IR 05000269/1987022

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Insp Repts 50-269/87-22,50-270/87-22 & 50-287/87-22 on 870615-16.No Violations & Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Closeout of Open Insp Items
ML16161A839
Person / Time
Site: Oconee  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 07/14/1987
From: Lawyer L, Long A, Shymlock M
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML16161A838 List:
References
RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-2.F.1, TASK-TM 50-269-87-22, 50-270-87-22, 50-287-87-22, NUDOCS 8707230352
Download: ML16161A839 (7)


Text

tkG UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

101 MARIETTA STREET, N.V ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:

50-269/87-22, 50-270/87-22, and 50-287/87-22 Licensee:

Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Docket Nos.: 50-269, 50-270, License Nos.: DPR-38, DPR-47, and and 50-287 DPR-55 Facility Name:

Oconee 1, 2, and 3 Inspection Conducted:

June 15-1.6, 1987 Inspectors:

  • -'t A. R.,Long Date Signe L. L. Lawyer Date Signed Approved by:

M. B. Shymlock, Section Chie Signed Operations Branch Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY Scope:

This routine, announced inspection was in the area of closeout of open inspection item Results:

No violations or deviations were identifie B70715 PDR ADOCK 05000269 PDR

REPORT DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted Licensee Personnel:

  • J. N. Pope, Superintendent
  • C L. Harlin, Compliance Engineer
  • T. C. Matthews, Nuclear Production Specialist, Compliance F. E. Owens, Compliance Specialist D. M. Clardy, Planning and Scheduling Engineer, Technical Support B. K. Milsap, Maintenance Services Engineer, Technical Support C. C. Jennings, Station Emergency Planner W. J. Washington, Production Specialist II, Maintenance Planning and Scheduling R. Bugert, Site Training Director Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, security force members and office personne NRC Resident Inspectors
  • J. C. Bryant, Senior Resident Inspector
  • L. D. Wert, Resident Inspector
  • Attended Exit Interview 2. Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized in an exit interview on June 16, 1987 with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 abov The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed the inspection findings, including the closure of the items listed below. No dissenting comments were received from the license ITEM NUMBER STATUS DESCRIPTION/REFERENCE PARAGRAPH VIO 269/85-25-01 Closed Failure to Report Trains A and B of 270/85-25-01 Containment Hydrogen Monitors Out 287/85-25-01 of Commission (Paragraph 3.)

IFI 269/84-25-01 Closed Implementation of the Employee 270/84-24-01 Training and Qualification System 287/84-27-01 (Paragraph 5.a)

IFI 269/84-25-02 Closed Inclusion of Backup Licensees in 270/84-24-02 All Facets of Requalification 287/84-27-02 Training (Paragraph 5.b)

IFI 269/85-09-01 Closed Resolution of Discrepancy in 270/85-09-01 Maximum Allowed Interval for 287/85-09-01 Biweekly Preventive Maintenance (Paragraph 5.c)

IFI 269/85-09-02 Closed Development of Preventive Mainte 270/85-09-02 nance Effectiveness Evaluation 287/85-09-02 (Paragraph 5.d)

IFI 269/85-09-04 Closed Resolution of Grace Period for 270/85-09-04 Declaring a Site Emergency 287/85-09-04 (Paragraph 5.e)

The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)

(Closed) Violation 269,270,287/85-25-01:

Failure to Report Trains A and B of Containment Hydrogen Monitors Out of Commission Background:

Contrary to 10 CFR 50.44(b)

and an NRC Confirmatory Order requiring implementation of NUREG-0737 Item II.F.1.6, Trains A and B of the licensee's Unit 1 Reactor Building Hydrogen Monitoring System were inoperable, from March 6, 1985, to March 26, 1985, due to failed calibration Resolution:

The licensee response dated May 2, 1986 was considered acceptable by the NR Procedure OP/0/A/1102/23, Operation of Containment Hydrogen Recombiner System (CHRS),

revised in February 1986, states that if all hydrogen analyzers are out of service and information is not available to determine the hydrogen concentration in the reactor building following a Loss of Coolant Accident, the CHRS shall be placed in service within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of Emergency Safeguard Features actuatio The licensee submitted a proposed Technical Specification amendment concerning containment hydrogen monitoring to the NRC by letter dated October 8, 198 The amendment has not yet been approved, but is being implemented by the licensee as if approve The proposed Table 3.5.6.1, Accident Monitoring Instrumentation, requires that 1 of 2 hydrogen monitors be operable at all times other than for cold shutdown and refueling outage Proposed Technical Specification Table 4.1.1 Item 57

requires a monthly check and an annual calibration. These proposed Technical Specification requirements are implemented in Procedures IP 253/5A,5B and IP 253/6A,6B for the monthly check and annual calibration, respectivel The inspectors concluded that the licensee had corrected the previous problem and developed corrective action to preclude recurrence of similar problem Corrective actions stated in the licensee response have been implemented. The item is therefore close.

Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during the inspectio. Licensee Action on Previous Inspector Followup Items (92701) (Closed)

Inspector Followup Items 269/84-25-01, 270/84-24-01 and 287/84-27-01: Implementation of Employee Qualification Training System Background:

At the time of NRC inspection 84-25, the Oconee Nuclear Station Training Department was engaged in many changes in their on-the-job training program, most notably the pending implementation of the Employee Training and Qualification System (ETQS). The items yet to be addressed were the extent of Training Department involvement, integration of the Senior Reactor Operator program, and how many people would be committed to the implementation of the progra Resolution:

The Employee Training and Qualification System (ETQS)

has been implemente Training Department involvement has been increased by changing the reporting of the ETQS coordinator to the Director of Operator Training at Ocone The ETQS coordinator works through some 121 trainers of which 42 are certified as qualifier The Senior Reactor Operator and Reactor Operator programs are currently integrated with classes LRO 10-86 and LSO 10-86 being conducted concurrentl Based on the above information, this item is close (Closed)

Inspector Followup Items 269/84-25-02, 270/84-24-02, and 287/84-27-02:

Inclusion of Backup Licensees in All Facets of Requalification Training

'@

Background:

In 1984, 10 CFR 55 Appendix A required that backup licensees partici pate in the licensed operator requalification program "except to the extent that their normal duties preclude the need for specific retraining in particular areas."

The Oconee requalification program permitted backup licensees (but not licensed operators) to be excluded from all lectures and to use a self-study technique to prepare for the annual examination segments. 10 CFR 55 did not permit exclusive use of self-study in lieu of a lecture serie In addition, the Oconee Requalification Program required that both licensed operators and backup licensees be judged by the same criteria relative to examination scores and the need for remedial trainin The criteria being utilized for removal from licensed duties (which are related to the aforementioned criteria) were differen Resolution:

The inspectors reviewed Periodic Training Licensed Operator Requal ification revised November 29, 1986 and approved in a letter to H. B. Tucker, Vice President of Duke Power Corporation Nuclear Production, from Daryl Hood, USNRC Operator Licensing Branch, dated January 28, 1987. This is Duke Power Company Standard #306 Opera tions Employee Training and Qualification System. This review was conducted to determine whether backup licensees participate in the Licensed Operator requalification program to the same extent as licensed operators and senior operators, whether the same criteria are applied for entry into the remedial and accelerated requalifica tion programs, and whether the criteria for removal from licensed duties are the same for backup licensees as it is for licensed operator It was determined that the previous contrasts and requalification program internal contradictions have been eliminated by removing any distinction between types of licenses (backup and licensed operator) in the requalification program so that all provisions apply to all licensed person Based on the above information, this item is close (Closed)

Inspector Followup Item 269,270,287/85-09-01:

Resolution of Discrepancy in Maximum Allowed Interval for Biweekly Preventive Maintenance Background:

Oconee Technical Specification 4.0.2 stated that biweekly surveil lance requirements will be performed within a maximum of 20 day However, the licensee's Materials Manual 3.2.1, Scheduling Preventive Maintenance, Attachment 1, stated that the maximum interval between biweekly preventive maintenances was 21 day *

NRC Inspection Report 269,270,287/85-09 also documented a concern that preventive maintenances for equipment recently upgraded to the safety-related category might be performed under procedures designed for non-safety related equipment and would therefore not be adequately tracked, or have adequate acceptance criteria, retention of records, and -periodic revie No specific instances were identified in the inspection repor Resolution:

The inspectors verified that the maximum interval for biweekly periodic maintenance was changed from 21 to 20 days in the Equipment Data Base Manual, which is the controlling document for the Preven tive Maintenance Report (PMRPT)

computer program which controls maintenance scheduling. This is now in line with Technical Specifi cation and procedural requirement The inspectors discussed with the licensee the processes used to change applicable procedures when equipment is reclassified as safety related. As required by the Quality Standards Manual, the Engineering Support Staff reviews equipment upgrades to ensure necessary proce dures are correspondingly upgrade Based on the above information, this item is close (Closed)

Inspector Followup Item 269,270,287/85-09-02:

Development of Preventive Maintenance Effectiveness Evaluation Background:

The Oconee Preventive Maintenance (PM)

program did not contain a method for determining the effectiveness of the testing frequencies through utilization of failure trending or other technique Resolution:

The inspectors verified through discussions with licensee personnel that Maintenance Department personnel routinely trend equipment failures on both safety-related and non-safety related equipment when failure rates seem to have changed significantl Results of this trending, after appropriate review, are factored into the PM program testing frequencies as applicable. The failure rates are based upon experience at Oconee as well as other Duke Power Company facilities, Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) data, and Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System (NPRDS)

dat This determination of PM program effectiveness, although not rigidly formalized, seems to have resulted in appropriate changes to PM content and frequency in such cases as Low Pressure Injection Cooler Cleaning, the Reactor Building (RB)

Cooler Cleaning, the Main Turbine Inspection and the Chemical Pump Testing. The licensee stated that they are planning to make the PM effectiveness program more forma (Closed)

Inspector Followup Item 269,270,287/85-09-04:

Resolution of Grace Period for Declaring Site Emergency Background:

Procedure RB/O/B/1000/01 stated that all alarms lost for 15 minutes was a criterion for declaring a site emergenc The criteria in NUREG 0654 did not provide a 15 minute grace perio Resolution:

Revisions 86-2 and 86-3 of the Oconee Nuclear Station Emergency Plan were approved by NRC letter dated February 6, 198 Included in the approved Revisions was a change in the classification of loss of control room alarms from a site emergency to an aler A fifteen minute grace period before declaring the alert was approve Based on the above information, the item is closed.