IR 05000272/1987012
| ML18093A145 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 05/29/1987 |
| From: | Norrholm L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18093A144 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-87-12, 50-311-87-15, GL-81-21, GL-83-28, NUDOCS 8706090176 | |
| Download: ML18093A145 (12) | |
Text
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No /87-12 50-311/87-15 50-272 Docket No DPR-70 License No DPR-75 050272-870326 050272-870410 050311-870407 Licensee:
Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Plaza Newark, New Jersey 07101 Facility Name:
Salem Nuclear Generating Station - Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey Inspection Conducted:
April 21, 1987 - May 18, 1987 Inspectors:
Approved by:
T. J. Kenny, Senior Resident Inspector K. H. Gibson, Resident Inspector R. J. Summers, Project Engineer L. J. Norrholm, Chief, R actor Projects Section No. 2B, Projects Branch No. 2, DRP Inspection Summary:
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Inspections on April 21, 1987 - May 18, 1987 (Combined Report Numbers 50-272/87-12 and 50-311/87-15)
Areas Inspected:
Routine inspections of plant operations including:
follow-up on outstanding inspection items, operational safety verification, maintenance, surveillance, review of special reports, licensee event followup, and closeout of previously identified safety issue The inspection involved 190 inspection hours by the NRC inspectors; 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> of inspection were performed during off-normal hours including 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> of backshift inspection on April 30, 1987, 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of backshift inspection on May 15, 1987 and 5.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> of weekend backshift inspection on May 10, 198 Results:
One licensee identified violation involving failure to perform diesel surveillance tests is discussed in Section 7 of the report.
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DETAILS Persons Contacted Within this report period, interviews and discussions were conducted with members of licensee management and staff as necessary to support inspection activit.
Follow-up on Outstanding Inspection Items (Closed)
Violation (50-311/87-03-01); Inoperability of both emergency core cooling system (ECCS) residual heat removal (RHR) subsystems for approximately 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> The NRC has received the letter from the licensee dated April 30, 1987, and has reviewed the corrective actions including:
Changes to surveillance procedure SP(0)4.5.3.1 (Valve testing in the RHR system);
Changes to segment 4 of the operator requalification training; The proposed changes to Amendment No. 7 of the UFSAR; Proposed Technical Specification change; Changes to the 10 year !SI program; and, Methods of improving communications with Westinghouse.
Based on the licensee's actions, the inspector considers this item close (Closed)
Violation (50-311/87-04-01); Failure to properly surveil-lance check containment boundary valves in accordance with Technical Specification The inspector reviewed the licensee's response to the violation, dated April 14, 1987~ The licensee identified 19 discrepancies on the containment boundary valve surveillance procedures in addition to the 5 identifted in the violatio The inspector verified that all of the affected valves have been subsequently added to the appropriate surveil-lance procedure.. The inspector had no further questions at this tim.
Operational Safety Verification 3.1 Documents Reviewed Selected Operators' Logs Senior Shift Supervisor's (SSS) Log Jumper Log Radioactive Waste Release Permits (liquid & g~seous)
Selected Radiation Work Permits (RWP)
Selected Chemistry Logs
Selected Tagouts Health Physics Watch Log 3.2 The inspector conducted routine entries into the prot~cted areas of the plants,. including the control rooms, auxiliary buildings, fuel handling buildings, and containments (when access is possible).
During the inspection activities, discussions were held with operators, technicians (HP & I&C), mechanics, supervisors, and plant managemen The purpose of the inspection was to affirm the licensee's commitments and compliance with 10 CFR, Technical Specifications, and Administrative Procedure.. On a daily basis, particular attention was directed to the following areas:
Instrumentation and recorder traces for abnormalities; Adherence to LCO's directly observable from the control room; Proper control room shift manning and access control; Verification of the status of control room annunciators that are in alarm; Proper use of procedures; Review of logs to obtain plant conditions; and, Verification of surveillance testing for timely completio On a weekly basis, the inspector confirmed the operability of selected ESF trains by:
Verifying that accessible valves in the flow path were in the correct positions; Verifying that power supplies and breakers were in the correct positions; Verifying that de-energized portions of these systems were de-energized as identified by Technical Specifications; Visually inspecting major components for leakage, lubrication, vibration, cooling water supply, and general operating conditions; and, Visually inspecting instrumentation, where possible, for proper operabilit I I
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On a biweekly basis, the inspector:
Verified the correct application of a tagout to a safety-related system; Observed a shift turnover; Reviewed the sampling program including the liquid and gaseous effluents; Verified that radiation protection and controls were properly established; Verified that the physical security plan was being implemented; Reviewed licensee-identified problem areas; and, Verified selected portions of containment isolation lineu Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) System Walkdown:
The inspectors verified the operability of the selected ESF system by performing a walkdown of accessible portions of the system to confirm that system lineup procedures match plant drawings and the as-built configuratio This ESF system walkdown was also conducted to identify equipment conditions that might degrade performance, to determine that instrumentation is calibrated and functioning, and to verify that valves are properly positioned and locked as appropriat The Unit 1 safety injection system was inspecte No deficiencies were identifie.3 Inspector Comments/Findings:
The inspector selected phases of the units operation to determine compliance with the NRC 1s regulation The inspector determined that the areas inspected and the licensee 1s actions did not constitute a health and safety hazard to the public or plant personne The following are noteworthy areas the inspector researched in depth:
3. Unit 1 Unit 1 operated at 100% power throughout this inspection period with the exception of power fluctuations for the purpose of testing.
3.. On May 14, 1987, an ENS call was made with regard to a containment sump leak rate of 7.5 gallons per minut The leak was service water from the motor cooler line on No. 12 containment fan coil unit (CFCU).
The licensee entered the technical specification action statement and isolated the CFC The licensee completed repairs (refer to Section 4 for details) and returned the unit to servic Unit 2 Unit 2 operated at 88% power throughout this inspection period because of current limitations on the 500 KV transmission system in southern New Jerse On April 14, 1987, the licensee asked for and received a relaxation from the ASME Section XI code in order to tighten packing on 22BF19 (feedwater regulating valve to No. 2 steam generator).
The resident inspector reviewed the work performed on the valve (see Section 4 of this report).
Units 1 & 2 On April 20, 1987, the resident inspectors were informed by the licensee that a licensed control room operator had tested positive for use of a controlled substance during his annual physica The licensee's immediate action was to confront the operator who agreed to be escorted to the medical facility for additional testin The operator, who was in training at the time, was suspended pending the results of the second tes On April 29, 1987, the licensee learned that the second test was also positiv In accordance with the licensee's drug and alcohol abuse policy, the employee was terminate Also in accordance with the policy, the licensee is considering the individual's acceptance into their rehabilitation progra The resident inspectors, through discussions with station management and immediate supervision, have ascertained that the individual did not display aberrant behavior, excessive absenteeism, or tardines In general, the individual performed his licensed duties as expected.
. The licensee has not received a reply from the individual with regard to his intentions to enter the rehabilitation progra *
On April 29, 1987 at 2:00 p.m., Wackenhut Cor replaced YOH Security, Inc. as the contract guard force at the Salem and Hope Creek sites. The resi-dent inspectors observed the turnover and discussed the transition with licensee security managemen All but six of the YOH guard force personnel were retained by Wackenhu The transition appeared to go smoothl On April 30, 1987 at 12:00 midnight, the union's (IBEW)
contract expired and a new contract was adopted for a two year perio In preparation of the potential for a strike the resident inspectors performed inspection procedure 92709 11 Licensee Plans for Coping with Strikes 11 *
The inspectors reviewed the following:
Contingency plans for strike situations, Salem Generating Stations; Personnel assignment rosters; and, Licensed operators* training and qualification history, including those licenses that are not acti~ely engaged in the daily operation of the unit Through a review of the above documents and discussions with licensee management the inspectors confirmed the fo 11 owing:
All personnel that were to be in a position requiring a license met the criteria of 10CFR55 Personnel were assigned to_all areas required for operation including:
- Communicators (Emergency Plan); OSC coordinator; Emergency Plan assignments; and, Maintenance and Surveillance assignment All oil and chemical tanks were being kept topped off and the agencies which supply such services were notified and the licensee was guaranteed delivery during the strik Local and state law enforcement agencies were notified of an impending strik **
The inspectors concluded that the licensee was prepared.to operate the facility during a union strike and had provisions to operate the plant safely, implement the emergency plan, if necessary, and ensure offsite communications throughout a union walk-ou No violations were identifie.
Maintenance Observations The inspector reviewed the following safety related maintenance activities to verify that repairs were made in accordance with approved procedures and in compliance with NRC regulations and recognized codes and standard The inspector also verified that the replacement parts and Quality Control utilized on the repairs were in compliance with the licensee 1s QA progra Work Order Number 87-04-24-065 Maintenance Procedure Work Request 005041 Description Tightened packing on 22BF19 (feedwater control valve for No. 2 steam generator)
The licensee torqued the packing on 22BF19 to 13 foot pound This is the requirement for a valve of this type that utilizes Chesterton packin The torque setting was found at 10 foot pound Wear of the packing has been attributed to the cause of the relaxation of the packing nut The leak was stopped and the valve was partially stroked open and closed and returned to servic The licensee requested and was granted relief by NRR from ASME Section XI valve testing requirements in Qrder to make this repair without shutting the unit dow The licensee's actions and basis for relief from the testing requirement of ASME Section XI were forwarded to the NRC by letter dated May 14, 198 Work Order Number 87-04-07-038 Maintenance Procedure Code Job Package S-87-076 Description Replace section of pipe from valve n CV281 to valve n CV308 on Unit 1 reactor coolant system letdown line The repair necessitated isolation of normal RCS letdown and placing excess letdown in servic Existing valve 1CV253 and its associated tee and valve 1CV281 were reused in the repai Nondestructive examinations and hydrotest were satisfactor Normal RCS letdown is back in servic The inspector has no further question *
Work Order Number 87-05-14-028
Maintenance.*
.Procedure Code Job Package S-87-102 Description Repair of No. 12 containment fan coil unit service water leak On May 12, 1987, the licensee identified a 7.5 gpm service water leak on No. 12 CFCU motor cooler outlet line downstream of valve no. 12SW71 at the bottom of the tee connection for thermowell (TT3844).
The tee was cement-lined carbon steel pip The cement lining apparently degraded allowing the tee to corrod Piping and fittings between valve No. 12SW71 up to and including the 90 degree elbow downstream of the tee were replace Valve No. 12SW69 was also replace The thermowell (316 carbon steel) was reuse Belzona was applied to the inside of the repaired are Nondestructive examinations and the hydrostatic test were acceptable following completion of the repair Work Order Number 87-04-02-032 Maintenance Procedure MllE Description Repair flange leak on service water valve 21SW42 The licensee repaired a service water leak due to erosion/corrosion of the flange seating surface for valve 21SW4 This valve is the flow control valve for the jacket water cooler on the No. 2A diesel generato The damage to the flange was repaired by weld and Belzona applicatio No violati6ns were identifie..
Surveillance Observations During this inspection period, in-progress surveillance testing as well as completed surveillance packages were reviewe The inspector verified the following:
that the surveillance tests were performed in accordance ~ith licensee approved procedures and NRC regulations; that the instruments used were properly calibrated; and, that qualified technicians performed the surveillance activitie In addition, as part of an ongoing review of inservice testing of pumps and valves, the following surveillance activities were observed:
Unit 1 Procedure SP(0)4.0.5-V-SW-1 Description Inservice Testing - Service Water Valves
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Unit 2 Procedure Description SP(0)4.0.5-P-CC(23)
Inservice Testing - No. 23 Component Cooling Pump SP(0)4.0.5-P-SW(23)
Inservice Testing - No. 23 Service Water Pump SP(0)4.0.5-P-RH(21)
Inservice Testing - No. 21 Residual Heat Removal Pump SP(0)4.0.5-P-RH(22)
Inservice Testing - No. 22 *Residua 1 Heat Removal Pump PI/S - AF - 3 Periodic Inspection Surveillance -
Auxiliary Feedwater Backleakage No violations were identified; however, as stated previously, the inspection of the inservice testing of pumps and valves has not been completed at this tim Details of this effort will be documented in a future inspectio * Review of Periodic and Special Reports Upon receipt, the inspector reviewed periodic and special report The review intluded the following:
inclusion of information required by the NRC; test results and/or supporting information consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; planned corrective action for resolution of problems, and reportability and validity of report informatio The following periodic reports were reviewed:
Unit 1 Monthly Operating Report - April 1987 Unit 2 Monthly Operating Report - April 1987 No violations were identifie.
Licensee Event Report Fo 11 owup The inspector reviewed the following LERs to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was taken, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accord-ance with Technical Specification Unit 1 87-003 Containment Pressure/Vacuum Relief Valves Open Beyond 1000 Hour Limit due to Procedural Inadequacy 87-004
After collection and recording of information for cyclic data the licensee discovered that the 1000 hour0.0116 days <br />0.278 hours <br />0.00165 weeks <br />3.805e-4 months <br /> limit had been exceeded for 198 The amount of hours recorded was 123 The cause of the hours exceeding 1000 hours0.0116 days <br />0.278 hours <br />0.00165 weeks <br />3.805e-4 months <br /> was due to inadequate maintenance of the cyclic lo The 1000 hours0.0116 days <br />0.278 hours <br />0.00165 weeks <br />3.805e-4 months <br /> is an administrative limit requested by the NRC and is not a safety limi The licensee has taken the necessary steps to correct the procedure and train personnel to more closely monitor the vacuum reliefs of the containment The inspector considers this item close Diesel Generator Missed Surveillance Due to Inadequate Post Maintenance Testing Caused by Personnel Error On April 10, 1987, surveillance runs on 18 and lC diesel generators (DG) were missed due to the action statement for lA DG maintenance being prematurely exited following completion of an unsynchronized test run on lA D The unsynchronized test run was inadequate to prove operability because the generator output breaker had been racked out and tagged to support the maintenance activitie The retest of the lA DG should have included synchronization and loadin Retest of lA DG and sur-veillance tests of 18 and lC DGs were subsequently completed satisfactoril The licensee took the following corrective actions: Counseled the shift supervisor who had incorrectly specified the inadequate retes.
Circulated the LER to all licensed operator.
Revised procedures OD-10 "Removal and Return of Safety Related Equipment" and SP(0)4.8.l.l.2 Emergency Diesel Generator Surveillance Procedure to clarify retest requirement.
Training Department will review the occurrence for incorporation into the licensed operator training and requalification program Failure to perform the 18 and lC diesel generator surveillance tests within the required time is a violation of Technical Specification 3.8.1.1 Action (50-272/87-12-01) However, in accordance with 10CFR2, Appendix C, a notice of violation is not being issued since this violation meets all of the following criteria: It was identified by the licensee; It fits in Severity Level IV or V;
Unit 2 87-005 11 It was reported as required; It was corrected, including measures to prevent recurrence, within a reasonable time; and, It was not a violation that could reasonably be expected to have been prevented by the licensee's corrective action for a previous violatio Turbine/Reactor Trip from 85% Power Due to Loss of DC Control Power to the Turbine Electro Hydraulic Control System Caused by a Failed Servo Card This event was discussed in Inspection Report 50-272/87-06 and 50-311/87-1 The licensee plans to calibrate spare servo cards in the future to prevent recurrence of this even The inspec-tor has no further question.
Closeout of Previously Identified Safety Issues 8.1 The following items were closed by the inspector.
April 1981 Order for Modification of License Concerning Primary Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valves (TI-2515/84) Generic Letter 83-28, Item 4.1 - Required Actions Based on Generic Implementation of Salem ATWS Events (TI-2515/91) Generic Letter 81-21 - Natural Circulation Cooldown (TI-2515/86)
8.2 Details of the closeout and inspector finding.
April 1981 Order This item was closed in combined Inspection Report 50-272/85-12, 50-311/85-1 The inspector reviewed the licensee's pro-cedures for performing the required testing and concludes that the tests are being performed in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the April 1981 Orde.
Generic Letter 83-28, Item The inspector reviewed the following documents in which the NRC staff concluded that the licensee has complied with the NRC staff position for this item:
(1)
Combined Inspection Report 50-272/83-13, 50-311/83-19
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Safety Evaluation for Salem Generating Station Units 1 and 2 Generic Letter 83-28 Items 3.1.1,... 4.1... dated March 17, 198.
Natural Circulation Cooldown This issue was addressed in combined Inspection Report 50-272/81-11, 50-311/81-12 which discusses the actual performance of a natural circulation cooldown test which was performed as a license condition for Unit The licensee also experienced a false loss of offsite power which forced the shutdown of all reactor coolant pumps (due to loss of component cooling water).
This event is document in Special Inspection Report 50-311/86-26 and was partially witnessed by the resident inspecto Based on the above and a review of the licensee's procedures and training program the resident inspector concludes that:
Procedures are in place to cooldown the reactor utilizing natural circulation; Operators are trained, on the simulator, to utilize the cooldown procedures; and, Operators have utilized the following procedures during actual conditions of natural circulation and have demonstrated assurance that upper head bubble formation did not occu Also, the operators demonstrated a complete recover.3 Procedures Reviewed EOP-TRIP-1 El-4.15 EI-Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Loss of Component Cooling Blackout No violations were identifie.
Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the course of the inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and finding An exit interview was held with licensee management at the end of the reporting perio The licensee did not identify 2.790 material.