IR 05000272/1987015
| ML18093A229 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 06/30/1987 |
| From: | Borchardt R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18093A227 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-87-15, 50-311-87-18, NUDOCS 8707160790 | |
| Download: ML18093A229 (10) | |
Text
Report No Docket No License No Licensee:
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION *
REGION I
50-272/87-15 50-311/87-18 50-272 50-311 DPR-70 DPR-75 050272-870423 050311-870511 Public* Service Electric and Gas Company 80. Park Plaza __ _
Newark, New Jersey 07101 Facility Name:
Salem Nuclear Generating Station. - Units 1 an Inspection At:
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey Inspection Conducted:
May 19, 1987 - June 15, 1987 Inspectors:
T. J. Kenny, Senior Resident Inspector K. H. Gibson, Resident Inspector Approved R. J. Summers, Project Engineer by:7.J.6~~.
R. W. Borchardt, Acting Chief, Reactor Projects Section No. 2B, Projects Branch No. 2, DRP Inspection Summary:
Inspections on May 19, 1987 - June 15, 1987 {Combined Report Numbers 50-272/87-15 and 50-311/87-18)
Areas Inspected:
Routine inspections of plant operations including:
followup on outstanding inspection items, operational safety verification, maintenance, surveillance, review of special reports, and licensee event followu The inspection involved 112 inspection hours by the resident NRC
. inspectors including 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> of backshift inspection on May 22, 1987 and 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of weekend inspection on June 14, 198 Results:
One violation was identified involving a failure to maintain and implement a technical specification surveillance procedure resulting in the surveillance not being performed within_ the required time (paragraph 5).
An unresolved item*was identified pertaining to the reliance upon an unqualified manual isolation valve while an automatic containment isolation valve was
inqperable (paragraph 4).
In addition, another unresolved it~m was identified pertaining to the expired calibration stickers on various equipment in the plant (paragraph 5).
8707160790 870709 PDR ADOCK 05000272 G
- DETAILS Persons Contacted Within this report period, interviews and discussions were conducted with members of licensee management and staff as necessary to support inspection activit.
Followup on Outstanding Inspection Items (Closed)
Inspector Follow Item (272/86-21-01); The inspector verified that overtime worked during the Unit 2 refueling outage and up to the present by the Operations and Radiation Protection departments was controlled in accordance with technical specifications (Generic Letter 82-12) and station procedure (Closed) Violation (311/87-11-01); The inspector verified that the licensee posted a sign near the crane controls to state that the overload cutoff surveillance test shall be completed prior to crane us In addition, the licensee has addressed this problem with the contractor personnel management in order to prevent recurrenc * *operational Safety Verification 3.1 Documents Reviewed
Selected Operators' Logs Senior Shift Supervisor's (SSS) Log Jumper Log Radioactive Waste Release Permits (liquid & gaseous)
Selected Radiation Work Permits (RWP)
Selected Chemistry Logs Selected Tagouts Health Physics Watch Log 3.2 The inspector conducted routine entries into the protected areas of the plants, including the control rooms, Auxiliary Building, fuel buildings, and containments (when access is possible).
During the inspection activities, discussions were held with operators, technicians (HP & I&C), mechanics, supervisors, and plant managemen The purpose of the inspection was to affirm the licensee's commitments and compliance with 10 CFR, Technical Specifications, and Administrative Procedure. On a daily basis, particular attention was directed to the following areas:
Instrumentation and recorder traces for abnormalities;
- 3.. Adherence to LC0 1s directly observable from the control room; Proper control room shift manning and access control; Verification of the status of control room annunciators that are in alarm; Proper use of procedures; Review ~f logs to obtain plant conditions; and, Verification of surveillance testing for timely completio On a weekly basis, the inspector confirmed the operability of selected ESF trains by:
Verifying that accessible valves in the flow path were in the correct. positions; Verifying that power supplies and breakers were in the correct positions; Verifying that de-energized portions of these systems were de-energized as identified by Technical Specifications; Visually inspecting major components for leakage, lubrication, vibration, cooling water supply, and general operating conditibns; and, Visually inspecting instrumentation, where possible, for proper operabilit On a biweekly basis, the inspector:
Verified the correct application of a tagout to a safety-related system; Observed a shift turnover; Reviewed the sampling program including.the liquid and gaseous effluents; Verified that radiation protection. and controls were properly established; Verified that the physical security plan was being implemented;
Reviewed licensee-identified problem areas; and, Verified selected portions of containment isolation lineu.3 Inspector Comments/Findin~s:
The* inspector selected phases of the units operation to determine compliance with the NRC 1 s regulation The inspector determined that the areas inspected and the licensee's actions did not constitute a health and safety hazard to the public or plant personne The following are noteworthy areas the inspector researched in depth:
3. Unit 1 Unit 1 operated at 100% power throughout the inspection period with the exception of short load reductions for maintenance activities and weather conditions relative to remova 1 of the 11tri p-a-uni t" scheme from serv.i c In addition, a reactor trip occurred on June 2, 1987 and is discussed later i-n this sectio On May 27, 1987, No. 11 containment fan coil unit (CFCU) was isolated due to a leaking gasket on the lower cooling coil which resulted in a service water leak inside containmen The licensee tightened up on the cooler head flange and No. 11 CFCU was placed back in servic On June 2, 1987, Salem Unit 1 experienced a turbine/reactor tri The 5021 Deans 500 KV line was struck by lightning resulting in the activation of the 11trip-a-unit 11 schem The 11trip-a-unit 11 scheme was installed on Salem Unit 1 following the loss of the 5015 Keeney 500 KV line to prevent grid instability if the Deans line was los This was the first challenge tG the trip-a-unit schem All plant equipment functioned as designe At the time of the trip, No. 12 charging pump was out of service for maintenance, including bearing replacemen Following repair and testing of No. 12 charging pump the unit was returned to power on June 4, 1987.
- 3.. Unit 2 Unit 2 operated at 89% power throughout the inspection period due to grid stability consideration Several*
short load reductions were accomplished for maintenance activities and weather condition On June 8 and June 12, 1987, the licensee requested and received exemptions from NRR applicable to ASME code post maintenance retest requirements (full stroke test)
for repair of a packing leak on main feed regulating valve 23BF1 The valve was successively tightened to increased torque values (17 and 21 ft-lbs) with a partial stroke test performed following the adjust-ment The leak stopped as a result of the second torquing evolutio Units 1 & 2 On May 30, 1987, following completion of the 90%
undervoltage transfer relay modifications to the vital busses, the Salem Units 1 & 2 group (non-vit~l) busses were reenergized from the auxiliary power transformers which is their normal power suppl The group busses had been powered from the station power transformers since the August 26, 1986 false loss of offsite power even On June 10, 1987, as a result of a licensee initiated Appendix R review of Salem Units 1 & 2, the licensee identified that the control circuitry for both diesel fuel oil transfer pumps for each unit are common and that a single failure in the control circuitry could render both pumps inoperabl The licensee established a fire watch in the area and removed the automatic control circuitry for one pump per unit, thereby separating the pump control circuitr The inspector is following the licensee's development and implementation of short and long term corrective action On May 20, 1987 on Unit 1 and on May 31, 1987 on Unit 2, the licensee identified out of specification parameters for borated water sources as follows:
Unit 1 No. 12 Boric Acid Storage Tank (BAST) boron concentration of 19,234 ppm compared to the T.S. lower limit of 20,100 pp *
4. *
Boron Injection Tank (BIT) boron concentration of 19,944 ppm compared to the T.S. lower limit of 20,100 pp Unit 2 Boric acid storage system capacity less than minimum volume of 5136 gallon The appropriate technical specification action state-ments were entered and the out of specification con-ditions were corrected within the required tim The licensee has determined that these occurrences have resulted from performing infrequent manipulations with these systems due to the heating steam system being out of service and inadequate direction by shift supervisio The licensee has committed to procedura-lize these manipulations to ensure acceptable opera-tion in the futur The inspector will review the procedures when complete (IFI 50-272/87-15-01)
No violations were identifie Maintenance Observations The inspector reviewed the following safety related maintenance activities to verify that repairs were made in accordance with approved procedures and in compliance with NRC regulations and recognized codes and standard The inspector also verified that the replacement parts and Quality Control utilized on the repairs were in compliance with the licensee's QA progra Work Order Number 870609013 870415012 870507039 870512034 Maintenance Procedure OCR EC-2278 Code Job Package s87-117 OCR EC-2271 Description Structural seismic supports for fire barriers between vital equipment in switchgear rooms, elevation 84 1 Repair and retest 21SW127, service water inlet valve to N component cooling heat exchanger 90% UV transfer relay modification to vital busses
Work Order Number 87-05-11-034
Maintenance Procedure M14A-2 Description Repair/Replace valve 2NT32 ( CIV for accumulator nitrogen supply line)
On May 9, 1987, valve 2NT32 failed open during operatio Since this valve is a containment isolation valve, the licensee declared the valve inoperable and took appropriate action in accordance with technical specification The licensee isolated the affected penetration by use of a closed manual valve (2NT903) per action C of Technical Specification 3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves (CIV). Valve 2NT903 was tagged closed; however, the valve was opened periodically to permit the operators to maintain the accumulators pressurized in accordance with technical specifications. These operations (of the manual isolation valve} were conducted 2 to 3 times per week as authorized by the shift supervisor, with an operator stationed at the valve to close it, if required..
V~lve 2NT32 was repaired on June 12, 198 Therefor~. the licensee relied upon the ~losed manual va}ve for approximately 1 month of operatio Section 6.2 of the Salem UFSAR details the design bases for the containment systems including a description of the containment isolation syste These isolation. barrier bases include:
environmental considerations, missile and water jet protection, and Class 1 seismic desig In addition, the containment isolation valves, including 2NT32, are leak rate tested in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J as described in Section 6.2.4.4 and Table 6.2-12 of the UFSA During the month of operation with valve 2NT32 failed open, the licensee closed the upstream manual valve, 2NT903, to provide additional assurance of the isolation function; however, this valve and its associated piping does not meet any of the design bases stated in the UFSAR for containment isolation valves/containment boundary and leak rate testin Throughout the month of operation with 2NT32 failed open, containment integrity was maintained through reliance solely upon 2NT34, the inboard, check, containment isolation valve. Technical Specifications would permit such operation indefinitel However, power operations with a containment boundary that no longer meets the analyzed design for an indefinite period of time is considered an unresolved ite (50-311/87-18-03)
Also, as a result of containment isolation valve 2NT32 failing in an open position, the inspector reviewed the maintenance history for the valv The valve is a Copes Vulcan Model d 100-100, 1 inch 1500 psi, SW control valv The licensee valve mark number is X-According to the licensee there are only two such valves in use at Salem, valve 2NT32 and the respective Unit 1 containment isolation valve 1NT3 Valve 2NT32 had previously failed open in November, 198 No other similar fai.lures were identified. Although the frequency of occurrence of the failures is low~ the number of valves in use of this design is very lo Licensee assessment of the failure rate of this valve type to evaluate modifications is warrante This matter will be reviewed in a future inspectio (50-311/87-18-04)
8 Surveillance Observations During this inspection period, the inspector reviewed in-progress surveillance testing as well as completed surveillance package The inspector verified that the surveillances were performed in accordance with licensee approved procedures and NRC regulation The inspector also verified that the instruments used were within calibration tolerances and that qualified technicians performed the surveillance The following surveillances were reviewed:
Unit 1 lPD-16.2.010 lIC-18.1. 006 lIC-18.1.007 *
Unit 2 SP(0)4.6.1.3(a)
SP(0)4.5.2b Channel Functional Power Range 1N44 SSPS Reactor Trip Breaker and P-4 Test Prior to Startup Containment Airlocks Emergency Core Cooling -* ECCS Subsystems On May 20, 1987, the licensee identified that Technical Specification Surveillance 4.5.2b, which verifies the operability of the emergency core cooling subsystems, had not been completed within the last 31 days as require Technical Specification 3.0.3 was entered and the surveillance completed satisfactorily. Surveillance Procedure SP(0)4.5.2b "Emergency Core Cooling - ECCS Subsystems" specifies the requirements of TS 4.5.2b and includes three checkoff sheets to complete the surveillanc On April 18, 1987, checkoff sheet 1 (manual valve lineup) was performed, however checkoff sheet 2 (remote operated valve lineup) and checkoff sheet 3 (ECCS piping vents) were not performe Checkoff sheets 2 and 3 were not attached to the procedure used on April 18 and resulted in those sections of the surveillance being overlooke Further investigation by the licensee determined that these two checkoff sheets were misfiled in the master file resulting in them not being included in subsequent copies of the surveillance procedur Although the licensee identified this problem, the NRC is issuing a Notice of Violation because the procedural inadequacies were not identified at the time of procedure irnplementio Personnel completed and management reviewed the completed procedure without the required completed check off sheets. Therefore, failure to perform a technical specification surveillance within the required time, failure to follow procedures, and failure to properly maintain procedures is a violation of the Unit 2 technical specification (311/87-18-01)
Units 1 & 2 The inspector identified various gauges on equipment in the switchgear rooms that had expired calibration sticker The licensee in their followup identified numerous similar instances in the auxiliary buildin Several years ago, gauge calibration requirements were changed from a 3 year to a 5 year frequency, but the calibration stickers were not updated to reflect the change when it was mad The stickers are updated when the calibration is performe The licensee is in the process of reviewing calibration history records to ascertain whether any of the expired stickers are valid and whether safety related equipment is involve This item is unresolved (272/87-15-02; 311/87-18-02) pending completion of the licensee's re~iew.and result.
Review of Periodic and Special Reports Upon receipt, the inspector reviewed periodic and special report The review included the following:
inclusion of information required by the NRC; test results and/or supporting information consistent with design ~redictions and performance specifications; planned corrective action for resolution of problems, and reportability and validity of report informatio The following periodic reports were reviewed:
Unit 1 Monthly Operating Report - May 1987 Unit 2 Monthly Operating Report - May 1987 In addition, the inspector reviewed:
Special Report 50-272/87-3, Service Water Leak Inside Containment
- No. 12 Containment Fan Coil Unit Motor Coo 1 er Leak due to Corrosion Special Report 50-272/87-4, Service Water Lea-k Inside Containment
~ No. 11 Containment Fan Coil Unit Lower Cooler Leak due to Loose Bolts on the End Bell No violations were identifie.
Licensee Event Report Followup The inspector reviewed the following LERs to determine that reportabjlity requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was taken, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specification Unit 1 87-005 Unit 2 87-007
lF Group Bus Underfrequency Protection Inoperable Due to Mispositioned Knife Switch On April 23, 1987 during performance of routine maintenance, the licensee identified that the knife switch for lF Group Bus Underfrequency Reactor Coolant Pump Protection was ope Corrective actions included closing the knife switch and installing locks on the doors of the group bus electrical panels, and discussing the situation with personnel responsible for maintenance and testing involving the knife switc The cause of the knife switch being open is unknown __
However, this is considered an isolated occurrence and the inspector has no further questions at this tim TS 3.7.11 Non-Compliance - Discovery of Fire Barrier Impairment On May 11, 1987, the licensee identified an unsealed fire barrier penetration between the 84' elevation switchgear room and the 100' elevation relay roo The impairment is applicable to both unit Corrective actions included establishing a one hour roving fire watch in the area until the penetration can be resealed during the next outage of sufficient duratio The licensee also plans to conduct a review of all fire barrier penetration seal The inspector will follow the licensee's action No violations were identifie.
Unresolved Item Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations or deviations. Unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in paragraphs 4 and.
Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the course of the inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and finding An exit interview was held with licensee management at the end of the reporting period. -The licensee did not identify 2.790 material.