IR 05000272/1987035
| ML18093A637 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 02/08/1988 |
| From: | Chopra P, Eselgroth P, Johnston W, Koltay P, Thomas Koshy, Mcfadden R, Pullani S, Scholl L, Trehan N NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18093A636 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-87-35, 50-311-87-35, NUDOCS 8802170209 | |
| Download: ML18093A637 (33) | |
Text
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
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Report N /87-35; 50-311/87-35 Docket N and 50-311 License N DPR-70 and DPR-75 Licensee:
Public Service Electric & Gas 80 Park Plaza Newark, New Jersey 07101 Facility Name:
Salem Nuclear Generating Station-Units 1 & 2 Inspection At:
Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey Inspection Conducted:
November 30, 1987 - December 4, 1987 Inspectors:
SIGNED COPY ON FILE P. Senior Electrical Engineer, NRR r, RI L. L. Scholl, Reactor Engineer, RI SIGNED COPY ON FILE Reviewed by:
Approved by:
8802170209 880208 PDR ADOCK 05000272 Q
date date date
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date I-20-88 date I. *-~(7- ~
date date
/-2 8-88 date
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Inspection Summary:
Inspection on November 30, 1987 - December 4, 1987 (Report Numbers 50-272/87-35 and 50-311/87-35 Areas Inspected:
This special inspection was conducted to evaluate the present integrity of the safety related electrical distribution system with respect to protection from loss of more than one train of safety related equipment due to a common mode failur This inspection reviewed the adequacy of Safety related breaker coordination, breaker and fuse sizing, voltage studies and emergency diesel generator loading analysi Results:
During the inspection of the licensee's review of breaker coordination for safety related systems the team found that the overall scope of work was sufficiently comprehensive to address the issue of breaker coordination adequac The inspection team reviewed the licensee's planned status of safety related breaker coordination for restart of both units and had no exceptions to the licensee 1 s pla The team reviewed the area of emergency diesel generator (EOG)
loading during postulated LOCA conditions and identified the need for documented engineering analysis to support the procedural guide lines provided to operators for ensuring that EOG load limits are not exceede One item on EOG loading analysis and one item on undervoltage analysis remain unresolved.
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Table of Contents Page Introduction and Baci',ground....................................... 1 Purpose and Scope................................................. 2 Inspection Method................................................. 2 Summary of Inspection Findings.................................... 3 Details of Inspection of Electric Power Systems................... 5 Breaker Coordination......................................... 5 5. KV and 4KV Balance of Plant Buses................... 5 5. KV Safety Related Buses and Below.................... 6 5. DC System Circuit Breaker and Fuse Coordination....... 7 Short Circuit Analyses....................................... 9 5. Inspection Scope, Approach and Criteria............... 9 5. AC System Calculations, Pl-183545-E03-l.............. 10 5. DC System Calculations............................... 11 Breaker and Fuse Sizing..................................... 11 5. AC Breaker (13KV, 4KV BOP, 4KV safety related and Below)........................................... 11 5. DC System Circuit Breaker and Fuse Sizing............ 12 Review of Design Change Packages (DCPs)..................... 12 5.4.l Administrative Controls.............................. 12 5. Design Change Packages and Safety Evaluations........ 13 5. 5 Voltage Study of Sal em El ectri cal Di stri but ion System....... 15 Protective Relaying......................................... 16 5. Overcurrent Protection............................... 16 5. Ground Fault Protection.............................. 17 5. 7 Emergency Diesel Generator (EOG) Loading.................... 18 :.~:.,..;,;:.I~,.. ~ ~.-~~c::ct~lj-= ~c~:_J
~::~;-;.!(.C:11~i-.C:c.................... 19 5.. Set Point and Configuration Control.................. 19 Maintenance Activities............................... 19 Independent Measurements and Calculations........................ 20 Unresolved Items................................................. 20 Exit Interview................................................... 20 Attachments Simplified Sketch of Salem 1&2 Electric Power Systems Documents Reviewed Persons Contacted
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Introduction and Background The electric power systems (onsite and offsite) are important to the safety of a nuclear power plant and must be designed and maintained accordingl The safety function of each electric system (assuming the redundant system is not functioning) is to provide sufficient capacity and capability of electric power for the safe operation of the plant under all operating modes including anticipated operational occurrences and postulated accident To achieve this safety function, 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 17 - Electric Power Systems, speci-fies design requirements concerning system capacity, independence, redundancy, availability, and reliabilit Further, General Design Criterion 18 - Inspection and Testing of Electric Power Systems, specifies design requirements concerning provisions for their periodic inspection and testin The Salem 1&2 Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Section 8, Electric Power Systems, describes how these design requirements are me It also specifies the licensee's commitments with respect to the applicable Regulatory Guides (RGs) and industry standards such as the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE).
The licensee's electric power systems, as originally designed (i.e., prior to the issuance of the Operating License)
were reviewed by the NRC against these requirements and commitment This review was conducted prior to licensing the facility.
Following the issuance of the Operating License, plant modifications can be made which involve significant changes in the configuration of the electric power system These modifications may involve substantial load growth of the electric power system As a result, lacking adequate controls, the electrical power systems may be loaded to their rated capacity, or overloade This may adversely affect the functioning of protective relays and coordination of the interrupting device Load growth may also create bus undervoltage conditions which may trip out or damage motors, resulting in unnecessary bus transfers, or cause other operational transient Therefore, plant modifications should be evaluated to assure that their effect does not violate the requirements of General Design Criteria 17 and 18, and FSAR commitments, before the modifications are implemente Other types of significant changes in the configuration which might adversely affect the performance of electric power systems are:
a transfer of a large load from one bus to another; replacement of system components such as breakers, fuses, or motors with a component having different functional characteristics; and changes in the set point of protective relays or breaker All such changes should be evaluated by the licensee for potential problems.
- In September 1987, the NRC performed an inspection of the licensee's com-pliance with the 10 CFR 50 Appendix R requirements, (Inspection Report 50-272;311/87-11).
During this inspection it was determined that some uncertainties existed as to the extent of electrical breaker coordination in areas affecting the safety related and safe shutdown electrical distri-bution system The licensee committed to promptly review and address this concer.0 Purpose and Scope The principal purpose of this special electrical inspection was to assess the adequacy of breaker coordination at Salem Units 1 & 2 with respect to the integrity of the safety related electrical distribution systems and their role in responding to plant emergencie The criteria utilized in this aspect of the inspection was to assess whether or not the status of plant breaker coordination at Salem Units 1 & 2, prior to restart, could result in the loss of more than one train of safety related equipment during a common mode failur This inspection also included reviews of breaker and fuse sizing; design change packages; field installations; maintenance practices; voltage studies and emergency diesel generator (EOG) loadin.0 Inspection Methodology The team reviewed the adequacy of the safety related electrical distribution system with respect to the following factors affecting system availability:
(1) selectivity among the various protective devices which respond to over-loads and short circuits, in order to ensure that the minimum of unfaulted load is interrupted; (2) reasonable sensitivity and speed of response of the protective devices, considering the characteristics and criticality of the protected equipment; (3) accuracy of the coordination curves in repre-senting the types, ratings, and settings of the devices actually present in the plant; (4) adherence to the principal that no single failure (including a failure of a circuit breaker, fuse, protective relay, instrument trans-former, etc.) can disable more than one redundant safe-shutdown train; (5) assurance that faults in non-Class lE parts of the power system cannot credibly degrade Class lE power availability; and (6) absence of apparent credible common-cause multi-train failure modes in those cases where complete selective coordination cannot practically be achieve A selected sample of Class lE and Non lE buses was walked down to collect the as built data on relay set points,.load configuration and equipment ratin This data was compared to electrical one line drawings, relay setpoint calculations and load studie The licensee analyses on selected protective relaying and breaker coordination was reviewed and field verified to determine the electrical system capability to limit the effects of elec-trical fault Since these electrical faults can be caused by both inter-nal and external hazards, installations suceptible to such damage were reviewe Even though the Salem station is not committed to the requirements of Regulatory guide 1.75 on separation, the independence of the electrical train between safety trains and to nonsafety trains, was reviewed to establish the reliability of the electrical syste A sample of significant electrical modifications were reviewed in detai The purpose of this review was to verify that appropriate controls for the assurance of quality were in effect and that adequate safety evaluations were performed by the licensee to ensure that no unreviewed safety questions (10 CFR 50.59) exis The modification program was reviewed to verify that the appropriate maintenance attributes are transferred into the applicable procedure The onsite electrical power systems, emergency diesel generator and the 125V Batteries loading calculations were reviewed to verify the systems*
capacity to respond to design basis event The dynamic part of the electrical system as documented in. the licensee studies was verified to assess the system capability to respond to transient undervoltage, bus transfer, starting of large motors et The summary of the inspection findings is given in Section 4, and* the details of the inspection findings are provided in Section 5 of this repor.0 Summary of Inspection Findings During the inspection of the licensee 1s review of breaker coordination for safety related systems, the team found that the overall scope of work was sufficiently comprehensive to address the issue of breaker coordination adequac In particular, the licensee 1s review included not only safety related circuit breakers, but also an adequate review of the potential impact of breaker coordination involving non-safety related circuit The licensee 1 s technical review work was generally thorough and based on sound technical judgemen In certain instances the team raised questions - that are documented in the inspection report - about analyses that had not been performed at the time of the inspectio In each case, the licensee 1s response resulted in satisfactory resolution of the ite Also, since the licensee 1 s overall analysis of the breaker coordination issue was in its final stages, but not as yet completed, these items are not being reported as o~issions on the part of the license The licensee 1s review of the safety related breaker coordination issue did not identify any instances where the absence of complete coordination between breakers would compromise the safety related electrical distribution system in terms of losing more than one train of safety related equipment from a common mode failur Recognizing the merits of i~creased breaker coordination, the licensee did take the initiative to increase the margins of safety in a number of instances by modifying
breaker internal components in some cases and adding circuit fuses in others, thereby increasing the degree of coordination between certain breaker The inspection team reviewed the licensee 1 s status of safety related breaker coordination for restart and had no exceptions to the licensee 1 s pla The inspection team also reviewed the status of other electrical areas of interest at Salem in connection with the on-going electrical distribution system review program initiated by the licensee during the past yea A summary of team findings, observations and licensee commitments is as follows:
At the time of this inspection the licensee identified a potential problem with motor control center (MCC) bus voltages under postulated degraded grid and loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) conditions such that certain safety related equipment might not be operabl This item was identified as a part of the licensee 1s on-going program of review of the Salem station electrical distribution syste The licensee committed during this inspection to complete their analysis of this area and make any necessary system changes before restart of each Uni This report includes an unresolved item (UNR) on this subject in section The team reviewed the area of emergency diesel generator (EOG) loading during postulated LOCA and loss of offsite power conditions and identified the need for documented engineering analysis to support the procedural guidelines provided to operators for ensuring that EOG load limits are not exceede While the emergency procedures provide operators with the load limit and guidance in support of manual load swap so as to maintain loading within the limit, there was no licensee analysis that demonstrates the capacity of the EOGs as sufficient to envelope all the design basis loading requirement This report includes an Unresolved Item (UNR) on this subject in section The team noted that the breaker coordination curves associated with the reactor coolant pumps exhibit some overlap in a small portion of the range of current values on the breaker characteristic curves and recommended that the licensee review the feasibility of relay adjustments to eliminate this condition and thereby improve the coordination for these breaker The licensee committed to do thi In the team's review of administrative controls for breaker trip device set points, it was determined that the licensee's Maintenance Management Information System (MMIS) - which is in the final stages of program establishment - will be the controlling source for these set points and historical dat The licensee committed to have either the applicable portion of MMIS or alternate controlled one line diagrams marked up to reflect all set points prior to unit restart.
With respect to station electrical load growth control, the licensee stated that the new Administrative Control of Design and Configuration Change Program will control all future major electrical modifications and configu-ration changes currently being controlled by procedure GMB-EMP-009. The licensee committed to having the new program in effect in January 198.0 Details of Inspection of Electric Power Systems Breaker Coordination 5. KV and 4KV Balance of Plant Buses The plant electrical system receives power through the auxiliary power transformers and station power transformer When the station is generating less than approximately 38% power, the power supply is only through station power transformers. The power feed for the station transformers come from 13 kilo Volt ring bus located within the Salem station protected area which is fed from several power source During any plant condition station power transformers supply both Class lE and non lE buses rated at 4160 The reliability of this offsite power supply is critical to the safety of the plant operatio The reliability is enhanced through a fully coordinated electrical protection system.
The non safety part of the electrical system is connected to the group buses identified as E, F and These buses primarily serve the balance of plant equipment, that are not critical to the shut down of the statio This equipment is more susceptible to failures due to internal and external hazard The faults generated by those failures have to be promptly isolated to limit the possibility of loosing the offsite power suppl In order to verify this function, the team selected non safety bus 26, and reviewed the protective relaying and coordinatio The team walked down the 26 Vital bus (Non lE bus) and verified the protective relay setpoints on both feeder breakers and the reactor coolant pump breake Based on the present relay settings, the licensee generated the coordination curve The team reviewed the coordination drawing 1 HAKRCPE dated December 2, 1987, and concluded that Bus 26 had complete coordinatio However, some specific comments on margin between the protective characteristic curves are addressed in Section 5.6.
5.1. 2
The ground fault protection of the subject buses was also reviewed to verify coordinatio The team reviewed the ground protection coordination curve lHAKRCPG dated December 2, 198 This drawing established full coordination from 4160 volt group bus to 13800 Volt ring bus in the switch yar The team also reviewed 'The Relay Test Order' for Station Power Transformers 22 and 2 The team did not observe any deficient condition Safety Related 4KV Buses and Below The licensee has embarked on a major program of modifications to the electrical protection subsystem of the Salem auxiliary power syste This involves a completely new coordination study which requires the re-setting of many of the protective relays and circuit breaker trip units in the system as well as the replacement of a number of low-voltage breaker magnetic series trips with static trip units and the addition or replacement of fuses in cases where essential coordination cannot otherwise be achieve Except where specifically noted in the discussion below, all of the elements of this program are scheduled for completion before the Salem plant is re-starte The following is the team 1 s evaluation of the level of auxiliary power system protective device coordination which will be achieved when all planned modifications are complete Complete coordination will be achieved among all 4160 V AC Class lE protective relays (including both phase over current and ground-fault relaying), and between the 4160 V relays and the trip units of the low-voltage power circuit breakers in the 480 V and 240 V AC distribution substation In many cases this will require the replacement of the existing magnetic series trip units with static trip The trip replacement program is in progress, and is concentrating on the most-critical breakers firs (A few breakers may not be completed until after restart because of component coordination pending replacement.)
Complete coordination will be achieved between the main and feeder power circuit breakers in the Class lE low-voltage ac (480,and 240 V) distribution substations through re-setting and/or trip unit replacemen As above, a few trip devices may be replaced after restart if satisfactory coordination can temporarily be achieved with the existing trip units and necessary parts are not immediately availabl Coordination among low-voltage (480 V and 240 V AC,) Class lE molded-case circuit breakers and fuses will continue to be imperfect at levels of short circuit current which exceed the instantaneous tripping current of the "upstream" breaker.
However, in the large majority of such cases non selectivity will only occur in case of severe short circuits near the motor control centers and distribution panels involve Such faults are extremely improbable in view of the current-limiting effects of arc and ground-return-path impedances, and the fact that all of the potential fault locations where the available current is sufficient to trip both breakers are within "protected areas
as defined abov Furthermore, the inspection team walked down the selected areas of multi-train electrical circuits where lack of complete coordination existe As a current feasibility study so indicates, the licensee may correct some of these cases by replacing the downstream breakers with units having smaller rating Otherwise, a justification will be prepared for the miscoordination condition In the remaining non selectivity cases, the devices involved are for a dedicated servic Therefore, which device operates first is irrelevant to the availability of the circuit involve The licensee will also justify the continuation of these condi-tion In general, no significant discrepancies were observe. DC System Circuit Breaker and Fuse Coordination Several aspects of the Class lE 125 VDC and 28 VDC systems were examined during the inspectio These included breaker/fuse coordination, battery capacity, and a field inspection of various DC Electrical Distribution Panels, Cabling and batterie The primary focus of this inspection was to determine if adequate coordination existed between the DC overcurrent protective devices such that a common mode failure would not cause the loss of more than one of the three independent DC power source The licensee contracted with an outside source to perform a detailed study of the DC system and the results are contained in Document Number Pl-183545-E05-1, Salem 1 and 2 125 Volt Battery Study, and Pl-183545-Ell-02, Salem 1 and 2 DC and 120 Volt AC Coordination Stud These documents were reviewed in their 11draft 11 for The licensee is in the process of validating the data and making corrections where necessar The methodology for calculating short circuit currents was reviewed and found to be acceptabl The contribution of the battery charger filter capacitors to available short circuit current was not initially considered, however, the licensee evaluated the question and determined that the current limiting circuit within the charger would ensure short circuit currents are within the bounds of those used for the original calculation *
The calculations identified numerous DC circuits which did not have full coordination between protective devices over the entire range of the available curren In some instances, the licensee is making modiffcation to improve the margins of safet For example, diesel generator field flashing circuits are being modi-fied by the addition of a fuse in series with the circuit breaker to provide full coordinatio There are seven inverter circuits for each SALEM unit which do not completely coordinate with the main battery fuses for a phase to phase short circuit at the bu The licensee has addressed these circuits in the safety evaluation report (SER)
and determined that no circuit modifications are warranted due to the fact that:
a)
The equipment and cables are located in a protected area resulting in a low probability of this type of fault occurring in a common mode fashion affecting more than one trai b)
If such a fault did occur and the fuses blew, the battery charger would continue to power the bus, and c)
The operators have blown fuse indications in the main control room and thus would be immediately aware of the problem and could initiate corrective actio During review of the Unit 1 125 VDC one line electrical diagram (D'tJG. 203007) the inspector questioned whether the battery charger output circuit breaker has been reviewed with respect to coordi-nation with the main battery fuses such that a fault within the charger would not result in a blown fuse and result in the loss of the entire DC bu The licensee determined that coordination for these breakers had not been reviewed and subsequently found that similar to the inverter feeds, full coordination was not presen The inspector verified the physical configuration of the battery chargers with respect to the DC bus to confirm the licensee's determination that there is no common cause which would lead to the simultaneous loss of more than one DC bus due to the absence of total coordinatio The licensee included these cases in the SE The other area of concern in the DC systems is that of lack of full coordination between the 100 amp main.circuit breaker in the DC distribution panels and the branch circuit breaker In both the 125 voe and 28 voe systems a fault in a branch circuit occurr-ing in close proximity to the distribution panel could result in both the branch circuit breaker and the panel main circuit breaker openin The postulated fault current decreases with distance
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from the distribution panel due to the added circuit resistance in the cablin Full coordination is achieved for faults approx-imately 30 feet away from distribution cabine The licensee has determined that in all cases full coordination is achieved before the cabling leaves the protected confines of the auxiliary relay room within which the distribution cabinets are locate Again there are no credible postulated common mode causes within the auxiliary relay room which would lead to the simultaneous loss of more than one distribution cabine Walkdowns of the auxiliary room and cabling were performed by the inspectors and did not reveal any common mode hazard The inspection also included a review of the battery capacit The draft copy of electrical consultant _study Pl-183545-E05-1 indicated potential discharge rates which would exceed the capacity of the installed 125 VDC batterie A more detailed load analysis is being performed by the licensee and the initial calculations indicate that the capacity is adequat The inspec-tor reviewed the methodology and assumptions being used by the licensee's engineers and determined that the values being used are more realistic than the consultant study and they are conser-vative value A detailed load study for the 28 VDC batteries has not been performed at this time but preliminary calculations do not indicate there will be a problem with the discharge rat A walkdown was performed to verify that only the loads shown on the electrical drawings were connected and that all temporary circuits were remove No discrepencies were noted for the sample of panels inspecte The inspector also verified that the licensee was reviewing circuit loading with respect to potentially excessive voltage drops which could affect individual component operabilit The electrical consultant study indicated that voltage drops in excess of 10% of rated battery voltage may occur for some load The licensee reviewed and reperformed calculations using more realistic parameters confirmed that adequate operating voltage would be available to all component.2 Short Circuit Analyses 5. Inspection Scope, Approach, and Criteri The inspection team evaluated the AC and DC short circuit calcu-lations for the Salem plant auxiliary power systems, which are contained in calculation nos. Pl-183545-E03-1 Rev. 0 and Pl-183545-E06-l, Rev. 0, and Pl-183545-E06-1, Rev. >
All of these analyses were prepared by a contractor and are currently under review and revision by the license The revisions will consist exclusively of the correction of over-conservative as~umptions which lead to overstatements of available short cir-cuit current The team concluded that the preliminary contractor calculations bound the results of the revised calculation The inspection approach consisted of reviewing the input data, assumptions, and methodology of the calculations, including 11 talking through" the methodology with the cognizant licensee and/or contractor engineers; evaluating all results for plaus-ibility; and numerically checking a small random sample of calculation The basic evaluation criteria for the short circuit analyses were the following:
(I) application of proper calculation methodologies as defined in the applicable industry standards, primarily IEEE Std I4I, ANSI C37.0IO, ANSI C37.I3, and NEMA AB-I; (2) use of worst-case plant configuration and impedance data; (3) use of conservative assumptions and approximations in the absence of specific plant data; and (4) adequacy of confidence level of dat. AC System Calculations, PI-I83545-E03-I.
These calculations were performed using the contractor 1 s validated short-circuit computer software, and cover all significant Class IE and non-IE AC busses at the I3.8 KV, 4I60 V, 480 V, and 240 V level They cover four cases involving all combinations of power supply from the station unit auxiliary transformers or the station power transformers (off-site power), and the presence or absence of three 4 KV circulating water pumps per uni Three-phase impedanceless faults were also considere The cases in which the six circulating water pumps are powered from the Hope Creek station rather than the Salem 4160 V group busses reflect the current plant configuratio The information on key assumptions in the preliminary contractor calculation report was not in final form, however sufficient information was stated to show that a number of very conservative approximations were used, such as the assumption that all low-voltage distribution substation busses are loaded IOO% with running motor This conservatism results in a substantial overstatement of short circuit currents, especially at the 480 V and 240 V levels, and more than compensates for any possible non-conservative errors in cable lengths, et The licensee has identified a number of overconservatisms in the AC short circuit analysis and referred the calculation back to the contractor for revisio The team reviewed the licensee 1 s comments on the calculations and concur that, when incorporated, they will make the analysis fully acceptabl. DC System Calculations 5. 2. 3.1 5.2. V Vital DC System Calculations, Pl-183545-E05-1 The preliminary DC 125 V short circuit calculations were performed manually, and covered all 125 V DC distribution panels and other significant location While this calculation is acceptable with respect to conservatism and methodology, the licensee has identified several overly-conservative assumptions made by the contractor which led directly to an indication of excessive circuit breaker interrupting duties at several location The calculations are under revision using walkdown-derived cable lengths, current vendor data on battery internal resistance, etc.,
which the licensee expects will demon-strate that the appa-rently deficient breakers are actually satisfactor The team reviewed the licensee 1 s planned revisions, and agreed that they will improve the realism of the results while retaining adequate conservatis V Vital DC System Calculations, Pl-183545-E06-1 The preliminary 28 V DC calculations initiated by the licensee were also performed manuall The team found them technically satisfactory, and take no exception to the conclusion that there are no short-circuit-current problems at the 28 V DC leve.3 Breaker and Fuse Sizing 5. AC Breakers (13 KV, 4 KV BOP, 4 KV Safety Related and Below)
As part of the short circuit analysis discussed in Section 5.2 of this report, the licensee evaluated the sizing of the AC breakers (momentary and interrupting rating) by comparison with the calcu-lated short circuit current The above analysis, in summary indicates that the existing AC breakers at Salem are adequately sized for carrying the momentary and interrupting short circuit currents, for the case in which the six Salem circulating water pumps (CWPs) are supplied from Hope Cree However, the design margin is relatively small for the 4 KV breaker For the case in which the CWPs are supplied from Salem, the analysis determined that the 4 KV breaker readings are inadequate to withstand and/or interrupt the available short circuit current when operating in certain configuration The details of the adequacy of the breaker sizing under the two cases discussed above are shown in Section of the licensee analysi *
5. The team reviewed the licensee analysis and noted its conclusion It should be emphasized that the analysis is in its draft form and the licensee is still evaluating its conclusion DC System Circuit Breaker and Fuse Sizing The inspectors also reviewed a sample of the 125 VDC system circuit breakers and fuses for proper sizing and interrup~ing capacit The draft copy of study Pl-18345-E05-1 contains short circuit calculations for the 125 voe circuits and compared these values to the ratings for the corresponding circuit breaker and fuse interrupting capacitie The inspector reviewed this report and also examined a sample of the DC electric diagrams to verify all the loads were included in the study and also performed a field walkdown to verify the drawing accuracy with respect to actual connected loads on the DC panel The study performed by the licensee 1 s contractor indicated that the interrupting capacity of the 1200 A battery fuses and the auxiliary shutdown system distribution cabinet circuit breakers may not be adequate for the calculated available short circuit amperag The inspector discussed these concerns with the licensee staff and was provided with adequate resolution that the fuses and circuit breakers were in fact satisfactor Within the scope of this review the inspector had no further concern.4 Review of Design Change Packages (DCPs)
5. Administrative Controls The team reviewed the administrative control documents listed in Attachment 2 to ascertain that adequate assurances of quality, in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, exist for the safety related activities associated with the modi-fication of the electrical power system These include:
Design and Design Change Control (This includes specifications, drawings, procedures and instruction Controls include selection and review for suitability of design change packages for their safety-related administrative controls and independent design verification).
5. *
Document Control (This includes drawings, procedures, and instructions, and changes to these documents).
- Post-Modification Testing (Written test procedures incorporating requirements and acceptance criteria; documentation and evaluation of test results).
The licensee 1 s QA program and administrative controls were reviewed with an emphasis on plant modification activities which could potentially affect the safety functions of the electric power system Individual DCP reviews are covered in Section 5. The teams findings with respect to overall administrative controls in this area are as follows: *
Engineering and Plant Betterment Department procedure GMP-EMP-009, Operational Design Change Control was reviewe The subject procedure is the controlling document for all engineering design changes for the statio The team noted that the procedure does not clearly define the requirements for updating the Maintenance Management Information System (MMIS).
The licensee stated that a new program identified as the Administrative Control of Design and Configuration Change is in final draf The program which is scheduled for implementation in January 1988, will replace the GM8-EMP-009 procedure for major modification Requirements for the updating of MMIS data band on design changes is clearly identified in the new document The team verified that admini-strative control of load changes will be accomplished through the Discipline Design Consideration Check List for Electrical, which is part of the Administrative Control of Design and Configuration Change progra Design Change Packages (DCPs) and Safety Evaluations A sample of modifications involving significant changes in the configuration of electric power systems was selected for detailed revie The scope of review included a verification that:
The Administrative Controls described in Section 5. above were effectively practiced during the implementation of the modification *
Adequate safety evaluations were performed to ensure that no unreviewed safety questions (10 CFR 50.59) exis *
Independent design verifications were performed as require *
Adequate post-modification tests were performed and the test results met the acceptance criteri *
The modifications involving a major change in the configuration of the electrical power systems were further reviewed in detail to determine the extent of the change and its potential effect on the safety functions of these system This also determines the need to perform revised load studies to verify that the new configuration will adequately perform its intended safety function A complete list of DCPs reviewed is included in Attachment 2 Section Of all the DCPs reviewed, two need particular mention as they relate to significant load changes (increase or decrease)
at Salem 1 and The first DCP, 2EC-01381-A, involved replace-ment of 3 condensate pumps in each unit with higher horie power pumps (3000 HP Vs 4000 HP) to eliminate frequent outages caused by low feed pump suction pressur The.licensee indicated that a static type of electrical load st~dy was performed at the time this design change was implemented in 198 This study concluded that the increased loading is within the capability of the Auxiliary Power Transformers (APTs) which normally power the station in-house load However, it could overload the Station Power Transformers (SPTs), which is not the normal source of power for the station in-house loads under summer (hot) weather conditions if the units are operating at full loa A limited dynamic (short circuit) study was also done at this time which indicated an increase in short circuit currents caused by the chang This could result in exceeding the interrupting capacity of the pump breakers by approximately two percen A licensee evaluation on the subject (S-2-E130-EEE-023, dated May 9, 1984) concluded that because of the conservative nature of this study, no electrical system modifications are require However, the team considers that the situation clearly indicated a need to perform a detailed integraded dynamic study (short circuit, breaker sizing, and coordination studies etc.) of the Salem electrical distribution system at that tim Such a study, if it had been done, would have identified the station overload-ing problems under dynamic conditions and the undervoltage problems such as those experienced during the August 26, 1986 event (refer to Inspection Report 50-311/86-26, for details).
This concern further re-enforces the need to administratively control such significant load changes and to perform the required static and dynamic studies, as was discussed further in Section 5.4.1 of this repor The second significant DCP reviewed (lSM-0194 for Salem-1, and 2SM-0194 for Salem-2) involved transfer of six Circulating Water Pumps (CWPs) (three per unit at 2000 HP per pump) from the Salem electrical distribution system to the Hope Creek syste This modification was completed in January 1987 as a temporary change to eliminate the overloading/undervoltage problems at the Salem units so that the units could continue to operate until a final solution is arrived a The licensee indicated that this temporary change could be the final solutio. A recent short circuit study (Pl-183545-E02-1 dated July 1, 1987) indicates that, with the CWPs fed from Hope Creek, the overloading/undervoltage problems at Salem would be eliminated (refer to Section 5.2 of this report, for a discussion of this study).
Further, this also would reduce the short circuit current levels to within the rating of the breakers (refer to Section 5.3.1 of this report, for a discussion of the breaker sizing).
The licensee further indicated that because the Hope Creek electrical distribution system was originally designed for a two unit station, it has adequate spare capacity to feed the Salem CWP A licensee evaluation (H-1-MCXX-ESE-0631, dated January 16, 1987) concluded that the additional loading on the Hope Creek system will not affect the system operation detrimentall.5 Voltage Study of Salem Electrical Distribution System On August 26, 1986, a reactor trip occurred at Salem Unit 2 which was shortly followed by a safety injection actuation and a subsequent false loss of offsite power to the safety related buse The continued operation of Salem Units 1 and 2 following the above event was justified by returning the plant loads to within the values identified in the 1981 degraded grid voltage analysis when both Salem units were in operation, units loads were administratively limited to approximately 82% reactor powe At this power level the station electrical loads were within the limits of the 1981 degraded grid voltage analysi This load reduction was accomplished by removing non-essential equipment from servic It was the licensee's intention to continue operating in this mode until additional transient analysis could be ccmpleted and a long term corrective action plan could be formulate Subsequent to the above, the licensee initiated efforts to look at various options which could allow Salem units to return to full gene-rating capacit The option selected involved transfer of six circulating water system pumps from the Salem electrical distribution system to the Hope Creek syste The transfer was accomplished by routing a 13KV feeder from the Hope Creek switchyard to the Salem switchyar A transient analysis of the Salem electrical distribution system was performed which verified that the above configuration would not cause a repeat of the August 26, 1986 even In addition, the second level of undervoltage relay (degraded grid) settings were changed from 91% to 91.6% of the design voltag The licensee intends to operate Salem Units 1 and 2 in this design configuration (feeding six Salem circulating water pumps from Hope Creek switchyard) until long term corrective actions to improve the station electrical distri-bution system voltages are implemente *
During this inspection at Salem,. the licensee reported the existence of degraded voltage at various motor control centers (MCC's) which could affect safety related equipment operabilit This was recently identified as a re~ult of the licensee's ongoing program to improve station electric distribution system voltages at Salem Units 1 and An engineering evaluation revealed that, if a LOCA occurred coincident with a degraded grid voltag (4KV system operating just above the second level of undervoltage relay setting of 91.6%), certain plant MCC 1 s could experience a bus voltage as low as 87.5% of the nominal voltag Additionally, the feeder circuits from the MCC to the load (motors) will experience an additional 1% dro This low voltage condition could impair the operation (starting) of safety related equipmen It could also cause stalling of operating equipment connected to these MCC 1 The licensee has confirmed based on review of various motor specifica-tions and motor speed torque curves with respect to pump or fan speed curves that the Salem motors will start at 80% of the rated voltag The industry practice is to have 90% of the design voltage for con-tinuous operatio In addition, the licensee evaluated the affect of this degraded voltage at the control circuits of the safety related motor It was determined that certain contactor coils would not have sufficient voltage (pull-in) to start safety related motors.
In view of the above, it appears that this design deficiency in the degraded grid voltage protection system has existed for some time at Salem Units 1 and The engineering evaluations are continuing to determine how this undervoltage problem at Salem can be resolve The licensee is looking at various options ~uch as changing load taps on 4.16KV/230V transformer, adding interposing relays in the control circuits or increasing size of circuit cable The licensee has committed to resolving this issue before restar The staff will review and evaluate the undervoltage voltage problem at Salem when the licensee 1 s studies are completed and documente This is Unresolved Item No. 87-35-0.6 Protective Relaying 5. Over Current Protection The protective relay coordination study is primarily centered on the trip characteristics of the largest load on the bus and the feeder to that bu This review was to address the other safety significant loads, its protection coordination and to determine if the existing setpoints are adequate to perform its safety functio The team randomly selected the following loads at various voltage levels to examine the protective relaying.
- 5. *
I7 V Loads 2A Containment Spray pump 400HP IA Safety Injection pump 400HP IA Aux. Feed pump 600HP 1B Charging pump 600HP IA Service Water pump IOOOHP Reactor Coolant pump 600HP V Loads 2A Boric acid pump I5HP IA Aux. bldg. exhaust fan 75HP 1B Aux. bldg. exhaust fan 75HP lA Chiller lOOHP Field verification and the review of the protective system characteristic curves confirmed that the above loads were adeouately protected and coordinate The team reviewed the Reactor Coolant Pump protection coordination curves IHAK RCPE dated December 2, 198 The margin between the motor overcurrent relay and the feeder overcurrent relay trip characteristic at the given setting was minimu The licensee is considering to increase this margin by adjusting the tap and the time dial settin No other deficiencies were identifie Ground Fault Protection The safety related AC electrical system is grounded only at the 4160 Volt level.
Ground fault protection is provided for Reactor Coolant pump, safety injection pumps, service water pumps and containment spray pump These pumps use two sizes of induction motors namely IOOO,horse power and 400 horse powe The protec-tion provided for these motors are simila The team reviewed the ground fault protection coordination curve IHAKRCPG dated December 2, 1987, and concluded that the protection is adequate and properly coordinated.
- 18 Emergency Diesel Generator Loading The team reviewed the loads on the safety bus and the emergency loading of the diesel generator to assess the present adequacy of the emergency diesel generator capacit The Salem Unit 1 and 2 plants each have three emergency diesel generators whi~h are designed to perform their safety function assuming any 2 of the 3 diesels are operating during an acciden The diesels are rated as follows at 0.8 power factor:
2600 KW - Continuous 2750 KW - 2000 Hours 3100 KW - 30 Minutes Safety Evaluation CD-SE-7 dated September 17, 1976 and 11 Design Analysis and Evaluation of Salem Standby AC Power Supple Adequacy 11,
Report #CD-M-66 Rev 1 dated January 12, 1981, were reviewe In the CD-M-66 evaluation the licensee states that the highest short-term load on the diesel generators is approximately 2772 KW which slightly exceeds the 2000 hour0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br /> ratin This loading would be for less than one hou Also under a LOCA and Loss-of-Offsite Power (LOOP) condition, with the failure of #13 component cooling pump to start, the long term loading could be a maximum of 2626 KW, slightly exceeding the continuous ratin The report states that the loading analysis was conservative and that actual loads should be lower than estimate However, no further calculations were provided which would refine the assumptions used and demonstrate that loadings would in fact be within the diesel rat~ng Even though the team recognizes the conservatism in the calculations, a complete analysis is necessary to determine the actual loading of the generato The licensee was in the process of reanalyzing the diesel loading during the inspection and preliminary calculations indicated that a diesel generator overloading condition would not occur during accident condition It was also noted that the Emergency Operating Procedures did provide direction for the plant operators as to which loads should be stopped to allow starting other required loads without exceeding the diesel load ratin Although preliminary calculations and procedures do not indicate an overload problem would exist, the licensee could not provide a detailed analysis and associated diesel generator load profile to demonstrate that diesel generator loading will not be a problem under the worst case combination of an accident with the concurrent single failure of a component (which would cause diesel generator loading to be at a maximum).
Even though, as indicated above, the emergency procedures give guidance to the operators for swapping loads and remaining below a specified EOG loading level, the licensee should have a documented analysis supporting the diesel generator capability to respond to the worst analyzed accident with a concurrent single failure and that the issued emergency procedures are consistant with this analysi This is an Unresolved Item No. UNR 87-35-0.8 Breaker and Protective Relay Maintenance 5. Setpoint and Configuration Contro. The licensee is in the process of establishing a computerized system to maintain the configuration of.breaker and protective relay set point The present plan is to have this program in place before Salem 2 restar This program is identified as Maintenance Management Information System (MMIS).
The MMIS data base will be the source for breaker and relay set points with back up data available on controlled one line diagram The MMIS data base is capable of generating the maintenance instructions with the applicable variable Currently the licensee relies on the following documentation for maintenance:
For all breaker protective devices, current and historical data is recorded and retrievable on Maintenance Procedure M&Q-Test Data Sheet Trip settings for the recently installed SS5 solid state trip devices are identified on 230V-Vital Bus one line diagram Set points for 00-3 electro-mechanical trip breakers are also identified on the 230 V-Vital Bus diagram Maintenance Activities The inspector reviewed documentation controlling the installation of SS-5 type breaker overload driven and associated over load device set points for breaker locations 2B8Y and 2B13 The inspector field verified over current relay set point changes at 4KV vital bus 4160/480 and 4160/230V transformers. The setpoint changes were accomplished in accordance with relay department
procedure No. 4N-1, as part of Design change Request lEC-229 Additionally the inspector verified the setpoint data on drawing G01242A 1382 I No discrepancies were observed.
- Independent Measurements and Calculations One of the major areas where the licensee determined that full over current protection coordination could not be achieved is in the DC distribution that originated from the distribution panels located in the Relay roo The team performed an analysis to assess the impact of this lack of full coordinatio The objective of the analysis was to arrive at the cable length at which the circuit will become coordinated for a fault at that locatio This is the result of the cable resistance that is added in series to the fault current for a short circuit simulated away from the distribution pane The breaker coordination curve lAlDlAAE dated October 1, 1987 indicates the distribution circuit to be coordinated with the upstream breaker when the fault current does not exceed 500 Ampere The calculation of cable length using this short circuit current and unit resistance of the cable, indicates that the DC circuits of ANG #14 wire will be coordinated at a distance of 35.5 feet for panel 2A The licensee had subsequently added this calculation into the Salem 1&2 DC and Vital AC coordination study Pl-18345-Ell Revision All of the cables that leave their distribution panels are routed in a mild and seismically qualified area equipped with a fire detection and suppression* system for a length of approximately 50 feet before they leave the Relay roo This room houses only control equipment which is very unlikely to cause any significant internal hazards that can propagate deleterious effects to multiple train Based on there facts, the team concluded th3t the lack of full coordination for DC distribution circuits does not compromise the integrity of the DC safety related electrical distribution syste.0 Unresolved items Unresolved items are matters for which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable, violations, or deviation Two unresolved items are discussed in sections 5.5 and 5.7 of this repor.0 Exit Interview Attachment 4 is the list of persons contacted during the inspectio At the conclusion of the inspection on December 4, 1987, the inspection team met with the licensee representatives, denoted in Attachment The team leader summarized the scope and findings of the inspection at that tim The team leader and the licensee discussed the contents of this inspection report to ascertain that it did not contain any proprietary informatio The licensee agreed that the inspection report may be placed in the Public Document Room without prior licensee review for proprietary information (10 CFR 2.790).
No written material was provided to the licensee by the tea **
Page 1 of 2 Attactiment 1 Simplified Sketchsof Salem 1 & 2 Electrical Distribution System KEENEY
!1()15 NEWFREEOOM 5023 NEW FREEDOM
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Page 2 of 2 REVISION 1 JULY n, 1987 Ref. Dwg. 703007 A*8789 l7
Pl8.IC srnm El[CTRIC At() GAS COll'ANT SAUM MJCL[AR G[l(RATING SIAlklN 175 v.n.c. ().{ Lllf'
Un1t I Updotod rSAR Sheol I of r,9 8.3*7
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Doc. N.
Drawings 601701-A-1305 203000-A-8789 203001-A-8789 203002-A-8789 203003-A-8789 203004-A-8789 203061-A-8789 Attachment 2 Documents Reviewed *
Title Revision Salem/Hope Creek Nuclear G S -500, 13.8 KV
Elementary One Line Diagram No. 1 & 2 Units Generators & Main
Transformers - One Line Control Diagram No. 1 Unit 4160V Group Buses One Line
Diagram No. 1 Unit 4160V Vital Buses One Line
Diagram No. 1 Un it 460V & 230V Vital and Non-Vi ta l
Bus One Line Control Diagram No. l & 2 Units 13 KV Switchgear One Line Control Diagram No. 2 Unit 4160V Vital Buses One Line Diagram
8 203062-A-8789 No. 2 Unit 4160V Group Buses One Line
Diagram 203063-A-8789 No. 2 Unit 460V & 230V Vital and Non-Vital
Bus One Line Control Diagram DWG #221408 lAADC 125 V.D.C. Distribution
Cabinet v/i ring DWG #211342 D\\vG #203007 No. 1A-125V DC Bus Wiring Diagram Unit 1 125 V.D.C. One Line Electrical Diagram
18
- -** *
Attachment 2 Documents Reviewed Doc. N Title Design Change Packages (DCPs)
lSM-0194 2SM-0194 2EC-01381-A 2EC-01896 2EC-02210 2EC-02240 2EC-02263 2EC-02291 2EC-02292 2EC-02271 Temporary Power for Circulators (Unit 1)
Temporary Power for Circulators (Unit 2)
Condensate and Feedwater System, Removal of the Existing Condensate Pumps and Installation of Higher Horsepower Motors Upgrade the Fast Transfer on Vital Buses on Undervoltage Conditions Replace Existing Diesel Generator Differential Relays Type 12 CFO 12 (not Seismically Qualified in the De-energized Condition) with IJD Type Relays or SA-1 Type Relays Disconnect and Remove the Existing No. 22 Westinghouse 25 MVA Station Power Transformer in Switchyard, Install a Spare General Electric 28 MVA Transformer on the Existing 22 SPT Mounting Pad.....
Install Two (2) 70A and Four (4) 15A Seismically Qualified 125 VDC Molded Case Circuit Breaker The Circuit Breakers will be wired into the existing Diesel Generator 125 VDC Control power and field flashing circuits...
230V Trip Elements Are to be Replaced Overcurrent Relay Setpoint Changes Rewire Undervoltage Relays (91%) to Bus PTs, Add New Relay and Resistor at Vital Buses Revision
0
0
0
0
0
Doc. N Attachment 2 Documents Reviewed Title Revision Engineering/Safety Evaluations H-l-MCXX-ESE-0631 S-C-F300-MEE-025 S-2-El30-EEE-023 Correspondence NLR-N87013 NLR-N87187 NLR-N87186 Justification for feeding 6 Salem Circulating Water Pumps from Hope Creek's 13KV Ring Bus I~tegrated System Summary of the Condensate Pump Upgrade to Improve Feed Pump Suction Pressure Conditions Engineering Evaluation of Existing Station Power Distribution System to Support Upgraded Condensate Pump Motors
(Jan. 16, 1981)
(August 14, 1984)
(May 9, 1984)
Letter from C.A. McNeill, Jr. to NRC January 30, 1987 Subj~ct: August 26, 1986 Reactor Trip and False Blackout Signal at Salem Unit No. 2 - Status of Corrective Actions, Salem and Hope Creek Generating Stations Letter from C.A. McNeill, Jr. to NRC Subject:
Request for Directionary Enforcement, Tech. Spec. 3.8.1.1, Facility Operating License DPR-75 Letter from C.A. McNeill, Jr. to NRC Subject:
10 CFR 50 Appendix R Safety Evaluation, Salem 1 and 2 October 13, 1987 October 1, 1987 *
Doc. N Attachment 2 Documents Reviewed Title Revision Studies and Analyses Pl-183545-E02-1 PTI Report N R8-87 Pl-183545-E03-1 Pl-183545-E05-1 Pl-183545-E06-1 Raughby Study Pl-183545-E03-2 Pl-183545-Ell-2 Pl-183545-E05-l CD-SE-7 CD-M-66 N/A Saiem Nuclear Generating Station; 13.8 KV, 4:16KV and LV Systems Short Circuit & Motor Starting Study Salem Nuclear Plant Short Circuit Study 13,8 KV, 4.16KV, and LV Systems Short Circuit & Motor Starting Study Salem 1 and 2 125 Volt Battery Study Salem 1 & 2 28 Volt Battery Study Salem Auxiliary Power System Intrim Study Part 1 U80 & 240V Vital Area Systems Voltage Drops Salem 1 and 2 DC and 120 Volt Vital AC Coordination Study Bus 'B' Load Analysis July 1, 1987 February 1987
7-1-87 0 Undated Draft 0 Undated Draft Draft Draft Salem 1 and 2 125 Volt Draft Battery Study Integrated Safeguards Operation N/A During Postulated Design Basis Events Design Analysis and Evaluation of
Salem Standby AC Power Supply Adequacy 125 VDC Battery Capacities Draft 11/30/87
- Doc. N Studies and Analyses IV-16,3,1 EOP-LOPA-1 Table A
Attachment 2 Documents Reviewed Title Emergency Power-Diesel Operation Safeguard Loading Sequence Maintenance Procedu~es GMS-EMP-009 M3J M3Q M3Q-4 M3Q-5 M3Q-6 M3T M3U M3D M4H-1 DE-WB.ZZ-0001 thru 0005 Operational Design Change Control 4KV and 13KV Breaker Timing 230 and 460 Volt K-Series Breaker Overload Test 230/460 V ITE K1600 Circuit Breaker Periodic Maintenance 230/460 ITE K225 and K600 Circuit Breaker Periodic Maintenance 230 and 460 Volt ITE K-Series Breaker t*~2intenance Under Voltage and Under Frequency Trip Check and Time Response Surveillance Test Safeguard Equipment Control System Output Relay Time Response Surveillance Test 4KV and 13KV Magne-Blast Circuit Breaker Inspection and Test Installation and Removal of FS-195 Fire Wrapping For Cable Tray and Cable Administrative Control of Design and Configuration Change Revision
0 Rev. 2
8
1
16
10 Draft
L'
Doc. N Attachment 2 Documents Reviewed Title Maintenance Procedures (Continued)
87 1115068 & 69 IEC-2292 4 Nl-1 Work Orders Design Change Request 4KV Vital Buses Subsection of Relay Manual Revision
Attachment 3 Persons Contacted Public Service Electric and Gas Company
- S. E. Miltenberger, V. P. Nuclear Operations
- J. T. Boettger Assist, Assistant V. P. Operations Support
- Bruce A. Preston, MGR-LIC & REG
- L. A. Reiter, GM-Lie & Reliability
- L. K. Miller, MGR~Nuclear Engr Svc *W. Pavincich, Principal Engineer
- R. W. Skwarek, Project Manager-Special Projects
- M. Rosenzweig, Mgr-QA Engr. & Procurement
- M. Morroni, Tech Dept I&C Electrical Eng
- V. J. Polizzi, Project Manager-H. *R. W. Chranowski, Lead Engineer
- L. G. Hajos, Sr. Staff Engineer
- M. L. Burnstein, Principal Engineer Offsite Safety Review
- E. A. Liden, MGR-Offsite Safety Review
- M. K. Gray, Li c ens i n g Eng i nee r
- G. A. Roggie, Salem Station Licensing Engineer
- R. Donges, Licensing Engineer
- R. Mollica, Elec. Design
- R. Swartzwelder, Licensing Engineer
- C. W. Lambert, Sciences-Manager
- D. W. Dudson, Licensing Engineer W. G. Drummond, Senior Staff Engineer C. W. Hotz, Relay Department S. W. Hooks, Maintenance Supervisor R. A. Burrigelli, GM-Etpb W. Moo, El ectri cal Engineer, Consultant D. J. Vito, Senior Licensing Engineer D. E. Vangeputte, Licensing Engineer M. A. Mortarulo, Senior Engineer Systems M. E. Woloski, Senior Staff Engineer United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- W. V. Johnston, Acting Director, Div. of Reactor Safety
- E. C. Wenzinger, Chief, Branch No. 2, Div. of Reactor Projects
- P. W. Eselgroth, Acting Tech. Assistant, Div. of Reactor Safety
- S. V. Pullani, Senior Operations Engineer, Div. of Reactor Safety
- T. Koshy, Reactor Engineer, Div. of Reactor Safety
- P. S. Koltay, Senior Resident Inspector IP-3, Div. of Reactor Projects
- T. J. Kenny, Senior Resident Inspector Salem, Div. of Reactor Projects
- K. H. Gibson, Resident Inspector Salem, Div. of Reactor Projects
- 0. Chopra, Lead Electrical Engineer, Nuclear Reactor Regulation
- N. R. Trehan, Electrical Engineer, Nuclear Reactor Regulation
- L. L. Scholl, Resident Inspector, Div. of Reactor Projects R. McFadden, Chief Electrical Engineer, Science Applications International Corporation
- State of New Jersey
- L. A. Hamersky, Supervisor Nuclear Engineering, Bureau of Nuclear Engineering
- W. Cristali, Nuclear Engineer, Bureau of Nuclear Engineering
- Denotes those present at the Exit Meeting held on December 4, 1987.