IR 05000272/1987032
| ML18093A605 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 01/14/1988 |
| From: | Swetland P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18093A604 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-87-32, 50-311-87-33, NUDOCS 8802020290 | |
| Download: ML18093A605 (20) | |
Text
Report No Docket No License No Licensee:
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
50-272/87-32 50-311/87-33 50-272 50-311 DPR-70 DPR-75 050272-871008 050272-871023 050311-870820 050311-871022 Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Plaza Newark, New Jersey 07101 Facility Name:
Salem Nuclear Generating Station - Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey Inspection Conducted:
November 3, 1987 - November 30, 1987 Inspectors:
T. J. Kenny, Senior Resident Inspector K. Halve}' Gibson eside Inspector
~/,
Approved by:
~,,.,~*--~~;::¢~~~~~~~~=======
Chief, Reactor Projects
==1blrr date
Projects Branch No. 2, DRP Inspection Summary:
Inspections on November 3, 1987 - November 30, 1987 (Combined Report Numbers 50-272/87-32 and 50-311/87-33)
Areas Inspected:
Routine inspections of plant operations including:
followup on outstanding inspection items, operational safety verification, maintenance, surveillance, review of special reports, licensee event followup, assurance of quality, followup on electric circuit breaker coordination, and service water repairs to fan cooler unit The inspection involved 183 _inspector hours by the resident NRC inspectors including backshift inspections on November 4, and November 25, and weekend inspections on November 7, and November 21.
8802020290 880114 PDR ADOCK 05000272 G
-2-Results:
Both units were shutdown during this inspection period and the inspections mainly concentrated on the licensee's repair and design change processe One item addressed in Section 5 of this report is unresolved and concerns a steam break within No.. 13 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump enclosure; in particular 1.) the apparent loss of configuration control and 2.) the operabity of adjacent equipment to the enclosure in the event of a steam line break.
- L DETAILS Persons Contacted Within this report period, interviews and discussions were conducted with members of licensee management and staff as necessary to support inspection activit.
Followup on Outstanding Inspection Items (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (272/84-02-01); This item was open due to the licensee's failure to maintain laboratory QC chart The inspector verified that control charts have been generated and maintained for metals and for the ion chromatography analyses of chloride and sulfat The inspector considers this item close.
Operational Safety Verification 3.1 Documents Reviewed Selected Operators* Logs
-
Senior Shift Supervisor's (SSS) Log Jumper Log Radioactive Waste Release Per~its (liquid & gaseous)
Selected Radiation Work Permits (RWP)
Selected Chemistry Logs Selected Tagouts Health Physics Watch Log 3.2 The inspector conducted routine entries into the protected areas of the plants, including the control rooms, Auxiliary Building, fuel buildings, and containments (when access is possible).
During the inspection activities, discussions were held with operators, technicians (HP & I&C), mechanics, security personnel, supervisors, and plant managemen The inspections were conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedures 71707, 71709, 71710, and 71881 and affirmed the licensee's commitments and compliance with 10 CFR, Technical Specifications, License Conditions, and Administrative Procedure.3 No violations were identifie Inspector Comments/Findings:
The inspector selected phases of the units riperation to determine compliance with the NRC 1s regulation The inspector determined that the areas inspected and the licensee's actions did not constitute a health and safety hazard to the public or plant personne The following are noteworthy areas the inspector researched in depth:
3. *
-4-Unit 1 The unit continues in a refueling outage which began on October 2, 198 During this report period the following major milestones were actomplished:
Replacement of all J-tubes in all four steam generators was complete The J-tubes were replaced with an -inconel tube with a carbon steel collar.-
Ten year Inservice Inspection (IS!) of the reactor vesse No indications were identifie Ten year hydrostatic testing of systems in accordance with the ten year !SI pla Sixty-one (61) of 86 tests have been complete Removal of old incore flux thimbles and replacement of new flux thimbles wfth-installed th~rmocouples has been complete Pip~ supports for ~arious syste~~ are essent~ally complete See section 4 of this report for more detail sludge lancing results for all 4 steam generators
-
No. 11 = 24 pounds of sludge removed
-
No. 12 = 31 pounds of sludge removed
-
No. 13 = 46 pounds of sludge removed
-
No. 14 = 41 pounds of sludge removed Removal of Re~istance Temperature Detector (RTD)
bypass loop piping and replacement with WEED style N-9004 RTDs qualified to IEEE 323~1974 and IEEE 344-1975 installed directly into the reactor coolant loops hot and cold legs. These RTD's are duel element - one connected to the control and protection instrumentati-0n, the other will be left disconnected as an installed spar See Section 4 of this report for more detail Installation of wear inserts into the lower core support bottom plate was completed.. As discussed in Combined Inspection Report 272/86-11; 311/86-22 flux thimbles had been wearing, in the area where they pass through the bottom plate of the_ lower core support barrel due to vibratio The installation of the inserts are intended to make the fit more snug and reduce the vibration and wear.
-5-On November 25, during refueling activities, the licensee identified a physical restriction between*
the fuel assemblies in the core and some of the new instrument guide tubes (associated with the in-core flux mapping detectors and the new core exit thermocouple detectors), which prevents the fuel assemblies from prope~ly landing on the lower core support plat The 109 elements that had been 1 oaded i nt*o the core were removed and returned to the spent fuel pit. The licensee fabricated a go-no-go gage to measure all of the newly installe inserts to determine how many were out of toleranc The licensee is evaluating possible repair method At the end of this report period the status was as follow *
Measurements are being taken with the go-no-go gag Two options are available for repair; (1)
machine off the tops of the inserts to meet tolerances.or (2) remove the inserts (they were inserted and rolled in place)
An investigation by the licensee is in progress to determine how the inserts were manufactured too lon The resident inspector has requested a copy of the report when complete As required by Technical Specification 4.4.5.5.a, the licensee made the following notification on November 20, * 1987:
110n October 21, 1987, three tubes were plugged in Unit 1 No. 13 Steam Generato Two of the tubes, located at row 44/column 62 and row 34/column 78, were plugged due to tube wall loss in excess of 40% (50% and 49% respectively). The third tube, located at row 9/column 49, was plugged as a conservative measure due to no 1antivibration bar* contact.
The installation of 11J 11 tubes and the insert problem have impacted the outage duration by at least 14 days as of November 30, 198 The resident inspectors are continuing to follow the licensee's progress.
- 3. *
-6-Unit 2 The unit was shutdown on October 23, 1987, because of the licensee 1s uncertainties with a justification for operation commitment to the NRC regarding electrical circuit breaker coordinatio The unit was placed in Mode 5 to facilitate maintenance repair The following are the major repairs performed during this report perio Reactor coolant pump No. 24, replacement of No. 1 seal and parts of No. 2 and 3 seals as necessary to correct an excessive seal leakof Remove, repair, re-balance, and replacement of all control rod drive mechanism vent fan Three fans are comple'ted and the fourth fan was in the process of being overhauled on November 30, 198 Upgrade of A.C. circuit breaker coordination that
- was identified in the licensee 1 s review of
- ~lectrical system design evaluations. A special NRC team inspection will be co~ducted November 30 -
December 4, 1987 to review the licensee 1 s action All BF-19 1 s (feedwater regulating valves) were repacked and retorqued to the manufacturer specifications. This was performed to correct packing leak As required by Technical Specification 4.4.6.5.a, the licensee made the following notification on November 20, 1987:
110n November 11, 1987, five tubes were plugged in Unit 2 No. 24 Steam Generato Two of the tubes, located at row 33/column 55 and row 32/column 65, were plugged due to tube wall loss in excess of 40%
(41% and 48% respectively).
The tube in location row 40/column 49 was plugged as a conservative measure due to a tube wall loss of 35%.
The other two tubes, located at row 1/column 16 and row 1/column 37, were plugged due cold leg tangent cracking. 11 The startup of Unit 2 is expected as soon as the licensee successfully demonstrates that breaker coordination exists at all electri~ voltage levels or following an acceptable justification for continued operation.
3. *
-7-Both Units On November 27, 1987 at 4:15 p.m. as a result of an ongoing licensee engineering evaluation of the station's electrical system, the licensee concluded that with a degraded grid condition (offsite power is not lost), a LOCA, and the 13.8 to 4 KV (station power) transformer tap changer failing to f~nction; the lA 1B2, and lC (2A, 2B2 and 2C)
service water 230 VAC motor control centers' (MCC) bus voltages could degrade to a~ low as 87.5% of 230 VA This is below that required for assured operability of equipment (motor starters, certain small pumps and valves) supplied by the 230 VAC and 115 VAC (stepped down from 230 VAC) MCCs in the service water are Both units were in a cold shutdown conditio The licensee intends to issue a Design Change to correct this proble On November 27, 1987 at 9:03 p.m., the Keeney 500 KV line that connects the 500 KV yard *of Hope Creek station to Keeney, Delaware (across the Delaware Bay) was re-energized for service. The. line had been disabled by a tanker collision on March 1, 1987. *
On June 16, 1987, the licensee received a letter from the Vitro Corporation; manufacturer of the Safety Equipment Cabinet (SEC), stating that South Carolina Electric Company had filed a Part 21 with the NR The letter stated that certain lugs and electrical connections may be suspect and not have the proper connection The licensee has taken the following actions regarding both units:
Performed a search of records to see if any plant faults were attributable to faulty connections in the SE None were foun Performed an inspection of both SEC's and replaced and repaired any suspect connection The repairs were made under the following work orders:
Cabinet Unit 1 Unit 2 A
B 870917076 870917094 871114064 871119095 Performed functional testing on all functions performed by the SEC's.
c 870917096 871119106
-8-Although some suspect connections were found, the connections had always performed their required functions on occasions when require No violations were identifie.
Maintenance Observations In conjunction with Unit 1 refueling activities the inspectors reviewed*
portions of the following outage design change packages (including the safety evaluations), attended selected SORC and planning meetings relative to these items, and witnessed portions of continuing work in the. fiel The inspectors verified that the activities were performed in accordance with approved procedures and in compliance with NRC regulations and recognized codes and standard The insp~ctors also verified that the replacement parts and quality control utilized on the repairs were in compliance with the licensee's quality assurance (QA) progra The inspectors plan to follow the below listed design changes through testing and final acceptance by the license Design Change Package (DCP)
Description lEC-2230 Removal of resistance tempe~ature detector (RTD) bypass loops and Status:
. installation of Combustion Engineering in-line narrow range reactor coolant system (RCS) temperature measurement system, including installation of
- elec~ronics to the reactor protection syste In-line RTD's have been installed in the four RCS loops, three therrnowells in each hot leg and one thermowell in each cold le The inspectors reviewed documentation pertaining to installation of the three thermowells on No. 12 RCS hot leg:
Site Traveler 864825-002 Field Questionnaires Field Action Requests Weld Procedure Specification GTAB.43-900 Revision 1 Weld Procedure Qualification Records Weld Inspection Records:
-9-Thermowell N Welder Performance welders)
Weld N. RD-PSE-LOOP2-1-218 RD-PSE-LOOP2-1-228 RD-PSE-LOOP2-1-238 Qualification Test Records (3 Radiographic Inspection Report for Test Welds Radiographic Technique Report The inspector had no questions on these document An NRC Region I specialist inspector observed the completed Reference Junction Boxes A and B and reviewed the special test procedures relative to the DC See Inspection Report 272/87-34 for detail lEC-1890 Appendix R modification to install wide range temperature indication for RCS loops nos. 12 and 13 on the hot shutdown pane Status:
Installatio~ is complet A specialist inspector from Region I reviewed the testing requirements for this modificatio See Inspection Report 272/87-34 for detail *
lEC-2173 Install ATWS Mitigation System Actuation Circuitry (AMSAC)
'
Status:
Installation and acceptance testing is complet The resident inspector and an NRC Region I specialist inspector witnessed portions of the acceptance testin Reviewed Westinghouse procedure NSID-EIS-87-3 Test was satisfactory. Also see Inspection Report 272/87-34 for more detail lEC-2261 Modifications to 64 safety related pipe support U-bolt anchor assemblies 3
diamet~r and abov Status:
lEC-1076 Modifications to the U-bolt hangers is complet The inspector witnessed portions of this work during auxiliary building and containment tour No violations were identtfie Upgrade 210 pipe.supports of various
- systems througho~t the plan Status:
-10-Installation of the pipe supports is complet The inspectors reviewed the licensee's report and had a meeting with the licensee's investigation team with regard to an allegation received by the NRC resident inspectors concerning components being damaged to discredit the contractor assigned to this jo The licensee's investigation team concluded that the component damage (arc-strike on a pipe) was due to poor workmanship of the craft personnel who performed work on the pipe support, and that the allegation could not be substantiated. After the craft personnel involved were terminated.from the site, no f.urther damaged components (poor workmanship) were identifie Following observation of the location and the nature of the arc-strike, review of the licensee's report, and dis~ussions with licensee and contractor personnel, *the inspector also concludes that the allegation is unsubstantiate The inspector reviewed the following documentation relative to repair of the arc-strike and observed the completed weld repair:
Code Job Package I-87-035 "Base Metal Repair to Spool RD-l-CVC-168-2
Deficiency Report PI-87-029 Inspection Poirrt Checklist
.
PSE&G Nuclear Department Welding/Brazing Manual,Section V,. Part B "Base Metal Repair Procedure" Weld Procedure Specification NDWP-7, Revision 2,
Weld Joint Notice No. 687, Revision 0 Nondestructive Examination Reports Weld No. FW-RD-l-CVC-168-2-PIDWJN-685-1 The inspector had no further questions on this issu lEC-2232 Remove existing flux thimbles and top mounted thermocouples, install bottom mounted thermocouples and associated electronic Status:
Conoseal caps were welded on penetration nos. 74, 75, 76, 77 and 7 One weld repair was performed on no. 79 cohoseal penetration.. The inspectors reviewed procedures, weld records and welders qualifi~ations as follows: *
-11-Site Traveler 864845-01~001 through 004 Fi~ld Questionnaires Weld Procedure Specifications:
GTA 8.8-703 GTA 8.8-705 GTAA 43.43-115 GTAA 43.43-710 GTA 43.43-904 Weld Procedure Qualification Records Weld Inspection Records Liquid Penetrant Examination Records for Weld Preps Dimensional Inspe.ction of Weld Preps Radiographic Inspection Reports Penetration N (Repair)
We 1 der P*erformance welders)
Weld No..
FW-1-RX-DCRWJN-705-4 FW-1-RX-DCRWJN-705-5 FW-1-RX-DCRWJN-705-1 FW-1-RX-DCRWJN-705-2 FW-*1-RX-DCRWJN-705-3 WJN No. 714 Qualification Test Records *cs Radiographic Inspection Report for Test Welds Radiographic Technique Report P.O. 223568 Certificate of Conformance and QC Acieptance Records for Conoseal Caps The inspector noted that on the root pass exams for weld nos. 705-3 (RT 4.4E) and 705-4 (RT 4.4A-1) the radiographic examination (RT 1 s) were rejected by an independent lab Level II NOE inspector, but later accepted by a Combustion Engineering (CE) Level III inspecto The resident inspector discussed this _
observation with the licensee's QC mana~er who was aware of these actions, had been involved and concurred with the result The inspeitor verified that satisfactory liquid penetrant examination (LP) exams of the root pass and satisfactory RT and LP of the final welds were performe The inspector had no further question No violations were identifie Surveillance Observations During this inspection period, the inspector reviewed in-progress surveillance testing as well as completed surveillance package The inspector verified that the surveillances were performed in accordance with licensee approved procedures and NRC regulation The inspector
-12-also verified that the instruments used were within calibration tolerances and that qualified technicians performed the surveillance The following surveillances were reviewed:
Unit 1 Procedure lIC-18.003 Procedure M9-IHP-AF-11 Description SSPS Multiplexing Test - verifies multiplexing between overhead alarms, bezels, and the compute Description 10 year ISI:
Perform pressure drop test on the auxiliary feedwater header to n steam generato The inspector observed the conduct of portions of the above 10 year ISI test procedur The pressure drop test was conducted in lieu of a normal hydrostatic test because portions of the tested header were buried and therefore inaccessible for a visual examination to verify pipe integrit The pressure drop test failed because of excessive leakage through the test boundar The inspector reviewed the licensee's disposition of the te~t failure and noted the followu The lice~see 1 s resolution concluded that the pressure drop test was not valid due to the test boundary leakage, and the licensee proposed an alternate test method in lieu of the pressure drop tes The inspector observed the alternate test method in which the header was pressurized to the required hydrostatic test pressure and then header pressure maintained with the hydrostatic test pum While the pressure was maintained, and for the du~at~on of the test, both the volume of water used by the pump and collected downstream of the leaking test boundary valve were measure The two measured volumes were then compared to provide assurance that the inaccessible portion of the pipe had no identified leakag With regard to this test procedure, the inspector found that with acceptable standardization of the volume measurements that the method was a reasonable alternative to the pressure drop test since the test boundary valves could not be made leak tight. It was further determined, however, that the requirements of Article IWD-2000 of Section XI of the ASME Code do not provide for any alternate methods of testing for inaccessible pipe other than the pressure drop tes The licensee stated that the alternate test method will be submitted to the NRC for review as well as a request for an exception to the requirements of IWD-200 This matter is considered unresolved pending review and approval of the licensee's submitta (272/87-32-01)
..
-13-While the inspector was observing the conduct of the 10 year ISI test on the auxiliary feedwater system piping, two openings in the room enclosure were identifie The No. 13 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump is a turbine driven pump and is enclosed within a structure that minimizes the hazard to the plant and equipment associated with a potential high energy pipe brea The enclosure provides a protective barrier to other safety related equipment in the auxiliary building; i.e., the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps, the alternate shutdown panel and a vital bus motor ~ontrol center which are located in the immediate vicinity of the enclosur The area associated with this equipment has been classified as a "mild environment" in terms of environmental qualification of equipment; and as such, the equipment in the area has not been required to be protected for high humidity or temperature effect In the overhead area of the enclosure were four auxiliary feedwater lines (one per steam generator).
Each of the four lines had a vent line that penetrated the ceiling of the enclosur Two of the penetrations were sealed closed and the remaining two vent. lines went through the identified opening The licensee described the enclosure in the FSAR Section 3.6.5.10, 11Protection Against Steam Flooding. 11 The FSAR states, in part, that in order to preclude undesirable effects due to steam flooding, seven areas (including the auxiliary feedpump turbine room) were transformed into one environmentally isolated, contiguous zone which is vented to the atmosphere via the penetration area pipe-break vent panel In addition, the FSAR further describes that in order to preclude steam induced environmental damage to.the No. 11 and 12 auxiliaryfeedwater pump motors and adjacent vital control centers, the No. 13 auxiliary feedpump and its turbine were enclosed in a steel plate sub~roo This sub-room was designed with back-draft dampers and a new wall opening to the adjacent pipe alley to provide a defined path to the atmosphere for steam flows resulting from postulated pipe rupture Since the openings in the steel plate sub-room allowed for a path to the adjacent 11mild 11 EQ area, which is different than the design as described in the FSAR, the inspector questioned whether the two motor driven auxi 1 i ary feedwater pumps and associated motor contra 1 center *
will remain operable under all possible high energy line break In addition, it could not be determined how or when the identified degraded condition came to b This matter is unresolved pending licensee and NRC *assessment o~ these problem (272/87-32~02)
Unit 2 Procedure Description M3A 60 Month Battery Performance Discharge
- Test of 2A * 125V Battery No violations were identifie ** Review of Periodic and Special Reports Upon receipt, the inspector reviewed periodic and special report The review included the following:
fnclusion of informaticin required by the NRC; test results and/or supporting information consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; planned corrective action for resolution of problems, and reportability and validity of report informatio The following periodic reports were reviewed:
Unit 1 Monthly Operating Report - October 1987 Unit 2 Monthly Operating Report - October 1987 In addition, the inspector reviewed Unit 2 Special Report 87-3,
"Non-valid Test Failure of No. 28 Diesel Generator".
The test was terminated on August 20, 1987 due to an intermittent, short duration, self-correcting Diesel Generator field ground alar The root cause of the alarm has not been determined:
This alarm is for warning only and does not trip the diesel.. Licensee investigation up to this point has not identified any problem with the generator or protective relaying which would cause this ala.r The licensee plans to perform the following during the next refueling outage to further troubleshoot the field ground alarm:
Inspect and clean the generator field brushes and slip ring assembly to eliminate possible grounding paths due to carbon particles; Megger the generator field windings;*
Megger the saturable transformer which is used to control the field current; and Engineering evaluation of the investigation result~ to determine if *disassembly of the generator and inspection of the field winding (rotor). is require The inspectors will follow licensee troubleshooting efforts during the Unit 2 refueling outage scheduled for September 198 No violations were identifie.
Licensee Event Report Followup The inspector reviewed the following LERs to determine that
- reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was taken, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specification..
Unit 1 87-014 87-015 Unit 2 87-014-15-Loss of Control of a Locked High Radiation Area Door Due to Personnel Error This incident was reviewed by NRC Region I health physics specialists during a routine refueling inspection, and is currently under evaluation by NRC Region See Inspection Report 272/87-30; 311/87-31 for details when issue Two of Three Diesel Generators Inoperable during Refueling Activities due to Personnel Error
- This incident was discussed in Combined Inspection 272/87-28; 311/87-30 and the inspectors have no fur~her question Incorrect Diesel Generator Infeed Breaker Setpoint due to Inadequate Documentation Control This incident was discussed in Combined Inspection 272/87-28; 311/87-30 and is being reviewed by an NRC Special Inspection Team on November 30 - December 4, 1987 as part of the Salem electrical system inspectio The resident inspectors have no further questions at this tim No violations were identifie.
Assurance of Quality This section is new to the Salem resident inspection report and is intended to document licensee involvement and effectiveness in assuring quality with regard to activities at all levels within the licensee organization, prevention and identification of defici~ncies, and problem resolution ongoing during the report perio During this inspection period both Salem units were shutdown with licensee activities concentrated in maintenance, modification, and testin Several discrepancies were identified with these activities in which the licensee was generally prompt in identification of the problem, responsive and conservative in their approach to resolving the 'issue For example, in Unit 1,.identification of stea*m generator J-tube erosion resulted in replacement of all J-tubes in the four.
steam generators (SG's) and the licensee also visually inspected Unit 2 SG' The li~ensee was responsive in investigating the condition of SG tubes in response to the North Anna event and briefed NRR in Bethesda on their investigation. A number of new flux thimble tube
-16-antivibration wear inserts were found to prevent certain fuel assemblies from properly landing on the core support plat The licensee pursued two parallel paths for resolution of the dimensional problem and is conducting an.investigation of how the design deficiency occurre In addition, the licensee aggressively investigated applicability and repaired SEC electrical connections in response to a notification ~eceived from the manufacture I
.
Quality Assurance presence is evident during outage activities, A Quality Control stop work order was issued by the licensee agains contractor performing hanger modifications due to poor work practice The licensee was thorough and timely in their investigation of ~he work deficiencies and immediate corrective action Actions taken to resolve the material deficiencies were satisfactor An allegation was.also involved with this issue which the licensee assigned a multidisciplined investigation team to resolve. This investigation was also thor6ugh and satisfactorily addressed the allegers concern Two openings in the turbine driven auxiliary feed pump room ceiling were identified by an NRC inspector and led to questions concerning the quality of licensee configuration control in this area and resulted in an unresolved item pending licensee review and respons The licensee 1s repair of the openings was prompt and adequate to resolve the material deficienc As discussed in paragraph 9 of this report, weaknesses in control and communications within the engineering organization resulted in inaccurate information being submitted to NRC regarding Appendix 11 R 11 concerns on electrical breaker coordinatio The licensee effectively investigated this event, and established short and long term correttive action At the close of this inspection, all of the corrective actions were not yet fully implemented and therefore, the effectiveness of such could not be fully assessed at this tim However, at the time the licensee certified breaker coordination at the 4 KV level to the NRC, only certain individuals in the engineering organization were aware that breaker coordination at the 4 KV level was not yet fully verifie Licensee management was aware.that the NRC desired that breaker coordination at the 4 KV level should be assured to justify continued plant operatio Since neither group effectively communicated their knowledge to the other and no formal control process existed to require such an interface, management submitted an inaccurate statement to NRC regarding 4 KV breaker coordinatio Formal communications and controls within the licensee 1 s organization should have prevented this inaccurate statemen.
Followup on Breaker Coordination Since the discovery of questionable breaker coordination found during the Appendix 11 R 11 inspection on September 14-18, 1987, the licensee was
.
'
-17-subsequently required to submit a Justification for Continued Operation (JCO) letter to the Regio The licensee has also been to Region I for a meeting with regional personnel to discuss breaker coordinatio As a result of the letter submitted on October 16, 1987, which stated that breaker coordination existed on the 4KV level and the subsequent discovery of lower than required relay setpoints in the overcurrent devices in Unit 2 diesel generator outpu~ breakers which contradicted the statement in the letter of October 16, 1987, the licensee was required to conduct an investigation to determine how the inaccurate.statement was mad *
The results of the investigation were submitted to the Region on November.3, 1987, and contained the chronology of events that led to the inaccurate statement and corrective measures to prevent recurrenc The inspectors conducted a review of the licensee's actions, including inte~views with team members and other selected personnel, with the following results:
The inspectors concluded that th~re was no evidence that the inaccurate breaker coordination statement was made knowingly, or with any intent to misrepresent the fact The investigation team was competen The scope of the review was adequat The appropriate individuals were interviewe The conclusions of the investigation appropriately reflected the data co 11 ecte The licensee's November 3 letter delineated the following corrective actions:
- Establish a formal ~orrective action program within Engineering and Plant Betterment to identify and document discrepancies and concerns which arise during engineering activitie.
Revise the status reporting associated with the electrical design review program t6 provide management with more formall~ structured and quality periodic report.
Review and revise the process for NRC submittals to include
- provisions to identify and eliminate inconsistencies between interrelated document These actions were not complete at the time of the NRC review, however, the inspectors reviewed preliminary and d.raft procedures and documents, had discussions with senior managers and concluded that these measures should aid in the prevention of incor~ect statements and a more thorough review of documents transmitted by the license The inspectors categorized the following two causal areas which appeared to have led to the misstatement of breaker coordination: No formal measures existed for deficiency reporting and control within the engineering organizatio * No formal management of commitment tracking existed including:
Clarity of assignments, Quality control of completion of assignments; and, Authority and responsibility for completion was not clearly delineate These concerns were presented to the licensee. for resolutio The inspectors will follow up on the licensee's actions during future inspection The inspectors do not have any further questions relating to this subject at this tim.
Service Water Repairs to Fan Cooler Units As addressed in combined inspection report 272/87-28; 311/87-30 and in particular Appendix 11C 11 of that report, the licensee discussed weld repairs to the fan cooler units (FCU 1s) during the last refueling outage on Unit At a meeting in Region I on September 29, 1987 they also indicated that during the outage o~ Unit 1 (presently in progress)
repairs would be made as needed to the FCU's~
.The licensee examined all of the welds associated with the 5 FCU's using nondestructive ultrasonic examination (UT) metho A total of 1150 welds, both stainless steel and carbon, were examine As a result of the testing 62 welds were determined to need repair as fo 11 ows:
Fan cooler unit no. - 11 No. of repairs
- 11
13
15 IO
18
Total
The re~airs were made in accordance with Section XI of the ASME code under the following code packages:
11 FCU 12 FCU 13 FCU 14 FCU 15 FCU S-87-254 S-87-255 S-87-256 S-87-257 S-87-258
'.
-19-The inspector examined the repairs (listed in Appendix A) performed under code packages S-87-254 and S-87-25 During the process the inspector reviewed the following:
Welding Procedure Specification Sheets Work Orders Maintenance Procedure MllD Inspection Point Check Lists including QC hold points Weld History Records Surface Nondestructive Examination Reports Technical Qualification to perform Nondestructfve Testing (UT)
Storeroom issue for weld rods including C of C Welder Performance Qualification Records and results (in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Code)
The inspector determined that personnel were qualified and the work was accomplished and performed in accordance with the appropriate portion of Section XI of the ASME Cod The inspector will follow the hydrostatic testing of the FCU's as they are performe The inspector has no further questions at this tim.
Unresolved Item Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations or deviation The unresolved item~ identified during this inspe~tion are discussed in paragraph.
Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the course of the inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and findin~s. An exit interview was held with licensee management at the end of the reporting perio The licensee did not identify 2.790 materia..
,.
Appendix A Service Water Weld Repairs Examined in Detail Fan Coil Unit No. 11 C-SI-SW-535-SMDWJN 676-1 C-SI-1-SW-549-SMDWJN-692-1 C-SI-1-SW-535-SMDWJN 684-4 C-SI-SW-5538-SSPWJN 669-1 C-SI-SW-553-SMD-WJN-723-3 Fan Coil Unit No. 13 C-SI-5808-SMDWJN-741-1 C-SI-5808-SMDWJN-741-2 C-SI-5808-SMDWJN-741-3 C-SI-SW-5828-SMDWJN-719-1 C-SI-SW-5828-SMDWJN-719-2 C*SI-SW-5828-SMDWJN-719-3 C-SI-SW-5828-SMDWJN-720 C-SI-SW-592-WJN668-1 C-SI-SW-592-WJN668-2 C-SI-SW-592-WJN668-3