IR 05000269/1987021
| ML15244A256 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 06/03/1987 |
| From: | Grace J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Tucker H DUKE POWER CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8706110223 | |
| Download: ML15244A256 (22) | |
Text
REQULATORINFORMATION DISTRIBUTION *TEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR:8706110223 DOC.DATE: S7/06/03 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
FACIL:50-269 Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Duke Power C Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 2, Duke Power C Oconee Nuclear Station! Unit 3, Duke Power C AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION GRACE Region 2, Office of Director RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION TUCKER Duke Power C SUBJECT: Forwards summary of 870513 enforcement conference w/util in Region II ofc re sequence of events per Unit 3 heatup u/both trains of HPI inoperable & both trains of reactor bldg cooling. units inoperable & corrective actions to be take DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE45D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR I ENCL SIZE:_c TITLE: Summary of Significant Meeting with Licensee NOTES:AEDD/Ornstein:1c AEOD/Ornstein:lc AEOD/Ornstein:1c RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENcL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD2-3 LA
0 PASTIS,H
1 INTERNAL: AEOD/DOA
1 AEOD/DSP/TPAB
1 DEDRO
1 NRR/DLPG/GAB
1 NRR/DREP/EPB
1
.RR-7PMAS ILRB
1 OCC/ROED
1 REO FILE
1
RGN2 FILE 01
1 EXTERNAL: LPDR
1 NRC PDR
1 NSIC
1 NOTES:
1 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTIR
ENCL
Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, 50-287 License Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47, DPR-55 Duke Power Company ATTN:
Mr. H. B. Tucker, Vice President Nuclear Production Department 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Gentlemen:
SUBJECT: MEETING SUMMARY - REPORT NOS. 50-269/87-21, 50-270/87-21 AND 50-287/87-21)
This letter refers to the enforcement conference conducted, at our request, in the Region II Office on May 13, 198 This meeting concerned activities authorized by NRC Operating License No DPR-38, DPR-47 and DPR-55 for the Oconee Nuclear Statio The meeting was held to brief the NRC on the sequence of events regarding Unit 3 heatup with both trains of High Pressure Injection (HPI) inoperable and both trains of the Reactor Building Cooling Units (RBCU)
inoperable and corrective actions to be taken for all units as a result of this even Our concerns with the inoperability of the HPI system and the RBCUs were expressed to you at the meeting and your positive response to our concerns is appreciate It is our opinion that this meeting was beneficial and has provided for a better mutual understanding of the inspection findings and enforcement issue We also found your description of the findings and your corrective actions to be beneficial in our evaluation of the issue In accordance with Section 2.790 of NRC's "Rules of Practice",
Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and the enclosures will be placed in NRC's Public Document Roo Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact u
Sincerely, Original Signed by M. L. Ernst/for J. Nelson Grace Regional Administrator Enclosures: eke JCrs4k Meeting Summary w/attachments cc w/encl:
M. S. Tuckman, Station Manager 6706110223 870603 PDR ADOCK 05000269 P
Dke Power Company
1
1987 bcc w/encl:
NRC Resident Inspector H. Pastis, NRR State of South Carolina Document Control Desk RI RII RII RII BBonser:jt TPee les R es
,-sst
/ /7
/,,87 g/%, /87 6//87
ENCLOSURE MEETING SUMMARY On May 13, 1987, representatives of Duke Power Company (DPC) met with the NRC at the NRC's request in the Region II office in Atlanta, Georgi The topics of discussion were the inoperability of the HPI system and RBCU's during heatup of Oconee Unit 3. The list of those attending the meeting is in Attachment Following opening remarks given by M. Ernst, NRC, RII Deputy Regional Administrator, DPC gave a presentation which addressed the specific concerns that the NRC had requested to be discusse The presentation consisted of a description of the HPI system and RBCU's, a sequence of events, method of discovery, cause, consequences, corrective actions, and the safety significance of each issu The outline of the DPC presentation is contained herein as Attachment The NRC is presently considering enforcement action on these issues. This meeting served to enhance Region II's understanding of the issues and DPC's plans to prevent recurrence of similar problems Attachments:
1. List of Attendees at the Oconee Enforcement Conference 2. Oconee Nuclear Station Unit 3 High Pressure Injection/Reactor Building Cooling Units -
NRC Meeting May 13, 1987
ATTACHMENT I ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE DPC -
OCONEE 5-13-87 ATTENDEES Leigh Trocine Enforcement Specialist NRC Jack Bryant Senior Resident, Oconee NRC Tom Peebles Act Br. Chief Projects NRC Brian Bonser Project Engineer NRC Virgil L. Brownlee DRP, Acting Deputy Director NRC Malcolm Ernst Dep. Regional Administrator NRC George Jenkins Director, EICS NRC Albert Gibson Director Reactor Safety Division NRC Helen N. Pastis Oconee Projects Manager - NRR NRC William Troskoski Region II Coordinator, EDO NRC Peter K. VanDoorn Senior Resident Catawba NRC Paul Guill License Engineer Duke Bruno Uryc Enforcement Coordinator NRC Maurice McIntosh General Manager, G. Duke Mike Tuckman Station Manager, ONS Duke Richard Sweigart Superintendent of OPS, ONS Duke Fred Owens Regulatory Compliance, ONS Duke Ned Edwards Operating Engineer, ONS Duke Paul White Design Engineer G. Duke Norman Starbaugh Nuclear Production Egr. G. Duke E. M. Weaver DPCO Design Engineer, M&N Di Duke Gregg B. Swindlehurst DPCO Design Engineer, M&N Di Duke
ATTACHMENT 2 Q)c< GQSTE E M -TU CLj c~J rm zCS W'TA= T D GIT ISU TJ~TIwc 3c(r.w; ITrr HIGH ~
~
~
-3 2RSSJI987JC~
AGENDA HIGH PRESSURE INJECMTI O
EVEN DESCRIPTION OF HIGH PRESSURE
-
INJECTION SYSTEM SEQUENCE OF EVENTS METHOD OF DISCOVERY CAUSE CONS EQUENCES CORRECTIVE ACTIONS REACTOR~
BUIL DING COOLING UNhIT'S DESCRIPTION OF REACTOR BUILDING COOLING UNITS SEQUENCE OF EVENTS METHOD OF DISCOVERY CAUSE CONSEQUENCES CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
DESCRI PTII ON OF HIGH PRESSURE INJE'CION SYSTE M
( HPI)
NORMAL OPERATIONS A
OR B HPI PUMPS SUPPLY MAKEUP TO RC SYSTEM AND RCP SEALS
-
SUCTION FOR PUMPS IS FROM LETDOWN STORAGE TANK
-
.SUCTION IS CROSS-CONNECTED
-
SUCTION VALVES FROM BORATED WATER STORAGE TANK HP-24, 25 ARE CLOSED
-
DISCHARGE VALVE HP-27 IS OPEN, HP-26 IS CLOSED EMERGENCY OPERATION
-
ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM IS ACrTUATED
-
LOW REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRES SURE
-
HIGH REACTOR BUILDING PRESSURE
-
AS B, AND C
HPI PUMPS AUTOMATI CALLY START
-
SUCTION VALVES HP-24 AND
OPEN
-
HP-26 OPENS ("A" HEADER INJECTION VALVES)
-
WATER IS INJECTED FROM BWST TO REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM
HIG PESURE INJECT[ON SYSTEM TIC LETDOWN
~1 0~A SEAL RrTI65
LPE LP-54t4 L-4(tEIAL INJECTION)I AC IT All LETW.TE 361 lI PtWP A JS IEI C
St A
1M4(
64 263 145 SEL N~~rrt
IS 1131 813
~110 410 -- M B Pt EA
IPIs ILTER A SCPreA (D~~~SA ACEC P1(T5EL4,cPupA 129 131
?76 146 SEALLINJECI O
I(EST STOAG TAK1.706
255
P-57 LPI~~
ES OT 5 tOPCA P333 UNT AL(ALEESPECETA P10 GSF-0 AI.DO
SEQUENCE OF EVZENT'S 3/26/87
-
ALL UNIT
SYSTEM LINEUPS COMPLETE AFTER REFUELING SYSTEM HEATUP BEGINS 3/31/87
-
UNIT AT HOT SHUTDOWN 1612 SMALL NON-ISOLATABLE LEAK OCCURS UNIT COOLDOWN BEGINS 4/1/87
-
UNIT AT COLD SHUTDOWN 0730
-
PLANT ANNOUNCEMENT MADE OF POSSIBLE DEFUELING 4/2/87
-
SHIFT MADE DECISION TO 0715 PREPARE FOR DEFUELING
-
SHUTDOWN TAGGING INITIATED FOR DEFUELING
-
HP-24 AND HP-25 BREAKERS OPENED AND REDTAGGED PER SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE FOR DEFUELING 4/5/87
-
UNIT
STARTUP BEGUN 0900 DEFUELING DID NOT TAKE PLACE 4/10/87
-
UNIT
EXCEEDS 350 DEGREES 1030 WITH BREAKERS FOR.HP-24 HP-25 OPEN 4/11/87
-
HP-24 HP-25 BREAKERS DIS 0715 COVERED OPEN AND IMMEDIATELY CLOSE UNIT WAS AT HOT SHUTDOWN (NOT CRITICAL)
MvETHOID OF DI SCO'VERY
-
OCONEE OPERATORS PERFORM ALARM CHECK SUMMAARY REVIEWS
-
NUISANCE COMPUTER ALARMS ARE SUPPRESSED
-
REVIEW OF SUPPRESSED ALARMS IS CON DUCTED EACH SHIFT
-
OPERATOR RECOGNIZED HP-24 AND HP-25
"COIL BAD" ALARM IMMEDIATE CONFIRMATION THAT BREAKERS WERE OPEN
CAUSE OF EV ENT INADEQUATE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN SHIFT STAFF AND SUPPORTING ENGINEERS ENGINEERS SHOULD HAVE COMMUNI CATED PLANT CONDITIONS DESIRED INADEQUATE REVIEW OF SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE BY SUPPORTING ENGINEERS
-
NORMAL METHOD FOR REMOVAL AND RESTORATION OF EQUIPMENT NOT USED
-
REVIEWS BY SHIFT OPERATIONS NOT SUF FICIENT
-
SAFETY TAG LOG REVIEW NO ADEQUATE
-
OPERATOR BOARD WALKDOWNS NOT ADE QUATE
,
REVIEW OF COMPUTER
"ALARM CHECK SUMMARY" NOT ADEQUATE
CONSEQUENTCES OF EVE'T ES ACTUATION STARTS ALL
PUMPS WITH SUCTION ON LDST
-
OPERATOR HAS
TO 3 MINUTES TO RECOGNIZE
-
EITHER RESTORE BWST SUCTION OR STOP PUMPS
-
OPERATOR AIDS TO IDENTIFY THE PROBLEM
-
LDST LEVEL RECORDER STRATEGICALLY LOCATED
-
LDST LOW LEVEL ALARM
-
LDST LOW-LOW LEVEL ALARM
-
ES ACTUATION INDICATION PANEL
-
TRAINING IS CONDUCTED ON THIS SCENARIO ON SIMULATOR
-
EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES
-
VERIFIES VALVES GO TO ES POSITION
-
ADDRESSES FAILURE OF HPI SYSTEM
-
LARGE BREAK LOCA NOT A
CONCERN
-
BREAKERS MISPOSITIONED
HOURS
-
DECAY HEAT VERY LOW
-
UNIT SHUTDOWN FOR EXTENDED PERIOD
-
PROBABILITY OF SMALL BREAK IN THIS TIME SMALL
CORRECT'IVE AC'TI ONS I ]MMD"ED IA TEDq
-
BREAKERS FOR HP-24 AND HP-25 CLOSED
-
REVIEW OF PLANT CONDITIONS CONDUCTED INVESTIGATION BEGUN TO UNDER STAND EVENT P LANN ED
-
A CASE STUDY TYPE TRAINING PRO GRAM WILL BE CONDUCTED WITH ALL LICENSED OPERATORS
-
ENHANCE STARTUP PROCEDURE BY INCLUDING ELECTRI CAL BREAKER VERIFICATION OF ES COMPONENTS PRIOR TO EXCEEDING 250 DEGREES
-
FORMALIZE ALARM CHECK SUMMARY REVIEW AS PART OF SHIFT T/O
-
REWORD SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE REQUIR ING SUPPORT ENGINEER DIRECTION FOR SHUTDOWN TAGGING
,
-
CONDUCT ADDITIONAL TRAINING ON CONTROL BOARD WALKDOWNS FOR ALL LICENSED OPERATORS
I~EAZ rc~ BtJI LaDll~1G GQQJZI~TG U~I~rS
DESCRIPT'ION OF REACTOR BUJILDING COOLINTG UNT ITS NORMAL OPERATION
-
THREE COOLING UNITS AVAILABLE
-
NORMALLY OPERATE WITH A
AND C
IN FAST SPEED COOLING WATER SUPPLIED BY LOW PRESSURE SERVICE WATER
-
INLET ISOLATION VALVES NORMALLY OPEN LPSW 16, 19, 22
-
OUTLET ISOLATION VALVES (ES)
NORMALLY OPEN LPSW 18, 21,
AUXILIARY COOLING UNITS NORMALLY IN SERVICE LPSW 565 OPEN LPSW 566 CLOSED EMERGENCY OPERATION
-
ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATES ON HIGH REACTOR BUILDING PRESSURE
-
ALL THREE FANS RUN IN SLOW SPEED AUXILIARY COOLING UNIT ISOLATED, LPSW 565 CLOSES, LPSW 566 OPENS
-
OUTLET VALVES OPEN (IF NOT ALREADY OPEN)
LPSW 18, 21, 24
-
REQUIRED TO BE OPERABLE PRIOR TO EXCEEDING 250 DEGREES 350 PSI (2 COOLERS)
LOW PRESSURE SERVICE WATER SYSTEM (REACTOR BUILDING & AUXILIARY BUILDING)
Lpsw LPSV LPSW SIIvpLy LIM~
LINE 'I EAE FILTER FLE WSW Ims Is lB:
22:
fle DTECAY MEAT A8 CIXII Al 6 TTIN LRa AD R R
R8t
-
HOSE 565 (5 tE ESI 563 STATIONS WW7 tEi RACOR BLD inj COMERIS AUX. FAN C
COOLERS B
C A
IT OF 4B jTEACY ACP INITS A:3351 v-SIIEAT A2 0I 02 ANDATE a UNIT BERI COMER)
ANIL (8 T
c ACOcLERSg ICI PUMP aBc so noC cc cc LS ANDTO RI BEARniaT RI A-I COMLING JACKET 517 508 AA-Il B
RB P
AB AD AS (D -l --RA-3l ARIA-31 RIA-31 RI A-3l1l-I All (N-41ESI Is
24 5651~
lES)
IESt IES)
8I
03 I LPSW-251L (601 ILPSW-25235 v
2PSW-251 2LPSW-252 3LPSW-405 3LPSW 404 TARO MOAINS BE TRN 71) CCII CROSSOVER QSFO-1240-.TOII
SEQUEN TCE OF EV'E NT'rS 4/5/87
-
UNIT STARTUP FROM COLD SHUTDOWN INITIATED 4/9/87
-
NORMAL STARTUP DIVERTED 1700 TO PERFORM HEAT LOAD TEST ON REACTOR BUILDING COOL ING UNITS 4/9/87
-
REACTOR BUILDING COOLING 1745 UNITS SECURED, LPSW ISOLATED TO ALLOW REACTOR BUILDING TO HEAT UP FOR TEST
-
PROPERLY DOCUMENTED AND CON TROLLED 4/10/87
-
REACTOR TEMPERATURE EXCEEDS 0600 250 DEGREES WITH REACTOR BUILDING COOLING UNITS ISOLATED 4/10/87
-
RBCU VALVES WERE DISCOVERED 0700 SHUT DURING SHIFT TURNOVER 4/10/87
-
LPSW INLET VALVES OPENED, 0820 REACTOR BUILDING COOLING UNITS MEET TECH SPECS NOTE:
-
THE HP 24-25 EVENTS DID NOT OVERLAP THE RBCU EVENT
- 0g M1ETHOD OF DI SCOVERY~
-
REVIEW OF UNIT STATUS DURING TURNOVER
-
SHIFT RECOGNIZED 250 DEGREES HAD BEEN EXCEEDED
-
LINEUP WAS CORRECTED
-
REPORTABILITY EVALUATED INITIAL REVIEW INDICATED OPERATORS WERE AWARE OF SITUATION AND COMPENSA TORY MEASURES IN EFFECT
-
FURTHER REVIEW INDICATED NOT ALL OPERATORS WERE AWARE OF ABNORMAL LINEUP
CAPUS E
-
INADEQUATE COMMT-UNI CATI ONS BETWEEN SHIFT AND SUPPORTING ENGINEERS
-
INADEQUATE CONTROL OF REACTOR BUILDING COOLING UNIT TEST
-
INADEQUATE REVIEW OF PLANT STATUS PRIOR TO CHANGING MODES
cS.- ET MITCms CON1SEQUENCTES
-
ES ACTUATION WOULD NOT HAVE HAD DESIRED REACTOR BUILDING COOLING FROM REACTOR BUILDING COOLING UNITS
-
SOME CONTROL ROOM PERSONNEL WERE AWARE INLET VALVES WERE CLOSED
-
EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE REQUIRES VERIFICATION OF FLOW TO REACTOR BUILDING COOLING UNITS
-
VALVES COULD HAVE BEEN OPENED
-
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR REACTOR BUILDING COOLING UNITS WERE EXCEEDED FOR
HOURS, MAXIMUM REACTOR COOLANT TEMPERATURE WAS 290 DEGREES
-
HEAT SOURCE WAS SMALL
-
REACTOR BUILDING SPRAY WAS AVAILABLE
-
CONTAINMENT WAS NOT THREATENED
CORRECTAIVE ACTIO S
IMMIDED IATE
-
INLET VALVES LPSW 16,
arid 22 WERE OPENED PL ANNED
-
A CASE STUDY TYPE TRAINING PRO GRAM WILL BE CONDUCTED WITH ALL LICENSED OPERATORS STRESSING COMMUNI CATIONS
-
THE STARTUP PROCEDURE WILL BE ENHANCED BY INCLUDING ELECTRICAL BREAKER VERIFICATION OF ES COM PONENTS PRIOR TO EXCEEDING 250 DEGREES
-
THE ALARM CHECK SUMMARY REVIEW WILL BE FORMALIZED AS PART OF SHIFT T/O
-
CONDUCT ADDITIONAL TRAINING ON CONTROL BOARD WALKDOWNS FOR ALL LI CENSED OPERATORS