IR 05000266/2025001

Integrated Inspection Report 05000266/2025001 and 05000301/2025001

ML25132A281
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	05/13/2025
From:	Sanchez-Santiago E NRC/RGN-III/DORS/RPB2
To:	Durbin M Point Beach
References
EA-24-101, EAF-RIII-2025-0076 IR 2025001
Download: ML25132A281 (1)

Text

SUBJECT:

POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000266/2025001 AND 05000301/2025001

Dear Michael Durbin:

On March 31, 2025, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Point Beach Nuclear Plant. On April 18, 2025, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Point Beach Nuclear Plant.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Point Beach Nuclear Plant.

May 13, 2025 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, Elba M. Sanchez Santiago, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000266 and 05000301 License Nos. DPR-24 and DPR-27 Enclosure:

As stated cc w/ encl: Distribution via LISTSERV Signed by Sanchez Santiago, Elba on 05/13/25

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Point Beach Nuclear Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Failure to Expand Scope of Testing Required by the Inservice Testing Program Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000266,05000301/2025001-01 Open/Closed

[H.7] -

Documentation 71111.12 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.55a(f)(4)(ii) when the licensee failed to ensure Inservice tests conducted during successive code of record intervals complied with the requirements of the latest edition and addenda of the ASME OM Code incorporated by reference in paragraph (a)(1)(iv) of this section no more than 18 months before the start of the code of record interval. Specifically, following the failure of safety injection relief valve 2SI-887, the licensee concluded that they did not need to test 1SI-887, despite the test being required by the Inservice Testing (IST)program.

Additional Tracking Items

Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status NOV 05000266,05000301/2024012-01 Senior Operator stood watch as Shift Manager while license not active EAF-RIII-2025-0076 92702 Closed

PLANT STATUS

Unit 1 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On February 27, 2025, the unit began coastdown for the upcoming refueling outage. On March 22, 2025, operators shutdown Unit 1 from approximately 88 percent power for the scheduled refueling outage. The unit remained shutdown for the remainder of the inspection period.

Unit 2 began the inspection period at rated thermal power and remained at or near full power throughout the remainder of the inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs)in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) Unit 1 containment spray system, trains A and B on January 16, 2025

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

(1) Fire zones 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, and 310:

control building 4160V vital switchgear room, D-05 and D-06 battery rooms, diesel generator area, and air compressor room on January 17, 2025

(2) Fire zones 304N and 304S:

control building auxiliary feedwater pump area on February 18, 2024

(3) Fire zone 318:

Unit 1 and 2 control building cable spreading room on February 27, 2025

(4) Fire zones 138, 139, and 142A:

primary auxiliary building 8' central area and motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump rooms on March 21, 2025

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during the Unit 1 shutdown for refueling outage 42 on March 21 and 22, 2025.

Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator simulator training on February 10, 2025.

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:

(1)2SI-887, safety injection test line relief valve after failing as-found test

(2) Reactor protection system trip relay maintenance rule status

(3) D-05, 125VDC station battery and D-07, battery charger

Quality Control (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance and quality control activities to ensure the following SSC remains capable of performing its intended function:

(1) Emergency diesel generator fuel oil quality control activities

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:

(1) Elevated risk due to turbine trip testing, on January 23, 2025

(2) Elevated risk due to fuel reconstitution activities on January 29, 2025

(3) Elevated risk due to failure of anticipated transient without scram mitigating system actuation circuitry (AMSAC) P-20 bistable on February 5, 2025

(4) Elevated risk during Unit 1 lowered inventory on March 25, 2025

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensees justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) Emergency diesel generator, G-04, lack of oil found on outlet of air start motors

(2) Functionality of FLEX radios

(3) Alternating current electrical power circuit operability with low gas pressure on switchyard breaker

(4) Operability of Unit 2 B main feedwater isolation valve, 2CS-3125, following identification of low air accumulator pressure

(5) Operability of SW-183 following identification of leak by

71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Partial)

(1)

(Partial)

The inspectors evaluated Unit 1 refueling outage 42 activities from March 11, 2025, to March 31, 2025.

71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk

The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:

Post Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

(1) Post maintenance pump run for the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump following relay replacement and calibrations on January 29, 2025

(2) Post maintenance testing of the anticipated transient without scram mitigating system actuation circuitry (AMSAC) P-20 bistable following replacement on February 5, 2025

(3) Post maintenance testing of the 1B52-15A breaker following replacement on February 7, 2025

(4) Post maintenance run of the G-05 gas turbine generator following bearing replacement on February 24, 2025

(5) Post maintenance test of the D-07 125VDC battery charger following maintenance on March 19, 2025

Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

(1)1ICP 02.008-1, nuclear instrumentation power range axial offset calibration on January 14, 2025

(2) TS 83, G-03 emergency diesel generator monthly load test on February 26, 2025 (3)2ICP 13.016F, Unit 2 steam flow calibration on February 27, 2025

(4) IT 545C, leakage reduction and preventive maintenance program test of containment spray system when greater than or equal to 350 degrees Fahrenheit Unit 2, on March 13, 2025

Inservice Testing (IST) (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) IT 08A, Cold Start of Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump and Valve Test Unit 1, on February 7, 2025

71114.06 - Drill Evaluation

Additional Drill and/or Training Evolution (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated:

(1) Drill and exercise performance (DEP) opportunity during licensed operator requalification as-found simulator scenario on February 10,

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

IE01: Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.01)===

(1) Unit 1 (January 1 through December 31, 2024)

(2) Unit 2 (January 1 through December 31, 2024)

IE03: Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.02) (2 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 (January 1 through December 31, 2024)

(2) Unit 2 (January 1 through December 31, 2024)

IE04: Unplanned Scrams with Complications (USwC) Sample (IP Section 02.03) (2 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 (January 1 through December 31, 2024)

(2) Unit 2 (January 1 through December 31, 2024)

71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

(1) Identification of the measured reaction rate in a Unit 1 core location that was higher than predicted

(2) On watch senior reactor operator not cleanly shaven

OTHER ACTIVITIES

- TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL

===92702 - Follow-Up on Traditional Enforcement Actions Including Violations, Deviations, Confirmatory Action Letters, and Orders The inspectors reviewed the licensees response to NRC Biennial Requalification Program Inspection, Notice of Violation (NOV)05000266/2024012-01; 05000301/2024012-01 to verify if the reason, corrective actions taken and planned to address recurrence, and the date when full compliance will be achieved for this violation is adequately addressed.

Follow-Up on Traditional Enforcement Actions Including Violations, Deviations, Confirmatory Action Letters, and Orders===

(1) The inspectors conducted a review of the licensees response to a Severity Level IV Violation (EA-24-101) concerning a senior operator that did not maintain watch-standing proficiency during the 2nd quarter of 2023 that assumed the Shift Manager (SM) watch station in accordance with IP 92702, Followup on Corrective Actions for Violations and Deviations. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed action request items, corrective action program entries, and causal evaluations. The inspectors also reviewed licensee management assignment of responsibility for implementing corrective actions and licensee procedure/expectation changes to ensure full compliance with requirements.

The inspectors determined that corrective actions have been fully implemented.

The inspectors concluded that information regarding the reason for the violation is accurate, that the corrective actions to correct the violation and prevent recurrence have been implemented, and that full compliance for this violation has been achieved.

Based on the above, this violation is closed.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Failure to Expand Scope of Testing Required by the Inservice Testing Program Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000266,05000301/2025001-01 Open/Closed

[H.7] -

Documentation 71111.12 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.55a(f)(4)(ii) when the licensee failed to ensure Inservice tests conducted during successive code of record intervals complied with the requirements of the latest edition and addenda of the ASME OM Code incorporated by reference in paragraph (a)(1)(iv) of this section no more than 18 months before the start of the code of record interval. Specifically, following the failure of safety injection relief valve 2SI-887, the licensee concluded that they did not need to test 1SI-887, despite the test being required by the Inservice Testing (IST)program.

Description:

The safety injection system header is protected from overpressure by 2SI-887, safety injection test line relief valve. On October 22, 2024, during refueling outage 2R40, 2SI-887 was replaced as part of a planned preventative maintenance task every five refueling outages. On November 11, 2024, maintenance personnel performed as-found testing of the removed 2SI-887 valve. The valve failed to lift when pressurized to 2000psig, which is greater than the maximum lift setpoint acceptance criterion of 1797.35psig. The licensee wrote AR 2501382 to document the issue and AR 2501984 to generate a work request to inspect the failed valve.

The licensees American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code of Record for the Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants (OM) is the 2017 Edition. Mandatory Appendix I, Inservice Testing of Pressure Relief Devices, of the OM Code defines the requirements for 2SI-887, a pressure relief device used for overpressure protection. ASME OM requirement I-1350(c)(1) states in part:

For each valve tested for which the as-found set-pressure (first test actuation)exceeds the greater of either the +/-tolerance limit of the Owner-established set pressure acceptance criteria of subparagraph I-1310(e) or +/-3% of valve nameplate set-pressure, two additional valves shall be tested from the same valve group.

In AR 2501382, the licensee stated that no scope expansion was required after the failed test on 2SI-887, with the justification that it is the only valve in its group. The inspectors questioned whether 2SI-887 and 1SI-887, a similar valve on the opposite unit, should be part a of the same group. They also questioned the valves thermal relief classification, as a station component maintenance program procedure, CMP 2.3, Relief/Safety Valves, indicated that they are thermal relief valves. The licensee determined that they had an error in their classification, and the two valves should be a part of one group, and that they are not only thermal relief valves, but also have an overpressure protection function. They wrote a procedure change request to correctly classify the valves in CMP 2.3 and added the replacement and testing 1SI-887 to the cope for the next Unit 1 refueling outage.

Corrective Actions: The licensee plans to group 1SI-887 and 2SI-887 in one valve group and to update their classification from thermal relief valves to overpressure protection valves.

Additionally, they replaced 1SI-887 in the Unit 1 refueling outage, and will perform as-found testing.

Corrective Action References: AR 2504288, 2505199

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The licensees failure to expand the scope of testing to include 1SI-887 after identifying a failure of 2SI-887 was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the ASME OM code requires additional valves in the same group to be tested following a failure, but the licensee had concluded that they did not need to test 1SI-887.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more-than-minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, 1SI-887 could have degraded performance that would go undetected without scope expansion.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power.

The inspectors determined that this finding is of very low safety significance (Green)because they answered No to all Exhibit 2, Section A, Mitigating SSCs and PRA Functionality, screening questions.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.7 - Documentation: The organization creates and maintains complete, accurate, and up-to-date documentation. The licensee failed to expand the scope of relief valve testing because their relief valve procedure had incorrectly classified 1SI-887 and 2SI-887 in two separate groups and as thermal relief valves.

Enforcement:

Violation: Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50.55a(f)(4)(ii) requires, in part, Inservice tests to verify operational readiness of pumps and valves, whose function is required for safety, conducted during successive code of record intervals must comply with the requirements in the latest edition and addenda of the ASME OM Code incorporated by reference in paragraph (a)(1)(iv) of this section on the date no more than 18 months before the start of the code of record interval.

The licensees ASME Code of Record for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants is the 2017 Edition. ASME OM Code, 2017 Edition, Mandatory Appendix I, Paragraph I-1350(c)(1) states, for each valve tested for which the as-found set-pressure (first test actuation) exceeds the greater of either the +/-tolerance limit of the Owner-established set pressure acceptance criteria of subpara. I-1310(e) or +/-3% of valve nameplate set-pressure, two additional valves shall be tested from the same valve group.

Contrary to the above, on November 20, 2024, after the as-found set-pressure exceeded

+/-3% of valve nameplate set-pressure, the licensee did not test additional valves from the same valve group. Specifically, 2SI-887 was pressurized to 2000psig and did not lift, which is greater than 3 percent of the valve nameplate set-pressure of 1745psig, and the licensee concluded that the only remaining valve in the valve group, 1SI-887, did not need to be tested.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Minor Violation 71152A Minor Violation: On December 13, 2024, the licensee experienced issues with the control room emergency filtration system. At 1211, the licensee entered Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.9, condition C for two control room recirculation fans and two control room emergency fans being inoperable. One of the required actions for this LCO is to initiate actions to implement mitigating actions. These actions are specified in Technical Requirements Manual 3.7.9, one of which is to verify that 8 self contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) units are available in the event of a radiological exposure. One of these SCBA units was intended for use by the Unit 2 operations supervisor if a radiological condition exists when the control room emergency filtration system is inoperable. The licensee resolved the issues and exited LCO 3.7.9, condition C at 1345.

The inspectors toured the control room to observe operator response to the aforementioned issue and noted that the on-watch Unit 2 operations supervisor had facial hair. This individual assumed the watch at 1230 and was relieved at 1346. The inspectors questioned operations supervision regarding the site guidance for facial hair and the licensee generated a condition report to document this issue.

Title 10 CFR 20.1703 states, in part, The licensee shall implement and maintain a respiratory protection program, and The licensee shall ensure that no objects, materials or substances, such as facial hair, or any conditions that interfere with the facefacepiece seal or valve function, and that are under the control of the respirator wearer, are present between the skin of the wearers face and the sealing surface of a tight-fitting respirator facepiece. The licensees fleet procedure RP-AA-106 and site procedure, NP 4.2.32, establish the Respiratory Protection Program. NP 4.2.32, Section 4.5.2 states, Operators, RP Shift Technicians and assigned fire brigade members shall be clean shaven while on duty.

In addition, RP-AA-106, Section 3.7.2, states that Individuals within the Nuclear Division who, in order to immediately perform their emergency actions are required to be respirator qualified (plant operators and fire brigade members), shall maintain a clean shaven face (i.e., no beards), when at their respective facility.

Contrary to the above, on December 13, 2024, the licensee failed to ensure that no facial hair that interferes with the facefacepiece seal, a condition under the control of the respirator wearer, was present for an on-duty operator.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was minor. This violation is similar to example 6.n from IMC 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues. Specifically, this performance deficiency did not result in a personnel safety issue and did not impact the fit factor for a respirator issued to a worker for use in the field.

Enforcement:

The licensee reinforced the requirements for operators to be clean shaven while on watch and is evaluating the positions required to wear respirators as well as the time critical operator actions that could be impacted by not being clean shaven. This failure to comply with 10 CFR 20.1703 constitutes a minor violation that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

• On April 18, 2025, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Michael Durbin and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

110E017 Sheet 2

P&ID Safety Injection System

Drawings

110E017 Sheet 3

P&ID Safety Injection System

71111.04

Procedures

CL 7A

Safety Injection System Checklist Mode 1, 2, 3 Unit 1

Calculations

2002-0039

Fire Loading Calculation

PFP-0-CB

Pre-Fire Plan Control Building Elev 8 ft, 26 ft, 44 ft and 66 ft

71111.05

Fire Plans

PFP-0-PAB-8

Pre-Fire Plan Primary Auxiliary Building Elevations 8'

and Below

2509030

LOCT Segment 25A As-Found Failure

2/27/2025

2511100

1CS-2180 Failed to Modulate Open

03/21/2025

2511101

RMS Alarms During K-1B Restoration per OI 54

03/21/2025

2511114

AOP-5A U1R42 Shutdown

03/22/2025

Corrective Action

Documents

2511115

Entered AOP-25 During U1R42 Shutdown

03/22/2025

71111.11Q

Miscellaneous

PBN LOC 25A

001 E

As-Found

22558

2RT-6A Failed During Testing per 2ICP 02.003

03/24/2022

2430657

U2 RX Trip BKR did Not Trip During 2ICP 02.003A

06/24/2022

2481984

Unit 2ICP02.003A RCP Loss of Power Trip Test Failed

During

03/21/2024

2501382

2SI-887 Failed As-Found Test

11/12/2024

2501984

Disassemble/Inspect 2SI-887

11/19/2024

Corrective Action

Documents

2504945

Fuel Oil Analysis Required

01/05/2025

2504288

NRC Resident Identified Incorrect IST Valve Classification

2/20/2024

2505199

CMP 2.3 Relief/Safety Valves

01/08/2025

Corrective Action

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

2511017

RMP 9359-5A - D0-5 Station Battery, D-07 Battery Charger

03/20/2025

110E035 Sheet 1

P&ID Safety Injection System

Drawings

E-6 Sheet 1

Single Line Diagram 125V DC Dist. System

Miscellaneous

IST Background

Document App N

Safety Injection

CMP 2.3

Relief/Safety Valves

71111.12

Procedures

OI 92A

Fuel Oil Ordering, Receipt Sampling, and Offloading

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

RMP 9046-1

Station Battery 92 Day 12 Month Surveillance Tests

RMP 9359-5A

D-05 Station Battery, D-07 Battery Charger Maintenance

and Surveillances

RMP 9377A

Relief, Safety Relief Valve As-Found Testing

RMP 9377B

Relief, Safety Relief Valve As-Left Testing

40426362-04

2SI-00887 / Rebuild and Complete As-Left Testing (IST)

04/07/2017

40860404-03

2SI-00887 / Complete As-Found Testing Within 90 Days

(IST)

01/09/2025

40860404-04

2SI-00887 / Rebuild and Complete As-Left Testing (IST)

08/07/2024

40907277-01

D-05/D-07; Bat Disch & Chgr Recov - SR Tests

2/21/2025

Work Orders

40972979-01

D-05, Quarterly Station Battery Inspection

2/17/2025

Corrective Action

Documents

2506406

1PT-5971: Transmitter Loop Appears to Have Failed

01/26/2025

Corrective Action

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

2506502

Paint Chip on Fuel Assembly LL25 in SFP Location SN-54

01/27/2025

Miscellaneous

WM-AA-100-

1000-F01

Work Activity Risk Management Plan

PBF-1562

Shutdown Safety Assessment and Fire Inspection Checklist

for Mode 5 Steam Generators Not Available

03/24/2025

TS 3A

Turbine Trip Test Unit 1

Procedures

WM-AA-100-1000

Work Activity Risk Management

71111.13

Work Orders

41002782-01

1PT-5971: Transmitter Loop Troubleshooting

01/28/2025

Calculations

RAL-11565

Feedwater Isolation Valve Actuator Sizing Calculations

23075

1SW-183 Leaks By

03/29/2022

2504940

Little or No Oil Residue Found on Outlet of Air Start Motor

01/05/2025

2504941

Little or No Oil Residue Found on Outlet of Air Start Motor

01/05/2025

2505139

Need to Move B5b/Flex Radios to TB 109

01/07/2025

2505938

2T-233B MFIV Accumulator Pressure Low

01/19/2025

2506018

Low SF6 Gas Pressure

01/21/2025

71111.15

Corrective Action

Documents

2507352

AR 2423075 on 1SW-183 Operability Determination

2/05/2025

Corrective Action

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

2506783

MFIV Actuator Sizing Calculation

01/30/2025

M-207

P&ID Service Water System

Drawings

PBE-7033

Electrical Power Distribution

Engineering

Changes

2356

ECN for EC 11954 to Close Open Item 2.8.1 Receive Final

Vendor Documentation

Miscellaneous

PB 693

Point Beach Nuclear Plant Conformance Specification

Feedwater Isolation Valve

0-TS-EP-001

Weekly Power Availability Verification

EN-AA-100-1003

Control of Design Interfaces

EN-AA-100-1004

Calculations

EN-AA-110

Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Program

IT 330

Containment Isolation Valves (Cold Shutdown) Unit 1

NP 7.7.36

Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Program

Procedures

PC 21 Part 6

B.5.b and Miscellaneous Weekly Checks and FLEX

Equipment Monthly Checks

40752824-01

IT-330, Unit 1 Cont Isolation Valves (CSD)

04/16/2022

71111.15

Work Orders

40830498-01

IT-330, Unit 1 Cont Isolation Valves (CSD)

10/26/2023

2511105

Overspeed Protect Control Monitor Lighting Intermittently

03/22/2025

2511107

ORT 4 Unit 1 Aborted due to Rising Exhaust Hood

Temperatures

03/22/2025

Corrective Action

Documents

2511110

Unit 1 N-32 Source Range Detector Reads Low After

Shutdown

03/22/2025

Corrective Action

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

2511159

NRC Identified Items for Unit 1 Containment Inspection

03/22/2025

Clearance

MS MS-2019-O

Miscellaneous

Clearance

MS MS-2020-O

1RMP 9096-1

Reactor Vessel Head Removal and Installation Using Biach

Tensioning System

OP 3A

Power Operation to Hot Standby Unit 1

OP 3B

Reactor Shutdown

71111.20

Procedures

OP 3C

Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown Unit 1

PBF-1562

PBNP Shutdown Safety Assessment and Fire Inspection

Checklist

2009-0002

Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Uncertainty/Setpoint

Calculation

CN-CPS-07-13

Point Beach Steam Flow / Feedwater Flow Instrumentation

Setpoint, Uncertainty, and Scaling Calculation

Calculations

CN-CPS-07-13

Point Beach Steam Flow / Feedwater Flow Instrumentation

Setpoint, Uncertainty, and Scaling Calculation

2501533

G-05 Gas Turbine Tripped on High Gen. Bearing Drain

Temp

11/13/2024

Corrective Action

Documents

2506239

2-FM-464A Found Out of Tolerance at the Span Cal Point

01/23/2025

2509019

NRC Identified Proc. and ESOMS Log Entry Gaps During

U2R40

2/27/2025

Corrective Action

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

2509439

NRC Identified Issue with Calculation CN-CPS-07-13

03/04/2025

110E035, Sheet 3

Safety Injection System

Drawings

110E163 Sheet

Circuit Diagram AMSAC (1N16)

Engineering

Changes

295250

CN-CPS-07-13: SF/FF Msmtch, Hi SF, Hi-Hi SF Uncrnt,

Stpt, & Sclng Update and Correct Errors

Miscellaneous

IST Program

Document

PBNP Inservice Testing Program Sixth 10-Year Interval

0-SOP-DC-001

25 VDC System, Bus D-01 & Components

1-SOP-AF-001

Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation - Motor Driven

1ICP 02.008-1

Nuclear Instrumentation Power Range Axial Offset

Calibration

1ICP 03.012

At-Power Test and Calibration of AMSAC

1RMP 9329-3

1P-53 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Motor Relay Testing and

Calibration

2ICP 13.016F

Reactor Protection and Safeguards Analog Racks Steam

Flow Calibration

AD-AA-100-1006

Procedure and Work Instruction Use and Adherence

71111.24

Procedures

IT 08A

Cold Start of Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump and Valve

Test (Quarterly) Unit 1

IT 545C

Leakage Reduction and Preventive Maintenance Program

Test of Containment Spray System When [Greater Than or

Equal to] 350 F

MA-AA-203-1000

Maintenance Testing

PC 29

Gas Turbine and Auxiliary Diesel Load Test

PI-AA-103-1000

Human Performance Program Error Reduction Tools

Procedures

TS 83

Emergency Diesel Generator G-03 Monthly

40849137

1A52-83/12 Year Relay Replacement

01/28/2025

40907277-02

D-05/D-07, Ops - Post Maintenance Test / RTS

2/26/2025

40949958

1A52-83 - Calibrate and Test 1P-53 Breaker Relays

2/11/2024

40953022-01

2ICP 13.016F - Steam Flow Instruments Calibration

01/24/2025

40965740-02

1B52-15A; Setup and Stage Spare Breaker per RMP 9369-1

01/17/2025

40965740-04

1B52-15A; Perform Breaker Swap Using a Prepared Spare

01/22/2027

40965740-05

1B52-15A; Ops PMT / PMT (1W-1A1)

01/22/2025

40969507-03

(Contingency) Unit 1 NIs Power Range Axial Offset Cal

01/03/2025

40972983-01

1P-29 AFP Cold Start Test/Valves

01/28/2025

40975675-01

PC-29; G-05 Gas Turbine Generator Load Testing

2/21/2025

40977378-01

TS 83, G-03 EDG Operability Test

2/25/2025

41002782-02

1PT-5971: P-20 Bistable Limit Alarm Module Bench Test

and Replace

01/28/2025

71111.24

Work Orders

41002782-03

1PT-5971: PMT: AMSAC 1PC-5971, P-20 Bistable Limit

Alarm Module

01/28/2025

71114.06

Procedures

EPIP 1.2

Emergency Classification

Corrective Action

Documents

2504765

U1 Reaction Rate in Core Location B-06 Higher than

Predicted

01/02/2025

Corrective Action

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

2504121

On Shift Operator Was Not Cleanly Shaven

2/18/2024

1RESP 6.1

Core Power Distribution and Nuclear Power Ranger Detector

Calibration Unit 1

NP 4.2.32

Respiratory Protection Program

OM 3.1

Operations Shift Staffing Requirements

RESP 6.12

BEACON Power Distribution Monitoring System Calibration

71152A

Procedures

RP-AA-106

Respiratory Protection Program

Work Orders

40969507-01

Flux Mapping Data Analysis

01/03/2025

Corrective Action

Documents

AR 2492378

SM Reactivation Form Missing

06/26/2024

2702

Procedures

OM-3.1

Operations Shift Staffing Requirements

21