IR 05000269/1987044
| ML16295A299 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 12/03/1987 |
| From: | Bryant J, Peebles T, Skinner P, Wert L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16161A919 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-2.F.2, TASK-TM 50-269-87-44, 50-270-87-44, 50-287-87-44, NUDOCS 8712070144 | |
| Download: ML16295A299 (13) | |
Text
tpg REvo UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 11 101 MARIETTA STREET, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos:
50-269/87-44, 50-270/87-44, 50-287/87-44 Licensee:
Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, N.C. 28242 Facility Name:
Oconee Nuclear Station Docket Nos.:
50-269, 50-270, 50-287 License Nos.:
DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55 Inspection Conducted: Octo er 20, - November 20, 1987 Inspectors:
J. C. tr an 1. T. 'et'aeSge Approved by:
'eA
/iLfe T.A. Peebler, Section Chief Date'Signe Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection involved resident inspection on-site in the areas of operations, surveillance, maintenance, engineered safety features lineups, followup of events, Unit 1 shutdown work in progress, and participation in and observation of the annual dril Results: Of the seven areas inspected, one violation was identified. Violation (270/87-44-01), Failure to document action PDR ADOCK 05O00269 PDR
REPORT DETAILS Licensee Employees Contacted
- M.S. Tuckman, Station Manager T.B. Owen, Maintenance Superintendent R.L. Sweigart, Operations Superintendent L.V. Wilkie, Superintendent Integrated Scheduling J.M. Davis, Technical Services Superintendent C.L. Harlin, Compliance Engineer
- F.E. Owens, Assistant Engineer, Compliance Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and staff engineer Resident Inspectors:
- J.C. Bryant
- P.H. Skinner
- L.D. Wert
- Attended exit intervie.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on November 23, 1987, with those persons indicated in pargraph 1 abov The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (Closed)
Violation (from SSFI inspection), Adequate Procedures Were Not Available to Control Maintenance on Safety Related Motor Operated Valve This violation was also addressed in Unresolved Item 86-16-02, which was closed in Report N,270,287/87-3 The licensees' response has been received and corrective action described in Report No. 87-38. This item is close (Closed)
Violation (from SSFI inspection), Drawings Did Not Specify Proper End Gap for Keowee Batterie This violation was also addressed in Unresolved Item 86-16-13 which is closed in this repor It is also addressed in Report N,270,287/86-2 The licensees' response has been reviewed and corrective action is described in the referenced reports. This item is close c:
(Closed)
Violation 50-287/87-16-01:
Failure to Maintain Two High Pressure Injection Paths Operable When the RCS Was Above 350 degrees Licensee corrective actions have been reviewed and found acceptabl (Closed) Violation 50-287/87-16-02:
Failure to Maintain Two Independent Reactor Building Cooling Units Operable When the RCS Was Above 250 degrees F. Licensee corrective actions have been reviewed and found acceptabl (Closed) Violation 50-269,270,287/87-32-01:
Failure to Provide Storage Access Controls. The licensee has provided locked wire gates in order to provide positive access control and also to maintain adequate ventilation when neede Licensee corrective actions have been reviewed and found acceptabl.
Unresolved Items No unresolved items were identified during this inspectio.
Plant Operations The inspectors reviewed plant operations throughout the reporting period to verify conformance with regulatory requirements, technical specifica tions (TS),
and administrative control Control room logs, shift turnover records, some Unit 1 Block Tagout Log and Outage Shift Reports, and equipment removal and restoration records were reviewed routinel Interviews were conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics and performance personne Activities within the control rooms were monitored on an almost daily basi Inspections were conducted on day and night shifts, and on weekends. Some inspections were made during shift change in order to evaluate shift turnover performanc Actions observed were conducted as required by Operations Management Procedure 2-1, Duties And Responsi bilities Of Reactor Operators And Senior Reactor Operators. The complement of licensed personnel on each shift inspected met or exceeded the requirements of TS. Operators were responsive to plant annunciator alarms and were cognizant of plant condition Plant tours were taken throughout the reporting period on a routine basi The areas toured included the following:
Unit 1 Reactor Building Turbine Building Units 1, and 3 Penetration Rooms Auxiliary Building Units 1, 2, and 3 Electrical Equipment Rooms Units 1, 2, and 3 Cable Spreading Rooms Station Yard Zone within the Protected Area Standby Shutdown Facility Condenser Circulating Water Intake Area
During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, security, equipment status, and radiation control practices were observe Unit 1 remained in an outage status until November 12, when the outage was completed and the unit returned to servic Unit 2 operated at 85% power, limited by "B" steam generator levels, throughout the report perio Unit 3 operated at 100% power throughout the report perio No violations or deviations were identifie.
Surveillance Testing Surveillance tests were reviewed by the inspectors to verify procedural and performance adequacy. The completed tests reviewed were examined for necessary test prerequisites, instructions, acceptance criteria, technical content, authorization to begin work, data collection, independent verification where required, handling of deficiencies noted, and review of completed work. The tests witnessed, in whole or in part, were inspected to determine that approved procedures were available, test equipment was calibrated, prerequisites were met, tests were conducted according to procedure, test results were acceptable and systems restoration was complete Surveillances witnessed in whole or in part:
IP/1/A/200/42 RVLIS Calibration (Unit 1)
IP/2/A/305/3B RPS "B" Online Testing (Unit 2)
PT/1/A/0610/01J Load Shed Test (Unit 1)
PT/1/A/1103/15 Reactivity Balance Procedure (Unit 1 Heatup)
PT/2/A/0251/10 Auxiliary Service Water Pump Performance Test PT/O/A/R16P/04 Containment Hydrogen Control System Piping Flow Test (Performed on Unit 1)
OP/1/A/1104/O1 Core Flood System Operation (Test of Check Valves)
Completed Surveillance Procedures Reviewed:
PT/0/A/015O/O6 Mechanical Penetration Leak Rate Test PT/1/A/0160/(6 Reactor Building Cooling Units Heat Exchanger Performance Test IP/O/A/3001/11 Testing of Limitorque and Rotork Operators Using MOVATS PT/1/A/115/08 Reactor Building Containment Isolation and Verification One violation was identified and is discussed in paragraph 1.
Maintenance Activities Maintenance activities were observed and/or reviewed during the reporting period to verify that the work was performed by qualified personnel and that approved procedures in use adequately described all work that was not within the skill of the trade. Activities, procedures and work requests were examined to verify proper authorization to begin work, provisions for fire, cleanliness and exposure control, proper return of equipment to service, and that limiting conditions for operation were me Some attention was given to scaffolding, rigging, and other general work safety practices due to the extensive work ongoing with the Unit 1 outag Maintenance witnessed in.whole or in part:
WR 53295E Refurbish Limitorque Operator on 1 LP 8 WR 53576F Refurbish Limitorque Operator on 1 HP 417 WR 53298 Refurbish Limitorque Operator on 1 LP 15 WR 54005F Jumper Cell 29 on Battery 2CA No violations or deviations were identifie.
Resident Inspector Safeguards Inspection In the course of the monthly activities, the resident inspectors included a review of the licensee's physical security program. The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities which included; protected and vital areas access controls, searching of personnel, packages and vehicles, badge issuance and retrieval, escorting of visitors, patrols and compensatory post In addition, the resident inspectors observed protected area lighting and protected and vital areas barrier integrity, and verified interfaces between the security organization and operations or maintenanc No violations or deviations were identifie.
Unit 1 End of Cycle 10 Refueling Outage The Unit 1 refueling outage was completed on November 12, 198 Some of the major work performed during this period was chemical cleaning of steam generators, refueling, installing dams in the steam generator (SG) primary side cold legs, low pressure injection and reactor building cooler cleaning, plugging and repair of SG tubes, eddy current testing of SG tubes, overhaul of one low pressure turbine, replacement of the main transformer, and copper cleaning of the main generato Prior to the chemical cleaning of the steam generators, power was reduced to approxi mately 87% with steam generator levels at 90 -
92%.
Subsequent to the chemical cleaning with power at 100%, levels are now 52% and 56%.
The outage was originally scheduled for 65 days, but due to a generator balance problem and a hydrogen seal leak, the outage was extended an additional six day As of November 15, the unit was returned to 100%
powe.
Inspection of Open Items The following Licensee Event Reports and other open items are being closed based on review of licensee reports, inspection, or record review, as appropriate, and discussions with licensee personne (Open)
Deviation 269/86-20-02:
Discrepancy Between FSAR and Installed Seismic Instrumentatio Replacement of instrumentation was not completed as scheduled during the just completed refueling shutdown. The work performed is described in Report N /
87-4 (Closed)
Unresolved Item (269,270,287/85-02-01):
Leak Rate Accep tance Criteria for Individual Containment Isolation Valves. A review of this subject has determined that the licensee has changed PT/1,2,3/A/0150/06, Mechanical Penetration Leak Rate Test,to provide evaluation criteria for large leaks, trending information, documen tation of leakage evaluation and management review. of any failed component. The resident inspector discussed the licensee's procedure with region based personnel and, based on this discussion, the questions were addressed and no additional questions were identifie Based on this discussion and review, this item is close (Closed) IFI 50-269,270,287/87-35-01:
Clarification of Liquid Penetrant Procedure. The clarifications identified in this item-were made to DPC procedure NDE-35, Liquid Penetrant Examination, in a revision dated October 20, 198 This revision was discussed with regional based inspectors and based on that discussion, this item is close (Closed) LER 50-287/87-03:
Failure to Sample Isolated Gaseous Waste Tank Due to Personnel Error. Corrective actions have been examined and found to be satisfactor.
Safety System Functional Inspection Report Items left open on the referenced inspection report (50-269,270,287/86-16)
were reviewed to determine current status, as follows: (Closed)
URI 86-16-04 (Item 3.2.3):
Undesignated and Uncontrolled Valves in Backup Nitrogen Syste The SSFI inspectors found that some valves in the backup nitrogen system for valves MS 87, FDW 315 and FDW 316 were undesignated and uncontrolled. The licensee agreed that some of the valves were not
designated or identified by number since the nitrogen system was considered to be a backup to the air system which had its own backup air system. Drawings of the system with identified valves are now being prepare An SSFI team member stated that a valve had been removed from the system between May 21 and June 2, 1987, and that there was no record of the remova Licensee personnel acknowledged that there was no record of removal but stated, also, that no one acknowledged having removed a valve. Those familiar with the system also stated that, to their knowledge, there had never been a valve in the position described by the inspector. There does not appear to be any point in pursing this issue further. This item is close (Closed) URI 50-269,270,287/86-16-05 (Item 3.2.4):
Procedural Weaknesses Regarding the EFW Syste The inspectors have reviewed the licensees' response, EP/*/1800/01,
"Emergency Operating Proce dure" and other referenced procedures with the following observa tion Items:
(1) The inspectors concur with the response in that unnecessary or upon the first indication of a major steam line rupture is not desirabl (2) The inspectors reviewed OP/2/A/1106/06 Enclosure 3.11, Operational Guidelines for Correcting High EFDW Flo If FDW 315 or 316 fail open, operators are instructed to secure the TDEFWP, close the discharge valve on the affected MDEFWP (FDW 372 or 382) or trip the affected MOEFWP. The operator is then instructed to have FDW 315 or 316 manually throttled and then to reopen FDW 372 or 382 or restart the MDEFW (3) Reviewed OEE-16, "Starting Recommendations - 4000 Volt Motors" and verified guidance on MDEFWP's is include (4) OP/2/A/1106/06, Enclosure 3.4, Step 2.8 contains the statement that MDEFWP suction must be established before the hotwell level is decreased beyond
inches, but once started it can pump the hotwell down to about 12 inche The inspectors concur with the licensee's actions and con clusion This item is close (Closed) URI 50-269,270,287/86-16-07 (Item 3.3.2):
Testing of Check Valves MS 83 and MS 8 The licensee's response of October 1, 1986, states that testing of these check valves in the backflow direction is not required by ASME Section 11 and that the testing program is in full
compliance with ASME Section 1 The SSFI team's concern for proper operation of these valves was based, in part, on concern for proper operation of the related motor operated valves (MOV's)
due to the described inadequacies of maintenance of the MOV's. The MOV refurbishment program which should alleviate those concerns is described in Report N,270,287/87-3 Due to the SSFI team's concerns, during the Unit 3 refueling shutdown in early 1987, valves MS 83 and MS 85 were inspected. This work is described in report N,270,287/87-0 Since these 6 inch valves are not flanged, it was necessary to cut them out of the lines for examinatio The valves were found to be completely operational with no threatening defects detected, although there was some steam scoring of the valve seats and discs. The valves were examined by liquid penetrant, the seats were lapped and new discs installe The resident inspectors witnessed portions of this wor The reference report stated that MS 83 and MS 85 would also be examined on Units 1 and 2. However, due to the as found conditions of Unit 3 MS 83 and MS 85, the difficulty in removing and replacing the valves, and the need for obtaining Code relief on testing the steam line after the valves were replaced, the licensee has cancelled plans for Units 1 and 2 valve The licensee is considering other options but has made no commitments, nor are any required. This item is close (Closed)
URI 50-269,270,287/86-16-08 (Item 3.3.3):
Testing of Check Valves 2C-568 and 3C-568. The licensee response to this item was provided in the letter of December 16, 198 The referenced valves had not been tested due to the potential for severe damage to the motor driven emergency feedwater pumps prior to extension of pump suction piping in the hotwell The modifications have now been completed, as verified by the inspector The residents also reviewed tests TT/1/A/0600/01,02, and 03, Motor Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump Refueling Tes The flowpath utilized tested performance of the referenced check valves following installation of NSM 12493 on Units 1, 2 and 3. This item is close (Closed) URI 50-269,270,287/86-16-09 (Item 3.3.5):
Post-Modification and Periodic Testing for Nitrogen System Procedure IP/0/A/275/5W for valves FDW 315 and FDW 316; IP/0/B/270/IT for valves MS-126 and MS-129; and IP/0/B/2705E for valve MS-87 were changed to include functional verification on every refueling shutdown hereafter for each unit and standing work requests to accomplish this have been incorporated into the syste The procedures require functional verification that these valves will perform correctly on the nitrogen system with instrument air completely isolate The procedures also require independent verification of proper lineup upon completion of testing. These tests have been satisfactorily performed on all three units. This item is close (Closed)
URI 50-269,270,287/86-16-10 (Item 3.3.6):
Testing of the Standby Shutdown Facility. The licensee's response of 10/1/86 states that a problem was found with calibrations which, when corrected, showed the system to be operable despite low pressure service water (LPSW)
problem A resident inspector followup in November 1986 noted that problems with LPSW flow through HVAC units were continuing despite maintenance efforts to correct the situatio HVAC performance was again inspected in June of 198 With an ambient temperature of 90 degrees F, inside temperatures were well below the required action temperature of 78 degrees LPSW flow is controlled by a device used to sense the refrigerant condensing pressure in the Carrier condense After considerable work to determine the cause of inadequate LPSW flow, maintenance found the apparent cause to be the pressure sensor and LPSW valve positioning uni The control systems have now been rebuilt, resulting in considerably improved performance. This item is close (Closed) URI 50-269,270,287/86-16-11 (Item 3.3.7): Auxiliary Service Water (ASW)
Pump Testin The 'licensee's response of October 1, 1986, describes how the ASW system would be called upon for decay heat removal only after the loss of six other system It states also that in January and March 1978 NRC granted a ten year relief permitting routine testing of the ASW pump without measuring suction pressure, discharge pressure, or flo Another letter of March 25, 1982, grants relief, specifically, from the requirements to measure flow and pressure based on the fact that the ASW pump would be called upon only after concurrent loss of the main feedwater system, the auxiliary feedwater system and the decay heat removal syste The licensee has requested the relief be extended for an additional ten year period. A response has not yet been received. Based on the low probability of use of this pump and the fact that the licensee, at the time of the inspection and currently is operating within NRC regulations, this item is closed. Should the relief not be granted, action will be required of the license (Closed) URI 50-269,270,287/86-16-12 (Item 3.3.8):
Surveillance Testing of Batteries. Instrument Procedure (IP)/0/A/3000/5 for the 230KV switchyard batteries and IP/0/A/3000/3 for instrument and control batteries annual discharge test have been modified to use the load profile provided in the Technical Specification Procedure IP/0/A/400/11 for Keowee batteries is presently being rewritten to incorporate the load profile given in the Tech Spec This rewrite will be completed prior to the next load test of the Keowee bat terie This item is close i. (Closed)
URI 50-269,270,287/86-16-13:
Seismic Design and Instal lation of Safety Related Equipmen Part (1)
This item concerned a violation due to omission of spacer material from installed Keowee battery rack end gap The physical discrepancy was corrected by the licensee on the day it was identified by the SSFI tea The cause of the discrepant condition is described in Report N,
270,287/86-2 Corrected drawings which would have the violation had been received at the site, but the change requiring the spacer material was not note The inspectors have reviewed the licensee's corrective action to improve communications between Design Engineering and the Oconee sit These improvements should preclude further events of the nature. This item is close Part (2) The SSFI team could not find information to confirm seismic acceptability of the interstep connection between end cells of the Keowee instrument and control (I&C)
batterie The licensee reviewed the existing seismic qualification data for the I&C batteries and determined that the interstep connection was included in the seismic test of the batteries. This item is close j. (Closed)
URI 50-269,270,287/86-16-14, (Item 3.4.3):
Runout Protec tion for EFW Pumps. This item is also the subject of a violation cited in the referenced repor Since the unresolved item will be resolved when the violation is resolved, this item will be closed to avoid having two open items on the same subjec (Closed)
URI 50-269,270,287/86-16-16, (Item 3.4.6):
Backup Nitrogen Supply Systems. The nitrogen supply for each unit has been modified to add a second bottle and regulator in the system. Design calcula tions have been made to determine the amount needed to maintain a constant two hour supply: which confirmed the need to be one bottle (2 cu.ft.) at 2000 psig or two bottles at 1000 psi Bottles are delivered at 2400 psig. Procedural changes have been made to require changeout of any bottle when pressure decreases below 1000 psi This assures that a two hour supply is always at hand. This item is close.
(Closed)
URI 50-269,270,287/86-16-23, (Item 3.4.14):
Temporary Lead Shielding. The licensee's response of December 16, 1986, describes actions taken which revised procedural requirements and documenta tio It also addresses the causes of excessive lead blankets identified by the SSFI tea Corrective actions appear to be adequate. This item is close (Closed)
Item 3.2.2(2) Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve Though not listed as an Unresolved Item, the SSFI team expressed concern about the reactor operators' ability to operate the atmospheric steam dump
valve This concern is expressed in the SSFI report in items 2.1.1(2) and 3.2.2(2).
The licensee's response of October 1, 1986, to Item 2.1.1(2) describes the station modification to the atmo spheric dump valves then in progress but not yet physically installed on Units 1 and The modification has now been completed on all three unit The modification installed a pressure equalizing line bypassing the first isolation valve and a flow control valve bypassing the second isolation valve. Operators testing the new valves have reported them to be very easy to operate. Performance personnel have developed a stroke test procedure which has been added to periodic test require ments for testing during refueling outages. Operations has developed procedures for testing at full pressure during refueling outage This item is close.
Correct Component Verification During the inspection period the inspectors observed two instances in which the correct component verification required by Station Directive 3.2.1, Work Requests, to be performed and documented on all work requests had not been properly documente On October 16, 1987, Instrument and Electrical Technicians replaced a component in the Control Rod Drive Group Five Regulated Power Supply (Unit 2) and failed to document component verification until the job was nearly completed. Although the inspector observing the work did not note a deliberate completion of this verification, the technicians stated that they had made the verification earlier but failed to sign the work request documenting their actions. Although this is a violation of the licensee's directives, the maintenance was not directly safety related and was not specifically cited by the inspector On October 29, 1987, Instrument and Electrical technicians restarted Procedure IP/2/A/305/3B, Reactor Protection System Channel "B" Calibration and Functional Test, after a delay from October 27, 1987, without documenting correct component verification. The technicians stated that they had made the verification but failed to document their action The inspectors consider that the verifications were made but not properly documented. Particularly at this three unit station, this verification and its documentation enhance safety by helping to ensure that workers are on the correct unit, system or component before work is commence The latter example involved safety related testin Failure to document completion of the verification is a violatio (Violation 270/87-44-01, Failure to document actions).
1 NUREG 0737: II.F.2 Instrumentation for Detection of Inadequate Core Cooling
On November 4, 1987, the licensee contacted the resident inspector to discuss operability of the reactor vessel level indicating system (RVLIS)
portion of the inadequate core cooling (ICC) instrumentation system. The licensee stated that after extensive effort by their personnel, assisted by a Westinghouse representative, the RVLIS system could not be calibrated due to instrumentation reliability and desig Since this system is not addressed by Technical Specifications at this time and all other sections of ICC were functioning properly, the licensee's intent was to declare RVLIS out of service and continue their recovery from the outag A review by the resident inspectors verified that the RVLIS system has not yet been incorporated into the emergency procedures, thus the system would not be utilized for emergency or normal operation This problem was discussed between regional management and the resident inspecto Since DPC had previously notified the NRC, in a letter dated July 2, 1987, that RVLIS was installed, calibrated, and performs in accordance with the design expectations, the licensee will be notifying the NRC that the system is not functioning as previously discussed and will address actions that will be taken to correct this syste.
Confirmatory Order Concerning Reactor Building and Decay Heat Removal Coolers Problems caused by fouling of reactor building cooling units (RBCU)
and low pressure injection (LPI or decay heat removal) coolers and lake water temperatures have been a subject in several reports in 1987, including Report No,
270, 287/87-13, 17, 25, 29 and 3 NRC Confirmatory Orders of April 10, 1987 and August 6, 1987, placed restrictions of Operation on Oconee Unit The orders required that Unit 1 not be operated at any power level after cycle 10 until LPI and RBCU coolers had been cleaned and tested and had been approved for full power operation by Region I The licensee cleaned and tested the coolers during the EOC 10 refueling shutdown. The licensee determined that Unit 1 could be safely operated at power levels up to 100% with Lake Keowee water at temperatures up to 85 degrees Region II personnel witnessed cleaning and testing and reviewed the finding On November 5, 1987, Region II lifted the restrictions imposed by the Confirmatory Orde Original calculations on operability had considered water temperatures of 75 degrees; however, it was determined subsequently that lake temperatures have reached temperatures of almost 82 degrees F. The recent testing and calculations determined that the plant can operate safely at the higher temperature.
Degradation of Emergency Power Switching Logic for Units 2 and 3 On October 28, the licensee reported that a violation of Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.2(b) had occurre The licensee had removed the Standby Bus, which is an alternate source of power during certain
postulated emergencies, from service in order to perform testin This process included the removal of various control power fuses and opening of feeders circuit breakers associated with the Emergency Power Switching Logic (EPSL) as prerequisites to the tes While the plant was in this lineup, a roving watchstander on Unit 2 noted that an EPSL panel did not have its required configuration and reported this to the Shift Supervisor (SS).
Upon investigation the SS identified that the system was in a degraded condition. He took immediate actions to secure the test and return the EPSL system to an operable statu The licensee reported this occurrence in accordance with TS 3.7.9 in a letter dated November 2, 1987, and will submit a Licensee Event Report upon completion of a more detailed investigation of this inciden The safety evaluation conducted by the licensee indicated there was no significance with respect to its effect on the health and safety of the public. The resident inspectors are monitoring the licensee's efforts and will review in detail the results of the licensee's investigation.