IR 05000259/1980002
| ML18024B436 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 02/08/1980 |
| From: | Julian C, Upright C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18024B435 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259-80-02, 50-259-80-2, 50-260-80-02, 50-260-80-2, 50-296-80-03, NUDOCS 8003250382 | |
| Download: ML18024B436 (8) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTAST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303 Report Nos. 50-259/80-2, 50-260/80-2 and 50-296/80-3 Iicensee:
Tennessee Valley Authority 500A Chestnut Street Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401 Facility:
Browns Ferry Docket Nos. 50-259, 50-260 and 50-296 License Nos.
DPR-33, DPR-52 and DPR-68 Inspection at:
Browns Ferry site near Athens, Alabama Inspector:
C. Julian.r Approved by:
C.
M. Upright ctin Section Chief, RONS Branch Date Signed O gg D te Signed
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SUHHARY Inspection on January 21-24, 1980 Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 32 inspector-hours on site in the areas of observation of the refueling activities of Unit 1 in preparation for cycle 4 and review of the startup testing activities conducted on Unit 3 at the start of cycle 3.
Results Of the 2 areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
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L. Abercrombie, Power Plant Superintendent L. Harness, Assistant Power Plant Superintendent B. Studdard, Operations Supervisor G. Metke, Results Section Supervisor G. Cockrell, Reactor Engineer W. Alexander, Office of Power, QA 'Engineer Cole, Office of Power, QA Inplant Coordinator A. Teague, Electrical Maintenance Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included numerous technicians, operators, security force members, and office personnel.
NRC Resident Inspectors-R. F. Sullivan
- J.
W. Chase l
- "Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on January 24, 1980, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
The inspector stated the two items regarding Unit 3 test results described in paragraph 6 below requiring licensee action.
I,icensee representatives stated that the matters would be corrected.
The inspector noted the malfunction of the reactor building personnel entryway interlock as described in paragraph 7 below.
Licensee representatives committed to station plant personnel in both entryways until corrective measures have been devised and implemented.
The inspector stated that previously open item 79-26>>01 is closed and that previously identified unresolved item 79-36-01 concerning the requirements on refueling crews remains open pend'.,", receipt of an interpretation from NRC Headquarters.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspectio.
. Observation of Unit 1 Refueling Activities The inspector witnessed refueling activities in progress on Unit 1 from the control room and refuel floor.
The results of selected surveillance tests required during refueling were examined.
During a previous inspection in November, 1979, while Unit 3 refueling was in progress, the inspector identified to plant management an unresolved item 79-36-01 involving the failure to require an NRC licensed reactor operator or senior reactor operator to perform core alterations or be physically present to direct these alterations being performed by a reactor operator trainee.
The inspector noted that the licensee has made no changes in his refueling practices for the current Unit 1 refueling.
The inspector discussed the matter with the plant superintendent and stated at the'xit interview that the matter remains unresolved pending the receipt of an NRC headquarters interpretation of the requirements for refueling crews.
6.
Review of Post, Refueling Startup Testing Results on Unit 3 The inspector examined the results of the post refueling startup testing on Unit 3 at the start of cycle 3 as follows:
RTI"3B)
RTI-4, RTI-5, RTI-4, RTI-12, RTI-13, RTI-5, RTI-23A, RTI-32A,
"Fuel Loading After a Complete Core Unload"
"Full Core Shutdown Margin (open Vessel)"
"RTI-5, Control Rod Drive System (Open Vessel)"
"Full Core Shutdown Margin (Closed Vessel)"
"APRM Calibratio'n"
"Process Computer and Core Performance (0 to 55/ Power)"
"Control Rod Drive System (Closed Vessel)"
"Feedwater System (open Vessel)"
"Recirculation M-G Set Speed Control" The 'inspector noted that although. the Plant Operations Review Committee
'PORC)
had reviewed and approved the results of these tests, the plant superintendent had not yet given his signature approval to the test results of RTI-3B, 5, 23A, and 32A.
Licensee representatives stated in the exit'nterview that the test results will be reviewed and approved in the near future (50-259/80-02-1).
The inspector pointed out that in the text of the final report of RTI-5, the paragraph references to the acceptance criteria in procedure RTI-5 are incorrect.
Licensee representatives stated in the exit interview that this error willbe corrected prior to the next refueling (50-259/80-02-02).
The inspector reviewed the logs of the shift engineer and the refuel floor assistant shift engineer for the period ll/1-30/79.
Selected results of surveillance tests required to be performed during core alterations were examine No deviations or items of noncompliance were identified in this area.
Testing was incomplete at the time of inspection for plateau III (55-100/
power).
The remaining test results will be examined during a future inspec-tion.
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The inspector toured portions of the Unit 1 and 2 reactor building.
During the tour the inspector noted that the electro-mechanical interlock system on the Unit 1-2 personnel entryway from the turbine building to the reactor building appeared to be malfunctioning.
The entryway consists of a double door airlock-like arrangement that permits personnel to enter either the Unit 1 or Unit 2 reactor building without violating secondary containment.
An electro-mechanical interlock system is installed to prevent a door to either reactor building and the door to the turbine building being open at the same time, thus, violating secondary containment.
A similar malfunction of the interlock on the Unit 2-3 personnel entryway had been pointed out to plant management during an NRC inspection in November, 1979.
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8.
At the exit interview licensee representatives committed to station a member of the plant staff at each entryway to insure that secondary containment is not violated.
This door watch will remain in effect until corrective measures have been devised and properly implemented to prevent further failures of the interlock system.
The inspector stated that the results of these corrective actions will be reviewed during a future inspection (50-259/80-02-03).
Additional Inspection Items The inspector verified that the records of test RTI-5 for Unit 1, cycle
have been ammended to include the results of the friction testing of control rod 02-23 as per the licensee's commitment.
Previous open item 79-26-01 is now close l
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