IR 05000280/1979062
| ML18136A479 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 11/30/1979 |
| From: | Burke D, Kellogg P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18136A472 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-79-62, 50-281-79-82, NUDOCS 8002070491 | |
| Download: ML18136A479 (5) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
. ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 Report Nos. 50-280/79-62 and*S0-281/79-82 Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company
.Richmond, Virginia 23261 Facility Name:
Surry Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos 50-280 and 50-281 License Nos. DPR-32 and DPR-37 r
Inspection on October 1-31, 1979 Areas Inspected Virginia Branch
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3oe,,J79 Date Signed
/1/.50/77 Date Signed This routine, announced inspection involved 90 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of plant operations and operating records, plant maintenance, and plant I
securit Results Of the 3 areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in 1 area; 2 apparent items of noncompliance were found in 1 area
[Infraction-failure to follow alarm procedures - paragraph 5.c.; Infraction-cool down rate exceeded TS limit - pa~agraph 5.f.; one noncompliance and one deviation were found in the remaining area; Infraction alarm set points on radiation monitors CC-105 and 106 not in accordance with TS 3.7 - paragraph 5.h.; Deviation-two portable fire extinguishers not inspected monthly - paragraph 5.c.].
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DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees Virgiµia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO)
- W. L. Stewart, Station M~nager
- J. L. Wilson, Superintendent, Operations
- T. A. Peebles, Superintendent, Technical Services
- R. F. Saunders, Superintendent, Maintenance R. M. Smith, Supervisor, Health Physics R. L. Baldwin, Supervisor, Administrative Services G. Kane, Operating Supervisor
- F. L. Rentz, Resident QC Engineer M. R. Kansler, ~cting Engineering Supervisor Other licensee employees* c9ntacted during this inspection included control room operators, shift supervisors, QC, engineering, HP, plant maintenance, security, engineering, and administrative personnel.
- Attended exit interview Management Interviews The scope and findings were summar.ized on a weekl-y: basi~ with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 abov The items'of noncompliance and the deviation were discussed and the licensee stated that corrective-action was in progress on the item.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspecte.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspectio Unit 1 Operations and Maintenance Unit 1 returned to operation on October 24, 197 The inspector witnessed the plant startup and criticality which occurred at 7:50 pm; the ECP.was accurate and the operating procedures for startup and power operations were, followe Prior to startup, the inspector verified that the licensee had
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-2-taken specific actions which were required by IE Bulletins 79-06 and 79-06A, and its revisions and supplement Specific areas reviewed included the following:
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Emergency Procedure (EP)- revie _The inspector verified that the TMI
"lessons learned" actions and recommendations have been incorporated into the,EP's, and that the procedures direct tripping of the _operating reactor coolant pumps upon initiation of SI c*aused by low reactor coolant system pressur An additional licensed operator has been stationed,in the control room to accomplish this action and followup
. actions required during such an,occurrenc The inspector noted that'
EP2, 3, and 4, section 2 (Automatic Actions) still made reference to SI from low pressurizer* pressure in coincidence with low pressurize-r level, although the SI logic has been changed to initiate on low pressurizer pressure concidence alone (2/3); the EP's were appropriately revise Valve, Breaker, and Switch Alignment Revie The inspector reviewed valve, breaker, and switch alignment procedures (checklists) for engineered safeguards and service water* systems against the current P&ID's and single-line diagrams (e.g., FM prints) to verify the adequacy of alignment procedure The valves, breakers, and switches were also inspected to verify proper positioning and alignmen The safety-related'
valves, breakers, and switches were appropriately aligne The inspector identified one safety-related valve (MOV-1885D, LHSI recirc line)
which was not on the Safety Injection lines OP-7.1 valve checklist,'
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although the valve was properly positione In addition, several valves were not appropriately tagged with identifying numbers, and several small valves in the service water system were* not in the checklist position, although system operability was not affecte These are further examples of the item of noncompliance (280/79-60-01)
identified in IE Inspection Report 280/79-6 The licensee stated that the Unit 1 checklists will be performed again to identify valve positions, maintenance, or valve identification tagging as required (280/79-62-05).
A program for valve tagging and identification has been in effect for several month The inspector also verified valve alignments according to ES valve alignment checklist CL-53; while in the Unit 1 safeguards building and valve pit, the inspector noted that several ES valves (eg-SI-48, 1860, 1852B, CS-lOlB, 156A) did not have adequate local indication to deter-mine valve positio The licensee stroked these valves and the inspector verified proper valve positions; the licensee is repairing or replacing the valve local indicator Unit 1 Safeguards Building Tour._ While inspecting valves in the Unit 1 SG building, the inspector noted excessive groundwater accumulation in the valve pit are Although operability of the valves in the pit area was not affected, the water levels were alarmed in the control
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-3-room and the annunciator alarm procedure IB-26 (D-2) was not foliowed to remove the wate This failure to £ollow procedures is in noncom-pliance with TS 6.4.D, and is identified as an infraction (280/79-62-01).
In addition, the inspector noted that one of the two portable fire extinguishers in the SG building had not been inspected since January 197 A similar situation was found in the Unit 2 SG are This item was identified as a deviation from the commitments in the Surry fire Protection Systems Revie (280/79-62-04 and 281/79-82-01). Unit I Containment Tou The inspector toured the Unit 1 containment prior to reactor startup to verify system operability, housekeeping, and' cleanlines Within the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were identifie The inspector also verified that piping support modifications to the three RCS RTD loops had been completed and that the SI line supports had beeµ modified to eliminate the pipe overstress condition In addition, the inspector noted some.boric acid crystals on the valve body and bolts of SI-1865A, the A accumulator discharge isolation valv The licensee is evaluating the effects of this leakage and the possible effects of corrosion in accordance with TS 4.3; the valve leakage was repaire The inspector also noted that some water had accumulated in the recirculation spray head exchangers, although no 'water was detected in the RS shell side of the heat exchanger; the licensee initiated actions to remove the service water from the heat exchanger The containment,recirculation sump screens were verified in place and no trash was observed in the are General Area Tou While inspecting valve alignments 'from the RWST, the inspector observed the replacement of the heat tracing ion the RWST discharge lines to the ES system With the pipe insulation removed, the inspector noted an area of pitting on one of the discharge lines; the licensee ground the pitted area out and performed non-destructive
~esting to verify elimination of the defect and adequate pipe wall thicknes The electrical tape used to attach the heat tracing to the piping was chemically analyzed and determined to contain less than.1 ppm chlorides and sulfate The licensee has also taken action to lock accessible safety related manual valves such as CS-1 and 4 to secure proper valve alignment Records Revie The inspector reviewed certain Unit 1 and 2 operating records and completed procedures for the past yea While reviewin the Unit 1 wide* range hot leg temperature strip chart recorder (TR-1-413) *
data, for the October 4, 1978 cool d?wn, the inspector determined that the Technical Specification 3.1.B.1 RCS cool down rate limit of S0°F per hour was exceeded from approximately 3:30 pm to 4:30 pm and from 7:00 pm to 8:00 p This is an infraction,(280/79-62-02).
The completed RCS pressure-temperature curves for cool downs* were attached to OP as required by OP 3.2 "Unit Shutdown Operation", and demonstrated that the RCS pressurization limits (TS Fig. 3.1-1) were not exceede The RCS temperature trend recorder charts were not attached to OP 3.3 or, OP 3.4, but were located in the records storage vaul '
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-4-Testing Revie The inspector observed testing of the Unit 1 contain-ment isolation valves TV-DA-lOOA and B to verify that the valves close when SI is initiated and remain closed until both SI and the valves themselves are reset. Testing was performed in accordance with Design Change 79-S22 and was acceptabl The inspector also observed_additional ES pump and valve testing to verify that the tests were performed in accordance with the appropriate Periodic Test (PT) procedures and were in accordance with the TS. Within the areas inspected, no items of non~ompliance were identifie Plant Maintenanc The inspector reviewed certain plant systems maintenance to verify that the maintenance-activities were accom-plished in accordance with approved and adequate procedures and the Technical Specification Maintenance activities reviewed included:
(1)
Replacement of motor operated valve SI-1842 due to valve seat leakage; the Westinghouse valve, which replaced the Darling valve, was determined to be' acceptable by Engineering Study 79-3 (2)
Inspection of the Radiation Monitor (RM) panel readouts in the control room, on October 29, 1979, following the seven month facility outag Due to the decrease in the component cooling water activity, the background reading of the component cooling water radiation monitors RM-CC-105 and CC-106 had also decreased; however, the alarm setpoints of the monitors had not been reduced to alarm at twice background or les This is in noncompliance with Technical Specification 3.7, Table 3.7-5, item 2 and is an infraction (280/79-62-03). Plant Physical Protection The inspector verified the following by observation: Gates and doors in protected and vital area barriers were closed and locked when not attende Isolation zones described in the physica1 security plans were not compromised or obstructe Personnel were properly identified, searched, authorized, badged and escorted as necessary for plant access contro The inspector noted that the main site entrance security building chemical detector was not operating on October 24, 1979; however, since unbadged personnel entering the site are searched, no compensatory actions were require The inspector had no further questions at this time.
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