IR 05000269/1987049
| ML16298A115 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 03/02/1988 |
| From: | Reyes L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Tucker H DUKE POWER CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8803150348 | |
| Download: ML16298A115 (6) | |
Text
Du~
Power Company ArN:
Mr. H. B. Tucker, Vice President Nuclear Production Department 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Gentlemen:
SUBJECT:
REPORT NOS. 50-269/87-49, 50-270/87-49 AND 50-287/87-49 Thank you for your response of January 28, 1988, to our Notice of Violation issued on December 29, 1987, concerning activities conducted at your Oconee facility. We have evaluated your response and found that it meets the require ments of 10 CFR 2.20 We will examine the implementation of your corrective actions during future inspection Regarding your comments on the term "containment integrity", we agree that use of the term in the context of the violation was inappropriat Our records will be revised to delete the use of this term. Enclosed are revised copies of the Notice of Violation and appropriate pages from the inspection report to update your record We appreciate your cooperation in this matte
Sincerely, Luis A. Reyes, Director Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosures:
1. Revised Notice of Violation 2. NRC Inspection Report Revised Pages
REGION II==
o 101 MARIETTA STREET, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-269/87-49, 50-270/87-49, and 50-287/87-49 Licensee:
Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Docket Nos.: 50-269, 50-270, License Nos.: DPR-38, DPR-47, and and 50-287 DPR-55 Facility Name:
Oconee 1, 2, and 3 Inspection Conducted:
November 20 -
December 7, 1987 Inspectors:
cL-t7
J. C. Br ant, Dafe Signed T. A.< Pebeeto Chieff
1987Z P.~
Date Signed Date Signe L. D. We'st Date Signed Approved by:
12-12--
T. A. Peebles, Section Chief Date Signed Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope:
This special, unannounced inspection involved resident inspector inspection in the area of containment isolation during refueling operation Results:
In the area inspected, one violation was identifie REPORT DETAILS 1. Licensee Employees Contacted:
- M. S. Tuckman, Station Manager R. L. Sweigart, Operations Superintendent C. L. Harlin, Compliance Engineer
- F. E. Owens, Assistant Engineer, Compliance Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, mechanics and staff engineer Resident Inspectors
- J. C. Bryant P. H. Skinner L. D. Wert
- Attended exit intervie.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on December 7, 1987, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 abov The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio The following new item was identified:
Violation 269,270,287/87-49-01:
Failure to Maintain Containment Isolation During Refueling Operation.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters Not inspecte.
Unresolved Items Not inspecte.
Loss of Containment Isolation During Refueling Operations On October 12, 1987, during reinsertion of fuel into the Unit 1 reactor, the licensee notified the resident inspectors that air inleakage had been detected at the containment emergency hatch through installed temporary seals. Refueling operations had been stopped until the situation was corrected. An investigation of the event was begun by the licensee and findings of the investigation are provided in detail in Licensee Event Report 50-269/87-08 which was issued November 25, 198 the sleeves had been foamed from inside the airlock through the inner hatch toward the inside of the containment buildin To do this, the workmen had to crawl through the 30 inch diameter outer hatch and around the cables and piping passing through i The designer recognized that during this particular outage with the addition of two large pipes for chemical cleaning, it would be impossible for the workmen to crawl through the outer opening to reach the inner hatch. His intent was that the foaming be done into the sleeves from inside the containment building. He had taken pictures of the seal plate with sleeves and labeled them as taken from inside the reactor building to indicate how the foam should be introduce He was not aware that CMD preferred to avoid taking the foam machine into a contaminated are The P&SC was aware that the foam machine would not be taken into containment, but was not aware that, with the additional piping, workers could not enter the air lock from the yard area in order to foam in the same manner as in the pas The CMD lead man believed he should not take the foam machine inside containment, was told to foam from the outside, and did it in the only manner he was possible. Reaching into the lock through the outer hatch, he constructed two forms around the cables and pipes and foamed in between. The work was done with the general foaming procedure, but without the work package and procedure on hand; however, the general procedure was of little value for this particular jo Results of Loss of Containment Isolation There was no release of activity to the environmen As purge normally is maintained during refueling activities, which maintains a slight negative pressure in containment. Also, there was no dropped fuel or other occurrence which released unusual activity during any of the four periods mentioned when integrity was not maintaine LER 50-269/87-08 describes the FSAR analysis of fuel handling accident This analysis shows that had a fuel handling accident occurred at the time, the consequences would be bounded by the analysis and that doses at the site boundary would have remained below the limits of 10 CFR 10 This is Violation 269,270,287/87-49-01:
Failure to Maintain Containment Isolation During Refueling Operations.