IR 05000269/1987048
| ML16161A942 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 01/04/1988 |
| From: | Bryant J, Peebles T, Skinner P, Wert L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16161A941 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-87-48, 50-270-87-48, 50-287-87-48, IEB-87-002, IEB-87-2, NUDOCS 8801150120 | |
| Download: ML16161A942 (10) | |
Text
REGZ UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 JAN05 9 Report Nos.:
50-269/87-48, 50-270/87-48, and 50-287/87-48 Licensee:
Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Docket Nos.: 50-269, 50-270, License Nos.: DPR-38, DPR-47, and and 50-287 DPR-55 Facility Name:
Oconee 1, 2, and 3 Inspection Conducted:
November 21 -
December 21, 1987 Inspectors:
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y t Senio Resident Inspector t alU Signed i n Senio Resident Inspector lia/
Signed L.. Iert, Residen Inspector a t, S Tgend Approved by:
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T. A. Peebl's, Se 'iton Chief Dhte Signed Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope: This routine, announced inspection involved resident inspection on-site in the areas of operations, surveillance, maintenance, physical security, review of Safety System Functional Inspection Items, engineered safeguards features lineups, Emergency Condenser Circulating Water Systems, and Bulletin 87-02 action Results:
Of the eight areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie III15012O 880105 PDiR AtIO)CK 050o0269 ci pet'
REPORT DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- M. Tuckman, Station Manager J. Davis, Technical Services Superintendent W. Foster, Maintenance Superintendent
- T. Glenn, Instrument and Electrical Support Engineer C. Harlin, Compliance Engineer F. Owens, Assistant Engineer, Compliance
- R. Sweigart, Operations Superintendent Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and staff engineer NRC Resident Inspectors:
J.C. Bryant
- P.H. Skinner
- L.D. Wert
- Attended exit intervie.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on December 21, 1987, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 abov The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed below. Dissenting comments were not received from the license Proprietary information is not contained in this repor Item Number Status Description/Reference Paragraph 269, 270, 287/86-16-14 Closed Violation -
Runout protection for Emergency Feedwater Pumps, Violation withdrawn by NRC. (paragraph 10)
269/87-48-02 Open
- URI -
Containment Isolation Valve Open, unresolved until completion of licensee investigation, resident inspector review. (paragraph 4)
- Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or deviation, 270, 287/87-16-18 Open URI
-
Potential for motor driven emergency feedwater pump runou Pending installation of cavitating venturis as nuclear station modification. (paragraph 10)
269, 270, 287/87-48-01 Open'
IFI -
Correction of potential loss of siphon effect on Emergency Condenser Cooling Water System, Followup on adequacy of temporary corrective actions and permanent repair (paragraph 12)
269, 270, 287/87-02-05 Closed IFI -
Ruskin Fire Dampers, completed review of required training (paragraph 9c)
287/87-48-03 Open Licensee Identified Violation (LIV)
Failure to maintain required number of Engineered Safeguards Digital Channels in service. (paragraph 11)
P2187-01 Closed Misoperation of Brown Boveri ITE-50-D Overcurrent Relay Relay replacement completed. (paragraph 9a)
P2186-02 Closed Brown Boveri Circuit Breakers Wire Harness corrective action complete (paragraph 9a)
3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters Not inspecte. Unresolved Items (92701) Unit I Containment Isolation Valve Open On December 19, 1987, the licensee reported that containment isolation valve 1N-106 had been discovered ope This valve is a 1 inch manual valve. This system is used to blanket various reactor coolant system components with nitrogen. The licensee immediately shut 1N-106 and made a reactor building (RB)
entry and confirmed that valves upstream of 1N-106 were positioned to ensure there was not an open flowpath from inside containment to the outsid Additionally 1N-246, a check valve just inside the RB was checked and appears to be functioning properly. Initial information indicates that valve 1N-106 was opened on November 19, 1987, and remained opened until December 1 The licensee is continuing its investigatio This item will be identified as an Unresolved Item URI-269/87-48-02:
Containment Isolation valve 1N-106 open pending completion of licensee investigation and subsequent review by the resident inspector. Plant Operations (71707)
The inspectors reviewed plant operations throughout the reporting period to verify conformance with regulatory requirements, technical specifications (TS),
and administrative control Control room logs, shift turnover records, and equipment removal and restoration records were reviewed routinel Discussions were conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics, Instrument & Electrical (I&E), and performance personne Activities within the control rooms were monitored on an almost daily basis. Inspections were conducted on day and on night shifts, during week days and on weekends. Some inspections were made during shift change in order to evaluate shift turnover performanc Actions observed were conducted as required by Licensees Administrative Procedure The complement of licensed personnel on each shift inspected met or exceeded the requirements of TS. Operators were responsive to plant annunciator alarms and were cognizant of plant condition Plant tours were taken throughout the reporting period on a routine basi The areas toured included the following:
Turbine Building Auxiliary Building Units 1, 2, and 3 Electrical Equipment Rooms Units 1, 2, and 3 Cable Spreading Rooms Station Yard Zone within the Protected Area Standby Shutdown Facility Units 1, 2, and 3 Penetration Rooms During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, security, equipment status, and radiation control practices were observe Unit 1 operated at 100% power throughout the report perio Unit 2 Operated at 85% power, limited by "B" steam generator levels throughout the report perio Unit 3 operated at 100% power throughout the report period with the exception of a four hour period on December 18 when power was reduced to 93% to correct a feedwater control proble No violations or deviations were identifie.
Surveillance Testing (61726)
Surveillance tests were reviewed by the inspectors to verify procedural and performance adequacy. The completed tests reviewed were examined for necessary test prerequisites, instructions, acceptance criteria, technical content, authorization to begin work, data collection, independent verification where required, handling of deficiencies noted, and review of completed work. The tests witnessed, in whole or in part, were inspected to determine that approved procedures were available, test equipment was calibrated, prerequisities were met, tests were conducted according to procedure, test results were acceptable and systems restoration was complete PT/3/A/402/07 Reactor Building Spray System Performance Test (Unit 3)
PT/2/A/202/11 High Pressure Injection System Pump Performance Test (Unit 2)
IP/0/A/310/14B Engineered Safeguards System Analog Channel B Calibration (Unit 3)
IP/0/A/310/13A Engineered Safeguards System Digital Channel 2 Calibration (Unit 3)
IP/0/A/075/05 Preinstallation Checks of ES Module (Trip Logic Module Digital Channel 2) (Unit 3)
No violations or deviations were identifie.
Maintenance Activities (62703)
Maintenance activities were observed and/or reviewed during the reporting period to verify that work was performed by qualified personnel and that approved procedures in use adequately described work that was not within the skill of the trad Activities, procedures and work requests were examined to verify proper authorization to begin work, provisions for fire, cleanliness, and exposure control, proper return of equipment to service, and that limiting conditions for operation were me WR 10690C Low Pressure Nitrogen Heater Repairs WR 50886C Unit 3 Engineered Safeguards Digital Channel 2 Repairs WR 52876F Brown Boveri Overcurrent Relay Replacement No violations or deviations were identifie.
Resident Inspector Safeguards Inspection (71881)
In the course of the monthly activities, the Resident Inspectors included a review of portions of the licensee's physical security activities. The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities which included: protected and vital areas access controls; searching of personnel, packages and vehicles; badge issuance and retrieval; escorting of visitors; patrols and compensatory
S
.
post In addition, the inspectors observed protected area lighting and protected and vital areas barrier integrity, and verified interfaces between the security organization and operations or maintenanc The inspectors observed a significant increase in attention to individual security badge verification this report perio No violations or deviations were identifie.
Inspection of Open Items (92701)
The following open items are being closed based on review of licensee reports, inspection, record review, and discussions with licensee personnel, as appropriate:
a. (Closed) P2187-01:
Misoperation of BBC Brown Boveri ITE-50-D Overcurrent Relay Due to High Leakage Rate of RCA Type 40319 Transistor (EERCRS-8705417). By letter of July 6, 1987, the licensee states that the subject relay replacement was completed on May 4, 1987, by ONS Work Request - 52876 (Closed) P2186-02:
BBC Brown Boveri K600/K800 Circuit Breakers Wire Harness -
Packing Gear in Contact With Wire Harness Causing Wear. In 1981 DPC received a similar warning resulting in an inspection of all K600/K800 circuit breakers at Oconee and Keowe Some damage was discovered and repaire All wiring problems were corrected to preclude further damage. Routine inspections of this gear have been performed since that date but no further problems have been detecte (Closed) Inspection Followup Item (50-269, 270, 287/87-02-05):
Review Licensee's Part 21 Reevaluation on Ruskin Fire Damper The licensee has completed the training for fire protection personnel which included a discussion of fire dampers and potential of failure for these devices. Based on this action, this item is close.
Safety System Functional Inspection Report (92701)
Items left open on the referenced inspection report (50-269, 270, 287/86-16) were reviewed to determine current status, as follows:
a. (Closed)
Violation 50-269, 270, 287/86-16-14 (Item 3.4.3):
Runout Protection for EFW Pump This violation was withdrawn by letter from NRC dated December 15, 198 Final modifications to be completed are kept open by UNR 50-269,270,287/86-16-17(1) belo (Open)
URI 50-269, 270, 287/86-16-17 (Item 3.4.7):
Design Analyses Not Performed. This item contained five parts of which three are treated separately belo (1) (Open)
Potential for motor driven emergency feedwater pump runou The licensee has initiated nuclear station modifications (12684, 22684 and 32684)
to install cavitation
venturis in the the pump discharge lines to prevent runou These modifications which will be installed during refueling outages will all be completed by about March 199 (2) (Closed)
The standby shutdown facility auxiliary service water pump total discharge head calculation was completed and approved on December 8, 198 (3) (Closed)
Motor driven emergency feedwater pump capability to supply any unit's steam generators was verified by calculation on July 28, 198.
Engineered Safeguards Features (ESF) Digital Channel 2 Inoperable (71707, 61726) Unit 3 On December 3, 1987, while performing the ESF System Analog Channel B On Line Calibration Procedure IP/O/A/310/14B on Unit 3, the Instrument and Electrical (I&E)
technician observed that some indicating lights on the Digital Channel 2 cabinet did not respond as he expecte These observations were not specifically directed as part of the procedure that was being performed. Specifically lamp DS5 on Digital Channel 2 Trip Logic Module did not come on and the Analog B lamp on the Digital Channel 2 indicating panel did not go brigh The technician, suspecting that these indications were not proper under the test conditions, informed an I&E supervisor of his observation. The supervisor (an acting supervisor in this position) requested the technician further review the applicable technical drawings and initiate a work request for further investigatio This work request was not initiated until December 7. I&E Engineering on that date determined that Digital Channel 2 was in fact inoperable in that it would not respond to all Analog Channel B inputs as require The problem was traced to an intermittent switch contact problem in the digital channel's Trip Logic Module. Apparently some contacts in one of the wafers of a rotary test switch in the module had failed causing a loss of continuity from Analog Channel B to Digital Channel This resulted in Digital Channel 2 (which supplies initiating signals to one HPI train and other ESF components)
being inoperable, in that, if either the combination of Analog Channels A and B or B and C tripped, a trip of the digital channel would not result as require The Trip Logic Module was replaced and retested successfully within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of being declared inoperable. The other ESF digital channels on all units were tested and it was verified that similar problems were not present. The I&E department will be changing the procedure to include a check of digital channel functioning during analog channel testin In the past, on line testing of the analog and digital channel had been performed separately without verification of continuity between the channels during analog testin The procedure revision would confirm continuity from the analog channel through the Trip Logic Module switch to the digital channel after the functioning of the switch had been tested
7 and it had been repositioned to its normal position during earlier testing of the digital channe In the interim, I&E technicians have been directed to observe proper operation of the indicating lights on the digital cabinet during analog channel testin The inspectors expressed concern to licensee management regarding the significant amount of elapsed time between initial discovery of a possible problem and final determination of inoperabilit The alertness of the I&E technician performing the Analog B testing provided an excellent opportunity for early detection of a potentially serious problem but followup action on both his and the supervisors part was poo An additional concern is that no communications were held between the I&E Department and Operations personnel on the potential problem until December 7, four days after the initial concer Table 3.5.1-1 of the Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specifications (TS)
requires both digital channels of the ESF system to be operable or the unit placed in hot shutdown within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. While Digital Channel 2 was out of service for less than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> after being declared inoperable, it was apparently inoperable for over 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> before being restored to operation. A major portion of the inoperable period was not spent in diligent pursuit of an operability resolutio The licensee is continuing to investigate the proble The apparent violation of TS Table 3.5.1-1 appears to meet the criteria of 10CFR2 Appendix C concerning Licensee Identified Violations, therefore it will be cited as suc (LIV 50-287/87-48-01 Failure to Maintain the Required Number of ESF Digital Channels in Service.)
This LIV will remain open until the licensee completes his investigation and the inspectors have verified that the licensee has successfully taken corrective actions to minimize the likelihood of a similar situatio.
Emergency Condenser Circulating Water (ECCW) System (71707)
IE Reports No. 50-269, 270, 287/86-26 and 33 discuss an event in which it was discovered that flow of condenser circulating water (CCW) could not be maintained, in the event of loss of all power to CCW pumps, by siphon flow to the Keowee tailrace as described in the FSAR. The cause was due to air inleakage through an unbolted (by design) flange in the CCW suction line This line in actuality is a discharge line from the pump impeller, but becomes a suction line during siphon flo To correct this situation, the flange was sealed by enclosing it in a rubber boot. To prevent blowout of the boot under pump discharge pressure acting on water leaking into the boot area from the flange, twelve pressure equalization lines were installed leading from the enclosure discharging 20 feet under wate The pressure equalization lines are composed of a 2" nipple connected to the boot retainer, a quick disconnect fitting, a 2" pipe coupling, and threaded 2" aluminum condui Full pond elevation of Lake Keowee is 800 ft. above sea leve The flange is at 791 ft., and the quick disconnects about 789 f There is no problem in obtaining siphon flow if the level is above the flange, nor at lower levels if the boot and pressure equalization lines are intact. The minimum allowable lake level for Oconee operation is 775 ft. On or about December 6, 1987, for the first time since early 1987, Keowee level dropped to about 789 f On December 7 the licensee inspected the boot and equalization lines of the 12 CCW pumps and found that 5 of the 144 lines had faile The failure mode of two lines was breaking off of the line at the coupling just below the quick disconnec The other three lines had apparently unscrewed themselves from the couplin How the aluminum conduit could have unscrewed is not known, since the configuration included restraints which would seemingly make this impossibl Possibly, these three were never properly connecte The licensee has committed to the following corrective action For the short term, operating emergency procedures will be modified to require immediate inspection of the pressure equalization lines in the event of loss of CCW power on one or more units, with provisions on hand at the CCW pumps area for rapid sealing of any broken condui Also, monthly inspections of the boot and drains will be performed until a permanent fix 0 is provided. These actions will only be needed or required when Keowee level is below 791 f On December 16 the level was 792.7 fee For a permanent fix, the licensee has proposed a flexible connector from the pipe coupling, around a lower pipe flange, and then connected to conduit firmly attached to the pump suction lin This should eliminate much of the vibration at the coupling caused by turbulence in the suction wel It is proposed that this fix will be completed within a few months, beginning with the Unit 2 refueling outage scheduled for early February 198 The resident inspectors have reviewed closely these proposals and have no problem with the Also, the inspectors have reviewed Technical Specifications, emergency procedures, and the FSAR to determine requirements. It was concluded that if emergency procedures are followed the plant can survive a blackout without serious consequence The FSAR describes the ECCW system as available and thus requires the system to be operable. This is identified as an inspector followup item (IFI 50-269, 270, 287/87-48-01): Correction of potential loss of siphon effect on emergency condenser cooling water syste.
Bulletin 87-02 Fastener Testing (92701)
The inspectors reviewed the bulletin and the applicable Temporary Instruction (TI)(2500/26) in detail and with the assistance of a Region II inspector, participated in the licensee's selection of fasteners to be teste p
.
A licensee supplied printout of all fasteners utilized onsite was reviewed by the inspectors to ensure that selection was roughly in proportion to in-plant use of the material specifications listed in TI 2500/2 Utilizing an initial selection listing of fasteners developed by the licensee, the inspectors visually inspected fasteners in on-site warehouses and modified the initial selection in accordance with the TI and 87-02. The inspectors did find some fasteners that were not labeled as required in the ASTM specifications and these were included in the final selectio Additionally the inspectors ensured that some nuts manufactured to A-194 and A-563 standards and that some fasteners with the particular manufacturer's markings listed in the TI were selecte A total of eleven different manufacturers were included in the samples. Of the initial licensee proposed listing of twenty samples, six were replaced with fasteners that the inspectors indicated an interest in including in the selectio The inspectors reviewed the following maintenance/warehousing and receipt procedures for the issue and control of fasteners; Quality Control Procedure (QCG-1) "Receipt, Inspection and Control of QA condition material, parts and components except nuclear fuel" Oconee Nuclear Station Materials Manual; Section 4.4 "Material Receiving, Issue of stock and nonstock safety-related materials" Section 4.6 "Issue of Nonsafety Related or ATWS Materials" Section 4.7 "Marking of QA Material" In accordance with TI 2500/26 the licensee's response to Bulletin 87-02 will be reviewed by the inspector when it is submitted for comparison with the above procedures and completeness of further actions required by Bulletin 87-0 No violations or deviations were identified.