IR 05000261/1981003
| ML14176A591 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 02/10/1981 |
| From: | Hardin A, Kellogg P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML14176A587 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-261-81-03, 50-261-81-3, NUDOCS 8104100083 | |
| Download: ML14176A591 (8) | |
Text
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RUNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REdION II 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 Report No. 50-261/81-03 Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company 411 Fayetteville Street Raleigh, NC 27602 Facility Name: H. B. Robinson 2 Docket No. 50-261 License No. DPR-23 Inspection at H. B. Robinson site near Hartsville, South Carolina Inspected by: 6? kj ha 44i
A. K. Hardin Date Signed Approved by:
.
P. J. Kell g, Section Chie RONS Branch Date Signed SUMMARY Inspection on January 13-22, 1981 Areas Inspected:
This routine, unannounced inspection involved 76 inspector-hours on site in the areas of Licensee Event Reports, Operations, Open and Unresolved item Results:
Of the three areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified in two areas. Two violations were identified in one area, failure to have an adequate procedure, paragraph 6; and failure to adequately maintain procedures, paragraph I
DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- R. B. Starkey, Jr., General Manager
- F. Lowery, Operations Supervisor Unit 2
- Attended exit interview 2. Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on January 22, 1981 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 abov The two items of non compliance in paragraphs 6 and 9 were discussed with the license The licensee did not question the validity of the cited noncompliance. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Unresolved Item 261/80-28-01,
"Use of a Potentially Incorrect Value for Sub-Cooling Margin".
See-paragraph 10. Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspectio. Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS)
The purpose of this portion of the inspection was to determine the existence of adequate emergency procedures for coping with ATWS events. The licensee was asked to list any emergency procedures that address any of the following plant condition a. Failure to scram when require b. Failure to complete scram when initiated automatically or manuall c. InabiTity to move or drive control rod d. Failure to automatically scram when a parameter exceeds its trip valu e. Criteria for use of Standby Liquid Control System or Emergency Boration Syste f. Reactor trip or scra g. Anticipated transient without scra The licensee provided the following data:
Item a - None, Implied in Emergency Instruction E.I.14 Item b - None, Implied in EI-14 Item c - Abnormal Procedure, A.P. Item d - None Item e -
Abnormal Procedure, A. Item f - EI-14 A or B Item g -
None The inspector reviewed the above listed procedures and in addition a review was made of Standing Orders and Administrative Instructions dealing with Shift Foreman responsibilities and Control Operator responsibilitie The following summary findings were made based on the above revie a. Of the four types of procedures reviewed, i.e., Emergency Instruc Abnormal Procedures, Administrative Instructions, and Standing Orders, there is no requirement which clearly and unequivocably states:
"If an automatic scram should have occurred and has not, depress the scram button immediately".
b. Abnormal Procedure AP-2 entitled "Emergency Boration" requires in item B.4. that emergency boration be initiated if two or more rod position indicators fail to indicate rods are inserted after a plant shutdow c. There is no written procedure which specifically requires that if rods fail to move, the power disconnect switch or breaker to the holding coils shall be opene d. The criteria for use of the emergency boration system relative to the inability to insert negative reactivity by other means is included in Abnormal Procedure AP-2. The operator has the authority and responsi bility for meeting the procedure and initiating emergency boration when confronted with the conditions.described in the procedur During the inspection and at the exit interview, the inspector discussed the above findings. The inspector stated the procedures were insufficiently specific in some areas. Specifically, a clear require ment to manually trip the reactor when a parameter exceeds its trip valve without occurrence of an automatic trip and immediate actuation of the manual scram button if a partial or total rod failure to insert on demand occurs. The licensee stated their personnel are trained and are expected to respond to failures of the scram system by taking
immediate manual action. In addition, the licensee stated all licensed personnel, when in training on the simulator, are trained in an event wherein rods failed to enter on a demand tri The licensee agreed that putting specific statements requiring a manual trip on failure of an automatic trip into the emergency procedures was appropriate and they would take immediate steps to revise their emergency procedure Prior to leaving the site, the licensee gave the inspector a copy of their proposed revised procedures designed to be specific in coping with failure of the reactor to scram when require The inspector commented that the revised procedures appeared to deal adequately with the assumed failures, but would delay final judgement pending approval of the revised procedures by the Plant Nuclear Safety Committee (261/81-03-01).
6. De-energized Heat Trace Circuits At 9:35 A.M. on January 14, the licensee issued a clearance to work on boric acid transfer pump "A". Work on a boric acid pump requires shutdown of the heat trace circuits. The instructions for work on Boric Acid Transfer Pump
"A" are contained in Robinson's Operations Work Procedure CVC-6 in Revision 5 of Standing Order No. 9. The clearance was placed in accordance with the procedure as interpreted by the operator. About two hours later an I and C Technician performing a daily periodic test on heat tracing noted heat trace circuits for both the "A" and "B" Boric Acid Transfer Pump were de energize The I and C Technician reported the condition to the shift forema Reactor shutdown was started in accordance with 10-CFR-50.36(c)(2)
since Technical Specification 3.2.3.c, which requires at least one operable channel of heat tracing on the flow path from the boric acid tanks, could not be me Reactor power had been reduced 25 mw when heat tracing was restored to the
"B" pump. The temperature in the line did not go below 175*F compared to a limit of 145*F and flow through the. line was demonstrated in that the reactor was being shutdown by tborating with the "B" pum The loss of heat tracing was caused by an inadequate clearance procedure which was interpreted to authorized opening the breakers on El primary and El secondary. These breakers also de-energize E2 primary and E2 secondary and Circuit 5 primary and secondary which are the heat trace circuits for the "B" pump and the filter respectivel The licensee stated the intent of the procedure was that the fuses would be pulled for the affected heat trace circuits rather than open the breaker At the exit interview, the licensee was informed that the failure to have an adequate procedure for work on the heat trace circuits of the Boric Acid Transfer Pumps was a violation of Technical Specification 6.. Licensee Event Reports O The following LER's were reviewed to ascertain that reporting requirements were met, appropriate corrective action was taken, and that the event was
evaluated and reviewed by licensee personnel in accordance with approved procedures and administrative control LER No.80-029, "Packing Leak On RHR Valve No. 750"
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LER No.80-028, "Primary System Leak on Auxiliary Pressurizer Spray Valve CVC-311"
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LER No.81-003, "Inoperable Heat Tracing On Boric Acid Transfer Rumps" Emergency Diesel Generator Repairs During the 1980 Refueling Outage, a Fairbanks Morse Inspector inspected the two emergency diesel generator units (Fairbanks Morse Model 38TO8 1/8) at the Robinson sit The licensee reported that during the inspection of the piston rings through the cylinder exhaust ports of."A" standby unit, water was discovered on the piston rings which led the Fairbanks Morse inspector to make a more in-depth inspection of the piston and cylinder liner As a result, nine pistons and six cylinder liners were found to be severely eroded. The erosion in the cylinder liners is around the injection nozzle openings and the piston erosion is on the top surfac During the replacement of the six eroded cylinder liners and nine pistons, it was found that the remaining six cylinder liners had plugged water jacket openings around the injection nozzles. Removal of this fiber, gasket type material was accomplished but not knowing the extent of how much remained, the other six cylinder-liners were also replace The same in-depth inspection of "B" standby unit revealed six eroded cylinder liners and fifteen eroded pistons in the same areas as on unit "A".
There was no indication of plugged water jacket openings in unit "B".
The six eroded cylinder liners, the fifteen eroded pistons and, as a pre cautionary measure, the remaining six cylinder liners were replace The licensee believes theiprobable cause of the eroded cylinder liners and pistons is water leakage in and around the injection nozzles. The licensee sent an upper -and lower piston and a cut-out middle section of a cylinder liner to Fairbanks Morse Company for evaluation of the failur The material found in the water jackets, a sample of the cooling water and a fuel oil sample were sent to the Harris Energy Center for analysi Results from the Fairbanks Morse analysis of the occurrence had not been received at the close of the inspectio The material found in the water jackets was determined to be gasket material. No problem was detected with the cooling water or fuel oi Based on oral discussions with Fairbanks Morse, the licensee has been informed that the problem is not generi The licensee stated they would
expedite action from Fairbanks Morse. The inspector expressed concern that the present diesel inspection procedure did not contain adequate steps to assure detection of the type of problem found on the Robinson diesels and stated the item would be left open pending the Fairbanks Morse Report and a subsequent inspectio The degradation of the cylinder liners and pistons did not result in failure or noticeable loss of efficiency of the emergency diesel generators at the H. B. Robinson 2 plant, but did represent a degrading condition that could, if undetected, eventually have resulted in loss of operabilit /81-03-0. Annunciator-Panel Review The inspector reviewed the Reactor Turbine Generator Control Board (RTGB)
Annunciators. A licensed operator was requested to accompany the inspector and discuss the status of each alar The following annunciators were observed to be in the alarm mod ANNUNICATOR ANNUNICATOR NUMBER TITLE REASON FOR ALARM A-1-16 Abnormal Pressure V Pressurizer Motor Operated Temperature 456 Block Valve 456 Closed A-1-24 Abnormal Pressure V Pressurizer Motor Operated Temperature 455-C Block Valve 455C Closed A-1-29 Spent Fuel Level was low - water was Pit level low being adde Diesel Oil Storage Faulty Sensor, tank level Tank Level Low 80%.
was 87%.
Trouble ticket issue A-2-40 Motor Driven Fire Fire pump actually running Pump Running or due to low Header Pressur trouble Water being used for clean up purpose A-3-39 Pressurizer Liquid -
Pressurizer Vapor Temperature Vapor Hi-Temp TI 454 failed high C-1-48 Hot Penetration Flow Verified to be adequate Cooling, low flow Trouble Ticket issue D-1-29 Feedwater Header Pressure is low, due to Pressure low high flow rate required Zo sustain 2300 MW operation
0-2-31 Screen level Due to high water level in Differential High circulating intake pump Valve Pit Sump 0-2-32 Reheater A/B Power Controller problems, Drain Lost Drain Tank Tank Level High - Trouble Level High Ticket issue D-2-40 E-H Temp Low Due to Cold Weather D-3-33 Boric Acid Heat Boric acid evaporator trace trouble heat trace problem being reviewed by Auxiliary Operato D-3-11 Hydrogen Temperature apparently Temperature high correct for increased MWe output of generato High set point revision is under consideratio Diesel Room "B" Sensor failur Cooling Fan OL Trouble ticket issue Temp. high A further review of licensee Annunciator procedures was mad No procedures were available for the window entitled Abnormal Pressurizer Pressure. This window is in panel A-1 position 16 which formerly contained "N-2 Header" for which a procedure is present in annunciator procedure manua In addition, several discrepancies were observed between the titles displayed in the annunciators windows and the titles.shown in the annunciator procedures. The most significant of these are indicated in the listing belo ANNUNCIATOR ANNUNCIATOR PROCEDURE ACTUAL ANNUNCIATOR NUMBER WINDOW DISPLAY WINDOW DISPLAY B-1-35 SPARE Reactor coolant pump high vibration D-1-22 BLANK N2 Header 0-3-31 BLANK Generator low frequency D-4-33 MSRA's
"B" Waste Evaporator In view of the several discrepancies between the Annunciator Al-arm windows and the procedures, the inspector stated the'items appeared to constitute noncompliance with Technical Specification 6.8.1 which requires written
procedures and administrative policies shall be established, implemented, and maintained that meet or exceed the requirements and recommendations of Sections 5.1 and 5.3 of ANSI N18.7-1972 and Appendix "A" of USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.33 dated November 3, 197 The licensee commented they had already started on correcting the ommissions observed in the Annunciator procedur /81-03-0. Open Items a. (Closed)
261/80-25-01, Administrative Instruction update to reflect organizational changes of Technical Specification Amendment No. 46 has been accomplishe b. (Closed) 261/80-28-01, Following review of NRR communications with CPL on the subject of subcooling margin and of CPL's response and definition of 40aF as the plant specific valve for the subcooling limit prior to termination of HP1 is satisfactor SI 0)