IR 05000269/1987038
| ML16161A906 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 10/28/1987 |
| From: | Bryant J, Peebles T, Skinner P, Wert L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16161A905 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-87-38, 50-270-87-38, 50-287-87-38, IEB-86-003, IEB-86-3, NUDOCS 8711130227 | |
| Download: ML16161A906 (8) | |
Text
C; ptREGj UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, NA ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-269/87-38, 50-270/87-38, and 50-287/87-38 Licensee:
Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Docket Nos.: 50-269, 50-270, License Nos.: DPR-38, DPR-47, and and 50-287 DPR-55 Facility Name:
Oconee 1, 2, and 3-Inspection Conducted:
September 5 - October 19, 1987 Inspectors:
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~gafnd Approved
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A. A. Peebles, Section Chief D
Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection involved resident inspection on-site in the areas of operations, surveillance, maintenance, engineered safety features lineups, followup of events, and Unit 1 shutdown work in progres Results:
Of the six areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie PDR ADOCK 05000269 Q
REPORT DETAILS 1. Licensee Employees Contacted
- M.S. Tuckman, Station Manager T.B. Owen, Maintenance Superintendent R.L. Sweigart, Operations Superintendent L.V. Wilkie, Superintendent Integrated Scheduling J.M. Davis, Technical Services Superintendent
- C.L. Harlin, Compliance Engineer
- F.E. Owens, Assistant Engineer, Compliance Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and staff engineer Resident Inspectors:
- J.C. Bryant
- Skinner L.D. Wert
- Attended exit intervie. Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 19, 1987, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 abov The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters Not inspecte. Unresolved Items No unresolved items were identified during this inspectio. Plant Operations The inspectors reviewed plant operations throughout the reporting period to verify conformance with regulatory requirements, technical specifications (TS),
and administrative control Control room logs, shift turnover records, some Unit 1 Block Tagout Log and Outage Shift Reports, and equipment removal and restoration records were reviewed routinel Interviews were conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics and performance personne Activities within the control rooms were monitored on an almost daily basi Inspections were conducted on day and on night shifts, during week days and on weekend Some inspections were made during shift change in order to evaluate shift turnover performanc Actions observed were conducted as required by Operations Management Procedure 2-The complement of licensed personnel on each shift inspected met or exceeded the requirements of T Operators were responsive to plant annunciator alarms and were cognizant of plant condition Plant tours were taken throughout the reporting period on a routine basi The areas toured included the following:
Unit 1 Rx Building Turbine Building Units 1, 3 Penetration Rooms Auxiliary Building Units 1,2, and 3 Electrical Equipment Rooms Units 1,2, and 3 Cable Spreading Rooms Station Yard Zone within the Protected Area Standby Shutdown Facility Condenser Circulating Water Intake Area During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, security, equipment status, and radiation control practices were observe Unit 1 remained in the end of cycle 10 refueling outage throughout the report period. Shutdown work is discussed in paragraph Unit 2 operated at 85% power throughout the report period as limited by 28 steam generator high leve Unit 3 operated at 100% power throughout the report perio No violations or deviations were identifie. Surveillance Testing Surveillance tests were reviewed by the inspectors to verify procedural and performance adequacy. The completed tests reviewed were examined for necessary test prerequisites, instructions, acceptance criteria, technical content, authorization to begin work, data collection, independent verification where required, handling of deficiencies noted, and review of completed work. The tests witnessed, in whole or in part, were inspected to determine that approved procedures were available, test equipment was calibrated, prerequisites were met, tests were conducted according to procedure, test results were acceptable and systems restorations were complete Surveillances witnessed in whole or in part:
IP/3/A/0305/3B RPS "B" On-Line (U-3)
PT/2/A/0203/06 LPI Pump Performance Test (U-2)
PT/2/A/0204/07 Reactor Building Spray Performance Test(U-2)
No violations or deviations were identifie. Maintenance Activities Maintenance activities were observed and/or reviewed during the reporting period to verify that the work was performed by qualified personnel and that approved procedures in use adequately described all work that was not within the skill of the trad Activities, procedures and work requests were examined to verify proper authorization to begin work, provisions for fire, cleanliness and exposure control, proper return of equipment to service, and that limiting conditions for operation were me Some attention was given to scaffolding, rigging, and other general work safety practices due to the extensive work ongoing with the Unit 1 outag Maintenance witnessed in whole or in part:
WR 9562C Installation of Thermocouples in LPI/LPSW Cooler Discharge Lines WR 55063A Trip Test of 1X8 Circuit Breakers Cleaning of RBCU "A" Cooler Tubes WR 00180C Repairs to Valve 1LPSW-52 WR 50044 Replacement of CRD Gating Drive Unit, (Group 5 Regulated Supply)
No violations or deviations were identifie. Resident Inspector Safeguards Inspection In the course of the monthly activities, the resident inspectors included a review of the licensee's physical security progra The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities which included; protected and vital areas access controls, searching of personnel, packages and vehicles, badge issuance and '
retrieval, escorting of visitors, patrols and compensatory post In addition, the resident inspectors observed protected area lighting and protected and vital areas barrier integrity, and verified interfaces between the security organization and operations or maintenanc No violations or deviations were identifie. 9. Unit 1 End of Cycle 10 Refueling Outage Unit 1 remained in refueling shutdown throughout the report perio With about 50 of the 65 scheduled days elapsed, the shutdown is about 1 1/2 days behind schedul Refueling has been complete The inspectors
witnessed portions of a number of jobs in progress including the following:
Defueling and refueling operations, sleeving of steam generator (SG)
tubes, chemical cleaning of SG's, replacement of SG feedwater nozzles, installation of cold leg dams, cleaning of reactor building coolers, inspection of biological shield tendons, refurbishment of Limitorque operators and rework of valves (over 600 valves scheduled for rework), rewinding the electrical generator, and replacement of the main step-up transforme Chemical cleaning of the SG's has been complete Details of the technique used are given in report No. 50-269/87-4 Approximately 3350 pounds of material were removed from each SG, which was close to the precleaning estimated amount of 3400 pound As part of the licensees' overall effort toward radiation exposure reduction, two once through steam generator end units (upper and lower channel heads) were brought onsite and staged in the turbine buildin These were extensively utilized for detailed training of workers involved in eddy current testing, plugging, sleeving and cold leg dam installatio The use of these mockups greatly reduced the time required for workers to accomplish tasks within the radiation areas in the reactor building and provided an effective contribution to the licensees' ALARA progra. Inspection of Open Items The following Licensee Event Reports and other open items are being closed based on review of licensee reports, inspection, or record review, as appropriate, and discussions with licensee personne (Closed) 269,270,287/86-BU-03:
Potential Failure of Air Operated Valve in ECCS Pumps Due to Single Failure of Air Operated Valve in Minimum Flow Recirculation Line. The licensee responded to IEB 86-03 in a letter dated November 12, 1986. In their response the licensee stated the staff had reviewed and evaluated the subject bulletin and the results indicated the minimum flow recirculation lines for Oconee ECCS pumps are not subject to single-failure vulnerability since these lines do not contain automatically actuated valve At Oconee Nuclear Station the Low Pressure Injection (LPI)
pump recirculation lines do not have isolation valve The recirculation line on each LPI pump runs directly from the pump suction, with only an orifice installed to reduce pressure. Oconee operators are advised to monitor the LPI pumps and are not allowed to operate the pumps for more than 30 minutes when the minimum flow line is the only flow path availabl The minimum flow paths for the High Pressure Injection (HPI)
pumps return pump flow to the letdown storage tank through the seal return cooler All valves in these lines are either check valves or manually operated valve The HPI pumps actuate at 1600 psi with a discharge pressure of 3000 ps During a small break LOCA actuation or even with inadvertent action, their discharge pressure would be above the normal RC System operating pressure of 2155 ps In addition, the discharge valves have position indicators in the Control Room to allow operator action in the event of an inadvertent closur In summary, the licensee has determined that Oconee Nuclear Station has no single-failure vulnerability in the minimum flow recirculation line of any ECCS pumps that could cause a failure of more than one ECCS trai This item is close (Closed)
LER 269/86-13:
Improper Review and Approval of Procedures Due to Management/QA Deficienc Some of the procedures used for operation and maintenance of the Keowee Hydro Station had been approved by the hydro station superintendent rather than by ONS Superintendent of Maintenance or Superintendent of Operation All incorrectly approved procedures have now received proper review and approva (Closed)
LER 269/86-15:
Isolation of Overhead Power Path from Keowee Hydro Statio The relays which caused isolation of the overhead power path have been removed as previously schedule The relays were moved to a more stable location and also replaced by less sensitive relay (Closed)
LER 269/87-06:
Missed Inservice Inspection Resulting in Violatio Followup revealed that a leak test at pressure had been performed at completion of work; however, work was not inspected as an ISI inspection. The proper inspection has now been complete (Closed)
LER 269/87-07:
Misclassification of Low Pressure Service Water Piping. This item was determined to have been a misclassification of piping in the FSA Equipment was verified by the licensee to meet requirements. Documentation errors have been correcte (Closed) 269/P2186-01:
Alignment Dowels on Connecting Rod Bearings in Diesel Generator The report stated that all connecting rods purchased between 11/85 and 4/86 are suspec Licensee data reviewed revealed that all diesel connecting rod bearings at Oconee were installed by December 1984. None have been installed since that date and no spares had been purchased since that dat (Closed) IFI 269/87-11-01:
Licensee Addendum to Integrated Leak Rate Repor The referenced addendum has been submitted, and licensee commitments have been me Safety System Functional Inspection (SSFI) Open Items Several items left open on the referenced Inspection (269, 270, 287/86-16)
were reviewed to determine current status, as follow Item 86-16-01:
Lubrication Program for Motor Operated Valves (MOV).
The SSFI report found that the licensees' program for lubrication of MOV's did not adequately control lubricants or provide coverage for all environmentally qualified valves. In a letter of June 6, 1986, Duke Power Company provided to Region II a Justification for Continued Operation (JCO)
based on valve tests and background of lubricants use On June 29, 1986, DPC provided to Region II an expanded background on qualification of the lubricant Based on review by NRC, on August 21, 1986, Region II agreed with DPC's proposed actio On August 1, 1986, DPC representatives made a presentation to NRC in Region II. They described the MOV refurbishment program which had been accelerated and which would completely refurbish and test the 900 MOV's at a rate of about 100 on each refueling outage, or in a period of four to five year This included MOVAT's testing of the valve The resident inspectors have witnessed refurbishment and MOVAT's testing of MOVs as first reported in March 1986, and in a number of reports since that dat The program as described by DPC in August 1986 is ahead of schedul The inspectors have verified that the lubricants in use were as described in the program and will continue to do s Based on the progress of this program, Item 86-16-01 is close b. Item 86-16-02:
MOV Torque Switch and Limit Switch Set Points and MOV Corrective Maintenance Work Histor The report discusses shortcomings in the licensee program for MOV torque switch and limit switch testing and setting and problems noted in the MOV corrective maintenanc These problems also were discussed in resident inspector (RI) reports 85-37, 85-38, and 85-41. RI Report 85-41 also mentioned that the licensee was developing a valve improvement program. RI Report 86-04, states that the residents witnessed MOVATS testing and MOV refurbishmen As a result of SSFI findings, the testing and refurbishing program was accelerated and is being performed as described in paragaph "a" above. In view of the ongoing program this item is close c. Item 86-16-03:
Inoperability of Unit 3 Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump (TDEFWP). The SSFI report expresses concerns that the Unit 3 TDEFWP should have been declared inoperable from June 7 through June 22, 1984 due to numerous problems found during performance test During this period RI Reports 84-13 and 84-18 mention that twice in that period RI's witnessed performance tests of the Unit 3 TDEFW Also witnessed was the replacement of valve
3MS92, Unit 3 TDEFWP relief valv There are no details provided in these reports, concerning the tests, indicating that the residents found cause for considering the TDEFWP inoperabl Also, the residents have witnessed performance tests on this pump a number of times since the The pump is performing satisfactorily now and there is no apparent significance in pursuing these three year old tests. This item is close Item 86-16-06:
Improper Implementation of Independent Verificatio This item was followed up by the resident inspectors after identification by the SSFI team. The inspectors ascertained that the verification was actually made through diverse means but was not documented. A Level V violation was cited in Report No. 50-269, 270, 287/86-22 and was subsequently closed on verification of corrective action. This item is close.
Borated Water Storage Tank Spill At 12:30 on October 7, a spill of approximately 20,000 gallons of borated water occurred in the Unit 1 Auxiliary Buildin There was no fuel in the reactor at the time. The spill was caused by the failure of a freeze seal (exact cause of the seal failure is still under investigation)
in a 3 inch low pressure injection system recirculation line undergoing repair Water flowed out of the borated water storage tank through the failed freeze seal and line being repaired into the penetration rooms and then to the second and first floors of the auxiliary building and into the low pressure injection pump room Three workers received low level external contaminatio This contamination was removed by showerin The spill was cleaned up and a temporary patch placed on the line to stop the lea Although no radioactive liquid was directly released offsite during the spill, an amount estimated at 1890 gallons of radioactive water flowed through a trough adjacent to the borated water storage tank, entered the yard drain system and flowed into the number 3 chemical treatment pond. The contents of this pond flow over a weir into the Keowee Hydro Unit tailrac The licensee performed calculations based on analysis of composite pond samples collected at the weir which verified that no effluent limits were exceeded. Approximately 65,000 microcuries of activity were released as a result of the spil The licensee is continuing to investigate the spil The inspectors will follow licensee corrective action No violations or deviations were identified.