IR 05000259/1980044
| ML18025B368 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 01/21/1981 |
| From: | Brooks E, Quick D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18025B367 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259-80-44, 50-260-80-41, 50-296-80-40, NUDOCS 8103100053 | |
| Download: ML18025B368 (7) | |
Text
~S REoy P0 Cp pp t
IOl p
+w*w+
UNITEDSTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMlSSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTAST., N.W., SUITE 3'IOO ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303 Report Nos. 50-259/80-44, 50-260/80-41 and 50-296/80-40 Licensee:
Tennessee Valley Authority 500A Chestnut Street Chattanooga, TN 37401 Facility: Browns Ferry Docket Nos.
50-259,, 50-260,. 50-296 License Nos.
'nspection at Browns Ferry site, Athens, Alabama Inspector:
E.
H. Brooks Approved by:
D. quic
, Sect on Chief, RONS Date Signed
)-z)-SJ Date Signed Inspection on November 24-26, 1980 Areas, Inspected This routine, unannounced i'nspection involved 23 inspector-hours on site. in the areas of main steam isolation valve testing (Unit 3)
and inspection of pipe support-and restraint systems (Units 1, '2, 3)
Results Of the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- H. L. Abercrombie, Plant Manager
- J. L. Harness, Asst. Plant Manager
- R. Smith, gua1ity Assurance Supervisor
- R. Cole, Off.ice of Power, g.A. Supervisor
- K. Clark, Supervisor Containment Test Section
"T. Chinn, Compliance Office Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force member's, and office personnel.
NRC Resident Inspector
- R. Sullivan
- G. Paulk
- J. Chase
- Attended exit'nterview, Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on November 26,. l980.
with those. persons. indicated, in" Paragraph 1 above.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Unresolved item (50-296/78-30-03):
On October 31, 1978 inspection of hydraulic snublers installed in Unit 3 revealed that general service lubricant had been injected into the reservoirs of-several hydraul,ic; snubbers which normally contain high quality radiation resistant hydraulic fluid.,
Further review disclosed a similar situation existed on Unit 2..
The inspector could not determine by inspection of installed snubbers or review of the licensees inspection documentation that the corrective. action proposed by the licensee has adequately resolved the problems..
The* licensee agreed. to summarize, all actions taken such as additional inspection,,
testi'ng rebuilding, modifications, etc; to assure that all installed snubbers are free of contamination and that the potential for future contamination has been eliminated.,
The licensee.
has submitted a
summary of-actions, taken,. to the. NRC Regional Office.
This matter of contaminated snubbers and the corrective actions taken by the licensee is under review: and is still considered to be unresolved subject to further-review.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspectio Inspection of Pipe Support and Restraint Systems A visual inspection. of safety related snubbers outside containment was performed by the inspector on all three Browns Ferry units.
The Bergen-Paterson snubbers inspected were fitted with fabricated wire rings installed on the alemite fittings to prevent inadvertent lubrica-tion of the snubber reservoirs.
Metal warning labels were also attached to each snubber stating
"use silicon fluid only."
These were corrective actions provided'y the licensee.
in. accordance with Licensee Event'eport 78-030.
The licensee advised that a "foreign substance" was found in the fluid of a Unit 2 snubber during functional testing and that samples of the substance were being analyzed at the TVA central laboratory.
The licensee stated that alemite fittings on all Bergen-Paterson snubbers installed in all three reactor plants were removed for visual examination as a
means for identifying inadvertent lubrication.
As discussed in-Paragraph 3 above, the licensee will provide assurance that all installed snubbers are free of contamination and the potential for future contamina-tion has been eliminated.
In accordance with technical specifications, the licensee is currently inspecting snubbers on all three units on an operating cycle schedule..
Documentation of-the. current and. last preceeding snubber inspection was provided for the inspectors review.
The. licensee was. advised. of a. broken drain line support in the. area of R..19.T,'-LINE'l'evation 593.
A pipe hanger on the reactor building, component, cooling water line was also observed to be unattached in this same-general area.
The: licensee agreed to investigate and correct as necessary.
Main Steam I'solation Valve Testing, The inspector witnessed the start of MSIV testing on Unit 3.
While pressurizing between the two MSIV's installed in each of the four main steam lines, leakage exceeded the reference leak rate of 11.5 SCFH per valve,. contrary to, Technical-Specification 4.7.2.i.
Testing was halted at" this point to permit disassembly of the. inboard (inside containment)
MSIV.
The. testing procedure-followed: by the. licensee permits disassembly and sealing of. the inboard isolation val've in order that.
the.
outboard (outside. containment)
isolation valve: can be: pressure. tested individually and the resulting leakage compared with the total leakage.
Prior to sealing of the inner valve, the leakage for both valves in the D
steam line, although not accurately measured, was on the order of 2900 SCFH at'0 psig pressure between the valves, which greatly exceeds the technical specification criteria of 11.5 SCFH per valve at 25 psig pressure.
Similar leakage rates occured also in the A and B steamline f
Leakage in the C steamline although exceeding the acceptance criteria was not of such magnitude as the other three lines.
Failure of MSIV's to meet the leak testing criteria has been consisterit on all three units in the past, requiring valve repair to reduce the leakage to within the acceptance criteria:
Licensee event reports of MSIV leakage in some recent tests include the following:,
50-296/78-25 50-259/78-34 50-259/77-23 50-259/79-03 50-260/79-13 50-260/79-07 50-260/78-09 50-259/78-34 50-296/79-14 50-260/79-14 The licensee was advised at the exit interview that discussion with the regional office concluded that MSIY leakage in the Browns Ferry reactor.
plants constitutes a significant safety problem, and that it will be reported to NRC Headquarters along with recommendations that-corrective.
action be required either in the. form of revised testing requirements or system modification to include leakage control systems as proposed in Regu,latory Gui'de 1.9.6.