IR 05000259/2025001
| ML25125A068 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 05/09/2025 |
| From: | Renee Taylor NRC/RGN-II/DORS |
| To: | Erb D Tennessee Valley Authority |
| References | |
| DPR-033, DPR-052, DPR-068 IR 2025001 | |
| Download: ML25125A068 (29) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000259/2025001, 05000260/2025001, AND 05000296/2025001
Dear Delson Erb:
On March 31, 2025, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant. On April 8, 2025, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Andrew Mitchell, Director of Nuclear Plant Operations, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Two findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. One of these findings involved a violation of NRC requirements. One Severity Level IV violation without an associated finding is documented in this report. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment or a finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant.
May 9, 2025 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Ryan C. Taylor, Chief Projects Branch 5 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000259, 05000260, and 05000296 License Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52, and DPR-68
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000259, 05000260, and 05000296
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000259/2025001, 05000260/2025001, and 05000296/2025001
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2025-001-0022
Licensee:
Tennessee Valley Authority
Facility:
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant
Location:
Athens, Alabama
Inspection Dates:
January 1, 2025 to March 31, 2025
Inspectors:
S. Billups, Resident Inspector
S. Downey, Senior Reactor Inspector
D. Neal, Health Physicist
A. Nielsen, Senior Health Physicist
K. Pfeil, Resident Inspector
T. Steadham, Senior Resident Inspector
Approved By:
Ryan C. Taylor, Chief
Projects Branch 5
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Implement Compensatory Measures for Blocked Sprinkler Heads Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000259,05000260/2025001-01 Open/Closed
[H.8] -
Procedure Adherence 71111.05 The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of Unit 1 and 2 Operating License Conditions 2.C.(13) and 2.C.(14), respectively, for the licensees failure to implement all provisions of the approved fire protection plan when compensatory measures were not established for fire protection sprinkler heads obstructed by scaffolding. As a result, the associated sprinkler heads were non-functional until the licensee took actions consistent with the approved fire protection program, such as removing the scaffold and implementing a one-hour fire watch prior to rebuilding the scaffold.
Failure to Maintain Housekeeping Standards Leads to Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Isolation Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green FIN 05000260/2025001-02 Open/Closed
[H.1] -
Resources 71111.12 The inspectors identified a Green finding when the licensee failed to comply with procedure NPG-SPP-01.3, Housekeeping, Revision 11. Specifically, the licensee failed to maintain the steam vault free of debris such as litter, dirt...scrap, and clutter after work was complete in the area. Consequently, the debris clogged the floor drain when a leak occurred in the steam vault allowing water to backup, drain into floor penetrations, and drip on instrumentation causing a reactor core isolation cooling isolation.
Main Steam Relief Valves Lift Settings Outside of Technical Specification Required Setpoints Cornerstone Severity Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Not Applicable Severity Level IV NCV 05000259/2025001-03 Open/Closed Not Applicable 71153 A self-revealed Severity Level IV non-cited violation of Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.3 and TS 3.0.4 was identified when the licensee discovered, through as-found test results, two of thirteen main steam relief valves (MSRVs) that were removed for testing with as-found lift settings outside of the +/-3 percent setpoint band required for their operability.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000259,05000260/
2024-003-00 Units 1 and 2, Valid Specified System Actuation Caused the Automatic Start of Emergency Diesel Generators 71153 Closed LER 05000259/2024-004-00 Unit 1, Main Steam Relief Valves Lift Settings Outside of Technical Specifications Required Setpoints 71153 Closed
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 began the inspection period at full (100 percent) rated thermal power (RTP). On February 14, 2025, operators lowered reactor power to 64 percent RTP for a control rod sequence exchange. On February 15, 2025, the unit was returned to full RTP where it remained at or near for the remainder of the inspection period.
Unit 2 began the inspection period at full RTP and gradually reduced power to 80 percent on March 4, 2025, as a result of end of cycle coast down. On March 4, 2025, operators manually shut down the unit for planned refueling outage 2R23. The unit remained shut down for outage-related activities for the remainder of the inspection period.
Unit 3 began the inspection period at full RTP. On February 8, 2025, operators lowered reactor power to 66 percent RTP for a control sequence exchange. On February 8, 2025, the unit scrammed as a result of a fault in the main turbine generator isophase bus links. Following repairs, operators started up the unit on March 4, 2025. On March 8, 2025, the unit was returned to full RTP where it remained at or near for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk-significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of seasonal extreme cold temperatures for the following systems on January 9, 2025:
- Unit common residual heat removal service water pumps
- Unit 1/2 standby diesel generators
- Unit 3 standby diesel generators
Impending Severe Weather Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the overall preparations to protect risk-significant systems from impending severe weather local intense precipitation and high winds on March 3, 2025.
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (7 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Unit 3 residual heat removal loop 1 after pump maintenance and testing on January 21, 2025
- (2) Unit 3 reactor core isolation cooling after maintenance and testing on February 6, 2025
- (3) Unit 3 standby diesel generator 3A starting air and fuel oil subsystems after standby diesel generator auto start on February 21, 2025
- (4) Unit 3A and 3B standby diesel generator batteries following a loaded run on March 3, 2025 (5)auxiliary decay heat removal walkdown before residual heat removal loop swap during shutdown cooling outage on March 11, 2025
- (6) Unit 2 core spray prior to reactor pressure vessel drain down on March 26, 2025
- (7) Unit common main bank 2 & battery board 2 on March 27, 2025
Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the Unit 2 standby liquid control system after maintenance on March 28, 2025.
- (2) The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the Unit 2 residual heat removal system on March 31, 2025.
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (11 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Unit 1/2 standby diesel generator A, B, C, and D fan rooms on January 7, 2025
- (2) Unit 3 reactor core isolation cooling reactor building elevation 519/541 on February 3, 2025
- (3) Unit 1/2, fire area 1-6, control room air handling unit mechanical equipment room on February 6, 2025
- (4) Unit 2, fire areas 2-1 and 2-2, reactor building elevation 565' on February 6, 2025
- (5) Unit 3 turbine building general areas, elevation 586', after main generator isophase bus electrical fault on February 9, 2025
- (6) Unit 3, fire area 26, reactor building main steam valve vault, elevation 565' on February 11, 2025
- (7) Unit 3, fire area 23, 4kV shutdown board room 3EA and 3EC, diesel generator building elevation 583' on February 20, 2025
- (8) Unit 2, fire area 26, reactor building main steam valve vault, elevation 565' on March 5, 2025
- (9) Unit common, fire area REFUEL, refuel floor, reactor building elevation 664' on March 7, 2025
- (10) Unit 2, fire area 2-5, standby liquid control and electrical board rooms 2A and 2B, reactor building elevation 621 and 639 on March 26, 2025
- (11) Unit 2, fire area 16, main battery bank 2 and 1C control bay hallway elevation 593' on March 27, 2025
Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the onsite fire brigade training and performance during an announced fire drill involving a simulated fire in the Unit 3 3EC electrical board room on January 14, 2025.
- (2) The inspectors observed the onsite fire brigade response to the auxiliary instrument room number 3 incipient fire detection alarm due to smoke from ongoing hot work on January 28, 2025.
71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures
Flooding Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the Unit 3 reactor building main steam valve vault on February 18, 2025.
71111.08G - Inservice Inspection Activities (BWR)
BWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample - Nondestructive Examination and Welding
Activities (IP Section 03.01)
The inspectors evaluated boiling water reactor nondestructive testing by reviewing the following examinations from March 10, 2025 to March 14, 2025:
- (1) Radiographic Examination
1. RWCU-2-004-092-C1R0, pipe to valve weld, ASME Class 1. This included a
review of associated welding activities.
2. RWCU-2-004-093-C1R0, pipe to valve weld, ASME Class 1. This included a
review of associated welding activities.
Ultrasonic Examination
1. DRHR-2-18, pipe to tee weld, ASME Class 2
2. KR-2-47, pipe to elbow weld, ASME Class 1
3. N16B-1, safe end to pipe weld, ASME Class 1
4. RWCU-2-003-G002, pipe to elbow weld, ASME Class 1
Visual Examination
1. In-vessel remote visual inspection of the following items:
a.
Jet pump 16 AS1 Auxiliary Wedge (shroud side)b.
Jet pump 18 slip joint clamp c.
Jet pump 20 wedge WD-1 d.
Weld DP8a, shroud pipe to collar weld
2. VT-3 of the following items:
a.
2-47B400S0022, pipe support b.
2-47B400S0007, pipe support c.
2-47B452H0022, pipe support
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the main control room during Unit 2 refueling outage shutdown and scram recovery on March 4, 2025.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated a licensed operator requalification training session in the simulator which included a trip of an emergency equipment cooling water pump, high pressure coolant injection inadvertent initiation, reactor feedwater line break, and loss of a 480V shutdown board, reactor motor operated valve board, and control power to a core spray pump on January 29, 2025. This training session required the crew to enter various abnormal operating instructions, emergency operating instructions, and emergency plan implementing procedures to control the plant and appropriately classify the emergency.
- (2) The inspectors observed and evaluated a licensed operator requalification training session in the simulator which included power ascension, feed water level control system instrument failure, a feed water level control system instrument bypass and reset, a recirculation pump trip, a safety relief valve failing open, and a failure of all control rods to insert on a scram on January 29, 2025. This training session required the crew to enter various abnormal operating instructions, emergency operating instructions, and emergency plan implementing procedures to control the plant and appropriately classify the emergency.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) Unit 2 reactor core isolation cooling, impact of maintenance on environmental qualification of outboard steam isolation valve actuator, 2-BFN-71-FCV-3, motor on February 13, 2025 (2)housekeeping work practices and impact on plant equipment in the Unit 2 reactor building main steam valve vault on March 13, 2025
Quality Control (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance and quality control activities to ensure the following SSC remains capable of performing its intended function:
- (1) Unit common commercial grade dedication document review for standby diesel generator fuel oil on March 18, 2025
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
(1)maintenance risk assessment during Unit 3 reactor core isolation cooling outage on February 3, 2025 (2)maintenance risk assessment during power supply alert and associated deferred maintenance on February 21, 2025 (3)maintenance risk assessment during Unit 3 startup and Unit 2 shutdown on March 6, 2025 (4)maintenance risk assessment during high risk evolution of reactor pressure vessel head removal on Unit 2 on March 7, 2025 (5)maintenance risk assessment during Unit 2 residual heat removal shutdown cooling planned outage on March 17, 2025
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (8 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
(1)condition report (CR) 1982625, Unit 3 standby diesel generator 3A fuel oil transfer pump 1 low flow on January 3, 2025
- (2) CR 1973522, Unit 2 reactor core isolation cooling steam line isolation on January 23, 2025
- (3) CR 1985000, motor ground on Unit 1 high pressure coolant injection inboard injection valve actuator on January 31, 2025
- (4) CR 1990382, potential cracks in Unit 2 residual heat removal test return line on February 7, 2025
- (5) CR 1990713, Unit 3 standby diesel generator 3D battery exhaust fan breaker fault during the auto start of the unit 3 standby diesel generators on February 13, 2025
- (6) CR 1992514, Unit 3 hydraulic control unit 14-43 directional control valve block leaking at weld joint on February 19, 2025
- (7) CR 1992054, Unit 2 reactor building exhaust noble gas monitor check source failure alarm on March 4, 2025
- (8) CR 1997805, Unit 1 standby liquid control squib valve 1B continuity meter photohelic bulb extinguished on March 12, 2025
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
(1)updated final safety analysis report change no.26-084 to revise section 4.8.6.2, "Containment Cooling," to add controls for monitoring the time spent with residual heat removal system in suppression pool cooling mode on February 7, 2025
71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated various Unit 3 forced outage activities from February 8, 2025, to March 6, 2025.
- (2) The inspectors evaluated various Unit 2 refueling outage 2R23 activities from March 4, 2025, through March 31, 2025.
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (7 Samples)
(1)work order (WO) 124089136, Unit 2 high pressure coolant injection flow rate test at rated reactor pressure following system maintenance on January 6, 2025
- (2) WO 120777438, Unit 1 250V reactor motor operated valve board breaker open &
closed starter contactor replacement on January 16, 2025
- (3) WO 125137117, Unit 3 control rod drive 14-43 drive water check valve block weld repair on March 3, 2025
- (4) WO 125191414, Unit 2 inboard main steam isolation valve C as-left leak rate test after maintenance on March 24, 2025
- (5) WO 125126124, Unit 3 main turbine generator damaged isophase bus link replacement on March 25, 2025
- (6) WO 123637843, Unit 2 standby liquid control squib valve 2A replacement on March 26, 2025
- (7) WO 123639889, Unit 2 residual heat removal D heat exchanger relief valve replacement on March 26, 2025
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
- (1) WO 123851334, Unit 2 residual heat removal division I low pressure coolant injection mode logic time delay relay calibration on January 29, 2025
- (2) WO 123639915, Unit 2 refueling bridge preventive maintenance and testing prior to Unit 2 refueling outage on February 27, 2025
- (3) WO 124287563, Unit common reactor building crane preventive maintenance and testing prior to Unit 2 refueling outage on February 28, 2025
- (4) WO 124220550, Unit 1 standby liquid control pump 1A pump performance test on February 28, 2025
- (5) WO 123636560, Unit 2 high pressure coolant injection turbine governor inspection on March 11, 2025
- (6) WO 123810114, Unit 2 reactor cooldown rate monitoring during shutdown from shutdown to cold shutdown for refueling outage 2R23 on March 20, 2025
Inservice Testing (IST) (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
- (1) WO 124232993, Unit 1 reactor core isolation cooling pump performance test at rated pressure on March 10, 2025
- (2) WO 123809901, Unit 2 standby liquid control system functional test on March 31, 2025
Containment Isolation Valve Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) WO 124278209, Unit 2 local leak rate test for 2-FCV-1-26, Unit 2 inboard main steam isolation valve B, on March 19, 2025
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Required Emergency Preparedness Drill (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated an emergency preparedness drill on January 22, 2025. Events included a condenser circulating pump fire, complete loss of suppression pool water temperature indications in the control room, a reactor recirculation pump failure and trip, a leak in the drywell, an unisolable leak into the reactor building, fuel failure, and lowering water level in the spent fuel pool.
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls
Radiological Hazard Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated how the licensee identifies the magnitude and extent of radiation levels and the concentrations and quantities of radioactive materials and how the licensee assesses radiological hazards.
Instructions to Workers (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated how the licensee instructs workers on plant-related radiological hazards and the radiation protection requirements intended to protect workers from those hazards.
Contamination and Radioactive Material Control (IP Section 03.03) (3 Samples)
The inspectors observed/evaluated the following licensee processes for monitoring and controlling contamination and radioactive material:
(1)workers exiting the contaminated area on refueling floor (2)workers exiting the contaminated area in Unit 2 drywell (3)workers exiting the radiologically controlled area (RCA) during a Unit 2 refueling outage
Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (IP Section 03.04) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's control of radiological hazards for the following radiological work:
(1)work performed on Unit 2 main steam isolation valves
- (2) Unit 2 drywell undervessel maintenance
- (3) Unit 2 drywell scaffolding (4)refueling floor activities High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls (IP Section 03.05) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated licensee controls of the following high radiation areas and very high radiation areas:
- (1) Unit 3 steam jet air ejector, room 431, locked high radiation area (LHRA)
- (2) Unit 1 incore probe, room 222, LHRA
- (3) Unit 1 steam packing exhauster, room 399, LHRA
- (4) Unit 3 condenser room, room 191, LHRA
- (5) Unit 3 clean up pump 3A, room 508, LHRA Radiation Worker Performance and Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency (IP Section 03.06) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance as it pertains to radiation protection requirements.
71124.03 - In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation
Permanent Ventilation Systems (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the configuration of the following permanently installed ventilation system:
(1)control room emergency ventilation system
Temporary Ventilation Systems (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the configuration of the following temporary ventilation system:
- (1) high efficiency particulate air unit 609 (refuel floor), penetrant testing due 2-17-26
Use of Respiratory Protection Devices (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees use of respiratory protection devices.
Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus for Emergency Use (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees use and maintenance of self-contained breathing apparatuses.
71124.04 - Occupational Dose Assessment
Source Term Characterization (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated licensee performance as it pertains to radioactive source term characterization.
External Dosimetry (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated how the licensee processes, stores, and uses external dosimetry.
Internal Dosimetry (IP Section 03.03) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following internal dose assessments:
- (1) CR 1957037, contamination event
- (2) CR 1957042, contamination event (3)tritium bioassay results for torus divers, February through March 2024
Special Dosimetric Situations (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following special dosimetric situations:
- (1) declared pregnant woman records, 01/03/2023 through 01/03/2025
71124.05 - Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation
Walkdowns and Observations (IP Section 03.01) (9 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following radiation detection instrumentation during plant walkdowns:
(1)area radiation monitors (ARMs) in the radwaste building, turbine building, refueling area, main control room, and Unit 1 reactor building (2)portable ion chambers stored ready for use (3)portable teletectors stored 'ready for use' (4)portable neutron survey meters stored 'ready for use' (5)personnel contamination monitors at the RCA exit (6)small article monitors at the RCA exit (7)portal monitors at the protected area exit (8)whole body counter in dosimetry area (9)gamma spectroscopy equipment and liquid scintillation detectors in the chemistry count room
Calibration and Testing Program (IP Section 03.02) (15 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the calibration and testing of the following radiation detection instruments:
(1)2-RM-90-272, Unit 2 drywell high range ARM, 10/06/22 and 10/08/24 (2)2-RM-90-273, Unit 2 drywell high range ARM, 10/22/22 and 01/23/25 (3)2-RM-90-1, Unit 2 fuel pool ARM, 11/03/16 and 02/25/21 (4)00RE-90-214, Argos-5AB Zeus personnel contamination monitor, 08/31/24 (5)00RE-90-CR204, Chronos tool and equipment monitor, 11/05/24
- (6) TVA tag number 841990, Sam-11 small article monitor, 07/30/24 (7)high-purity germanium detector number 12, 01/20/17 (8)count room inter-laboratory cross check results, 1st quarter, 2nd quarter, 3rd quarter, 2024
- (9) TVA tag number 860644, Ludlum 9-3 ion chamber, 07/30/24
- (10) TVA tag number 952322, Teletector, 01/22/25
- (11) TVA tag number 860942, Ludlum 12-4 neutron detector, 09/24/24 (12)serial number A0742B, DMC 3000 electronic dosimeter, 10/01/24 (13)serial number A0C412, DMC 3000 electronic dosimeter, 11/13/24
- (14) TVA tag number 951503, Ludlum 3030P alpha/beta counter, 11/25/24
- (15) TVA tag number 952409, Ludlum model 177 frisker, 03/05/24 Effluent Monitoring Calibration and Testing Program Sample (IP Section 03.03) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the calibration and maintenance of the following radioactive effluent monitoring and measurement instrumentation:
(1)0-RM-90-130, liquid radwaste monitor, 07/25/24 (2)0-RM-90-147/148, main stack monitors, 07/25/24 (3)0-FT-90-271, main stack process flow, 07/25/24
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
BI01: Reactor Coolant System Specific Activity Sample (IP Section 02.10)===
- (1) Unit 1 (January 1, 2024, through December 31, 2024)
- (2) Unit 2 (January 1, 2024, through December 31, 2024)
- (3) Unit 3 (January 1, 2024, through December 31, 2024)
BI02: Reactor Coolant System Leak Rate Sample (IP Section 02.11) (3 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (January 1, 2024, through December 31, 2024)
- (2) Unit 2 (January 1, 2024, through December 31, 2024)
- (3) Unit 3 (January 1, 2024, through December 31, 2024)
OR01: Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness Sample (IP Section 02.15) (1 Sample)
- (1) February 2, 2024, through March 21, 2025 PR01: Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Effluent Occurrences (RETS/ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences Sample (IP Section 02.16) (1 Sample)
- (1) August 2, 2024, through March 21, 2025
71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) CR 1979883, corrective actions to address the uncontrolled carbon dioxide barrier degradation on January 8, 2025
- (2) CR 1954797, corrective actions to address the failure to transfer 4kV shutdown bus 1 to its alternate power supply on February 26, 2025
71153 - Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Follow up (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the operators' response and event follow-up to a Unit 3 unplanned reactor scram due to main turbine generator load reject on February 8, 2025.
- (2) The inspectors evaluated the licensee's response related to a contaminated person transported to an offsite medical facility on March 5, 2025.
Event Report (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):
- (1) LER 05000259, 05000260/2024-003-00, Units 1 and 2, Valid Specified System Actuation Caused the Automatic Start of Emergency Diesel Generators (ADAMS Accession No. ML24303A034). The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented as a minor violation in this report under Inspection Results Section
===71153. This LER is Closed.
- (2) LER 05000259/2024-004-00, Unit 1, Main Steam Relief Valves Lift Settings Outside of Technical Specifications Required Setpoints (ADAMS Accession No.
ML25010A346). The inspectors determined that it was not reasonable to foresee or correct the cause discussed in the LER, therefore no performance deficiency was identified. The inspectors identified a violation of NRC requirements associated with this LER which is documented in this report as an SL IV non-cited violation (NCV)under Inspection Results Section 71153. This LER is Closed.
Personnel Performance (IP Section 03.03)===
- (1) The inspectors evaluated control room operators during the March 3, 2025, startup on Unit 3 following a forced outage to repair a damaged main generator isophase bus and the March 4, 2025, shutdown of Unit 2 to begin a refueling outage.
Reporting (IP Section 03.05) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensees event reporting determination to ensure it complied with reporting requirements:
- (1) Retraction of Event Notification 57537. This event notification was originally reported as a notification of unusual event on February 9, 2025, due to the observation of smoke in multiple areas of the turbine building that required greater than 15 minutes to verify that no fire occurred. After later review of the circumstances surrounding the event, the licensee concluded that no fire existed and the conditions for declaring the notification of unusual event were not met. On February 13, 2025, the licensee retracted the initial emergency declaration. The inspectors reviewed the event and the retraction to determine if the retraction was appropriate.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Implement Compensatory Measures for Blocked Sprinkler Heads Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000259,05000260/2025001-01 Open/Closed
[H.8] -
Procedure Adherence 71111.05 The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of Unit 1 and 2 Operating License Conditions 2.C.(13) and 2.C.(14), respectively, for the licensees failure to implement all provisions of the approved fire protection plan when compensatory measures were not established for fire protection sprinkler heads obstructed by scaffolding. As a result, the associated sprinkler heads were non-functional until the licensee took actions consistent with the approved fire protection program, such as removing the scaffold and implementing a one-hour fire watch prior to rebuilding the scaffold.
Description:
On January 23, 2025, the inspectors observed a scaffold built approximately two feet below a permanently installed fire protection sprinkler head in the mechanical equipment room located on the 617 elevation of the Unit 1/2 control bay corridor. This area is designated as fire area 16B and the sprinkler system is identified as BFN-2-SUPR-026-0087/16B. By visual inspection, the inspectors concluded that the scaffold obstructed approximately half of the intended spray pattern for the sprinkler. A nearby scaffold tag indicated that the scaffold was constructed on October 15, 2024, and this sprinkler head was one of five in this area.
The inspectors informed the licensee of the blocked sprinkler head concern. The site fire marshal walked the area down and concurred with the inspectors observations that the scaffold was inappropriately blocking the sprinkler head. An extent of condition walkdown identified a second scaffold and obstructed sprinkler head near the pressure suppression chamber head tank located on the the 639' elevation of the Unit 2 reactor building (fire area 2-6). This sprinkler system is designated as BFN-2-SUPR-026-0077G.
In both areas, the licensee removed the scaffold, initiated a fire impairment, and implemented compensatory measures (one-hour fire watch) before the scaffolds were re-built. Additionally, training was provided to craft personnel on the procedural requirements to notify fire protection to perform a fire impairment evaluation. Licensee procedure NPG-SPP-18.4.6, "Control of Fire Impairments," Revision 23, required, in part, that fire protection be contacted to evaluate the necessity of a fire impairment if a scaffold greater than 4 feet in both length and width is constructed within 4 feet vertically of any installed sprinkler head. Both scaffolds in question met this dimension & spacing criterion but because fire protection was not consulted, a fire impairment was never evaluated and the pertinent compensatory actions were not implemented.
Browns Ferry Nuclear (BFN) Fire Protection Requirements Manual, Revision 26, Section 9.3.11.C, "Spray and Sprinkler Systems," states that sprinkler systems BFN-2-SUPR-026-0087/16B and BFN-2-SUPR-026-0077G are required to be functional. Section 9.3.11.C.1c states, in part, that:
"Sprinkler heads are functional ifby a visual inspection of each sprinkler or water spray nozzles spray area to verify that the spray pattern is not obstructedno comp measures are required if a maximum of 2 nozzles are non-functional; however, if the sprinkler heads cannot be made functional in 30 days, then comp measures are required to be established.
Based on this information, the inspectors concluded that both affected sprinkler heads were required to be functional per fire protection limiting condition of operation 9.3.11.C and, as per Table T9.3.11.C-1, the required compensatory actions were a one-hour roving fire watch for non-functional sprinkler heads.
Corrective Actions: Once identified, the licensee removed the scaffolds, implemented compensatory actions before rebuilding the scaffolds, and trained scaffold builders on applicable fire protection requirements.
Corrective Action References: CRs 1987194 and 1987349
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to implement compensatory actions for sprinkler heads non-functional for greater than 30 days was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the scaffold in proximity to the sprinkler heads rendered the sprinkler heads non-functional which is consistent with the more than minor criteria for example 2.d in Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, dated November 1, 2023.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix F, Fire Protection and Post - Fire Safe Shutdown SDP. The finding was assessed a high degradation rating because more than 10 percent of the sprinklers in the area were obstructed. Using Step 1.5, the inspectors concluded that the licensee did have a fire probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) capable of adequately evaluating the risk associated with the finding. Because the licensee did not model these sprinkler systems in their fire PRA and the probability of non-suppression for these two systems is 1.00, the delta core damage frequency was determined to be zero, which screens to Green.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.8 - Procedure Adherence: Individuals follow processes, procedures, and work instructions. Specifically, the scaffold construction did not involve the fire protection group as required by the scaffold procedure. If the fire protection group had been involved, it is reasonable to assume that they would have identified the impact on the sprinkler system and the work would have been performed using the appropriate fire protection controls.
Enforcement:
Violation: BFN Unit 1 Operating License Condition 2.C(13) and BFN Unit 2 Operating License Condition 2.C(14) requires, in part, that the licensee shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Fire Protection Report for the facility.
BFN Fire Protection Requirements Manual, Revision 26, Section 9.3.11.C, states that sprinkler systems BFN-2-SUPR-026-0087/16B and BFN-2-SUPR-026-0077G are required to be functional. Section 9.3.11.C.1c. states, in part, that:
"Sprinkler heads are functional ifby a visual inspection of each sprinkler or water spray nozzles spray area to verify that the spray pattern is not obstructedno comp measures are required if a maximum of 2 nozzles are non-functional; however, if the sprinkler heads cannot be made functional in 30 days then comp measures are required to be established.
Contrary to the above, between November 14, 2024, and January 23, 2025, the licensee failed to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Fire Protection Report for the facility. Specifically, the licensee failed to establish compensatory measures for non-functional sprinkler heads in sprinkler systems BFN-2-SUPR-026-0077G and BFN-2-SUPR-026-0087/16B as required by the Fire Protection Report.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Maintain Housekeeping Standards Leads to Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Isolation Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green FIN 05000260/2025001-02 Open/Closed
[H.1] -
Resources 71111.12 The inspectors identified a Green finding when the licensee failed to comply with procedure NPG-SPP-01.3, Housekeeping, Revision 11. Specifically, the licensee failed to maintain the steam vault free of debris such as litter, dirt...scrap, and clutter after work was complete in the area. Consequently, the debris clogged the floor drain when a leak occurred in the steam vault allowing water to backup, drain into floor penetrations, and drip on instrumentation causing a reactor core isolation cooling isolation.
Description:
On November 15, 2024, the licensee identified a steam leak in the Unit 2 reactor building steam vault which was later identified to be from a weld failure in a non-safety-related reactor water cleanup elbow. While the licensee was developing a plan to fix the leak, a steam line isolation to the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) turbine occurred on November 18, 2024, when temperature detectors sensed a high temperature in the torus room. This isolation caused RCIC to be inoperable and unavailable for the safety functions of core cooling and reactor water level control.
While investigating the cause of the isolation, the licensee found hot water dripping down a pipe penetration in the ceiling of the torus room, immediately below the steam vault, and splashing directly on temperature detectors responsible for isolating RCIC in the event of a steam leak in the torus room. Further investigation identified that the floor drain in the steam vault was clogged with miscellaneous litter and dirt causing several inches of water to accumulate in the room. This water overflowed the penetration curb surrounding the RCIC steam line penetration in the steam vault floor allowing water to enter the torus room and activate the room area temperature - high RCIC isolation signal.
Over the weekend of November 22, 2024, the licensee performed a weld repair to fix the steam leak and cleaned up the debris clogging the steam vault drain. After the debris was removed, the water in the room cleared indicating that the drain pipe was not clogged - only the trash screen at the floor drain. Operators later declared RCIC operable on November 24, 2024.
The licensee's initial characterization of the issue did not implicate the housekeeping contributions to the loss of RCIC. Licensee procedure NPG-SPP-01.3, Revision 11, states that trash, debris, scrap, rags and other combustibles resulting from work activities shall be removed from the work area at the end of the work activity or the end of the shift, whichever comes first. For general housekeeping requirements, the management expectations are maintaining the plant in a high state of cleanliness based, in part, on two standards. First, spaces will be uncluttered, and work practices will maintain equipment and space conditions as clean, or cleaner than found and support the clean as you go concept. Second, floor drains will be free of obstructions and that general housekeeping for floor and general areas will be cleared of litter, dirt, loose tools, scrap, clutter, etc.
The inspectors determined that when work was complete during the last Unit 2 refueling outage, the housekeeping in the reactor building steam vault did not meet the housekeeping expectations described in NPG-SPP-01.3. As a consequence, the debris left in the room after the Spring 2023 outage ultimately clogged the floor drain. This caused water to drain from the steam vault through a floor penetration instead of the floor drain as designed. This alternate drain path ultimately caused the RCIC isolation. The housekeeping implications were a direct result of the inspectors' questions and were not included in the licensee's evaluation of the issue at the time. Accordingly, this issue is being treated as NRC-identified because the inspectors identified a previously unknown weakness in the licensees classification, evaluation, and corrective actions.
Corrective Actions: The licensee repaired the steam leak, cleaned the debris from the floor drain, and added a closeout inspection of the reactor building steam vault for future outages.
Corrective Action References: CR 1973522 & 1992882
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to comply with procedure NPG-SPP-01.3 was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the licensee failed to maintain the steam vault free of debris such as litter, dirt...scrap, and clutter after work was complete in the area.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the debris clogging the drain directly contributed to RCIC being unreliable and unavailable.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Using Exhibit 2, the inspectors answered, No, to questions A.1 though A.6; therefore, the finding screened as Green. Although the debris existed for approximately a year and a half, the inspectors determined that the fault exposure time was approximately 6 days which was less than the Technical Specification allowed outage time of 14 days. The applicable RCIC mission time for both core cooling and level control is 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> and the leak took approximately 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to wash enough debris to the floor drain to cause RCIC to isolate and be unable to perform either function. Based on this, the inspectors concluded that the appropriate fault exposure time started 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> prior to the isolation and concluded when the water drained from the room and the torus room temperature detectors were no longer a potential target from the hot water leaking from the steam vault. This time period was approximately 6 days.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.1 - Resources: Leaders ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources are available and adequate to support nuclear safety.
Specifically, the licensee did not ensure that at the conclusion of work in the reactor building steam vault, the area was clear of litter, dirt, loose tools, scrap, and clutter.
Enforcement:
Inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated with this finding.
Main Steam Relief Valves Lift Settings Outside of Technical Specification Required Setpoints Cornerstone Severity Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Not Applicable Severity Level IV NCV 05000259/2025001-03 Open/Closed Not Applicable 71153 A self-revealed Severity Level IV non-cited violation of Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.3 and TS 3.0.4 was identified when the licensee discovered, through as-found test results, two of thirteen main steam relief valves (MSRVs) that were removed for testing with as-found lift settings outside of the +/-3 percent setpoint band required for their operability.
Description:
BFN Unit 1 TS 3.4.3 requires twelve of the thirteen MSRVs to be operable while in Modes 1, 2, and 3. On November 12, 2024, the licensee was notified of as-found testing results that two Unit 1 MSRVs were outside of the +/-3 percent setpoint band required for operability per TS surveillance requirement 3.4.3.1. It was determined that MSRV BFN-1-PCV-001-0005 failed due to corrosion bonding to the valve seat and simmering. MSRV BFN-1-PCV-001-0180 failed due to a relaxation of the setpoint spring over time. All MSRVs were considered to be inoperable during the entire operating cycle from October 26, 2022, to August 30, 2024, and longer than permitted by TS 3.4.3. Additionally, TS 3.0.4 requires that when a limiting condition for operation (LCO) is not met, entry into an applicable mode or specified condition is not permitted unless the associated actions permit continued operation.
On February 1, 2023, May 22, 2023, January 30, 2024, and May 5, 2024, BFN Unit 1 entered a TS 3.4.3 applicable mode when the required actions for TS LCO 3.4.3 were not met.
The affected valves remained capable of maintaining reactor pressure below the ASME code limit of 1375 psig. All thirteen of the MSRV pilot valves were replaced during the Unit 1 Fall 2022 refueling outage. The previous corrective action from LER 05000260/2021-002-00 to apply a platinum coating to the pilot valve using the plasma enhanced magnetron sputtering deposition method (PEMS), which improves the quality and adhesion of the coating, has been utilized. A flaking issue has been noted with the platinum coated pilot disc. The Boiling Water Reactor Owners' Group is continuing to work toward a solution to improve the quality and adhesion of the platinum coating on the discs.
Corrective Actions: The licensee replaced all thirteen MSRV pilot valves during the fall 2024 (U1R15) refueling outage. As-left testing verified that these refurbished pilot valves were within +/- 1 percent of their setpoints. The installed valves have implemented corrective actions from past occurrences of corrosion bonding that include preparing the pilot discs in accordance with the revised procedure and vendor recommendations. The currently installed refurbished valves had platinum coatings applied utilizing the PEMS deposition method, and as-left values were verified to be within +/- 1 percent of their setpoints. Additional corrective actions may be developed based on feedback from the Boiling Water Reactor Owners Group related to corrosion bonding of this specific model safety relief valve.
Corrective Action References: CRs 962223, 1286467, 1410577, 1521190, 1658693, 1699286, 1775232, 1822254, 1860559, 1929514, and 1972030
Performance Assessment:
The NRC determined this violation was not reasonably foreseeable and preventable by the licensee and therefore is not a performance deficiency.
Enforcement:
The ROPs significance determination process does not specifically consider the regulatory process impact in its assessment of licensee performance. Therefore, it is necessary to address this violation which impedes the NRCs ability to regulate using traditional enforcement to adequately deter non-compliance.
Severity: This violation is characterized as a severity level (SL) IV violation based on its similarity to SL IV example 6.1.d.1 in the Enforcement Policy. The inspectors also reviewed NRC Enforcement Policy, Section 2.2.1, "Factors Affecting Assessment of Violations," which states, in part, that in determining the appropriate enforcement response to a violation, the NRC considers, whenever possible, risk information in assessing the safety or security significance of violations and assigning severity levels. The inspectors determined the issue to be of very low safety significance because the valves remained capable of performing their required safety function.
Violation: BFN Unit 1 TS 3.4.3, "Safety/Relief Valves (S/RVs)," Condition A, requires that with one or more required S/RVs inoperable, the unit be in Mode 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and Mode 4 in 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.
Contrary to the above, two required S/RVs were inoperable from October 26, 2022, to August 30, 2024, and the unit did not enter Mode 3 and Mode 4 in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />, respectively.
BFN Unit 1 TS LCO 3.0.4, requires, in part, that when an LCO is not met, entry into a mode or other specified condition of applicability shall only be made when the associated actions to be entered permit continued operation in the mode or other specified condition of applicability for an unlimited period of time.
Contrary to the above, on February 1, 2023, May 22, 2023, January 30, 2024, and May 5, 2024, Unit 1 entered a TS 3.4.3 applicable mode when TS LCO 3.4.3 required actions were not met.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Minor Violation 71153 Minor Violation: As required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, activities affecting quality shall be accomplished in accordance with procedures. Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to accomplish an activity affecting quality in accordance with procedures. Specifically, on August 29, 2024, operators identified breaker 0-BKR-211-000D/001(breaker 1622), which is the alternate breaker that powers shutdown bus 1, charging spring light was extinguished but the mechanical flag indicated that the breaker was fully charged. Procedure 0-GOI-300-2, Electrical, step 3.1.3.F states in part that failure of the breaker charged light to illuminate, even if the charged flag is visible, canrender the closing circuit disabled.
On August 30, 2024, while aligning shutdown bus 1 to its alternate power source, breaker 1622 failed to close which resulted in deenergizing 4kV shutdown board A and B. This in turn led to both A and B standby diesel generators automatically starting and tying to their respective 4kV shutdown boards. The inspectors concluded that the failure to follow 0-GOI-300-2 led to the unplanned start of A and B standby diesel generators.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was minor. The inspectors concluded that this violation was of minor significance because it did not contribute to the actual inoperability of the standby diesel generator system and thus did not impact any cornerstone objective.
Enforcement:
This failure to comply with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, constitutes a minor violation that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On March 13, 2025, the inspectors presented the in-service inspection results to Quinn Leonard, Plant Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On March 20, 2025, the inspectors presented the radiation protection inspection results to Angel Yarbrough and other members of the licensee staff.
- On April 8, 2025, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Andrew Mitchell, Director of Nuclear Plant Operations, and other members of the licensee staff.
THIRD PARTY REVIEWS Inspectors reviewed Institute of Nuclear Power Operations reports that were issued during the inspection period.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
CR 1991340
Drawings
0-47E843-1
Flow Diagram CO2 Storage Fire Protection and
Purging System
Drawings
3-47E843-2
Flow Diagram CO2 Storage and Fire Protection
Corrective Action
Documents
1991340
NDE Reports
NDE Reports
R-017
Ultrasonic Examination of N16B-1
03/08/2025
NDE Reports
R-020
Ultrasonic Examination of RWCU-2-003-G002
03/10/2025
NDE Reports
R-030
Visual Examination of 2-47B400S0007
03/12/2025
NDE Reports
R-032
Visual Examination of 2-47B452H0022
03/12/2025
NDE Reports
R-052
Ultrasonic Examination of DRHR-2-18
03/14/2025
NDE Reports
R-053
Ultrasonic Examination of KR-2-47
03/14/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
CR 1973522, 1977288,
1973522, 199130,
1992882, 1999145
Miscellaneous
B-0009 Limitorque DC-
Actuators Outside
Containment Test
Report
Miscellaneous
B0058 Limitorque
Valve Actuator
Qualification for
Nuclear Power Station
Service Report
Miscellaneous
DFO Trailer, Chemistry
Results Spreadsheet
Miscellaneous
Form 8-Special CGD
Receipt Inspection/Test
Requirement
Miscellaneous
MMTP-142.1
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Limitorque Motor
Operator Repair and
Adjustment Guidelines
for SMB-000, SMB-00,
SB-00, and SBD-00
Miscellaneous
MMTP-144 Motor
Operated Valve
Diagnostic Testing
Miscellaneous
NPG-SPP-01.3
Housekeeping
Miscellaneous
OA Record-Report of
Results Data Report
Number 250117-
2932, 250128-
131418, 250206-
151630, 2502025-
154350, 250205-
154311
Miscellaneous
Purchase Order
24287
Work Orders
WO 24963499,120983148,
25060451,
25088969,
25115442, 125107244
Corrective Action
Documents
1973522, 1977288,
1972994, 1982625,
1990382, 1992514,
1985000, 1987376,
1990713, 1997805
Work Orders
24963499
Engineering
Changes
SAR Change No. 26-
084
Change to UFSAR 4.8.6.2, Containment Cooling
04/17/2015
Corrective Action
Documents
CR 1998082
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Miscellaneous
Certificate of
Conformance for
Purchase Order
765636, 7347581,
6494541
Miscellaneous
Purchase Order
765636 Revision 0
NDE Reports
Radiograph and radiography report for weld repair to
Unit 3 CRD 14-43
2/25/2025
Procedures
2-SR-3.6.1.3.10(B)
Primary Containment Local Leak Rate Test Main
Steam Line B: Penetration X-7B
Work Orders
25137117,
24089136,
20777438,
23851334,
23639915,
24287563,
24220550,
24232993,
23636560,
2539133,
25191414,
23637843,
23639889, 12380990,
23637843,
25126124,
25126199, 125130810
Corrective Action
Documents
CR 1996814
Radiation
Surveys
M-20250305-8
Procedures
EPIP-12
EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES
Rev. 27
Corrective Action
CR 1869532, 1905476,
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Documents
1994623
Corrective Action
Documents
CR 1979883, 1983223,
1641220, 1954395,
1954797, 1955386
Work Orders
2070946,
24780243, 124788330