IR 05000259/1980035
| ML19351F965 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 11/07/1980 |
| From: | Chase J, Dance H, Sullivan R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19351F956 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259-80-35, 50-260-80-29, 50-296-80-29, NUDOCS 8102200610 | |
| Download: ML19351F965 (10) | |
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'o UNITED STATES
In NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
,E REGION 11
I tol MARIETTA sT., N.W., SUITE 310o o
ATLANT A. GEORGIA 3o3o3
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Report Nos. 50-259/80-35, 50-260/80 29 and 50-296/80-29 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority 500A Chestnut Street Tower II Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401 Facility: Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-259, 50-260 and 50-296 License Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52 and DPR-68 Inspection at Browns erry site near Athens, Alabama inspectors:
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//- 7-['C R. F. Sull(van 8 Date Signed il.
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//- 7-VO J. V. C psd Date Signed Approved by:
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// 7 7d Hl C. Dance, Section Chief, RONS Branch Dite ' Signed SUMMARY Inspection on September 1 - 30, 1980 Areas Inspected This routine inspeccion involved 116 resident inspector-hours on site in the areas of operational safety, IE Circular follow-up, reportable y currences, plant physical protection, fire protection, refueling outage, reactor trip, IE Bulletin follow-up, and health physics.
Results i
Of the 9 areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were found in 6 areas; three separate items of noncompliance were found in 3 areas; (Infraction -
failure to fr.,11ow procedure for fuel assembly orientation verification; Infraction -
failure to have an outside agency perform a fire inspection within three years;
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Infraction -failure of personnel to have a Special Work Permit for entry into a High Radiation Area.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees H. L. Abercrombie, Plant Manager J. L. Harness, Assistant Plant Manager J. B. Studdard, Operations Supervisor R. Hunkapillar, Assistant Operations Supervisor J. A. Teague, Maintenance Supervisor, Electrical M. A. Haney, Maintenance Supervisor, Mechanical J. R. Pittman, Maintenance Supervisor, Instruments R. G. Merke, Results Section Supervisor R. T. Smith, QA Supervisor J. E. Swindell, Outage Director B. Howard, Plant Health Physicist R. E. Jackson, Chief, Public Safety R. Cole, QA Site Representative Office of Power Other licensee employees contacted included licensed senior reactor operators and reactor operators, auxiliary operators, craftsmen, technicians, public safety officers, QA personnel and engineering personnel.
2.
Management Interviews Management interviews were conducted on September 5,12,19 and 26,1980, with the Plant Manager and selected members of his staff. The inspectors summarized the scope and findings of their inspection activities.
The licensee was informed that three items of noncompliance were identified during this report period.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
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(Closed) Infraction (259/79-37-01): Failure of the Plant Operations a.
Review Committee (POP') to review Design Change Requests on safety-related equipment prior to their installation. The inspectors verified by review of records and discus: ion with electrical maintenance personnel, that they have been instructed of the requirements concerning modifica-tions.
In addition, the three modifications listed in the item of noncompliance were subsequently reviewed by PORC.
b.
(Closed) Infraction (259/79-33-01): Failure to tag and segregate out of calibration equipment. The inspectors serified by review of records, discussions with Quality Assurance personnel and Instrument Maintenance personnel that a computer program of all measuring and test equipment used by instrument maintenance is being compared against Quality Assurance's independent list for identifying items out of calibration.
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(Closed) Infraction (296/80-12-01): Failure to test the High Pressure Coolant Inj ection System when the Reactor Core Isolation Coolant System was inoperable. The inspectors verified that both operations and engineering personnel have been made aware of this incident and reviewed Browns Ferry procedures which require tracking of system status.
d.
(Closed) Infraction (259/80-19-01):
Failure to use procedures for special process involving heat treating of High Pressure Coolant Injection System.
The inspectors verified tJuat plant maintenance personnel were instructed to adhere to procedures without deviation.
4.
Unresolvcd Items No unresolved items were identified during this report period.
5.
Operational Safety The inspectors kept informed on a daily basis of the overall plant status and any significant safety m.
ters related to plant operations.
Daily discussions were held each morning with plant management and various members of the plant operating staff.
The inspectors made frequent visits to the control room such that each was visited at least daily when an inspector was on site. Observations included instrument readings; setpoints and recordings; status of operating systems; status and alignments of emergency standby systems; purpose of temporary tags on equipment controls and switches; annunciator alarms; adherence to procedures; adherence to limiting conditions for operations; tempora ry alterations in effect; daily journals and data sheet entries; and control room manning.
This inspection activity also included numerous informal discussions with operators and their supervisors.
General plant tours were conducted on at least a weekly basis. Portions of the turbine building, each reactor building and outside areas were visited.
Observations included valve positions and system alignment; snubber and hanger conditions; instrument readings; housekeeping; radiation area controls; tag controls on equipment; work activities in progress; and plant physical protection.
Informal discussions were held with selected plant personnel in their functional areas during these tours.
6.
Reportable Occurrences The below listed Licensee Event Reports (IERs) were reviewed to determine if the information provided met NRC reporting requirements. The determination included adequacy of event description and corrective action taken or planned, existance of potential generic problems and the relative safety significance of each event.
Additional inplant reviews and discussions with plant personnel as apprepriate were conducted for those reports indicated by an asterisk.
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i LER No.
Date Event
- 259-8024 04/10/80 Loss of one source of off-site power
- 259-8033 05/15/80 480V Reactor MOV board tripped 259-8049 06/20/80 IC RHR heat exchanger inoperable
- 259-8050 07/18/80 Turbine control valve pressure switch (PS-47-144)
miswired
- 259-8054 07/18/80 River temperature exceeded 90 F downstream of plant discharge 259-8058 08/28/80 Turbine first stage pressure switches exceeded Technical Specification limit (PS-1-81A and B)
- 259-8063 09/16/80 CAM-1-RM-90-251 out of service for greater than one hour i
- 259-8064 09/16/80 CAM-1-RM-90-249 out of service for greater than one hour
- 259-8068 09/01/80 Failure to perform fire audit every three
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years 260-8021 06/04/80 Particulate channel recorder 2-RR-90-249 out of service 296-8019 06/25/80 Drywell r, ump flow transmitter 296-8021 07/03/80 FT-77-16 was inoperable; RCIC turbine trip on overspeed
- 296/8033 09/12/80 Radiation alarm on 2B and 2D heat exchangers.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in the review of the above reports.
7.
IE Circular Review Licensee action on the below listed circulars was reviewed to determine if the licensee evaluation and action taken was appropriate to satisfy the concerns described in circulars. The review by the inspectors consisted of records review, procedure review and discussions with plant personnel. The circulars listed below are considered closed.
79-08, Attempted Extortion of Low Enriched Fuel 79-13, Replacement of Diesel Fire Pump Starting Contractors 79-15, Bursting of H. P. Hose and Malfunction of Relief Valve and
"0" ring in SCBA 79-17, Contact Problem in SB-12 Switch on GE Electric Metallic Circuit Breakers 79-24, Proper Installation and Calibration of Core Spray Pipe Break Detection Equipment 80-05, Emergency Diesel Generator Lubricating Oil Addition and on Site Supply 80-07, Problems With HPCI Turbine Oil System.
80-10, Failure to Maintain Environmental Qualification.
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8.
IE Bulletin Follow-up A follow-up review was made of the U ensee response to IE Belletin 80-17, Supplement 3, Failure of Control Rods to Insert During a Scram at a BWR.
The review consisted of examinations of Operating Instructions (OI),
Emergency Operating Instructions (E01), and discussions with operations personnel and various members of plant management. The inspectori. noted that the requirements of the IE Bulletin to scram on certain indications of loss of control air were included in the Browns Ferry E01s and CIs within the time limit set forth by the Bulletin. The inspectors had one area of concern in that upon receiving the " low scram air header pretsure alarm" at 70 psig, in the control room, the procedure required that an operator be dispatched to the gauge in the reactor building to read the pressure in the scram air header and communicate his findings to the control room. The inspectors felt that this procedure, in some cases, lead to not scraming the reactor at required 10 psi above the opening pressure of the scram outlet valve which was determined to be 50 psi. This issue was resolved by TVA and NRC management. The E0I was changed to req tire scraming on unanti-cipated low scram air header pressures without having to verify scram air neader pressures in the reactor building.
The inspectors haJ no further qucstions on IE Bulletin 80-17 Supplement 3.
IE Bulletin 80-17 remains open pending further evaluation.
9.
Plant Physical Protection During the course of routine inspection activities, the inspectors made observations of certain plant physical protection activities. These included personnel badging, personnel search and escort, vehicle search and escort, communications and vital area access control.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified within the areas inspected.
10.
Health Physics Frequent tours of contaminated storage areas and High Radiation areas were made by the inspectors to determine if proper posting and maintenance of barriers and contaminated waste was being performed in accordance with the NRC requirements and the Browns Ferry license. Two instances of improperly posted High Radiation areas were found on separate occasions.
In both cases, the radiation readings were approximately 110 mrem /hr on the outside of the High Radiation barrier.
Both were brought to the attention of Health Physics personnel who took immediate action to repair the area to extend the High Radiation area outside the barrier. In addition, Health Physics personnel resurveyed all known High Radiation areas to ensure they
were all properly posted. No further problems were identified.
Because the possibility existed that the High Radiation barriers were moved
j inadvertantly by plant personnel, tape is now bei 2g applied on the floor issnediately beneath the High Radiation barrier rope. This tape will identify any barrier which has been moved from its intended location.
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On September 21, 198L, Special Work Permit (SWP) 01-1-07562 was issued for access to a contaminated area around Unit I drywell access door.
The general dose rate reading in this area was 20 to 30 mrem /hr, and because of the loose surface contamination, it required a full set of contamination clothing. It was noted by the inspectors on September 22, 1980, that seven personnel had indicated entry to this area by signing in on the SWP; yet the area showed no signs of personnel activity. It was later determined by the inspectors that six of the seven personnel had used SWP 01-1-07562 to l
enter a High Radiation area, adjacent to the contaminated area, in which general area readings were approximately 300 mrem /hr.
No SWP had been issued for the High Radiation area.
Since Technical Specification 6.3.D.1 requires that entrance to a High Radiation area will be controlled by issuance of a SWP, this was identified as an item of noncompliance to plant management on September 23, 1980 for failure to issue a SWP for access control to a High Radiation area (259/
80-35-02).
In addition, it was noted that the revision to the Technical Specifications issued on October 11, 1979, inadvertently deleted the requirement for having a rate meter when individuals or a group of individuals enters a High Radiation area. This was brought to the attention of plant management by Region II Health Physics personnel. TVA has committed to submitting a Technical Specification change to require a rate meter when entering a High Radiation area.
In the meantime, Radiological Control Instruction-10 requires a rate meter for personnel entering High Radiation areas.
11.
Fire Protection On September 4,1980, the inspectors were notified by the plant manager that the three year independent fire inspection required by Technical Specification 3.11.E.2 was overdue as of September 1, 1980. The reason for missing this audit was attributed to a misinterpretation of the Technical Specifications and failure to award a contract in a timely manner to a qualified outside fire censultant.
During the week of September 15, 1980, the independent fire audit was performed by an outside agency. Seven-hour failure to have a fire audit done within three years of the last fire aud: t was identified to the plant manager on September 5, 1980, as an item of noncompliance (259/80-35-01, 260/80-29-01, 296/80-29-01).
12.
Refueling Outage On September 5,1980, Unit 2 was shutdown for a scheduled refueling outage.
The inspectors had been following outage maintenance, health physics activities (see Section 10), operations and refueling floor activities.
The inspectors have observed that the appropriate surveillance instructions were performed and that critical systems associated with core cooling were available for
- ration as required by the Technical Specifications.
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On September 25, 1980, the inspectors observed core alterations on the refueling floor and noted that the senior reactor operator was not in a position to directly supervise fuel handling as required by Circular 80-21.
The licensed operator spent most of his time in his office which is elevated approximately 15 feet above the refueling deck. From this elevation, the senior reaccor operator would have a good view of Unit I refueling operations, but his view is hindered by a distance of approximately 60 feet from Unit 2 and 200 feet from Unit 3 refueling activities. Communications with the refueling bridge was maintained by walkie-talkie.
Region II, the resident inspectors and plant managers discussed the location of the senior reactor operator on September 26, 1980. The licensee agreed to and has moved the senior reactor operator down to the refueling deck directly adjacent to Unit 2 reactor. In this location the senior reactor operator cannot see the fuel assemblies in the core; but, has good visual observation of the men on the refueling bridge and also has direct coaiuni-cation with the refueling bridge operator.
On September 15, 1980, while Unit 2 was in a scheduled refueling outage, the plant manager informed the resident inspectors that two fuel bundles were found to be misorientated by 90'.
This was discovered by visual observation and confirmed by reexamining the videotape taken at the end of the last refueling outage. The fuel bundles were in location 15-28 and were 7 by 7 General Electric type fuel.
The licensee reviewed the offgas activity for the past cycle and found no abnormal activities indicated, so concluded that the fuel was not damaged during the cycle. In addition, the Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) was calculated based on data from the computer for the four most severe transients during the past cycle and were found not to have exceeded the 1.33 MCPR limit set by the Technical Specifications for 7-by-7 fuel. At the present time General Electric (GE) and TVA are calculating to determine if the Linear Heat Generation Rate (LHGR) exceeded Technical Specifications during the past cycle and if the MCPR limit was exceeded based on data not avail-able to the computer. These two fuel assemblies will be removed from the core and stowed in the spent fuel pool as previously planned.
On September 19, 1980, the plant manager informed the inspectors that during a re-review of Unit I core verification videotapes taken after the last refueling outage, it was determined that one fuel bundle was misorientated by 90'.
This fuel bundle is also a GE 7-by-7 fuel bundle, at location 11-06 and is on the periphery of the core with no control rods adjacent to it.
With Unit I at full power, it was determined that the MCPR was at 5.055, well above the Technical Specification limit of 1.23. TVA calculated that for the worst transient, the MCPR for this fuel assembly would only decrease to approximately 4.0.
Since calculations show no significant detrimental effects to the fuel bundle or the fuel bundle around it, no operational limitation has been imposed on Unit 1.
The core verification tapes for Unit 3 were also reviewed and no misorientated fuel bundles were identified.
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-7-The inspectors reviewed the Browns Ferry procedures for fuel loading, General Operating Instruction (GOI) 100-3 Refueling Operations Technical Instruction
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(TI)-14 Special Nuclear Materials Control and Accountability Systems, and Refueling Test Instruction (RTI)-3 to determine adequacy of procedures for feel loading and core verification.
In addition, senior reactor operators assigned to the refueling floor, fuel handlers and nuclear engineers were interviewed to determine if any problem areas existed during fuel handling or core verification.
The inspectors found, that in general, the procedures were adequate for fuel handling and core verification; however, the following points were discussed with the plant manager at the weekly management meeting held on September 19, 1980.
When the nuclear engineer fills out the Fuel Transfer Form (FTF) to a.
assign locations in the core for each fucl bundle, the orientation is also assigned by specifying the quardrant in which the spring clip is to be located.
A second check by another nuclear engineer is performed
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to verify that the fuel bundles are in their correct location by serial number; however, no second check is performed to ensure that the spring clip is in its correct location. Fuel handlers have stated that about three fuel bundles per refueling outage are misorientated because the FTF is in error. The plant manager said TVA would consider a second verification of correct location of the spring clips on the FTF before it is icsued.
b.
Most of the reliance on fuel being properly orientated is placed on the videotape taken after the core load. This is supported by the fact that 16 fuel assemblies were discovered misorientated during the last Unit 2 core verification and 24 during Unit I core verification.
Also, the fuel handlers stated that when a fuel bundle is picked up in the spent fuel pool for insertion into the core, the fuel bundle is assumed to be in its proper orientation at that time.
They also stated that at times it is difficult to verify the location of the spring clips.
All personnel involved in fuel handling have been t
instructed on the need to ensure proper orientation of fuel bundles as they are loaded into the core.
c.
During the core verification, no official documentation exists for identifying a misorientated fuel assembly.
During the last core verification on Unit 2, 16 fuel bundles were identified as being misorientated, but only 14 were reorientated. The two bundles not corrected were the same two identified as being misorientated on September 14, 1980. A formal means of documenting misorientated fuel assemblies discovered during the core verification process will be implemented prior to verifying the core loading on Unit 2 during its current refueling outage.
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-8-Besides the corrective actions taken above, the plant also plans on revising their procedures prior to the core verification on Unit 2 during this refueling outage to include:
(1) a periodic break for the personnel performing core verification (2) when more than eight errors are found and corrected, a complete new videotape and reverification of the core required (3) each person will signoff for the specific part of the core that he verified (4) the videotape shall show the complete control cellt and allow individual fuel assembly serial numbers to be read.
On September 23, 1980, it was identified to the Assistant Plant Manager that the misorientation of the fuel bundles in Units 1 and 2 constituted an item of noncompliance for failure to follow procedures in regards to verifying core orientation as required by Technical Specification 6.3. A.2.
The Assistant Plant Manager had no comment on the item of noncompliance (259/80-35-03,260/80-29-02).
During the review of GOI-100-3, it was noted by the inspectors that the procedure to check for proper feel bundle seating could be misleading. The procedure called for lowering the grapple until it was just above the handle on a fuel assembly and then moving the grapple across the core to see if it struck any fuel Fundle handles.
It was pointed out by the inspectors, that if the reference fuel bundle in which they lowered the grapple to was not seated properly, then other fuel bundles not properly scated remain undetected.
The licensee revised GOI-100-3 to require using two fuel assemblies as reference points for the fuel grapple before moving it across the core to verify proper fuel bundle seating.
13.
Reactor Trips The inspectors reviewed activities associated with the below listed reactor trips during this report period.
The review included determination of cause, safety significance, performance cf personnel and systems, and corrective action. The inspectors examined instrument recordings, computer printouts, operations journal entries, scram reports and had discussions with operations, maintenance and engineering support personnel as appropriate.
On August 16, 1980, Unit 2 tripped at 5:39 a.m.
from 93% power during surveillance testing of the Main Steam Isolation Valve high temperature actuation logic.
Failure to reset the PCIS before going to the second switch resulted in main steam line isolation and reactor trip. Seven main steam relief valves lifted to control pressure. Both RCIC and HPCI actuated to control reactor water level. Systems performed as designed.
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-9-On September 1,1980, Unit 1 tripped at 1:41 p.m. from full power due to a turbine trip A water leak on the station cooling control cabinet shorted out a pressure relay which initiated the turbine trip. The reactor protec-tion system and control rod drive system performed satisfactorily. Three main steam relief valves lifted. No emergency core cooling system actuated.
On September 5,1980, Unit 2 was manually tripped from 52% power at 10:00 p.m.
to commence a scheduled refueling outage. Systems performed satisfactorily.
un September 13,1930, Unit 3 was manually tripped from 37% power at 11:55 p.m.
for a short maintenance outage to repair a main steam line isolation valve.
Systems performed satisfactorily.
On September 20, 1980, Unit 3 tripped at 1:58 p.m. from 90% power following failure of 480V shutdown board 3A to transfer from alternate to normal feed after maintenance. RPS MG set "A" was lost producing a half scram. I and
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C bus "A" was*also lost which caused SJAE "A" to isolate. Low vacuum on the main condenser completed actuation of the reactor trip. Control rod drive system performed satisfactorily. No main steam relief valves lifted; nor did any emergency cooling initiate.
On September 24, 1980, Unit I tripped at 11t22 p.m. from full power on generator load rejection due to a turbine trip. A short in a transformer sudden pressure relay led to a trip of the 500 KV circuit breakers for the generator which in turn tripped the turbine. Six main steam relief valves lifted to control pressure. No emergency core cooling actuated. Systems performed as designed.
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