300 thru 1-SI-31 The P&ID lists two valves labeled 1-SI-300, two valves labeled 1-SI-301, and valves 1-SI-302, 303, 305, 322, 306, 307, 345, 321, 320 and 346 instead of valves 302 thru 31 These items, including the RlIR discrepancy will remain open (280/79-33-02 and 281/79-51-02) pending future inspectio Valves 1-SI-1000 thru 1042 are not listed on the valve lineup. These valves are located on the level detectors for the safety injection accumulator This item was identified as an item of noncompliance at the exit interview. It has since been discovered that the operations personnel only line up valves to the first root valve and the valves associ-ated with the detectors themselves are the responsibility of the I&C personnel. The I&C personnel line up the detectors at the completion of calibration and other maintenance. This appears to be the practice used on other equipment (i.e., level detectors) und.er the cognizance of the I&C departmen This item will remain unresolved (280/79-33-03 and 281/79-51-03) pending resolution of whether the exclusion of the valves associated with instrumentation from the operational valve lineups is acceptable.