IR 05000266/1981023
| ML20041B225 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 01/28/1982 |
| From: | Guldemond W, Hague R, Konklin J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20041B201 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-266-81-23, 50-301-81-23, NUDOCS 8202230405 | |
| Download: ML20041B225 (7) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-266/81-23; 50-301/81-23 Docket No. 50-266; 50-301 License No. DPR-24; DPR-27 Licensee: Wisconsin Electric Power Company 231 West Michigan Milwaukee, WI 53203
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I Facility Name: Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2 Inspection At: Point Beach Site, Two Rivers, WI Inspection Conducted: December 1-31, 1981
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Inspectors:
W.
. Guldemond
,f 7/78 sb R
. Hagu p7/5f2
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AM Approved By:
J.
Konklin, Chief f/E7/72.
ctor Projects Section 2A
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Inspection Summary Inspection on December 1-31, 1981 (Report No. 50-266/81-23;'50-301/81-23)
Areas Inspected: Routine resident inspection of Operational Safety Verifi-cation, Monthly Maintenance Observation, Monthly Surveillance observation, Followup _on Licensee Event Reports, IE Bulletin Followup, Plant Trips, Followup on Items of Noncompliance, and Refueling Startup Testing. The inspection involved a total of 96 inspector-hours onsite by two inspectors including 21 inspector-hours off-shifts.
Results: Of eight areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were identi-fied in seven areas. One item of noncompliance was identified in one area (Failure to follow maintenance procedures-Paragraph 3).
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DETAILS 1.
' Persons Contacted
.*G.'A. Reed,= Manager, Nuclear Operations
- J. J. Zach, General-Superintendent
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- T. J. Koehler, Operations Superintendent J. C. Reisenbuechler, I&C Superintendent W. J. Herrman, Maintenance & Construction Superintendent R.'S. Bredvad, Health Physicist
- R. E. Link, EQR Superintendent
- F. A. Zaman, Staff Services Supervisor i
The inspection also talked with and interviewed members of the Opera-l tions, Maintenance, Health Physics, and Instrument and Control Sections.
- Denotes personnel attending exit interviews
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2.
Operational Safety Verification
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The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the month of-December 1981. The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of Unit I i
containment, the auxiliary buildings and both turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify-that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The inspector, by observation and direct interview,
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verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. During the month of December 1981, the inspector walked down the accessible portions of the safety injection, containment. spray, RHR, diesel generating, auxiliary feedwater, service water and emergency electrical systems to verify operability. The inspector also witnessed portions-of the radioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste shipments and barreling.
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under technical specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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3.
Monthly Maintenance Observation Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to verify that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.
The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certi-fled; radiological controls were implemented; and, fire prevention controls were implemented.
Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenaace which may affect system performance.
The inspector reviewed the maintenance procedures used for reactor coolant pump disassembly / inspection / reassembly during Unit I refueling 9.
Two items were identified in the procedures. The first item involved Step 2.6, which states "With the plant at full load, record the data indicated on Table A of Appendix A in the column labeled (BM) before maintenance." This data is pump performance data, in-cluding vibrations, cooling water temperatures, etc.
Line item 12 in Appendix A requires the power level at which the data was taken to be recorded. For both pumps the entry was 0% power. This is in violation of Technical Specification 15.6.8.1, which requires that the plant be operated and maintained in accordance with approved procedures, and is an item of noncompliance.
Licensee maintenance supervision has reviewed this item with mainten-ante personnel, stressing the importance and necessity of procedural adherence. Requirements for documented approvals of procedure changes were also reviewed. This corrective action is considered appropriate and this item is considered to be closed.
The second item involved Step 3.6, which specifies that the pump flywheel covers be bolted in place.
Both maintenance procedures had notations that the step was only partially complete. This was dis-cussed with the Assistant to the Superintendent of Maintenance and Construction, who verified that the step had, in fact, been completed but that the procedure had not been so annotated.
Following completion of maintenance on the Unit I reactor coolant pumps, the inspector verified that these systems had been returned to service properly.
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4.
Monthly Surveillance Observation The inspector observed technical specifications required surveillance testing on the Unit 2 analog system (ICP 2.1) and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated that limiting conditions for operation were accomplished, that test results conformed with technical specifi-cations and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
5.
Licensee Event Report s Followup Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, and that immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specifications.
Number Title 50-266/81-017/01T-0 Steam generator inspection results 50-266/81-081/01T-0 Potentially excessive stresses in masonry walls 50-266/81-014/01T-0 Containment isolation valve leakage On December 10, 1981, following rephasing of Unit I to the line at the end of the refueling outage, both steam flow channels for loop A were discovered to be indicating zero flow. These channels provide input to reactor trip and steam line isolation logic.
Investigation revealed that the zero flow indications were a result of improper zero settings on both steam flow transmitters.
In such a configuration neither channel was capable of performing its safety function. The licensee immediately placed one channel in the trip condition. The second channel was placed in the trip condition two hours later.
Both transmitters were realigned and put back in service approximately 4 1/2 hours after discovery of the problem.
The licensee documented the event in Licensee Event Report Number 50-266/81-019/01T-0. This report states in part "Although the exact cause of the transmitter misalignment cannot be determined, the cause is believed to be related to contractor activity in the area; either by movement of equipment in the area or by an inadvertent adjastment of the exposed zero adjust screw by an unauthorized person." In addition to realignment, the stated corrective action was, " Contractors will be reinstructed as to the caution required while working in sensitive areas."
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The inspector followed up on this event by reviewing calibration data for the transmitters before and after the occurrence, reviewing the physical configuration of the transmitters, including the zero adjust screws, and querying the licensee as to preventive measures. Based on these reviews it was determined that more than a month had elapsed between initial satisfactory calibration and discovery of the mis-alignment. During this period there was considerable traffic in the vicinity of the transmitters.
For an extended period of time the area around the transmitters was the center of activity for a con-tractor radiographic inspection of a reactor coolant pump. The zero adjust screws protrude from the front of the transmitters approximately 1/4 inch and are not secured in any manner. A certain positive force is required to turn the zero adjust screws.
These findings / observations support the licensee's contentions that the misalignment was caused by movement of the zero adjust screw, particularly in view of the fact that realignment of one of the transmitters was accomplished by simply adjusting the transmitter zero. However, as of the end of the inspection period, the licensee had not established any positive means to preclude untoward movement of the zero adjust screws on these or any of the other transmitters in or out of containment. As such, this item remains open and will be the subject of further inspection activity.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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IE Bulletin Followup i
The inspectors reviewed all outstanding bulletins and determined that none could be closed out.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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?lant Trips Due to a failure of source range detector N31B, Unit 1 experienced two reactor trips on December 9, 1981. The first occurred during an approach to criticality following rod worth measurements for physics testing. N31B spiked high, causing the trip. The reactor was not yet critical when the trip occurred. The second trip occurred imme-diately af ter the trip breakers were shut following the first trip.
N31B failed high, causing the trip breakers to open. Rod withdrawal had not begun at the time of the second trip. The licensee bypassed N31B and proceeded with physics testing.
Subsequent to the trips a discussion was held with Region III per-sonnel concerning reportability pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72.
Based on the circumstances of the trips and the notifications made it was decided that for these particular trips an ENS notification was not required. However, it was noted that this decision was not to be taken as a general interpretation of 10 CFR 50.72 and similar events in the future should be reported via ENS. The licensee acknewledged this position.
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At 6:30 a.m. on December 11, 1981, Unit 1 experienced an automatic power range low power reactor trip during turbine startup. The cause of the trip was personnel error in that the operator failed to block the low power reactor trip as required by procedure. All systems functioned normally and reactor startup was commenced at 6:40 a.m.
The necessity for procedure use/ compliance was discussed with the operator. This corrective action is considered appropriate for the specific error. The inspector expressed concern regarding personnel errors involving failure to follow procedures.
I. recent example noted was the inadvertent isolation of Unit 2 Train A high head safety injection.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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Followup on Items of Noncompliance The inspector reviewed docketed records relative to items of non-compliance and determined that there were no outstanding items of noncompliance.
9.
Startup Testing Refueling The inspectors monitored Unit I post-refueling startup testing as indicated below. The tests were monitored to ascertain whether they were conducted in accordance with technically adequate and approved procedures and Technical Specification requirements.
On December 4, 1981, the inspector observed performance of cold rod drop testing.
Prior to commencing the testing, the inspector reviewed the prerequisites and initial conditions. Based on this review it was determined that the plant pressure of 330 psig was not in accord-ance with the procedural requirement of greater than or equal to 375 psig. This was pointed out to the Superintendent-Reactor Engineering.
Based on discussions with Operations personnel it was determined that the 375 psig value was operationally inappropriate, being too close to the 415 psig setpoint of the low temperature overpressure mitigating system. The procedure was changed to allow the tests to be conducted at a lower pressure. No other discrepancies were noted.
On December 7,1981, the inspector observed performance of WMTP 3.2,
" Check Resistance vs Temperature Characteristics of RTD and Incore Thermocouple Response During IIeatup." No discrepancies were noted.
On December 9,1981, the inspector observed rod bank worth measurements using rod swap. No discrepancies were noted. The licensee conducted the tests at a dilution rate less than that used during the May, 1981 Unit 2 testing. All worth measurements were within the review and acceptance criteria.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection period and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities.
The licensee acknowledged these findings.
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