IR 05000272/1987036
| ML18093A614 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 01/22/1988 |
| From: | Swetland P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18093A613 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-87-36, 50-311-87-36, IEB-87-002, IEB-87-2, NUDOCS 8802030283 | |
| Download: ML18093A614 (13) | |
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Report No Docket No License No Licensee:
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
50-272/87-36 50-311/87-36 50-272 50-311 DPR-70 DPR-75 050272-871113 050311-871022 Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Plaza Newark, New Jersey 07101 Facility Name:
Salem Nuclear Generating Station - Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey Inspection Conducted:
December 1, 1987 - December 31, 1987 Inspectors:
Approved by:
T. J. Kenny, Senior Resident Inspector
~_zz_ospector P. D. Swetland, Chief, Reactor Projects Section No. 2B, Projects Branch No. 2, DRP Inspection Summary:
Inspections on December 1, 1987 - December 31, 1987 (Combined Report Numbers 50-272/87-36 and 50-311/87-36)
Areas Inspected:
Routine inspections of plant operations including:
operational safety verification, maintenance, surveillance, review of special reports, licensee event followup, assurance of quality,Bulletin 87-02 and security force overtim The inspection involved 97 inspector hours by the resident NRC inspector Results:
This report documents the resident inspectors routine evaluations and site occurrences during the month of December, 198 No violations or outstanding items were identified.
802030283 8r>oaa~72 DR ADOCK 0 PDR G
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DETAILS Persons Contacted Within this report perioq, interviews and discussions were conducted with members of licensee management and staff as necessary to support inspection activit.
Operational Safety Verification 2.1 Documents Reviewed Selected Operators' Logs Senior Shift Supervisor's (SSS) Log Jumper Log Radioactive Waste Release Permits (liquid & gaseous)
Selected Radiation Work Permits (RWP)
Selected Chemistry Logs*
Selected Tagouts Health Physics Watch Log 2.2 The inspector conducted routine entries into the protected areas of the plants, including the control rooms, Auxiliary Building, fuel buildings, and containments (when access was possible).
During the inspection activities, discussions were held with operators, technicians (HP & I&C), mechanics, security personnel, supervisors, and plant managemen The inspections were conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedures 71707, 71709, 71710, and 71881 and affirmed the licensee's commitments and compliance with 10 CFR, Technical Specifications, License Conditions, and Administrative Procedure No violations were identifie. Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) System Walkdown:
The inspectors verified the operability of the selected ESF system by performing a walkdown of accessible portions of the system to confirm that system lineup procedures match plant drawings and the as-built configuratio Thi ESF system walkdown was also conducted to identify equipment conditions that might degrade performance, to determine that instrumentation is calibrated and functioning, and to verify that valves are*properly positioned and locked as appropriat The Auxiliary Feedwater System for Unit 2 was inspecte No deficiencies were identified.
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Inspector Comments/Findings:
The inspector selected phases of the units operation to determine compliance with the NRC's regulation The inspector determined that the areas inspected and the lic~nsee's actions did not constitute a health and safety hazard fo the public or plant personne The following are noteworthy areas the inspector researched in depth:
2. Unit 1 The unit continued in a refueling outage which began on October 2, 198 At the beginning of this report period the licensee had defueled the core due to physical restrictions between the fuel assemblies in the core and the newly installed*instrument guide tubes associated with the in-core flux mapping detectors and the new bottom-mounted core exit thermocouple detectors (see combined inspection report 272/87-32; 311/87-33). After measurements were taken by the licensee, 27 guide tube inserts were identified as being too tall and were machined to proper tolerances utilizing an underwater ultrasonic cutting too The resident inspector witnessed portions of this operation including the actu~l cutting, QA involvement, qualifications of the operators and the cleanup effort at the end of the cutting sequences~ The inspector noted that all work and cleanup was performed by approved procedures and work practice The licensee's Nuclear Safety Review Group performed an investigation into the flux thimble guide.tube inserts being out of toleranc The resident inspector reviewed the Nuclear Safety Review Groups' report, issued December 7, 1987, which reached the following conclusion: A decision was made by engineering personnel to use Unit 2 dimensional data taken in the field for the Unit 1 design change assuming that Unit 1 and Unit 2 are the same in this are The decision was not subject to oversight or review by any other grou The report develops the progression of the faulty assumption and makes recommendations to prevent recurrenc These recommendations are being conside~ed for implementation by management at this tim On December 16, 1987, the licensee identified linear indications in the seat of the nozzles of the main steam safety valve These indications were apparently caused by thermal cycles across the seating surfac The indications were evident in 16 of the 20 safety valve The indications were machined away (within manufacturer's
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tolerances) in most of the case However there were indications that could not be removed because of dimensional tolerances of the nozzl These remaining indications, as well as the causes for the indications were evaluated in safety evaluation S-C-G210-MSE-395-The safety evaluation has been reviewed by NRC Region I and NRR with no outstanding concern The evaluation also made the following conclusions and recommendations:
No unresolved safety questions exist and there would be no changes or affect on the environmen Operation of the unit is acceptable with some linear
.indication The only failure likely to occur would be seat leakag Gross leakage would force the shutdown of the uni The licensee has c6m~ifted to replace the nozzles in Unit 1 and will inspect the nozzles in Unit The licensee has also committed to send one of the removed nozzles from Unit 1 to the laboratory for an analysi The inspector will follow these actions in subsequent routine inspections.*
On December 21, 1987, the licensee successfully completed the type 11A 11 containment leak rate test. A region based specialist was on site for the test and has documented the resulti in NRC inspection report 50-272/87-3 On December 22, 1987 while performing time response testing of service water pumps in number three service water bay, cross connect valve 13SW20 came off its seat allowing water to enter the main service water header in number one service water ba This header was open in several places to perform outage related maintenance and hydrostatic testin As a result number one service water bay and its associated equipment were floode Some water also entered number qne diesel generator fuel oil under-ground storage tank room through conduit pipin Water was also found in the intake structure switch gear room but no water was evident within the switch gea The licensee conducted two separate investigations to determine the root cause of the event (one by the station operations department; the other by members of the station QA and Nuclear Safety Review Group).
Initial indications were that the event was caused by reliance on 13SW20, the single isolation valve (which failed) between the in-service portion of the service water system and the portion of the system which had been opened to facilitate maintenance activitie The licensee
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is in the process of making repairs to various electrical components which were floode Region I conducted a special inspection to review the event and the licensee actions prior to plant startup. The results of this team inspection will be delineated in combined NRC inspection report 272/88-02; 311/88-0 The unit was in Mode 5 at the end of this report period*
awaiting the repairs to the service water components that were damaged during the above mentioned flooding even Unit 2 The unit was in Mode 5 at the beginning of this report perio The licensee was performing maintenance and awaiting completion of modifications and analyses of electrical coordination following a voluntary shutdown due to uncertainties with a justification for continued operation commitment to the NRC regarding circuit breaker coordinatio During this report period the licensee:
Replaced the seal in No. 24 reactor coolant pump which had an excessive leakof Removed, repaired and balanced the control rod drive mechanism vent fan Completed identified circuit breaker modifications in order to satisfy the justification for continued operatio (the changes to circuit breaker setpoints and trip devices are delineated in combined NRC inspection report 272/87-35; 311/87-35.)
On December 9, 1987, the licensee reported a service water leak on No. 22 containment fan coil unit (CFCU) motor coole An ENS call was made to satisfy reporting requirements in accordance with the site Emergency Pla Corrective actions were completed prior to startu (See Section 6 of this report for more details)
The vital Batteries were reported inoperable in Unit 2 when it was identified that one cell went below 1.200 specific gravity in accordance with Technical Specification The batteries were never removed from service but the actions of Technical Specifications for a shutdown plant were followed (isolation of containment).
The problem was that the height measurement correction was not being calculated correctl The licensee was using a specific gravity penalty of.001 per 1/16 of an inch level deviation rather than.001 per 1/32 of an inc The licensee contacted the battery manufacturer, then replenished some of the acid that has been lost (due to sampling) over the 17 year. *
inservice life of the batteries, and charged the batterie The subsequent battery testing indicated battery gravities well within the* Technical Specification limit Both Units On November 27, 1987, the licensee made an ENS notification regarding degraded 230 and 115 VAC service water motor
- control center's bu~ voltage The degrad~tion was caused by previously unanalyzed line losses at remote motor control center On December 5, 1987, as a result of continuing engineering evaluations by the licensee it was identified that the same conditions may apply to various other motor control centers throughout the plant and as a result it was concluded, by the licensee, that certain valves, for example the accumulator outlet valves (normally open) and the cold leg injection valves (normally open) could fail to operate during a LOCA, with a degraded grid condition for which the 13.8 to 4 KV
~tation power t~ansformer tap changer fails to operat Both units were in Mode 5 and the lice~see performed design changes to correct these conditions prior to startup of the unit Region I conducted an electrical team inspection November 30 - December 4, 1987. The licensee's evaluation and response to this problem is discussed in combined NRC inspection report 272/87-35; 311/87-3 On December.9, 1987, the licensee determined that reactor contrbl and protection system lead-lag function amplifiers
- had been improperly calibrated for dynamic respons This would result in the trip or alarm function activating before the design setpoints, and would be a conservative approach to the alarm or trip functio Derivative modules with a lead-lag circuit had also been improperly calibrated which would result in the alarm or trip not activating upo*n a slow-rate ramp of the input signa The alarm or trip would activate with a more rapid rate~ The circuits identified were:
Overpower delta t - a protection function Rod speed control in auto - a control function Turbine load reject - a control function The licensee is continuing an investigation to the safety significance of the above problem licensee recalibrated the affected circuits in (which was in Mode 5).
The circuits in Unit 1 recalibrated prior to the end of the refueling determine The Unit 2 were also outag On December 18, 1987 at 3:30 p.m., all land line communications were lost as a result of a traffic accident in the nearby community of Salem, New Jerse Both the ENS and normal telephone lines to the stations were temporarily out of service; however, the licensee still
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had radio communication equipment available and also had alternate telecommunications available through a microwave network to the Newark, N.J. corporate headquarters.. All normal and emergency telephone communications were restored about 10:00 p.m. on December 1 No vfolations were identifie.
Maintenance Observations The inspector reviewed the following safety related maintenance activities to verify that repairs were made in accordance with approved procedures and in compliance with NRC regulations and recognized codes and standard The inspector also verified that the replacement parts and Quality Control utilized on the repairs were in compliance with the licensee's QA progra Work Order Number Unit 1 871019110 870820043 850901015 871219148 Maintenance Procedure MllE (Mechanical Equipment Trouble-shooting and Repair)
MllE (Mechanical Equipment Trouble-shooting and Repair)
MP6.8 (Safety Injection Pump Bearing Inspection and Replacement 1IC-2.2.025(1PT-506 First Stage Turbine Impulse Pressure -
Channel II - Channel Calibration Procedure)
Description Replace filters in the 11 Auxiliary Building Exhaust Clean shaft and tighten sleeve nut causing boric acid leak on No. 12 safety injection pump Performed bearing inspection on No.12 safety injection pump Performed calibration on impulse pressure controller for loop 1PM506c lead-lag controller operation (First Stage Pressure) *
Unit 2 871018053 871010082 871205009
2IC-4.1.066 (2R41C Plant Vent Gaseous Monitor)
MP3.2 (Meggering Electrical Equipment)
MNJ (Service Water Silt Survey)
No violations were identifie Surveillance Observations Performed calibration on plant noble gas radiation monitor Inspected No. 26 service water motor visually and electrically, including Megger testin Performed silt level inspection of service water syste (No. 21 service water screen)
During this inspection period, the inspector reviewed in-progress surveillance testing as well as completed surveillance package The inspector verified that the surveillances were performed in accordance with licensee approved procedures and NRC regulation The inspector also verified that the instruments used were within calibration tolerances and that qualified technicians performed the surveillance The following surveillances were reviewed:
Unit 1 Surveillance SP(0)4.0.5-V-MS-5 Unit 2 Surveillance 4.8.1.1.2. No violations were identified.
In Service Test of Main Steam and Boiler Feed Valves
- No. 2A Diesel Generator Test (See Section 6 of this report for more details).
- 8 Review of Periodic and Special Reports Upon receipt, the inspector reviewed periodic and special report The review included the following:
inclusion of information required by the NRC; test results and/or supporting information consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; planned corrective action for resolution of problems, and reportability and validity of report informatio The following periodic reports were reviewed:
Unit 1 Monthly Operating Report - November 1987 Unit 2 Monthly Operating Report - November 1987 In addition, the iflspector reviewed; Special Report 87-6 for Unit 2, Service Water Leak from No. 22 Fan Cooler Uni The leak was identified to be from a drain plu The plug was*removed and reinstalled after it was determined that no corrosion was eviden After the plug was rein~talled, no further leaks were eviden The licensee could not determine the cause for the loose plu It is suspected that it was not tightened after replacement when the cooler was drained down for repairs and modifications earlier in the outag The inspector has no further questions on this matter.
Special Report 87-7 for Unit On December 7, 1987 during the performance of Surveillance 4.8.1.1.2.a.2, diesel 2A did not reach the required voltage of 4160 ~ 120 VAC in 13 seconds as per Technical Specification It did attain rated voltage in 14.2 second The root cause of this failure was personnel erro The failure occurred during testing of the diesel following the installation of modifications to meet circuit breaker coordination requirement A new fuse holder was miswired into the field flash circuit causing a reverse configuration which resulted in the field flashing circuit being inoperativ The field eventually flashed due to residual magnetism on the roto The fuse leads were corrected and the diesel was successfully returned to service on December 8, 198 All contractor electricians were counseled stressing the need to pay more attention to detai As a result of this valid test failure, surveillance.test intervals have been reduced to every seven days as per Regulatory Position C.2.d of Regulatory Guide 1.1. The resident inspector has no further questions at this tim No violations were identifie.
Licensee Event Report Followup The inspector reviewed the following LERs to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was taken, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specification **
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Unit 1 87-017-00 and 87-017-01 Discovered Leakage Paths from 13(23) AFW Pump Environmental Containment This LER and supplement dfscuises the NRC identified leakage paths from th~ No. 13 Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Compartmen This event is discussed in combined inspection report 272/87-32; 311/87-3 Unit 2 87-013-01 (Supplement)
- Technical Specification Surveillance 4.8.1.1.3.a Missed due to Inadequate Procedural Control This event related to surveillance testing of No. 22 diesel fuel oil transfer pump and was discussed in combined NRC inspection report 272/87-32; 311/87-3 The supplement stresses the development by the planning department of administrative controls for the Surveillance Test Work Order Program, required by Administrative Procedure 9; and commits to putting them in plac The inspector will review these changes during subsequent routine inspection.
Assurance of Quality Throughout the month of December, Quality Assurance/Quality Control (QA/QC) was actively involved in assuring qualit They were present at meetings involving the mismeasurement of the instrument guide tubes and the machining effort witnessed by the resident inspecto The QA/QC department manager has had several meetings with the resident inspectors with respect to the Unit 2 Appendix R modifications and upgrade of systems during the outage on Unit At these meetings, the manager discussed Quality Assurance approaches that were sound and conformed to the requirements for nuclear safet However, QA/QC did not prevent the failure of the field flash cir~uit of No. 2A diesel (reference paragraph 5).
The contractor, as required by procedure, had contacted the QC department at the start of the work on the diesel circuits. They did not notify QC when the termination of the new circuit was performe The QA hold point did not require witnessing the actual termination of the circuit, but a sign off after the fac In this case, the diesel was tested prior to the QC verification of the terminatio After discussions with the QC Manager, the inspector concluded that the licensee was aware of the problem and wil.l address the issue.
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Plant management has been involved with the outages, on both units, to the extent that sound decisions and conclusions were made within the requirements for nuclear safet The licensee management identifies problem areas to the resident inspector in a timely manner, and is thorough and pointed with their discussion.
Bull et in 87-02 On November 6, 1987, the NRC issued Bulletin 87-02, 11 Fastener Testing to Determine Conformance with Applicable Material Specifications.
In accordance with step 2 of 11actions to be taken 11, the resident inspector witnessed the licensee obtaining the samples of nuts and bolts as required by the bulleti *
_The licensee confirmed that, of the materials listed in the bulletin, the following were stocked in the store rooms:
Non-Safety Related A-193 87 A-193 88 A-307 Grade A A-307 Grade B Safety Related A-193 87 A-193 88 A-449 Grade 5 A-320 Grade L7 After determining the most frequently used materials, the following bolts and corresponding nuts were selected for analysis:
Non-Safety Related Material A-193 87 Bolt Size 1 1/8 x 6 1 1/4 x 6 1 1/8 x 6 1/2 7/8 x 5 1/2 1 x 6 A-193 88 1 x 2 1/2 A-307 Grade A 5/8 x 6 A-307 Grade B 1 1/8 x 3 1/4 1 1/4 x 3 1/2 1 x 4 1/2 Corresponding Nut Material Nut Size A-194 Grade 2H 1 1/8 A-194 Grade 2H 1 1/4 A-194 Grade 2H 1 1/8 A-194 Grade 2H 7/8 A-194 Grade 2H
A-194 Grade 2H
A-563 Grade A 5/8 A-563 Grade B 1 1/8 A-563 Grade B 1 1/4 A-563 Grade B
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,* Safety Related Corresponding Nut Material Bolt.Size Material Nut Size A-193B7 1/2 x 1 A-194 Grade 2H 1/2 1 1/8 x 6 A-194 Grade 7 1 1/8 1 1/4 x 5 1/4 A-194 Grade 7 1 1/4'
1 x 3 A-194 Grade 2H
A-193 B8 1 1/8 x 4 A-194 Grade 8 1 1/8 1 1/4 x 4 A-194 Grade 8 1 1/4 1 1/4 x.6 1/2 A-194 Grade 2H 1 1/4 1 1/4 x 7 1/2 A-194 Grade 2H 1. 1/4 A-320 Gr~de L7 1 1/8 x 5 A-194 Grade 7 1 1/8 1 1/4 x 3 1/2 A-194 Grade 7 1 1/4 These samples were sent to a laboratory for analysis in accordance with the bulleti The results and the remainder of the licensee's actions with regard to Bulletin 87-02 will be followed up in a later NRC inspectio *
The resident inspector has n6 further questions ~t this time. *
Security Overtime The inspector held discussions with the senior security supervisor and reviewed licensee records to assess license~ control of overtime for security force personne Generic Letter 82-12 guidelines were used as the basis for determining acceptability of the licensee's progra,
During non-outage periods the security forte is scheduled on a 5 shift rotation with one shift on days off and one shift in trainin During outages the security guards are scheduled for 6 days on/1 day off, three non-rotating shift The inspector reviewed time sheets for the security force and noted that only one person worked at the guideline limit of 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />s/week while the other members of the force averaged 48-60 hours/wee The senior security supervisor stated that the voluntary nature of the overtime scheduling generally allowed the one person to accept 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> overtime each day, but that shifts over 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> are not permitted which would preclude anyone from exceeding 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />s/week.. The guards are scheduled for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> shifts and may be asked to work an additional 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> if neede The senior security supervisor stressed that all overtime is voluntary unless a volunteer cannot be foun The inspector concluded that control of overtime for the security force is satisfactor No violations were identifie.
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1 Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the course of the inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and finding An exit interview was held with licensee management at the end of the reporting perio The licensee did not identify 2.790 material.