IR 05000266/1981015
| ML20031D298 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 09/22/1981 |
| From: | Guldemand W, Hague R, Konklin J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20031D293 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-***, TASK-TM 50-266-81-15, 50-301-81-17, NUDOCS 8110130224 | |
| Download: ML20031D298 (6) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Reports No. 50-266/81-15; 50-301/81-17 Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301 Licenses No. DPR-24; DPR-27 Licensee: Wisconsin Electric Power Company 231 West Michigan Milwaukee, WI 53203 Facility Name: Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
Point Beach Site, Two Rivers, WI Inspection Conducted: August 3-31, 1981
SmW Inspectors W. G. Guldemond 9,72 cP/
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. L. IIague 7-22-8/
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>$k Approved By; J. E. Konklin, Acting Chief 9'- 22 - 8/
Reactor Projects Section 2A
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Inspection Summary Inspection on August 3-31, 1981 (Reports No. 50-266/81-15; 50-301/81-17)
Areas Inspected: Routine resident inspection of Operational Safety Verifi-cation, Monthly Maintenance Observation, Monthly Surveillance Observation, Followup on Licensee Event Reports, IE Bulletin and Circular Followup, Review cf Plant Observations, Followup on Items of Noncompliance, TMI Action Item Updcte. The inspection involved a total of 171 inspector-hours onsite by two inspectors including 36 inspector-hours on off-shifts.
Results:
In nine areas inspected no items of noncompliance were identified.
8110130224 810923 PDR ADOCK 03000266 G
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted i
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- G. A. Reed, Manager, Nuclear Power Division i
J. J. Zach, Superintendent Technical Services T. J. Koehler, Operations Superintendent J. C. Reisenbuechler, I&C Engineer W. J. Herrman, Maintenance Superintendent R. S. Bredvad, Health Physicist
- R. E. Link, Assistant to the Manager
- F. A. Zeman, Office Supervisor The inspectors also talked with and interviewed members of the Opera-tions, Maintenance, Health Physics, and Instrument and Control Sections.
- Denotes personnel attending exit interviews.
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2.
Operational Safety Verification The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the month of August 1981. At 11:14 a.m. on August 28, 1981, a Unit I critical control
i power failure alarm was received. Investigation revealad that the alarm was caused by the opening of two D.C. control power breakers inside the
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Unit 1 control board. One of the breakers, No. 152, provides power to a relay which strips nonessential loads from the train "B" 480V safeguards bus when a train "B" safety injection signal is generated. The other breaker, No. 153, provides control and alarm power for level and automatic fill of the 4D diesel fuel oil day tank. With breaker 152 open, r.onessen-l tial loads on the train "B" 480V safeguards bus would not automatically strip upon receipt of a train "B" safety injection signal. This conceiv-
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ably could have resulted in a 4D diesel overload condition for a LOCA coincident with loss of offsite A.C.
With breaker 153 open, no alarm function was available to alert the operators of a low level in the 4D l'
diesel day tank. Further. automatic filling of the day tank would not have occurred as breaker '53 also supplies power to the level switches l
in the tank.
It is thus conceivable that the 4D diesel could have been run until the fuel oil in the day tank was depleted without the operator being made aware of the impending problem. Both breakers were shut at 1.:35 a.m.
On August 31, the licensee determined that the probable cause of the two breakers being open was a contractor employee working in the area.
Discussiens with the contractor employee revealed that, while working in the vicinity of the breakers installing firebarrier penetration seals, he inadvertently bumped into some equipment. The coPtractor employee was not sure if he bumped the breakers directly but did remember he heard a
" click."
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Because of this and other contractor-related events, the licensee has assigned a second engineer part time to follow contractor work.
The licensee has also committed to re-emphasize to contractor personnel the need for care when working in the vicinity of safety related equipment and the necessity of informing plant personnel immediately if anything out of the ordinary occurs. The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of both auxilary build-ings and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. On August 10, while performing a routine plant tour, the inspector noted an apparent flow restriction in the fire hose attached to hose reel HR-59 at the point of attachment.
The problem was relayed to licensee management. A similar problem was also discovered on hose reel HR-61. Adottionally, the hose on hose reel HR-1 was discovered without a nozzle. A followup check on August 24, 1981 showed that a nozzle had been installed.
On August 13, 1981, while performing a routine plant tour, the inspector noted a contractor welder working on beam welding on the intermediate level of the Unit I turbine hall. Slag from the welding operation was observed falling through the floor grating in the vicinity of two un-covered cable trays and a ventilation unit on the lower level of the turbine hall. There was no formal fire watch on either level of the turbine hall. A helper in the area was actively and exclusively engaged in disassembling a scaffold approximately 20 feet from the work area.
The problem was brought to the immediate attention of licensee supervision who suspended the work until a proper fire watch was set.
The inspector by observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
Included was verification of correct compensatory measures during modifi-cations to the physical protection system.
The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified impireentation of radiation protection controls.
It was brought to the attention of licensee management that the general clean-liness level of the auxilary building had declined. During the month of August, the inspector walked down the accessible portions of the Emergency Diesel Generating, Electrical Distribution, Auxiliary Feed, Containment Spray, and Safety Injection systems to verify operability.
The inspector also witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste shinments and barreling.
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under technical specifications, 10 CFR, and adr.inistrative procedures.
3.
Monthly Maintenance Observation Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical rpecifications.
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The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were re-moved from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returnin2 components or systems to service; quality control records were ma!.ntained; activities were accomplished by quali-fled personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and, fire prevention controls were implemented.
Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may af fect system performance.
During a routine plant tour on August 28, 1981, the inspector noted that auxiliary feed system manual Valves AF-4, AF-7, and AF-9 had no packing gland adjustment tamaining and had packing leaks. Maintenance requests had not been prepared to correct the deficiencies. This was brought to the attention of licensee management on August 31, 1981.
The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:
Replacement of Reactor Trip Relay RT-7B, Unit 2 Reactor Protective System.
IP28 Charging Pump.
Following completion of maintenance on the Unit 2 Reactor Protective System, and IP28 Charging Pump, the inspector verified that these systems had been returned to service properly.
4.
Monthly Surveillance Observation The inspector observed technical specifications required surveillance testing on the Unit 2 Reactor Protective System and Unit 1 Quarterly Axial Offset Measurement and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management
personnel.
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In response to the increasing failure rate of Model NBFD 315 relays detailed in Inspection Reports No. 50-266/81-11 and No. 50-301/81-13, the licensee issued an Interim Report which postulates three possible modes of failure, an extensive testing program, and three possible corrective actions. The inspector will continue to follow the testing program and corrective actions.
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5.
Licensee Event Reports Followup Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event report was reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specifications.
LER 81-011/03L-0 - Docket 50-266 Failure of a Steam Line Isolation Test Switch.
6.
IE Bulletin Followup All outstanding bulletins were reviewed to ascertain their status.
It was determined that none could be closed out.
7.
IE Circular Followup For the IE Circulars listed below, the inspector verified that the Circular was received by the licensee management, that a review for applicability was performed, and that appropriate corrective actions were taken or were scheduled to be taken.
81-09 Containment Effluent Water that Bypasses Radioactivity Monitor.
81-10 Steam Voiding in the RCS During DHR Cooldown.
8.
Review of Plant Operations On August 27, 1981, the inspcctor attended a critique of an emergency preparedness communications drill held on August 5,1981. The licensee identified several problem areas which included:
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Communications between control room and technical support center.
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Delegation of responsibilities.
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Verification of completed actions.
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Realism of scenario.
The licensee proposed effectual solutions to all of the problems encountered.
9.
Followup on Items of Noncompliance Licensee action in respense to the item of noncompliance documented in the inspection report below was reviewed to confirm that the actions were completed as committed and were in conformance wi?.h regulatory requirements.
Docket No.
Inspection Report No.
Remarks 50-266 81-10 (Closed) Failure to condoct order-required training for Event V check valve require-ments. The licensee completed the required training subsequent j
to identification of the problem.
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10.
TMI Action Items Update Based on a review of applicable documentation, the following TMI Action Items, numbered in accordance with NUREG-0737 are considered complete for both Units 1 and 2.
These are in addition to items reported complete in earlier inspection reports.
I.A.1.1.2 I.A.1.1.3A I.A.1.1.4 I.A.2.1.1 I.A.2.1.2 I.A.2.1.3 I.A.2.1.4.A I.A.2.1.5 I.A.2.3 I.C.4 II.B.2.1 II.D.1.1 II.E.1.2.2.C II.E.4.1 II.E.4.2.5 II.K.2.19.B II.K.3.2 II.K.3.3 II.K.3.10 II.K.3.12 II.K.3.17 II.K.3.30.A III.D.3.4.1 11.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
threughout the rnonth and at the conclusion of the inspection period and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The licensee acknowledged these findings.
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