IR 05000261/1981027
| ML14176A699 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 10/09/1981 |
| From: | Julian C, Weise S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML14176A695 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-261-81-27, NUDOCS 8112070407 | |
| Download: ML14176A699 (10) | |
Text
oQ UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 1l 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 Report No. 50-261/81-27 Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company 411 Fayetteville Street Raleigh, NC' 27602 Facility Name: H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Docket No. 50-261 License No. DPR-23 Inspection at H. B. Robinson Unit 2 Inspector:
0'~-~_____
______
S. Weise,R sidentfinspector Date Signed Approved by:____/6/
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/
C. Julian,-Acting Section Chief, Division of Date Signed Resident and Reactor Project Inspection SUMMARY Inspection on September 14 - October 2, 1981 Areas Inspected This routine announced inspection involved 85 resident inspector-hours on site in the areas of technical specification occurrences, housekeeping, site security, surveillance activities, TMI Action Plan requirements, maintenance activities, quality assurance practices, radiation control activities, outstanding items review, follow-up on enforcement matters, IE Bulletin, Circular, and Notice follow-up, and Confirmation of Action Letter follow-u Results Of the 15 areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified in 14 areas; one violation was found in one area (Failure to implement procedures and entering an action statement, paragraph 5.c.).
8112070407 811125 PDR ADOCK 05000261 G
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DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- R. B. Starkey, Plant General Manager
- F. Lowery, Operations Supervisor Unit 2
- F. Gilman, Senior Specialist, Regulatory Compliance D. Gainey, Senior Specialist, Emergency Planning W. Ritchie, RC&T Foreman
- J. Curley, Manager, Technical Support R. Chambers, Maintenance Supervisor Unit 2 S. Crocker, Manager, Environmental & Radiation Control L. Sansbury, I&C Foreman
- C. Wright, Specialist, Regulatory Compliance W. MacReady, Radiation Control Supervisor C. Bethea, Training Supervisor
- W. Crawford, Manager, Operations and Maintenance Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personne Other Organizations R. Muth, Westinghouse
- Attended exit interview 2. Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 2, 1981, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. The licensee acknowledged the violation but felt that the fact that it was licensee identified should prevent a violation from being issued. Additionally, licensee representatives stated that the fact that the check valve was found operable should reduce the safety significanc. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Deviation 81-02-04. This item concerned the licensee's failure to maintain adequate diversity of inputs to the core subcooling monitor. The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective action response dated March 2, 1981. The licensee has taken the corrective action as discussed, and the inspector verified that adequate diversity of inputs existed for the subcooling monitor. This item is close (Closed) Severity Level IV Violation 81-08-01. This item concerned the licensee's failure to control post-modification testing. The inspector
reviewed the licensee's response letter of April 21, 1981, and verified that the corrective actions had been taken. This item is close (Closed) Unresolved item 81-08-03. This item concerned the covers on safety-related heat tracing. The licensee is continuing to review this item from an ALARA standpoint, but has decided that the covers on safety-related heat tracing will be replaced until a long term fix can be developed and installed. This item is close (Closed) Deficiency 80-03-01. This item concerned the licensee's failure to label radioactive materia The inspector reviewed the licensee's response letter of March 20, 1980, and Health Physics Procedure-20. Adequate corrective actions appeared to have been taken. This item is close (Closed) Infraction 80-03-02. This item concerned the licensee's failure to evaluate sulfuric acid placed in a radioactive waste shipment. The inspector reviewed the licensee's response letter of March 20, 1980.and Health Physics Procedure-33. Adequate corrective actions appeared to have been taken. This item is close (Closed) Infraction 80-03-06. This item was discussed in inspection report
- 50-261/81-15 and dealt with an inspector concern that procedure HP-33 did not discuss allowable contamination levels for storage of radioactive waste drums and dumpsters outside the auxiliary building. The inspector reviewed Revision 6 to HP-33 which requires decontamination to below administrative limits. Through discussions with licensee management, the inspector determined these limits were presented in Section 6.2.2 of Volume 8, Radiation Protection Manua This item is close. Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspectio.-
Technical Specification Compliance a. During this reporting interval, the inspector verified compliance with selected limiting conditions for operation (LCO's) and reviewed results of selected surveillance tests. These verifications were accomplished by direct observation of monitoring instrumentation, valve positions, switch positions, and review of completed logs and records. The licensee's compliance with selected LCO action statements were reviewed as they happene b. On September 23, 1981, while at 50% power, 'B'
reactor trip breaker failed to open during scheduled surveillance testing. The breaker undervoltage coil de-energized as required on a high flux trip signal, but the breaker did not trip. The 'A'
reactor trip breaker had been demonstrated operable during the previously performed portions of Periodic Test 1 The 'B'
breaker was then manually tripped by instrumentation and control technicians investigating the failure. The
'B' reactor trip breaker was replaced with the 'A'
bypass breaker and
the Periodic Test was completed satisfactorily. The licensee is continuing to investigate the breaker failure. At the end of this reporting period, the failure appeared to be mechanical binding possibly associated with component wear. Westinghouse is providing assistance, and the licensee will provide an informational report on the breaker failure to the NR The inspector noted that the Robinson Technical Specifications (TS) do not address a reactor trip breaker failure as being either a limiting condition for operation (LCO) or a reportable occurrence. This is inconsistent with standard Technical Specifications. The inspector is concerned over this apparent weakness in the TS because of this breaker's importance to safety. This concern will be transmitted to NRR and is an open ite (50-261/81-27-32). The inspector also noted that the licensee's corrective actions were consistent with the requirements of standard Technical Specification c. On September 2, 1981, with the reactor at 25% power, the licensee determined that train B of the containment spray flowpath had not been demonstrated operable following maintenance on check valve SIS-890 This placed the plant in a limiting condition for operation (LCO) until surveillance testing proved flowpath operability. The flowpath was verified operable by performance of the applicable portion of Periodic Test (PT) 42, Cold Shutdown Interval Primary side Valve Test, within the time allowed by the LCO. This event is a reportable occurrence and is discussed in LER 81-2 The inspector investigated the events which led to this occurrenc The check valve SIS-890B was determined to have some backleakage during the performance of PT 42 on March 20, 1980. Work request OP-500 was written to document the needed maintenance. The check valve was placed under clearance and repaired on August 5, 1981, with the plant in cold shutdown. The work was completed the same day, and the clearance cancelled and placed in the awaiting test section of the Local Clearance and Test Report (LCTR) log. Testing in accordance with PT 42 was never conducted. Post-maintenance, and a pre-startup review of the LCTR log failed to identify this discrepancy. Startup was commenced and criticality reached on September 1, and the discrepancy was discovered on September The inspector noted that:
(1) The reactor was made critical on September 1, 1981, without having demonstrated that 'B'
containment spray flowpath was operable following the check valve maintenance. This was a violation of Technical Specification (TS) 3.3. (2) Procedures were not established or implemented to ensure post-maintenance checkout and return to service of safety-related equipment. No review of the LCTR log is required by procedure or
- administrative policy, and the review that operations personnel indicated was made was inadequat (3) The established procedures for conducting post-maintenance testing were not implemented. This is a violation of TS 6. (4) The maintenance necessary to correct the SIS-890B backleakage took over sixteen months to be accomplished despite the occurrence of a refueling shutdown and several extended periods of cold shutdow This event suggests a lack of timeliness in the completion of some maintenance on safety-related systms and is an inspector followup ite (50-261/81-27-37).
The violation described in (3)
above was identified by the licensee and reported to the NRC. The violations described in items (1) and (3) are assigned a common tracking number (50-261/81-27-33).
6. Plant Tour The inspector conducted plant tours periodically during the inspection interval to verify that monitoring equipment was recording as required, equipment was.properly tagged, operations personnel were aware of plant conditions, and plant housekeeping efforts were adequate. The inspector determined that appropriate radiation controls were properly established, excess equipment or material was stored properly, and combustible material was disposed of expeditiously. During tours the inspector looked for the existence of unusual fluid leaks, piping vibrations, pipe hanger and seismic restraint abnormal settings, various valve and breaker positions, equiment clearance tags and component status, adequacy of firefighting equipment, and instrument calibration date Some tours were conducted on backshift The inspector performed major flowpath valve lineup verifications and system status checks on the following systems:
a. Selected containment isolation valve b. Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Syste c. Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Syste d. Boration paths e. Residual Heat Removal System The inspector noted no violations or deviation.
Plant Operations Review a. The inspector periodically during the inspection interval reviewed shift logs and operations records, including data sheets, instrument traces, and records of equipment malfunctions. This review included control room logs, auxiliary logs, operating orders, standing orders, jumper logs and equipment tagout records. The inspector routinely observed operator alertness and demeanor during plant tours. During abnormal events, operator performance and response actions were observed and evaluated. The inspector conducted random off-hours
inspections during the reporting interval to assure that operations and security remained at an acceptable leve Shift turnovers were observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance with approved licensee procedure b. On September 25, 1981, while at 50% power and attempting to pull bank D rods, the control operator noted that control rod bank D, group 2 indicated about 11 inches out of alignment with bank D group 1 rod Attempts to move bank D, group 2 rods (3 control rods) indicated that these rods were not movable by their mechanisms. After about one hour from discovery of the position difference, a plant shutdown to hot shutdown was commenced. During the shutdown, it was determined that control bank B, group 2 rods (4 control rods) and shutdown bank B, group 2 rods (4 control rods) also would not move. After plant shutdown, the reactor was tripped, and all eleven affected control rods inserted normally. Troubleshooting determined that an input/output amplifier card diode had failed in the logic cabinet, which affected the lift coil signal from the slave cycler to power cabinet 2BD. The card was replaced, the control rods were exercised, and preparations for a plant startup were commence Due to difficulties encountered with the turbine stop valves and the electrohydraulic control (EHC)
system, the plant was not returned to power operation until September 2 On September 28, the plant was shutdown to allow further correction of EHC problems. These problems were corrected, and the plant returned to power operation on September 2 The licensee will provide further information on the control rod failure in LER 81-2 The inspector was concerned that this rod control failure did not result in an urgent failure alarm and went undetected for an indeterminate period. The inspector reviewed the Westinghouse Rod Control System Technical Manual and discussed the event with the licensee and Westinghouse personne Apparently, the urgent failure alarm was not received because the zener diode which failed passed sufficient current to satisfy the card failure detection circuit, but there was insufficient current to provide lift coil current deman Had the diode failed and interrupted the current signal to the lift coil, an urgent failure alarm would have resulte Inasmuch as this failure appears to be an isolated event of low probability (first such failure at Robinson, second such failure known by Westinghouse in recent years), the inspector is satisfied with licensee action Additionally, the failure data has been transmitted to Westinghouse for further design revie. Confirmation of Action Followup a. The inspector reviewed the NRC Confirmation of Action letter (CAL)
dated March 31, 1981, and CP&L's response dated May 5, 198 The inspector then reviewed Volume 13 of the plant operating manual, Emergency Response Program (Book 1) and Plant Emergency Procedures (Book 2).
Procedures in Book 2 have been approved to reflect the changes required by the CAL. Book 1, however, has not been updated to
reflect these changes. Discussions with licensee personnel satisfied the inspector that key plant personnel understood the changes and would respond in a manner consistent with NRC requirements. The licensee is in the process of updating Book 1, and this is an inspector followup item. (50-261/81-27-34).
b. The inspector reviewed the NRC Confirmation of Action letter dated April 27, 1981, and CP&L's response dated May 22, 198 Based on these references the inspector reviewed plant files and radiation/contami nation survey records. The Unit 1 Radiological Surveillance Program was first formalized by a Robinson memorandum dated May 8, 1981, and subsequently superceded by another Robinson memorandum dated July 6, 198 While the requirements of the Confirmation of Action letter appear to have been met, the established program has not been incorporated into approved plant health physics procedure Licensee representatives stated that the procedures were in the process of being writte c. The inspector reviewed the NRC Confirmation of Action letter dated February 10, 198 Based on the requirements of that letter, the inspector reviewed the licensee's overexposure report from March, 1981; health physics procedures HP-1, HP-7, HP-28; the General Employee Training Study Guide; Administrative Instructions Section 11.5; plant memeorandum dated February 18 and April 2, 1981; and an internal letter dated April 2, 1981. The inspector was satisfied that the licensee has adequately evaluated radiation doses to personnel that made steam generator entries, has upgraded the plant's contamination control and radiological survey programs, and has adequately evaluated potential releases from the auxiliary boilers. The inspector noted that the monthly radiation surveys of the Unit 2 secondary plant has not been incorporated into approved health physics procedures. Licensee representatives stated that these procedures and those of paragraph above were being developed as a new procedure HP-2. The establishment and implementation of the new HP-2 is an inspector followup ite (50-261/81-27-35).
9. Physical Protection The inspector verified by observation and interview during the reporting interval that measures taken to assure the physical protection of the facility met current requirements. Areas inspected included the organi zation of the security force, the establishment and maintenance of gates, doors and isolation zones in the proper condition, that access control and badging was proper, that search practices were appropriate, and that escorting and communications procedures were followe. Performance Appraisal Section Inspection The inspector has reviewed the Performance Appraisal Inspection report 50-261/81-05 (PAS).
Below is a listing of the resulting inspection items by tracking number, type of item, and associated paragraph of the above repor Number Type Item Paragraph 81-05(PAS)
81-27-01 Open 2.a.(2)
81-19-01 Unresolved 2.a.(2)
81-27-02 Unresolved 2.a.(3)
81-27-03 Open 2.a.(4)
81-27-04 Open 2.a.(5), 5.a.(2)
81-27-05 Inspector Followup 2.a.(7)
81-26-09 Violation 2.a.(8)
81-27-06 Open 2.a.(9)
81-27-07 Inspector Followup 3.a.(2)
81-27-08 Unresolved 3.a.(3)
81-27-09 Open 4.a.(1)
81-12-04 Violation 4.a.(2) and (3)
81-12-02 Violation 4.a.(6)
81-27-10 Open 4.a.(7)
81-27-11 Open 5.a.(1)
81-27-12 Open 5.a.(3)
81-27-13 Open 5.a.(5)
81-27-14 Open 6.a.(2)
81-27-15 Open 6.a.(3)
81-27-16 Open 6.a.(4)
81-27-17 Open 6.a.(5)
81-27-18 Open 6.a.(7)
81-27-19 Open 7.a.(1)
81-27-20 Inspector Followup 7.a.(2)
81-27-21 Open 7.a.(3)
81-27-22 Open 7.a.(4)
81-27-23 Open 7.a.(5)
81-27-24 Open 8.a.(2)
81-27-25 Inspector Followup 8.a.(4)
81-27-26 Inspector Followup 8.a.(7)
81-27-27 Open 8.a.(8)
81-27-28 Open 8.a.(9)
81-27-29 Open 9.a.(2)
81-27-30 Open 9.a.(3)i- (a), (b),
(c),(e)
81-22-04 Violaton 9.a.(3).Td), (f)
81-27-31 Inspector Followup 9.a.(4)
1 TMI Action Plan Requirements a. TAP No. II.K.3.10, Anticipatory Turbine Trip. The inspector reviewed the requirements of Enclosure (3) of the NRR letter dated May 7, 1980 and CP&L's response letter dated June 11, 1980. This item is not applicable to H. B. Robinson and is close b. TAP No. II.B.4, Training for Mitigating Core Damage. The inspctor reviewed the requirements of NUREG 0737 and the licensee's training records for management, operations, instrument and control, environmental and radiation control personne Those pesonnel required to receive the training appeared consistent with requirement A review of training records and/or discussions with affected personnel satisfied the inspector that all required personnel had received training commensurate with their duties. Item 2.b. of this requirement is close.
Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup a. The inspector reviewed the following LER's to verify that the report details met license requirements, identified the cause of the event, described appropriate corrective actions, adequately assessed the event, and addressed any generic implications. Corrective action and appropriate licensee review of the below events was verified. The inspector had no further comment LER Event 81-16
'A'
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Trip b. LER 80-17, Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Low Flow. The inspector verified that the licensee installed an air dryer per Modification 555 on the air supply line to the damper positioner. The licensee intends to inspect the air dryer on a refueling interval via Periodic Test 24.0. The procedure changes to PT 24.0 have not been made and constitute an inspector followup item (50-261/81-27-36). LER 80-17 is close.
Review of IE Circulars and Notices (IEC's and IEN's)
The inspector verified that IE Circulars and Notices had been received onsite and reviewed by cognizant licensee personne Selected applicable IE Circulars and Notices were discussed with licensee personnel to ascertain the licensees actions on these item The inspector also verified that IE Circulars and Notices were reviewed by the Plant Nuclear Safety Committee in accordance with facility administrative policy. Licensee action on the following IE Circulars and Notices were reviewed by the inspector and are close IE Circulars IE Notices 80-18 81-20 81-02 81-21 81-03 14. Follow-up on IE Bulletins For the following Bulletins, the inspector verified tha.t the response was timely, included the required information, contained adequate commitments and that corrective action as described in the written responses was
comolete a. IE Bulletin 80-2 This item concerned valve components supplied by Malcolm Foundry Company, In The inspector reviewed the licensee's response letters dated December 8, 1980, and June 18, 1981. There are no active safety-related valves in use at Robinson Unit 2 which have components cast by the above company. This Bulletin is closed b. IE Bulletin 81-02, Supplement 1. This item concerned gate valves that are susceptible to failure when subjected to high differential pressure. The inspector reviewed the licensee's response letter dated September 17, 1981, and determined that no gate valves of the concerned type are in use or maintained as spares at the Robinson plant. This Bulletin is close. Outstanding Item Review (Closed) Open Item 81-08-04. This item concerned discrepancies noted on safety-related heat tracing and valve SIS-870 The inspector toured the areas and found the particular discrepancies corrected and general house keeping improved. This item is close (Closed) Open Item 81-08-05. This item concerned safety relief valve monitor testing. Technical Specifications have been issued for this instrumentation in Amendment 59 dated August 24, 1981. This item is close (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 80-10-01. This item concerned contami nation of the Unit 1 boiler and boiler recirculation pump. The inspector reviewed the licensee's letter dated July 9, 1980, describing the internal contamination. The information provided appeared adequate. Further rami fications of this event are discussed in Inspection Report 50-261/81-1 This item is close (Closed) Open Item 81-27-03. This item concerned the fact that the licensee's administrative instructions did not require periodic review of certain plant procedures at least every two years as required by ANSI N18.7-1976, Section 5.2.15. Revision 108 to Administrative Instructions Section 5.6.1 dated July 13, 1981, has been implemented to correct this discrepancy. This item is close.
Medical Emergency Drill On October 2, 1981, the inspector observed a licensee medical emergency drill involving a simulated contaminated, injured worker. The actions taken to treat the individual and transport him to the local hospital were adequate. The inspector noted minor deficiencies in the health physics practices, simulation scenario, and communications between offsite supb~ti agencies. These problems were also identified by licensee observeis, and the licensee is taking corrective action. The inspector had no further comments.