IR 05000272/1987019
| ML18093A313 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 08/04/1987 |
| From: | Swetland P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18093A312 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-87-19, 50-311-87-21, NUDOCS 8708200151 | |
| Download: ML18093A313 (13) | |
Text
Report No.Docket No License No Licensee:
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
50-272/87-19 50-311/87-21 50-272 50-311 DPR-70 DPR-75 Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Plaza Newark, New Jersey 07101 050272-870525 050272-870603 050272-870628 050311-870506 050311-870519 Facility Name:
Salem Nuclear Generating Station ~ Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey Inspection tonducted:
June 16, 1987 - July 20, 1987 Inspectors:
Approved by:
T. J.. Kenny, Senior Resident Inspector K. H. Gibson, Resident Inspector
~.*
P. D. Swetland, Chief, Reactor Projects Section No. 2B, Proj~cts Branch No. 2, DRP. d.1=/r;.
- date Inspection Summary:
.
Inspections on June 16, 1987 - July 20, 1987 (Combined Reper~ Numbers 50-272/87-19 and 50-311/87-21)
Areas Inspected:
Routine inspections of plant operations including:
followup on outstanding inspection items, operational safety verification,.
maintenance, surveillance, review of speci~l reports, licensee event followup, and fire protectio The inspection involved 138 inspector hours by the re.sident NRC inspectors, including backshift inspections on July 17 (4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />) and Julj 19 (5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />).
Four hours of weekend inspection were conducted on July 12, 198 Results:
Concerns were identified with regard to pump and valve testing in accordance with the inservice testing progra See Section 5 for detail.. 8fic5K1 870812. ;::
05000272 PDR
DETAILS Persons Contacted Within this report period, interv1ews and di.scussions were conducted
\\'.{ith members of licensee management and staff as_necessary to support inspection activit.
Followup on Outstanding Inspection Item (Closed)
Inspector Follow Item (272/84-28-01); The inspector left this item open to review lic.ensee actions following a loss of service water cooling to the emergency dies.els as a result of a Safeguards Equipment Control (SEC) actuation for "Station Blackout".
The event took place while the reactor was in the defueled conditio The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions (delineated in Licensee Event Report 84-014), engineering evaluations for each corrective
- action, Administrative Directive No. 15, and associated changes to operating documents. Based on this revi~w. all concerns have been correcte The inspector considers this item close (Closed) * Inspector Follow Item (272/87-15-01); The inspector reviewed th~ following operations procedures (DPs) to verify that the changes made give direction for boric acid system manipulations with the heating steam system out of service:
OP II-3.3.17 Boric Acid Ev~porator - Normal Operations, Revision 7 ACN P-1 (Units 1 and 2)
OP II-3. Boric Acid Solution Preparation and Transfer - Revision 12 (Unit 1) Revision 8 (Unit 2)
This item is close.
Operational Safety Verification 3: 1 Documents Reviewed
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Selected Operators' Lrigs Senior Shift Supervisor's (SSS) Log Jumper Log Radioactive Waste Release Permits (liquid & gaseous)
Selected Radiation Work Permits (RWP)
Selected Chemistry Logs Selected Tagouts
Health Physics Watch Log.
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2*
3.2 The. irispe~tor conducted routine entries into.the protected areas of the plants, including the control rooms, Auxiliary Building, fuel buildings, and containments (when access is possible).
During the inspection activities, discussions were held.with operators, technicians (HP & I&C), mechanics, supervisors, and plant.managemen The purpose of the*inspection was to affirm the licensee's commitments and compliance with 10 CFR, Technical Specifications, and Administrative Procedure..2.2'
On a daily basis, particula~ attention was directed t6 the following areas:
Instrumentation and recorder traces for abnormalit~es; Adherence to LCO' s directly obser_vable from the control room; Proper control room shift manning and access control; Verifi~ation of the status of control room annu~ciators that are in alarm; Proper use of procedures; Review of logs to obtain plant conditions; and, Verification of surveillance testing for timely completio On a weekly basis, the inspector confirmed the operability of selected ESF trains by:
- Verifying that accessible valves in the flow path were in the correct position~;
Verifying that power supplies and breakers were in the correct positions; Verifying that de-energized portions of these systems were de-energized as identified by Technical Specifications; Visually inspecting major components for.leakage, lubrication, vibration, cooling water supply, and general 6perating conditions; and, Visually inspecting instrumentation, where possible, for proper operability.
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On a biweekly basis, the inspector:
Verified the correct application of a tagout to a safety-related system;.
Observed a* shift turriover; Review~d the sampling program including the liquid and gaseous effluents; Verified that radiation protection and controls were properly established; Verified that the physical security plan was being implemented; Reviewed licensee-identified problem areas; and, Verified selected portions of the. containment isolation lineu Engin.eered Safety Feature (ESF) System Walkdown:
The inspectors verified the operability of the selected ESF system by performing a walkdown of accessible portions of the system to confirm that system lineup procedures match plant drawings and the as-built configuratio This ESF system*walkdown was also conducted to identify equipment conditions that might degrade performance, to determine that instrumentation is calibrated and functioning, and to verify.that valves are properly positioned and locked as appropriat The Unit 1 Auxiliary Feedwater System was inspecte No deficiencies were identifie.3 Inspector Comments/Findings:
The inspector selected phases of the units operation to determine compliance with the NRC's regulation The inspectrir determined that the areas inspected and the licensee'~ actions did not constitute a health and safety hazard to the public or plant personne The following are noteworthy areas the inspector researched in depth:
3. Unit 1 3.3. Unit 1 operated at 100% power throughout the inspection period with two exceptions:
(1) from June 20 - 25 and J~ly 13 - 17, the unit operated at ~pproximately 90% power while trip-a-unit was selected to U~it 2 (see Section 3.3.2.2, Unit 2 fo~ further explanation.)
3. Unit 2
(2)
from June 26 - July 12, with trip-a~unit selected to Unit 1 and operating-at 100%,
several short load reductions were ac~omplished for turbin~ valve testing and to remove trip-a-unit from service due to
'severe weather conditions in the are.3.2.1 Unit 2 began the report period opefaiing at approximately 88% power:
3.3.2.2 On June 20, 1987, the 4nstallation of a trip-a-u~it protection system on Salem Unit 2 was completed, and the Hope Creek and Salem Unit 2 power system stabilizers were activated; These power dis-tribution modifications w~re implemented due to the extended outage of the Hope Creek to Keeney 500 KV transmission lin The loss of the Keeney line limits power output from the 3 Artificial Island uniis due to potential grid instabilities. Trip-a-unit protection auto-matically trips one unit at the site upon loss of an additional 500 KV transmission lin The
.
installation of trip-a-unit ~rote~tion on Salem 2 ( Salem 1 had trip-a-unit installed previously)
provides for additional operational flexibility as well as.a more favorable offsite power source configuration during a worst case line faul With the trip-a-unit installad on Unit 2 and the power system stabilizers activated, the combined 3 unit el~ctric power output is limited to 3262 MW electric. The licensee intends to operate Salem 2 and Hope Creek at 100% power and Salem 1 at reduced power in -0rder to extend the time to the Salem 1 refuel~ng outage.. The licensee has submitted a supplemental safety evaluation to the NRC relative to the operation of Salem and Hope Cree The inspectors verified that procedures are implemented to coordinate and control operation of the units with and without trip-a-unit enabled, to maintain system stability and licensed thermal power limit.3.2.1 On June 24, Unit 2 power level was reduced to 35% to troubleshoot and repair No. 2C 115 volt vital bus inverte The unit was returned to 100% power on June 2..e
3.3. On June 26, the operators received a high*
.vibration alarm on Unit 2 No. 6 bearing of N low pressure turbin Upon immediate investigation the bearing vibration increase and a very high pitched noise was observed at the inlet to No. 22 low pressure turbin Unit 2 load was decreased at a rate of 1%/mi and subsequently at 5%/min.. The vibration began to decrease, as well as the nois At approximately 61% reactor power, the turbine returned to normal vibration limits and the noise subside The licensee removed the Unit from service and placed the Unit in Mode The licensee performed the following during the outage:
rolled and inspected No. 6 main
- bearing, i~spected low pressure turbirie blading, and inspected No. 22 east intercept lin~.
These inspections revealed no apparent cause for the.vibration ahd noise. *The unit was restarted on July 1 with turbine parameters being closely monitored with vibration and acoustic equipmen Vibration and acoustic monitoring during unit load increases from July 1 to July 3 resulted in identifying leakage by the steam inlet gaskets of Nos. 21 and 22 low pressure_ turbine On July 3, the unit was removed from service and maintained in Mode 4 t~ replace the ~asket Unit 2 was returned to service on July 12, 1987 and operated at -100% powe.3. On July 17, 19, and 21, power was reduced to approximately 60% to troubleshoot and repair N steam generator feedpump (SGFP), which was
~xperiencing control problem The licens~e was continuing to troubleshoot the governbr control circuitry at the close of the report perio Units 1 and 2 3.3. Oh July 13, the licensee stationed an operator in the fire pump house and disabled both fire pump logic circuits in otder to replace the auto bus transfer devic All the necessary notifi-cations were made in accordance with technical specification The circuit was out of service for eight hours; The system has-been returned to normal.Servi C.
3.3. On July 18, the hypochlorite metering pump discharge pressure gauge blew off, spilling approxima*tely 1500 gallons of sodium hypochlorite to the Delaware Rive Sodium hypochlorite is a chemical used to treat circulating water fo~ biofouling purpose Appropriate federal and state agencies were
- notified in accordance with licensee procedure.
.
The spill was cleaned up by the chemistry department personnel, the discharge pressure
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gauge replaced, and the hypochlorite system was*
placed back in service on July 20, 198 No violations were identifie.
Maintenance Observations The inspector reviewed the following safety-related maintenance activities to verify that repairs were made in accordance with approved procedures and in compliance with NRC regulations and recognized codes and standard The inspector also verified that the
- replacement parts and Quality Control utilized on the repairs were in compliance with the licensee's QA prbgra Work Order Number 870623009
.870707034 870415012 Maintenance Procedure MP MP 7:8, M14A2 Code Job Package S-87-147 MllE Mechanical Equip-ment Troubleshooting and Repair No violations were identifie.
- surveillance Observations Description Repack 23BF19 with Chesterton live-loaded packing Check stem alignment*
and repack 23BF19 Resurface flange down-stream of valve 21SW127, reinstall valv During this inspection period, the inspector reviewed in-progress surveillance testing as well as completed surveillance ~ackages. The in~pector verified that the surveillances were performed in accordance*
with li~ensee approved procedures and NRC. regulation The inspector
- also verified that the instruments used were within ~alibration toleran~es and that qualified technicians perfor~ed the surveillances..
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The following surveillances were reviewed:
Unit 1 Procedure IC-2. 6. 059*
SP(0)4.0.5-P-AF(ll)
SP(0)4.0.5-P-AF(l3)
Unit 2.
Procedure SP(0)4.0.5-P-CV(21)
SP(0)4.0.5-P-SW(24-26)
SP(0)4.o.5~v-sJ~3 SP(0)4.3. Units 1 and 2
- Descr1 pti on IFT-543-14 Steam generator steam flow fun ct ion a 1,,... Channel II Inservice Testing,... Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps
/
Description Inservice Testing - charging pump Inservice Testing - service water pumps 2LT549 - No. 24 steam generator level channel
.functional - Channel II ECCS Subsystems -.Cold leg injection chetk valve testing (observed testing of 21 and 23SJ43 and 22 and.24SJ56 valves)
Atcumulator outlet valves 21-24SJ54 valve cycling and timing SSPS,... Slave Relay Testing - Train B The inspectors completed a review of inservi~e testing (IST) of pumps and valves as directed by NRC Inspection Procedure 7375 During the past four months the inspectors have interviewed licensee personnel; witnessed performance of pump and. valve testing; and revi.ewed procedures, data sheets, operating logs, engineering evaluations, trending program and related documentatio A review of the IST program and ASME Section XI requirements were also perf9rme As a result, the inspectors have made the following observations and conclusions:
Procedures for inservice testing of pumps and valves appear to be ade~uate to perform the required test Procedures are revised and new baseline data iS dev*eloped as needed to account for changes in pump parameters as a result of maintenance, et IST surveillance scheduling is done by the Planni~g Department in accordance with tbe IST program using the Managed Maintenance Information System (MMIS). *Both normal and increased frequency tests are schedule Work orders are- *printed daily by the MMIS when a surveillance is due *and are delivered to the responsible organization (generally Operations for pump and valve I1STs) by the Planning Departmen *
Instrum~ntation u~ed for pump and valve tests are calibrated at the required frequenc IST data is evaluated against baseline data by Operations superv1s1o Data results in the "alert" or "action" ranges are forwarded to System Engineering for evaluatio The inspectors observed that equipment is declared inoperable when results in the "action" range are identified.. Test.frequencies are increased as required when an 11alert" range value is obtaine System Engineering (Performance Department) trends IST results for pump testing with the exception of vibration data which they plan to trend when the trending program is computerize *
Engineering evaluations are performed as.required!
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- The inspectors noted that no violations of the code were identified and equipment adjustment and variances are allowable within the code, however the inspectors had the following concerns:
"Alert" and "action" range data obtained are discarded if the apparent te~t failures can be attributed to an error in performance of the procedur The inspectors have observed the same pump and valve tests run several times until compliance with the procedure is achieved and the results recorded acceptabl For example; a service water pump test was repeated three times because, after the first run, it was determined that a calibrated-stopwatch was not use After the second run (which still was in the alert range) the inspector identified to the licensee that the discharge pressure gauge being used was not the size called.*
for in the procedur On the third run, with a calibrated stopwatch and correct pressure gauge, the test results were acceptabl Had the procedure been more closely adhered to, the two additional pump runs would not have been necessar In *nether instance, the inspector observed test results recorded in pencil as allowable adjustments were made to the valv When acceptable results were achieved the pencii data was erased and the final data recorded in pe *
The i~spectors are concerned that procedures, in some cases, are not being strictly adhered t This caused an excessive number of runs to accomplish the testing. Also excessive unrecorded adjustments were made which, if recorded and reviewed by engineering, may lead to system/component or procedure improvement In addition, the i~spectors are concerned that equipment failure and maintenance history may not be maintained in all case These concerns were discussed several times during the inspection with licensee managemen The inspectors will follow the licensee's progres~ in resolving these concerns and addres$ the results in a future inspectio (272/87-19-01; 311/87-21-01) Review of Periodic and S~ecial Reports Upon receipt, the inspector ~eviewed periodit and special reports.
. The review included the following:
inclusion of information required by the NRC; test results and/or supporting information consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; planned corrective action for resolution of problems, and reportability and validity of report information.. The following periodic reports were reviewed:.
Unit 1 Monthly Operating Report ~June, 1987 Unit 2 Monthly* Operating Report - June, 1987 In addition, the inspector reviewed the 1986 Annual Environmental Operating Report (Non-Radiological), Salem Generating Station, Units 1 and 2. *
No violations were identifie.
Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup The inspector reviewed the following LERs to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate 'corrective action was taken, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accompli~hed in accordance with technical specifications (TS).
Unit 1 87-006 Both Trains of High Head SI Declared Inoperable ~ T.S. 3. Entered
. On May 25, 1987, during a walkdown of the plant, an operator identified that the spring charging motor in the 4KV breaker for No. 11 centrifugal charging pump, was not attached to the breaker framewor The pump was declared inoperable.due to the*inoperable 4KV breaker, and the proper technical specification action state-ment was entere The licensee noted that the redundant centri-fugal charging pump was not fully operable<due to the inoperability (for maintenance) of its associated ~mergency dies~l generator power suppl This condition required a plant shutdown with 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> in accordance with T.S. 3. The inoperable breaker was promptly replaced with a sp~re and the T.S. action statement
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was exite The licensee has examined all other breakers of this type and found no problem (The reason for the spring charging motor being dislodged was due to loose bolts.) The 1 i censee has al so investigated NPRDS, and Nuclear Netw-ork in order to determine if this problem is generi To date no_
generic link can be determined. 'The licensee is making checks once per shift to determine if this is a generic proble Th~
resident inspector has no further questions at this tim,
Turbine Trip/Reactor Trip from 100% - 5021 Deani Line Cross Trip Scheme - Lighting Strike 87-008 Unit 2 87-006 This LER discusses a reactor trip of June 2, 1987 ahd is discussed in combined inspection report 272/87-15/311/87-1 Failure to Implement Portions of the Inservice Testing Program The licensee was preparing a general pump trending program using existing data when it was discovered that vibration measurements required by the !ST program on diesel generator fuel oil transfer pumps and diesel g~nerator DIC lube 6il pre~
circulation pumps had hot been taken~ The licensee determined that procedures for taking-vibration readings on the diesel generator pumps had not been implemented following the addition of these pumps to the !ST progra Licensee review of all !ST requirements in preparation for the new trending program iden-tified no other equipment omission The licensee has taken vibration readings on all of the aforementioned pumps and ~one were out of specification Procedures for the diesel generator pump vibration m~asurements are in the review cycle and are to be incorporated shortly., The resident inspector has no further questions at this tim T.S. 3.7.10.3 Non-Compliance - Inadequate Fire'Watch Due to Personnel Error
,
A maintenance superviso~ assigned a fire watch to two ar~as of the auxiliary buildin It was then subsequently determined that a fire watch could not provide adequate continuous coverage since the two areas were on different elevations of the auxiliary buildin Two departments were involved and the determination for the error has been attributed to personnel erro The licensee has conducted a detailed review of the fire protection system requirements with the maintenance superviso The fire protection program including requirements and interpretations, as well
- as the incident, was discussed with all other maintenance supervisio The incident also prompted a review of the fire protection program. *The resident inspector has no further questions at this tim..87-008
.e
Missed T.S. Surveillance 4.5.2.b Due to P~rsonnel Error This LER discusses a partially completed surveillance on ECCS and is further discusse_d in combined inspection report*
272/87-15/311/87-18.
. No violations were identified.. Appendix 11 R 11 and Fire Protection The licensee requested, and was granted, an extension for the Appendix 11 R11 team inspection at Salem Statio The extension was requested because the licensee has an audit team on the site conducting a review of Appendix 11 R" program implementation with regard'to the original criteria and the new Appendix 11 R11 guidance of NRC_Generic Letters 83-39 and 86-1 The licensee committed that any findings *by the audit group would be reported to NRC and that LER 1 s.would be filed to document these finding To date several findings have been identified as noted belo Improperly sealed fire ba~riers (LER 87-009 and Supplement, Unit 1).
A total of twenty fire barriers w,ere identified as not being properly sealed. *The licensee took correctiv~ action in accordance with *
technical specifications, by the establishment of a roving fire watc The ~reas identified also contain fire detection equipment and independent suppression system The licensee could not identify the causes for the impairments which occurred since the last accept-able surveilfance (18 month).
The licensee resealed the penetrations
. and removed the fire watc The licensee plans to make programmatic change The resident inspector conducts periodic reviews of the fire protection area and will address the changes at that tim Service water cable runs do not meet separation requirements (LER 87-009, Unit 2).
Three electrical trains for the Unit 2 service water system do not meet 10CFR50 Appendix 11R 11 requirement The cause has been attributed to inadequate design revie The cabling meets the original electrical separation requirements, but does not meet the current Appendix 11R 11 requirement The. licensee stationed fire watches in the appropriate areas and design modification options to*
correct the deficiency are under co~sideration.*
Control circuitry for the diesel generator fuel oil transfer pumps does not. meet separation requirements and a single failure could render the fuel oil transfer system inoperable. (LER 87-010, Unit 1) The licensee has isolated the common control circuitry for one pump per unit. A jumper was installed to allow manual operation of these two pump Operating procedures have been implemented to direct the operators in starting the manual pump There is also
,.
'*
ample alarms and oil storage capacity to alert the operator in order to initiate these new operating procedure The licensee is considering design modifications to correct the deficienc The remaining items have not yet been assigned an LER number but have been reported to the resident inspector and NR (1)
Inlet and outlet damper cables for redundant trains of-RHR and charging pump room coolers are wired in the same pane _(2)
Control cables for the 20-minute lockout of-the RHR and charging pump room coolers, and the diesel fuel oil transfer pumps on blackout loading are wired in the same cable trays. A temporary design change previously made to correct a separate Appendix-11 R11 deficiency in the diesel fuel oil transfer pumps also c.orrects the deficiency stated abov The affected areas have partial fire detection and no suppression equipmen The licensee posted fire watches in the affected areas and is developing permanent design changes to meet Appendix 11 R
requirements.,
The licensee is keeping NRC Region I and NRR informed of Appendix 11 R
discrepancies identified as a result of their revie A future NRC Appendix 11 R 11 team inspection is planne The above mentioned deficiencies will be evaluated during th~t inspectio The inspector has no further questiOns at this tim.
Exit Interview At periodic intervals duting the course of the inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to dfscuss the inspection scope and. finding An exit intervie~ was held with licensee management at the end of the reporting perio The li~ensee did not identify 2.790 material.