IR 05000413/1987026
| ML15239A012 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee, Catawba, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 10/20/1987 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML15239A011 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-413-87-26, 50-414-87-26, NUDOCS 8711130142 | |
| Download: ML15239A012 (40) | |
Text
ENCLOSURE SALP BOARD REPORT U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE INSPECTION REPORT NUMBERS 50-413/87-26 50-414/87-26 DUKE POWER COMPANY CATAWBA UNITS 1 & 2 OCTOBER 1, 1985 THROUGH JULY 31, 1987 8711130142 871020 PDR ADOCK 05000269 G
SUMMARY OF RESULTS A. Overall Facility Evaluation During the SALP assessment period, the Catawba facility was effectively managed and achieved a satisfactory level of operational safet Strengths were noted in the functional area of Fire Protectio The licensee is well staffed with dedicated and qualified individuals. Management takes an active role in operations and once a problem is recognized, thorough corrective actions are implemented although not always timely. Weaknesses were noted in the functional areas of security and engineering suppor The Unit 2 depressurization event, which resulted in the inspection by the NRC Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) in June 1986, and several safety system design problems pointed out significant programmatic deficiencies in modification design and engineering suppor Management attention toward improvement programs in this area is warrante B. Facility Performance Summary Functional Area 3/1/84 - 9/30/85 10/1/85 - 7/31/87 Plant Operations
2 Radiological Controls
2 Maintenance
2 Surveillance
2 Fire Protection
1
Functional Area 3/1/84 - 9/30/85 10/1/85 -7/31/87 Emergency Preparedness
2 Security
2 Quality Programs and Administrative 2
Controls Affecting Quality Licensing Activities
2 Training
2 Engineering Support N/R
Preoperational and Startup
2 Testing N/R -
Not Rated IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS A. Plant Operations 1. Analysis During the evaluation period, inspections were performed by the resident and regional based inspectors. At the beginning of the period Unit 1 was in commercial operation and Unit 2 was undergoing preoperational testin A refueling outage was completed on Unit 1 on November 22, 1986, and Unit 2 began commercial operation on August 19, 1986. A major work activity on Unit 2 was the replacement of the main electrical generato Although this equipment is non-safety-related, it is noted that this was a well coordinated effor Control room demeanor is professional and operators are dedicated and attentive to their dutie Management is very involved in plant operation Staffing is adequate at all levels and the licensee has the worthy goal of adding additional SRO qualified individuals to the operations staff. Housekeeping is excellen The most significant event from a safety viewpoint during the period was the Unit 2 depressurization and subsequent safety injection in June 1986 during the loss of Control Room test (see Engineering Support and Preoperational and Startup Testing
Section). Other events of note include the loss of both trains of the Unit.1 Residual Heat Removal System (RHR) on August 15, 1986, and a 12,000 gallon spill in the Unit 1 containment on October 6, 198 The RHR system was inoperable for 15 minutes while the unit was in Mode 6 during the August even The Reactor Coolant System increased 10 degrees F to 120 degrees F during the event. The spill was caused by inadequate control of RHR pump testing (See surveillance section).
The period was characterized by a relatively large number of Engineered Safety Featured (ESF)
actuations and also a relatively large number of shutdowns due to reactor coolant system leakag The most common systems involved in ESF actuations were Main Feedwater, Auxiliary Feedwater, Ventilation Systems and Nuclear Service Water. Since two shutdowns due to leakage have occurred in 1987 a clear downward trend is not obvious for this problem. The majority of these have been minor mechanical joint leaks of 1 and 2 gpm. Several leaks have been greate They were a 1-inch letdown line break on Unit 1 in June 1986 (85 gpm); a reactor coolant pump seal failure on Unit 1 in August 1986 (60 gpm);
and an instrument line mechanical fitting failure on Unit 2 in January 1987 (5.5 gpm).
It is noted that the licensee has developed a Master Work Plan to address reactor coolant leakag Continued sensitivity to this problem is warrante The number of ESF actuations and reportable events has clearly decreased during the latter portion of the evaluation perio In addition, the number of human errors appears to be decreasing. An example of this would be the fact that human error contributed to approximately 32% of ESF actuations in 1985, 19% in 1986 and 6% in the first six months of 198 The licensee's trend analysis and other programs reflect appropriate pursuit of correcting human error problem Examples are assignment of specialized instrument/electrical crews to perform reactor protection system surveillance procedures and special management attention to a specific operations shift which had a relatively high human error rat Two Nuclear Equipment Operators were found sleeping during the perio It is noted that the licensee took aggressive corrective action measures which included disciplinary action and implementation of backshift management tour A special team inspection of Emergency Procedures was conducte Training had been conducted on selected emergency procedures, but no feedback had been documente Also, the writers guide format was not followed in a number of instance These failures and other documentation errors were cited as a Deviation from commitments made in the approved Procedure Generation Packag A total of 27 manual and automatic unplanned reactor trips at various power levels (including 3 at zero power) occurred during the period. Automatic trip rate per thousand critical hours is about average or slightly better dependent on the time period chosen when compared to recently licensed plants (1.34 for unit 1 and 1.04 for unit 2).
Human error was assigned as the cause of 33% of the trips in 1985, 27% in 1986 and 20% in 1987 (1st six months).
Feedwater level sensitivity on the Westinghouse Model 05 steam generators caused two trips and contributed to a third trip on Unit 2. The operators are now coping better with the steam generators and procedures have been enhance The licensee intends to obtain experimental data to try to improve the level control for the 05 steam generator Instrumentation will be installed during the Unit 2 refueling outage in late 198 Ten violations and two deviations were identified in this are Although programmatic violations were not evident, continued attention to the adequacy of procedures and to closely following procedures appears warrante a. Severity Level IV violation for entering Mode 4 contrary to Technical Specifications with the Containment Air Return System Inoperable (85-48, Unit 1 only)
b. Severity Level IV violation for failure to follow procedures associated with operation of a diesel generator (85-55, Unit 1 only)
c. Severity Level IV violation for failure to take adequate corrective action to prevent recurring Technical Specification violations of fire watch requirements (85-55, Unit 1 only)
d. Severity Level IV violation for operating outside Axial Flux Difference limits without taking actions prescribed by Technical Specifications (86-15, Unit 1 only)
e. Severity Level IV violation for failure to follow procedures for locking of valves (86-18, Unit 2 only)
f. Severity Level IV violation for failure to follow procedure during seal water injection filter replacement leading to spill (86-30, Unit 1 only)
g. Severity Level IV violation for failure to follow annunciator response procedure (86-51/86-54)
h. Severity Level IV violation for failure to place a containment pressure channel in the tripped condition (86-51, Unit 1 only)
i. Severity Level IV violation for failure to implement adequate procedure for security notifications when the standby shutdown facility is degraded (87-14/87-14)
j. Severity Level IV violation for inadequate investigation of isolated containment pressure channel (87-20, Unit 1 only)
k. Deviation involving failure to meet an FSAR commitment for Auxiliary Shutdown Panels (85-55/85-68)
1. Deviation for failure to meet commitments of the Approved Procedures Generation Package for emergency procedures (87-13/87-13)
2. Conclusion Category: 2 3. Board Recommendations No change in the NRC's inspection resources is recommende B. Radiological Controls 1. Analysis This area includes evaluation in primary and secondary plant chemistr During the assessment period, inspections were performed by the resident and regional inspection staff The inspection effort included completion of the preoperational and startup inspection program for Unit 2 as well as continuation of the routine inspection progra During the assessment period, the licensee continued to improve the radiation protection progra Management support and involvement in the program was adequate. Management has placed emphasis on maintaining exposures as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). Various members of management were involved sufficiently early in outage preparation to permit adequate planning of appropriate radiological controls for the work and consideration of ALARA related issue The health physics (HP)
technician and general employee radiation protection training programs were adequate. The HP technician training program was accredited by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)
during the assessment perio Management's support of and commitment to training were eviden The licensee's dosimetry program is accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Progra The licensee's health physics, and radioactive waste processing staffing levels were adequate and compared favorably with other utilities having a facility of similar size. An adequate number of ANSI qualified health physics technicians were available to support routine operations. The licensee has established a goal of eliminating all contract HP technicians for work during routine operation The licensee is taking action to realize this goal by March 198 During outage operations, additional HP technicians were used to augment the permanent plant staf The performance of the health physics staff in support of routine and outage operations was good. Also, a low turnover rate in the staff has resulted in an increasingly experienced group of individuals available for job supervision and coverag The overall quality and experience level of the health physics staff is a program strengt Throughout this period the licensee has made considerable progress in establishing and training an effective overall chemistry staff, primary and secondar Special emphasis has been placed on the qualification of chemistry technicians and in the development of an experienced group of chemists and engineers in support of the chemistry progra Although a structured training program is still being developed positive steps have been taken in the training and cross training of technicians and supervisor The licensee's total accumulated exposure for 1986 was 284 person-rem (essentially all from Unit 1) compared to the PWR national average of 397 person-rem per unit. This included the exposure received during the first refueling outage for Unit Through July 31, 1987, the total collective dose was 2 person-rem per uni This low total dose was achieved mainly because no major outage had occurre The exposure goal for 1987 is 263 person-rem per unit due to the refueling outages scheduled for the last two months of the yea Based on the projected workload through the end of the year, including the second refueling outage scheduled for Unit 1, the licensee should still remain below the PWR national exposure average for 1987. The licensee received one violation for failure to record whole body dose in accordance with instructions on NRC Form The licensee's thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD) dose algorithms were not correctly established to account for doses to the lens of the eye from high energy beta and low energy photon radiation The incorrect dose algorithms resulted in the assignment of doses which were in error by less than 12 percen Corrected doses were all less than NRC limit The licensee was effective in reducing the number of personnel contamination event There were 97 skin and 99 clothing contaminations in 1986 compared with 28 skin and 51 clothing contaminations through August 198 During calendar year 1986, the licensee disposed of 6800 cubic feet (ft 3 ) of solid radioactive waste containing 13 curies of activit This volume of waste shipped was well below the 1986 PWR national average of 7500 ft 3.
Through July 1987, the licensee had disposed of 2,200 ft3 of solid radioactive waste containing 93.5 curies of activit The principal liquid radwaste system treatment and processing components at the Catawba Station are shared by Units 1 and 2 and were primarily installed at the time Unit 1 was complete Likewise, effluent radioactivity monitoring equipment was installed and tested at the time of the Unit 1 fuel loadin All additional systems and components for Unit 2 have checked out satisfactorily with the exception of the post-accident gaseous sampling system (PAGSS) which was not operable primarily due to the presence of large quantities of water in the plant nitrogen system. Also, there was an unresolved item regarding line loss of radioiodine aerosols due to long sampling line The licensee had initiated action to make sampling line iodine loss tests, including species determination Procedures were prepared and testing materials and equipment were on han A specific date for completion of testing was not established as a result of other priority wor The licensee indicated testing might be started in September (1987) but could not commit to a dat The licensee's program for shipping radioactive material accounted for one violation (see below) during the assessment period involving failure to follow shipping procedure In the area of radiological environmental monitoring, inspections of this program indicated the program had been adequately implemented. Inadequacies identified in the previous SALP period had been adequately addresse Confirmatory measurement inspections revealed inconsistencies in licensee analytical results for gamma spectroscopy measurements of samples and reflected a need for improvement in the areas of counting room instrumentation and analytical procedures and technique A violation was identified in this area for exceeding the procedural requirement of 10 percent dead time limits relating to gamma spectroscopy analyse This did not affect the analytical result The quality control program for radiological measurements met the guidance of Regulatory Guide 4.1 It was noted that the licensee's internal QA audits identified several quality control items in the confirmatory measurements are The licensee took appropriate corrective action on these finding.
During the evaluation period, there was an unplanned release of gaseous radwaste from a waste gas decay tank (WGDT)
to the Auxiliary Building atmosphere and to the environment through the Unit 1 ven The source of the radioactive gas was traced to a malfunctioning compressed air drain trap valve. Calculated beta skin dose to eight individuals onsite ranged from 0.3 mrem to 23 mre Followup whole body burden analysis indicated no uptake of radioactivity by the exposed individuals. The release had an insignificant impact with regard to dose to the environmen The radiological effluent program was conducted in an acceptable manner. Effluent releases beginning in 1985, the year Catawba 1 went into power operation, through 1986, are summarized in the Supporting Data and Summaries, Section The licensee's calculated offsite doses for 1986 from radioactive effluents were 2.2 mrem gamm These values place the licensee well within the limits of 40 CFR 190.10, i.e., 25 mrem to the whole body average over 12 consecutive month There were no significant trends during the period as the result of fuel load and startup of Unit 2, and power operation of Units 1 and In the areas of secondary plant chemistry and corrosion control, the licensee maintained chemistry control of Unit 1 in a manner that met the criteria recommended by the Steam Generator Owners Grou During the first fuel cycle for Unit 1, chemistry control had been complicated by "shakedown problems" related to staffing, training, completion of laboratory construction, and inefficient operation of the condensate cleanup syste However, the licensee's capability to control secondary chemistry significantly improved during the second cycle for Unit 1 and the first cycle for Unit 2 as these problems were resolve At the end of 1986, the licensee maintained 8,500 square feet (ft 2 ) of the radiation control area (RCA), excluding containment, under contamination controls. That figure represented 4.2% of the total RCA. As of July 1987, the total contaminated area in the RCA increased to 10,500 ft2 or 6.7% of the RCA. The primary reason given for the increase was maintenance problem No major spills or other problems had occurred but numerous leaks from valves were causing the increase in the total area under contamination contro Four violations were identified:
a. Severity Level IV violation for failure to maintain radiation exposure records in accordance with instructions contained on Form NRC-5 (86-20/86-20).
b. Severity Level IV violation for failure to follow procedures in gamma spectroscopy analyses by exceeding 10 percent dead time limits (results were not affected)
(86-23/86-25).
c. Severity Level V violation for failure to follow procedures for documentation of radiological surveys of radioactive material shipments (87-11/87-11).
d. Severity Level V violation for inadequate quality assurance procedures resulting in failure to identify gamma spectroscopy analysis inaccuracies and in failure to prevent inaccurate calibrations of geometries used for reactor coolant and effluent monitoring measurements (85-50/85-60).
2. Conclusion Category: 2 3. Board Recommendations No change in the NRC's inspection resources is recommende C. Maintenance Analysis During the evaluation period, routine inspections were performed by the resident and regional inspection staff Regional inspections included three inspections of maintenance:
-one involved welding and nondestructive examination; one inspection relative to damaged pipe supports; and a special team inspection in January 1986 included maintenance. The maintenance program appeared to be well organized with a well trained and qualified staff. The maintenance department at Catawba is stable with a low turnover rat Maintenance coverage is provided for all shift Management involvement in maintenance activities is adequate and improvin The licensee has recognized the need for more management involvement in plant activities. Special observation training has been completed for mechanical maintenance supervisors and is in progress for instrument/electrical supervisor In addition, upper management plant tours have been implemented which include observation of wor The high forced outage rate illustrates that increased management attention is require Licensee resolutions to maintenance related technical issues generally were conservative and showed clear and thorough understanding of the issue There appeared to be some reluctance to fully document maintenance problems at the beginning of the SALP period, however, this has improved as exemplified by more Problem Investigation Reports (new method for tracking nonconforming items, Licensee Event Reports, Part 21 Reports etc.) being initiated in this are Maintenance activities exhibited evidence of adequate preplanning and assignment of prioritie Several events could have been prevented by better plannin The licensee is attempting to improve the process with a more thorough planning process and trainin Several licensee identified violations occurred during the period where retesting was inadequate after maintenance/modification activitie Relatively few site personnel were recruited from Duke's older nuclear units thus inexperience has been a contributing cause to some problem The licensee has recognized this and taken action to provide additional guidance and training through its Employee Training and Qualification System. The program has been fully accredited by INP Personnel are generally not allowed to perform activities on safety related equipment unless they have been qualifie Maintenance work request backlog has decreased considerably since the last perio Some have been outstanding for a long period of time, however, prioritization of safety related work is adequate. The licensee has set specific goals to reduce the number and age of work request Three violations were issued for failure to follow procedure and two were issued for inadequate procedure This is indicative of plant personnel on the learning curv A maintenance procedure upgrade to INPO standards is in progres Five violations and one deviation were identified in this area as follows:
a. - Severity Level IV violation with two examples of inadequate maintenance procedures (86-05, Unit 1 only).
b. Severity Level IV violations for failure to follow procedure for corrective maintenance (86-27, Unit 1 only).
c. Severity Level IV violation for failure to provide adequate procedure for valve operator maintenance (86-27, Unit 1 only).
-
14 Severity Level IV violation for failure to follow appropriate procedure while troubleshooting breaker causing a reactor trip signal and ESF actuation (86-39, Unit 2 e. Severity Level IV violation for failure to complete a written safety evaluation for a nuclear station Deviation for failure to implement a change to the maintenance program and conduct training as committed to NRC in a violation response (86-54, Unit 2 only).
2. Conclusion Category: 2 3. Board reccomendations No change in the NRC's inspection resources is recommende D. Surveillance 1. Analysis During the evaluation period,.routine inspections were performed by the resident and regional inspection staff A special regional team inspection in January 1986 included this are The licensee has an adequate program for scheduling surveillance testing which identifies surveillance requirements by due dates, and issues a weekly schedul This program is computerized and controlled by the integrated scheduling personne Some weaknesses in the licensee's administrative control of this program were identified during the January 1986 inspection and again recently by the license Appropriate corrective action has been implemente Tests were normally completed on time in lieu of using extension period Surveillance activities reflected adequate preplanning and assignment of prioritie Facility surveillance procedures were usually adequate, however, inadequacies in this area did lead to four violations which are listed below. Surveillance activities were generally thorough and proper, however, three instances of failure to follow procedures led to violations as described belo Of the total licensee events during the period, 14 involved missed or improperly performed surveillance Licensee resolution of surveillance related technical issues generally showed a clear and thorough understanding of the issues and was usually conservative and viabl In part, as a result of a violation listed below, the licensee formed a Testing Review Committee to review the adequacy of the testing programs at Catawb The committee did a thorough review and made appropriate recommendations for improvements and additional testin The licensee was given credit for three Licensee Identified Violations as a result of committee findings. The licensee must be commended on this initiativ The following violations were identifie a. Severity Level IV violation for inadequate procedures resulting in missed surveillances of valves for containment integrity (86-24/86-26).
b. Severity Level IV violation for failure to follow procedures involving various surveillance activities (86-24/86-26).
c. Severity Level IV violation for inadequate procedure for testing of RHR pumps leading to a 12,000 gallon spill (86-43, Unit 1 only).
d. Severity Level IV violation for failure to implement pre-Mode 3 surveillance procedure on one occasion (87-05, Unit 2 only).
e. Severity LeveL IV violation for failure to comply with Technical Specifications with an inoperable containment isolation valve (87-05, Unit 2 only). Severity Level IV violation for failure to follow pressurizer PORV test procedure and inadequate PORV test procedure (87-08 Unit 1 only).
g. Severity Level V violation for failure to include several Nuclear Service Water valves in the surveillance procedure (86-45/86-48).
h. Severity Level V violation for use of a non-calibrated gauge for surveillance (86-45, Unit 1 only).
2. Conclusion Category: 2 3. Board Recommendations No change in the NRC's inspection resources is recommende E. Fire Protection 1. Analysis During the evaluation period, inspections-were performed by the resident and regional inspection staff Regional prelicense Appendix R fire protection team appraisals were conducted for Unit 2 in October and December 198 Additionally, a routine post license inspection for Units 1 and 2 was conducted in October 198 These inspections were conducted in the areas of fire prevention and protection and the licensee's implementation of their commitments regarding the safe plant shutdown requirements and guidelines of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R and Standard Review Plan 9. No major concerns were identified in the Appendix R safe shutdown are The operational fire protection and prevention program adhered to NRC guidelines. The licensee has issued procedures for the administrative control of fire hazards within the plant, surveillance and maintenance of the fire protection systems and equipment, and organization and training of a plant fire brigade. These procedures were reviewed and found to meet the NRC requirements and guideline General housekeeping and control of combustible and flammable materials were satisfactor The fire brigade was adequately organized and trained. Adequate fire brigade equipment was available and was properly maintaine The fixed fire detection and protection systems were being properly maintained, inspected, and tested in accordance with technical specification The annual fire protection/prevention audit and 24 month QA fire protection program audit by offsite organizations and the triennial audit by an outside fire protection organization were reviewe These audits were conducted within the specified frequency and cover all the essential elements of the fire protection progra The licensee has implemented appropriate corrective action on discrepancies identified by the audi Frequent management involvement in the site fire protection program and the well developed, issued and implemented fire protection administrative procedures contribute to the quality in the fire protection program. Upper management provided the necessary support for implementation of the permanent plant fire protection program and is aware of its importanc The licensee's response to NRC initiatives has-been timel Fire protection events were promptly reported and properly analyze Staffing of the fire protection organization was adequat During this assessment period no violations or deviations were identifie.
Conclusion Category: 1 3. Board Recommendations No change in the NRC's inspection resources is recommende F. Emergency Preparedness 1. Analysis During the assessment period, inspections were performed by resident and regional staf There were three inspections of Radiological Emergency Plan implementation and procedures, and observation of two annual radiological emergency preparedness exercises. Two Emergency Plan revisions were reviewe An adequately staffed corporate emergency response and planning organization routinely provided support to the plan Key positions in the corporate and plant emergency response organizations were fille Corporate management was directly involved in the 1986 and 1987 annual emergency preparedness exercises and followup critiques demonstrating a strong commitment to maintenance of an effective emergency response progra The licensee continued to promptly and effectively respond to the NRC initiatives regarding emergency preparedness issues, as demonstrated by effective implementation of corrective actions in response to identified enforcement items and exercise weaknesse Observation and critique of the annual emergency preparedness exercises disclosed that several areas of the Emergency Plan could be effectively implemented including protective action decision making, notification and communication, dose calculation and assessment, public information and coordination with offsite agencie However, it was also observed that certain key emergency functions were not well implemented resulting in three exercise weaknesses:
inadequate training of the Technical Support Center (TSC)
Field Team Coordinator, failure to classify a Site Area Emergency, and failure to identify and factor into accident assessment and mitigation critical parameters contributing to the accident. It was noted during the exercise that there were problems with the training of the TSC Field Team Coordinator who was assigned to manaqe and direct the field monitoring teams. Although the teams traversed the plume several times, plume centerline radiation level and airborne radioactivity values were never measure Personnel involved in accident assessment and classification failed to
classify the Site Area Emergency based on radiological effluent monitor data in accordance with the classification procedur In addition, the TSC staff assumed that containment integrity was maintained throughout the exercis As a consequence, a failed cQntainment penetration through which the source term was released to the environment was not identifie Other items requiring licensee corrective actions were:
(1) a violation involving failure to schedule and conduct a required semiannual health physics drill; and (2) a violation involving failure to maintain and update controlled Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures assigned to principals of the site emergency response organizatio The licensee committed to implement corrective actions for these items consistent with regulatory requirements and guidanc Revisions 7 and 8 to the Emergency Plan were reviewed during this assessment perio With the exception of a plan change which was part of Revision 7, the plan changes were in accordance with the appropriate planning standards and evaluation criteri The one exception that was noted involved a change in the frequency of emergency response training from annual to biannua A regional letter was forwarded to the licensee requesting that the inconsistency be resolved in order to maintain required annual training as originally defined in the Emergency Plan, and promulgated in the planning standards and evaluation criteri The licensee's response to the NRC plan review letter was acceptabl Two violations were identifie a. Severity Level IV violation involving failure to conduct a semiannual health physics drill (86-40/86-43).
b. Severity Level V violation involving failure to maintain and update Controlled Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures assigned to Emergency Response Organization principals (87-03/87-03).
2. Conclusions Category: 2 3. Board Recommendation No change in the NRC's inspection resources is recommende Security 1. Analysis During this evaluation period, inspections were performed by the resident and regional inspection staff The total of ten inspections of the security program included four special inspection The licensee continued to exhibit evidence of prior planning and assignment of priorities at both site and corporate levels as demonstrated by the responsiveness in training personnel and implementing a program to accomplish fingerprinting requirements of all employees in accordance with newly established regulatory requirement Observations of security operational activities included evaluation of routine security force tasks, compensatory measures being established when required, and management sensitivity and promptness in reporting security event Functional operability and personnel efficiency were clearly demonstrate In response to the discovery of unprotected openings in vital area barriers, the licensee performed an extensive vital area equipment survey and an analysis of protected and vital area barrier The survey was accomplished by corporate and site security and engineering personnel and documented in the Catawba Nuclear Station Physical Security Design.Plan (PSDP).
Based on the findings in the PSDP, an extensive vital area upgrade program was institute The licensee received six violations during this rating perio In addition, one licensee identified violation was reviewed and documented in a regional inspection repor These violations varied in the area of program applicability and the degree of severity and are not indicative of a programmatic proble However, collectively, they demonstrate a decline in overall security program effectivenes Corrective action by the licensee was prompt and thorough as demonstrated by the actions to survey, analyze, and upgrade protected and vital area barrier During the evaluation period, an event occurred in the licensee's corporate offices that involved the inadequate destruction of Safeguards Information which had a potential adverse impact on the Catawba Nuclear Station security progra The event and resulting impact were discussed during an enforcement conference in the Region II offic The licensee initiated corrective actions which included revision of applicable procedures and retraining of personne The operational capability of the security force was enhanced by an effective training progra Training records have been computerized for better suspense control and training topics have been prepared on video tape to provide standardized coverage of subject materia Six violations were identified:
a. Severity Level III violation for failure to conduct an adequate vehicle search (86-04, Unit 1 only).
b. Severity Level III violation for failure to provide positive access control to a vital area (86-16, Unit 1 only).
c. Severity Level IV violation for inadequate protected area lighting (86-13, Unit 1 only).
d. Severity Level IV violation for failure to provide positive access control to a vital area (86-17, Unit 2 only).
e. Severity Level IV violation for inadequate destruction of Safeguards Information (this violation occurred at the licensee's corporate office) (87-19/87-19). Severity Level V violation for failure to document communications tests (86-18/86-20).
2. Conclusion Category:
3. Board Recommendations No change in the NRC's inspection resources is recommende Outages 1. Analysis During the evaluation period, routine inspections were conducted by the resident and regional inspection staf These inspections included observations of refueling, modifications, inservice inspection and inservice testin One Unit 1 refueling outage, the Unit 2 main generator replacement outage and a number of short duration outages occurred during this perio The licensee has developed an adequate mechanism for scheduling of required work and prioritization of other work to be performed during outage This process has evolved as experience has been gained and effectively uses computer technology for assistanc Management was appropriately involved in all aspects of outage Although the main generator is non-safety-related it is noted that this major job on Unit 2 was exceptionally well coordinated leading to a timely replacemen The Unit 1 refueling outage was completed in 101 days versus 73 days scheduled. The outage
was forced to begin two weeks early due a Reactor Coolant Pump seal failure which caused some planning problems and manpower shortage The outage was extended 12 days due to a reactor coolant spil Other unplanned problems, mostly equipment related, contributed to further delay Overall completion of work was good in that 2589 work requests were completed versus 1470 scheduled, 86 design modifications were completed versus 75 scheduled and 45 design variations versus 8 scheduled. Man-rem exposure was 199.4 versus 315 expected. Deleted work included polishing of the fuel pool transfer canal and reactor cavity walls, generator field rewinding and component cooling suction and discharge cross-connect valve replacemen The licensee conducted a good critique and made appropriate recommendations for improvement. One obvious positive aspect of the outage was the dedication and cooperative spirit exhibited by the personnel involve In the latter part of the evaluation period, the licensee had concluded that the ASME Section XI programs needed strengthening. Efforts were in process to issue a Section XI manua Thi.s manual should greatly improve the ASME Section XI inspection program. This manual will serve to better define key positions and authorities and responsibilities. A well' defined training program for al.1 personnel involved in ISI was defined and implemented. Records were complete and well maintaine One violation was identified in this area as follows:
Severity Level IV violation for failure to adequately control a modification leading to a waste gas release (86-51/86-54).
2. Conclusion Category: 2 3. Board Recommendations No change in the NRC's inspection resources is recommende I. Quality Programs and Administrative Controls Affecting Quality Analysis During this assessment period, inspections were performed by the resident, regional and headquarters inspection staf For the purposes of this assessment, this area is defined as the ability of the licensee to identify and correct their own problem It encompasses all plant activities, all plant personnel, as well as those corporate functions and personnel
that provide services to the plant. The plant and corporate QA staff have responsibility for verifying quality. The rating in this area specifically denotes results for various groups in achieving quality as well as the QA staff in verifying that quality is achieve At the beginning of the SALP period multiple regional inspections were conducted in such areas as audits, design control, document control procurement, et These inspections verified that programmatic controls had been established for these area Implementation was also verified to assure that licensee personnel were following established program Near the end of the SALP period, a QA effectiveness inspection was conducte The inspection team recognized the emphasis placed on achieving quality within the line organization and the technical resources maintained within those organization While the NRC strongly endorses this policy, the NRC also believes it is important that the quality verification organizations be technically credible and have the capability to identify and ensure prompt resolution of significant safety issue There were significant technical issues involving the operability of several systems and components that were identified during this inspection that indicated the quality verification organizations were 'not fully effective in either identifying or resolving significant safety issue Further, it appears that the emphasis and technical resources placed within the line organization were not effective in achieving prompt resolution of the identified safety problem There were also problems in the area of design changes and post modification testing identified during this inspectio Most of these problems can be attributed to weaknesses in communication and coordination between the engineering organization and plant staff located at the site. This issue has been discussed in the section on Engineering Suppor However, oversight by the quality verification organizations was not effective in identifying and resolving these problem A review of your Quality Assurance Audit and Surveillance programs indicated that although QA reports contained some technical findings, the reports did not reflect an in-depth review and technical analysi The QA findings were not substantive and technically oriented such as those identified by the Testing Review Committe It appears that the quality assurance organization monitors compliance and line management performs quality verificatio The NRC does not consider these independent function The inspectors found that Duke Power Company QA was not involved in the detection and resolution in many of the significant issues identified, and therefore, implementation of your quality verification programs in this manner has not been an effective use of the QA organizatio Programs have been implemented to improve the interface between the engineering department and the staff at the sit Other recommendations for your test programs are being considere However, changes to programs alone are not enough; there must be effective oversight from quality verification organizations in all aspects of plant operations on a continuing basis to detect and correct weaknesses before they result in significant safety problem Improvement has been noted in the operations and maintenance areas, due to conscientious monitoring of work practices within the departments themselve The Catawba Safety Review Group (CSRG)
has the responsibility for trending Problem Investigation Reports (PIR) and notifying site management of their findings. A decrease in the number of feedwater system related trips is indicative of the effective ness of this progra Licensee QA inspection personnel were adequately trained and properly conducted inspection The Quality Assurance Surveillance Department has increased the amount of operational training received by the personnel within the grou One group of people have already received the 46 week non-licensed operator training and a second group has started the cours This has the potential of increasing the effectiveness of the QA surveillances performed on sit Overall QA department involvement in the Unit 2 start-up test program was shallow. One site surveillance covering precritical checks and initial criticality was conducte None were conducted relative to initial fuel load, low power testing, or power ascension testing. No corporate audits were conducte The following are some observed strengths in management controls affecting quality:
Management involvement in plant operations as evidenced by decreasing percentages of human error type problem Management involvement early in outage preparations permitted adequate work planning and consideration of ALARA related issue Management involvement in maintenance activities as evidenced by supervisory maintenance observation training and upper management tours Management involvement in surveillance activities as evidenced by forming the Testing Review Committe Management involvement in fire protection as evidenced by involvement in the site fire -protection program and administrative procedures Prompt and effective response to NRC initiatives regarding emergency preparedness issue Management attention in outage activities as evidenced by a well coordinated turbine generator replacement effort and better than expected work performance during an outag Management commitment to training areas and evidenced by the EQTS program, INPO accreditation, and construction of a new training cente The following are some observed weaknesses in management controls affecting quality:
Management involvement in plant security as evidenced by a decline in overall security program effectiveness Inability of QA surveillances or QA audits to identify signifncant trends on programmatic problem Audits are compliance oriented as opposed to performance oriente Management attention in engineering support as evidenced by poor coordination, poor design and lack of appropriate design information in the design engineering group Management attention to completing the test program for Unit The licensee takes thorough and broad based corrective actions once a significant problem is realize QA Department involvement in operations is still superficia Timeliness of corrective actions can be improved, especially those which involve corporate suppor Three violations were identified:
a. Severity Level IV violation for failure to follow QA procedure for control of nonconforming items (85-43, Unit 1 only)
b. Severity Level IV violation for failure to follow procedures in restoring to service failed support/restraints (86-03, Unit 1 only)
c. Severity Level IV violation for improperly installed and missing nuts on the containment ventilation condensate drain tank support (87-04, Unit 2 only)
2. Conclusion Category: 2 3. Board Recommendations The board recommends increased management attention in the area of QA Department scope and depth of inspections, findings and the effective resolution of those finding J. Licensing Activities 1. Analysis Evaluation of this functional area was based on the licensee's performance in support of licensing action These actions consisted of license amendment requests, including changes to the Technical Specifications, exemptions and code relief requests, responses to generic letters, TMI items, and other action For Catawba Unit 2, these actions include the prelicensing activities which culminated in the issuance of the low power and full power licenses in February and May 1986, respectively. There were about 130 licensing actions completed during this SALP perio During the present rating period, there was evidence of prior planning and assignment of priorities and decision making was at a level that insured management revie Well stated, controlled, and explicit procedures were in place for control of activitie The licensee's resources were generally ample and used in such a manner that a high level of attention was brought to bear on design and engineering issues needing expedited resolutio Reviews and responses were timely, thorough, and technically soun Management participation and involvement were evident in various meetings with the staff and during several site visits by NRC managemen The licensee's management attention has improved the quality of submittals for proposed Technical Specification change However, several recent matters such as Reactor Coolant System unidentified leak rate and extension of several surveillance intervals required two additional inputs before a notice could be published. Also, in one request for Technical Specification changes regarding editorial, typographical errors and clarifying statements, the licensee agreed with the staff that, on one ESF interlock, the FSAR is incorrec Thus, further licensee attention and improvement are require In the case of Nuclear Service Water System the licensee had written internal Technical Specification interpretations and operational procedures to address the sharing aspects of the system in lieu of proposing license amendment Management attention is required in this area to ensure that the Technical Specification reflect the as-built plant conditions and the FSA The licensee demonstrated understanding of the technical issues and carefully studies each NRC question or position for impact on the plant prior to taking action. Conservatism was generally exhibited and approaches were generally sound and thoroug The licensee seemed to closely follow the regulatory environment and took an active role from safety standpoints. The licensee has consistently taken the lead for the nuclear industry to help resolve matters of generic concern. For example, the licensee has participated in the Westinghouse Owners Group for the steam generator tube rupture and small-break LOCA method In a majority of cases, the licensee provided timely responses to NRC positions and requests for information. The licensee has been efficient in responding to follow-on questions. Acceptable resolutions were initially proposed in most case The licensee was always ready to meet with the staff when such a meeting would assist in resolving issues and explaining designs or position On a number of occasions the licensee, on their own initiative, met with the staff to discuss proposed submittals to assure that prior to transmitting the submittals to the NRC, they would be completely responsive to the staff's position The licensee attempts to meet deadlines and notifies NRC when they cannot be met. It appears, however, that the licensee was more responsive to those issues that they considered as having higher priority (i.e., those issues affecting plant operation such.as surveillance extensions and Appendix J exemption)
and should improve the timeliness of responses to NRC concern Issues to which the licensee assigned lower priority frequently required schedule extension Staffing in the licensing area is satisfactor Although experienced individuals seem to be overburdene The fact that the plant is only 17 miles from the corporate office is a plus in that transfers of employees between corporate headquarters and the site can be easily accomplishe With regard to reporting of operational events, it has been
observed that the Licensee Event Report (LER) program at Catawba is adequate. Generally, LER submittals are made on a timely basis and contain adequate information on the event description, event evaluation and corrective actions. An assessment of LER's by the NRC Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data concluded that steady improvement was achieved in the quality of discussions of root cause and safety consequences, however there has been a steady decline in the quality of discussions concerning operator actions. A Quality Validation Inspection Team conducted an audit from July 13 through July 24, 1987, and questioned the licensee's timeliness in determining the reportability of the Nuclear Service Water System design adequacy. This matter will be pursued in the next SALP repor The licensee allows itself to delay reporting of events until an engineering analysis can be performed to show if the plant was in an unanalyzed condition that compromised plant safety. This may take many months and is inconsistent with the staff policy of prompt reportin Management attention is required in the area -of promptly reporting significant event No violations or deviations were identified in this are. Conclusion Category: 2 3. Board Recommendations Increased responsiveness is required on issues not related to operation Training 1. Analysis On March 25, 1987, the licensee completed final INPO accreditation on all their Training Program A reactive inspection following the Catawba Unit 2 depressurization event of June 27, 1986, found that training deficiencies contributed significantly to the even Due to a breakdown in the design and training organization interface, design changes in the steam generator power operated relief valve (PORV)
controllers were not incorporated into operating procedures or the training program. As a result, in the lineup for a 'Loss of Control Room Functional Test', the four steam generator PORV controllers were set at 75% open instead of close When control was switched from the control room to the
local control station the breakers were closed, and the PORVs opened. Additionally, when the local operator attempted to shut the PORVs, he actually caused them to go full ope The open PORVs caused a rapid primary system cooldown and depressurizatio Other contributing factors to this event included inadequate training on the shutdown instruments and controls, and inadequate training on the 'Loss of Control Room Functional Test'
procedure The latter contributed to a reluctance by the control room crew to promptly assist the shutdown panel crew in controlling the plant when obvious abnormal and unexpected plan conditions occurred. The failure to provide adequate licensed operator requalification training on the steam generator PORV design changes was identified as a violation but was not cited due to the Commission Policy Statement on Trainin An evaluation was conducted on the effectiveness of the training programs for licensed operators, non-licensed operators, and non-licensed staf Abnormal plant events were selected including the plant depressurization of June 27, 1986, in which training deficiencies appeared to have been a contributing facto Plant personnel involved were selected for interviews and/or training record reviews to determine training program effectivenes In all cases reviewed, attendance records and examinations showed that the personnel involved had adequately participated in all required training and requalification trainin This was true of licensed operators, non-licensed operators, and maintenance technician Also, for each of the events, the licensee had provided adequate feedback of the identified training need, and had appropriately updated and revised the training programs to correct the deficiencie In the case of the plant depressurization, all licensed operators had received appropriate update trainin A review of the programmatic aspects of the licensed operator training and requalification programs indicated that they were adequately administere There was appropriate control over program analysis, design, development, implementation, and evaluatio The feedback of operating events, design changes, and procedure changes was an established process which resulted in up to date instructio Personnel involved at all levels of the Employee Training and Qualification System were interviewed; including trainers, qualifiers, supervisors, engineers, technicians, and trainee Each interviewee understood the system, what approvals were needed to perform work, and when Quality Assurance notification was require Overall, the training program appeared to be adequat An examination of licensed operator candidates (7 reactor operator, 5 senior reactor operator)
was conducted during September 2-4, 198 All 12 candidates passed the written and oral exam The 100% pass rate represented a substantial improvement over the pass rate of about 80% achieved during the previous SALP perio In May 1987, during NRC walk-downs of Emergency Procedures conducted in the control room, a failure to provide adequate training to assure implementation of emergency operating procedures in regard to the calculation of subcooling margin was found, but was not cited due to the Commission Policy Statement on Trainin An inspection in July 1987 confirmed that adequate operator requalification training on 'Loss of Control Room'
emergency procedures had been conducted, including a review of the June 27, 1986 depressurization even This training included labelling and operation of controllers and transfer of control back to the control room when a situation arose that could not be adequately controlled from the auxiliary shutdown pane Overall during this SALP period, the training program and records were adequate. The 100% pass rate on the September 1986 operator licensing examination was exemplary. Training records reviewed appeared to 'be consistently adequate and complet However, a weakness in the area of Emergency Operating Procedures was evidenced by the operating performance during the depressurization event and by subsequent inspection findings in this are Inadequate training was assigned as a cause for one reactor trip during the perio The licensee had made a substantial commitment to training via the ETQS program, INPO accreditation, construction of a 40,000 square foot training center which was recently completed and purchase of a state of the art site specific simulator to be operational in early 198. Conclusion Category: 2 3. Board Recommendations No change in the NRC's inspection resources is recommende L. Engineering Support 1. Analysis This is a new functional area which encompasses design engineering (D/E)
and onsite engineering support relative to plant design, modification implementation, testing and evaluation of problem This evaluation is based on routine inspections conducted by resident and regional personnel in this area as well as other functional. area It is recognized that typically new plants experience some difficulties as system design problems are discovered during initial stages of plant operation To some degree this has been evidenced at Catawb The licensee has a very talented in house D/E group.with the capability to conduct detailed, timely and thorough analyse Most evaluations are conducted in this manner given the many priorities placed upon the D/E group. A significant number of licensee events, however, involve design deficiencies (24 total).
Some of these can be credited to the difficulty in recognizing all operational aspects of certain designs, but a significant number of these events were caused-by poor coordination, lack of appropriate design information and poor design by D/E and onsite engineerin Poor coordination and lack of timeliness was sometimes evident relative to D/E support. Two violations were issued relative to this weakness (see violations c. and e. below).
In addition, operability evaluations were not always timely, based on resident inspector observation The licensee appears to be improving in this regar Inadequate design control was also evident in several instances during the evaluation period leading to two significant violations, a. and b. listed below. One problem involved poor implementation of a modification to the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine Control Panel provided for alternate shutdown capability for a loss of control room even This lead to a Unit 2 depressurization and safety injectio This event as well as a deviation listed in the Operations Section involved inadequate consideration of human engineering aspect Improved support is necessary in this are The other problem resulted in degradation of the Containment Air Return Fans for both units and the Unit 1 Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve One incident was identified when a special test was inadequately controlled (see violation d below).
Also it appears that D/E personnel sometimes have a minimal involvement in determining post modification test requirements and the involvement has not been formalize More involvement may have prevented some
licensee identified events involving failure to conduct appropriate testin A Catawba Testing Review Committee has appropriately made recommendations for improvement in this are The lack of appropriate D/E information relative to level control of the Westinghouse Model 0 steam generators for Unit 2 contributed to several reactor trips and a number of Engineered Safety Features actuations during the perio Although this problem primarily involves inadequate vendor supplied information, the responsibility ultimately lies with the license An issue also involving D/E was the design of the Nuclear Service Water (NSW) system. This design has required operations personnel to develop difficult to understand actions to assure technical specification required operability of NSW since mid 198 A possible NSW single failure vulnerability issue was raised by site operations personnel in early 1987. Although the licensee appeared to have taken appropriate interim actions, this issue was yet to be resolved at the end of the evaluation perio Also, the intake pit instrumentation has been unreliable and only two instruments were provided leading to several ESF actuations and NSW down tim Although this is a difficult situation to judge since the issues are complicated, it does appear that better support could have benefited operations personne Based on NRC actions and the licensee's own reviews, the licensee has recognized the weaknesses described abov Proposed corrective actions were presented to Region II management on March 6, 1987 and in responses to the violations identified. These improvements include a system expert concept and development of a D/E program called TOPFOR Some of the goals of the TOPFORM program are to provide improved support and interface with site personnel, strengthen the modification process, improved and more formalized design interface and improved documentatio Initial review of licensee intended actions appears to indicate the potential for significant improvemen The improvements had yet to be implemented and time teste Five violations were issued as described below:
a. Severity Level III violation for inadequate design control of a station modification leading to a plant depressurization and safety injection (86-27, Unit 2 only)
b. Severity Level III violation for inadequate design control leading to degraded Containment Air Return Fans (Unit 1 and 2) and Pressurizer PORVs (Unit 1 only) (87-06/87-08)
.
Severity Level IV violation for inadequate engineering f operations, evaluation of an event that damaged support/restraints The interface, (86-03, Unit 1 only)
rious groups esulted in test Severity Level IV violation for failure to implement an timely manne approved procedure for special testing of the Diesel Generator load sequencer panel (86-47, Unit 1 only)
ted as evidenced
'as minor and not Severity Level IV violation for failure to provide adequate
- tive action was measures to evaluate Containment Spray heat exchanger violation fouling (87-06, Unit 2 only)
Conclusion of tests was loss of control ategory: 2 ary system. That tion criteria for 3oard Recommendations s. It should be epressurization The Board noted a lack of timely communication and coordination the operating and
)etween the site and corporate engineering staf this test, engneeingsectio With
?rational and Startup Testing (Unit 2)
1 test, all other Sprocedures and Analysis rsonne )uring the review period, routine inspections were performed by phy of completing
- he regional and resident inspection staff Routine possible until inspections of test procedures, test witnessing, test results md evaluation of review, and evaluation of the licensee's administrative controls from discussions 4hich govern the conduct of the preoperational and startup test fing 100% power arogram were performed as well as inspections relative to cial This construction completio in completing
.be no management Areas inspected during the preoperational timeframe included ielding; preservice inspection (PSI);
Reactor Vessel (RV)
nternals; containment penetrations; spent fuel racks; heating, entilation and air conditioning; and safety related pipe
>upport The startup test inspection program was completed
.1-ith inspection 414/87-16, which was conducted May 11-15, 198 y system water
.icensee management involvement in construction activities eppeared to be adequate and decision making was at a level that follow procedures issured adequate management review. Records were complete, well aview of QA aaintained, and available, it 2 only)
l1ajor Unit 2 preoperational tests completed during the-ssessment period included the Engineered Safety Features (ESF)
Test and Reactor Protection System (RPS) Tes Management involvement and control in assuring quality was evident by well
)tated and defined procedure Records were complete, legible,
3. Board Recommendations NONE V. SUPPORTING DATA AND SUMMARIES A. Licensee Activities During the assessment period, major activities included normal power operations, completion of unit 2 startup program, unit 1 first refueling outage and additional activities as follows:
Unit 1 First Refueling Outage S/G Tube Eddy Current Testing Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Replacement Steam Generator Moisture Separator Modifications Pressurizer PORV Upgrade to Safety Related Inadequate Core Cooling Monitor, Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation Modification High Pressure and'One Low Pressure Turbine Inspection Delaval Diesel Inspections Outage to Repair Letdown Line Weld Failure The unit ended the assessment period conducting normal power operation Unit 2 Full Power License Issued Completion of Startup Testing and Declaration of Commercial Operation Main Generator Stator Replacement Following Phase to Phase Short Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Replacement D5 Steam Generator Level Problems The unit ended the assessment period conducting normal power operation Both Units Rotork Valve Motor Operator Torque Switch Setting Problems Training Programs Fully INPO Accredited Completion of New Training Facility Construction
B. Inspection Activities During the assessment period, routine inspections were performed at the Catawba facility by the resident inspectors and the regional inspection staff. Special inspections were conducted to augment the routine inspection program as follows:
1. QA Team Inspection; November 1985 (Report No. 50-413/85-49, 414/85-58) Technical Specification review, January 1986; (Report N /85-55, 414/85-68)
3. Operational Readiness Team Inspection, January 1986 (Report No. 50-413/86-05, 86-07)
4. Augmented Inspection Team on Depressurization Event, June 1986 (Report 413/86-25, 414/86-27)
5. ATWS Generic Letter 83-28 Team Inspection; July 1986 (Report No. 50-413/86-26, 414/86-29)
6. QA Quality Verification Team Inspection; July 1987 (Report No. 50-413, 414/87-23)
C. Investigation and Allegation Review No major investigative activities occurred during this assessment perio D. Escalated Enforcement Actions 1. Civil Penalties Depressurization Event - Severity Level III Violation, $50,000 C.P. issued November 12, 1986, Order imposing $50,000 CP and amended violation issued April 14, 1987 2. No Civil Penalties Issued a. Access Control, Weapon in Protected Area - Severity Level III, issued March 25, 1986 b. Access Control Vital Area Barrier - Severity Level III, issued June 25, 1986 c. Containment Air Return Fan Cofferdams/Pressurizer PORV Design, one Severity Level III, two Severity Level IV violations issued May 15, 1987
36 Orders Issued None 4. Enforcement Conferences 1-14-86 Access Control - Weapon in Protected Area 4-24-86 Access Control -
Vital Area Barrier 8-11-86 Depressurization Event 4-16-87 Containment Air Return.Fan Cofferdams/Design Issues 6-01-87 Improper Disposal of Safeguards Information (Corporate Office)
E. Licensee Conferences Held During Appraisal Period 1. RH, NRR and licensee management met onsite on November 15, 1985, to assess licensee readiness for Unit 2 licensin.
Commissioner Zech, his Technical Assistant, RH management and licensee management met onsite on April 28, 1986, to discuss operational history and readiness for Unit 2 initial criticality and testin.
RII, NRR and licensee management met onsite on August 8, 1986, to conduct a review of operational history of Catawb.
RII management, the NRR Licensing Project Manager and licensee management met onsite on January 29, 1987 to discuss operational history of Catawb.
RH and licensee management met in the RH Office on March 6, 1987, to discuss adequacy and effectiveness of management control systems in the areas of plant operations, engineering support and communications between operations and design personne F. Confirmation of Action Letters A Confirmation of Action letter was issued July 3, 1986, regarding the Unit 2 depressurization and safety injection which occurred on June 27, 198 G. Licensee Event Report Analysis During the assessment period, 165 LERs for Unit 1 and 2 were analyzed. The distribution of tese events by cause, as determined by the NRC staff, was as follows:
Cause Unit 1 Unit 2 Total Component Failure
21
Design Construction, Fabrication, or
3
Installation Personnel:
- Operating Activity
4
- Maintenance Activity
4
- Test/Calibration Activity
17
- Other
2
Out of calibration
-
2 Other
6
94
165 H. Licensing Activities The assessment of licensing activities was based on licensing actions which included the following:
--
Exemption from General Design Criterion 4
--
Combustible Gas Control System
--
Environmental qualification of safety-related equipment
--
Diesel generator reliability, TDI Owners Group recommendations
--
Main steam line break analysis
--
Appendix R to 10 CFR 50
--
Elimination of arbitrary intermediate breaks
--
Inservice testing of pumps and valves
--
Control room design review Significant amendments included:
Diesel generator reliability, Generic Letter 84-15 Exceptions to experience requirements for SRO candidates Allowed time for operation with ice condenser doors in a closed and inoperable condition Establishment of a single Technical Specification document for both units
on one-time basis, of 18-month surveillances d with ESF testin of time for resolution of accumulator tank instrumenta-at various power levels e and steam generator rupture analysis io Twelve occurred on g the allowed out-of-service times for reactor trip alog channels
--
ion of a boron dilution mitigation system the alarm/trip setpoint for containment radiation from 62% power due to a g the allowed outage time of auxiliary building filtered am feedwater header ystem steam generator (S/G)
- ionary enforcement actions were granted to the licensee ting perio from 97% power due to an edwater control valve 2 held regularly with the licensee staff to discuss the chedule for completion of licensing action In
. tings were held with the licensee to discuss and work rom 91% power due to an solution of the following technical issues:
p trip led to a turbine 1 generator reliability le gas control system
)m 100% power due to a as elimination strument pressure gave a
.B&W fuel for.Catawba and McGuire Stations lant System flo testing of pumps and valves ctivity om 0%
critical)
erator failed to block ins vs. Functional Areas frmb 100% power due to D V IV III II Ir supply card caused a
.EA/UNIT N /2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 f 44% power due to a erations 2/2 9/3 erro Ten control rods ical Controls 2/2 2/2 te flux rate tri nce 0/1 3/2 ance 2/1 4/4 m 85% power due to
)tection the wrong power range
- y Preparedness 1/1 1/1 in Feedwater regulation 1/1 2/2 2/0 1/1 Programs and m 85% power due to a strative Controls 2/1 e caused a main generator ing Quality s to shut causing the n Activities-ing Support 2/1 1/2 Iom 70% power due to a etional and Startup X/1 X/1 nnel tripped the wrong ic (Unit 2)
2/3 6/6 26/18 3/
k. November 18, 1986, automatic trip from 0% (not critical)
power due to a defective procedur Calibration of RTDs caused an OTOT trip signa. January 31,. 1987, automatic trip from 25% power due to a defective procedure and a training deficiency. Inadequate control of turbine loading led to a high-flux low power tri Site specific simulator training would have prevented this tri m. March 6, 1987, manual trip from 58% power due to an unknown caus A Main Feedwater control valve closed causing impending low-low level in S/G ' n. April 9, 1987, automatic trip from 100% power due to an installation deficiency. Moisture in a terminal box caused a blown fuse which caused a Main Feedwater isolation valve closure and low-low S/G leve o. April 9, 1987, manual trip from 0% power (not critical) due to an equipment failur DRPI was lost with Shutdown Bank
'A' rods out during a startu. Unit 2 a. May 17, 1986, automatic trip from 15% power due to an equipment failure. Malfunction of a reverse purge valve in Main Feedwater led to low-low S/G leve May 18, 1986, manual trip from 15% power due to a design deficiency. Poor S/G level control caused a Main Feedwater pump tri c. May 19, 1986, automatic trip from 17% power due to a design deficienc Poor S/G level control caused low-low S/G leve d. July 8, 1986, automatic trip from 32% power due to personnel erro Inadequate operator control of Main Feedwater led to low-low S/G level (level control sensitivity contributed).
e. August 4, 1986, manual trip from 48% power due to an unknown caus Main Feedwater isolation valves closed leading to impending low-low S/G leve f. November 20, 1986, automatic trip from 85% power due to an equipment malfunctio An out of calibration pressure switch led to a loss of Main Feedwater, a turbine trip and subsequent reactor tri g. November 22, 1986, automatic trip from 25% power due to personnel error, equipment failure and defective procedur Inadequate control of Main Feedwater led to a low-low S/G leve A failed circuit card in the pump controller contribute h. January 28, 1987, automatic trip from 100% power due to equipment malfunction. A test cable shorted causing Main Feedwater control valves to close causing low-low S/G leve i. February 24, 1987, automatic trip from 100% power due to a personnel error. A shift supervisor inappropriately told an operator to reset a breaker which caused a Main Feedwater pump trip, turbine trip and subsequent reactor tri March 23, 1987, automatic trip from 100% power due to equipment malfunction during a load rejection tes Turbine Emergency Trip System low pressure caused a turbine trip signal which caused a reactor tri k. May 5, 1987, manual trip from 100% power due to a management/QA weaknes Inadequate controls for replacing a relay caused relay actuation and loss of cooling water to Reactor Coolant Pump meter A design deficiency in the chilled water system contribute. May 8, 1987, manual trip from 65% power due to an equipment failur A failed process control card caused a Main Feedwater valve closure and impending low-low S/G leve K. Effluent Summary for Catawba, Units 1 and 2 1985 1986 Gaseous Effluents (curies)
Fission and Activation Gases 2.77E+2 2.72E+3 (9.37E+3)
(8.04E+3)
Iodine and Particulates 4.OOE-5 1.47E-2 (9.62E-2)
(4.60E-2)
Liquid Effluents (curies)
Fission and Activation Products 1.26E+0 7.64E-1 (2.59E+0)
(2.11E+0)
Tritium 1.75E+2 2.36E+2 (7.35E+2)
(7.43E+2)
Valves in parentheses are Region II averages for PWR's Whole Body Dose (mrem)
0.88 2.2