IR 05000250/1988008
| ML17345A221 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 05/23/1988 |
| From: | Brewer D, Crlenjak R, Mcelhinney T, Schnebli G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17345A220 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-250-88-08, 50-251-88-08, NUDOCS 8806070294 | |
| Download: ML17345A221 (30) | |
Text
~P,g REMI
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+**pe UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-250/88-08 and 50-251/88-08 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102 Docket Nos.:
50-250 and 50-251 License Nos.:
DPR-31 and DPR-41 Facility Name:
Turkey Point 3 and
Inspection Conducted:
March 25 through April 25, 1988 Inspectors:
R.
Brew r, Senior Resident nspector J
T.
F.
Mc lhinney, Resident I
pector h
bl i, es1 n
n ector Approved by:
.
V. Crlenj, Section Chief ivision of Reactor Projects Date igned S z~ 99 ate Signed
~ZZ P8 ate Signed 52'P ate S gned SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, unannounced inspection entailed direct inspection at the site, including backshift inspection.,
in the areas of annual and monthly surveillance, maintenance observations and reviews, engineered safety features, operational safety, facility modifications and plant events.
Results:
One violation with three examples for failure to meet the requirements of TS 6.8. 1 was identified.
Two of the examples (paragraph 6.a.
and 7.a.)
were Licensee Identified Violations (LIV) meeting the criteria of
CFR 2, Appendix C, therefore, no Notice of Violation will be issued.
The third example (paragraph 9.a.)
was cited as another example of violation 88-07-01 and will not include a separate Notice of Violation.
Response to the third example should be included in the licensee's response to 88-07-01.
SS06070294 SS0525 PDR ADOCK 05000250
REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- J. S.
Odom, Vice President
~C. J.
Baker, Plant Manager - Nuclear
"D. A. Chancy, Engineering Site Manager L.
W. Pearce, Operations Superintendent
- F. H. Southworth, Technical Department Supervisor J
~
W. Kappes, Maintenance Superintendent T. A. Finn, Training Supe'rvisor J.
D. Webb, Operations - Maintenance Coordinator W.
R. Williams, Assistant Superintendent Planned Maintena D. Tomaszewski, Instrument and Control ( I&C) Department S
"J.
C. Strong, Electrical Department Supervisor
- L. W. Bladow, Quality Assurance (QA) Superintendent
"R. J. Earl, Quality Control (QC) Supervisor B. A. Abrishami, Acting Technical'epartment Supervisor
"R.
G.
Mende, Operations Supervisor
"J. Arias, Regulation and Compliance Supervisor V. A. Kaminskas, Reactor Engineering Supervisor
- R. D. Hart, Regulation and Compliance Engineer G. Solomon, Regulation and Compliance Engineer S. Hale, Engineering Project Supervisor P. Higgins, Site Engineering Licensing
"J.A. Labarraque, Senior Technical Advisor nce upervisor Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, and electricians.
- Attended exit interview on April 26, 1988.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized during management interviews held throughout the reporting period with the Plant Manager-Nuclear and selected members of his staff.
An exit meeting was conducted on April 26, 1988.
The areas requiring management attention were reviewed.
No proprietary information was provided to the inspectors during the reporting period.
Note:
An alphabetical tabulation of acronyms used in this report is listed in paragraph 1 Followup on Items of Noncompliance (92702).
A review was conducted of the following noncompliances to assure that corrective actions were adequately implemented and resulted in conformance with regulatory requirements.
Verification of corrective action was achieved through record reviews, observation and discussions with licensee personnel.
Licensee correspondence was evaluated to ensure that the responses were timely and that corrective actions were implemented within the time periods specified in the reply.
(Closed)
250,251/DRP85-01.
Station Battery Operations, Maintenance and Inspection.
This item was addressed in NRC inspection report 250,251/85-06 and an additional item was documented as IFI 250,251/85-06-03, Resolve Adequacy of Method to Correct Battery Specific Gravity for Changes in'lectrolyte Temperature and Level, which was closed in inspection report 250,251/84-40.
Thi s i tern i s cl osed.
(Closed)
250/80-BP-Ol.
Follow up on Licensee review of electric power system adequacy.
The licensee identified that the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG)
had the potential for over-loading.
Plant modification and procedure reviews were conducted to prevent this over-loading.
The NRC prepared a Safety Evaluation Report, dated December 15, 1986, which concluded that the diesel loads are in conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.9, Position C.2.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Violation 251/85-24-01.
Failure to meet Technical Specification (TS) 3.5, table 3.5.1, item 1.5, blocking SI signal.
The licensee issued a training brief to emphasize the changes in Operating Procedures (OPs)
0205. 1, "Unit Shutdown - Full Load to Hot Shutdown Condition",
and 0205.2,
"Reactor Shutdown
-
Hot Shutdown to Cold Shutdown Condition".
The inspector verified the training brief and this item is closed.
(Open) Violation 250,251/85-05-01.
Failure to test fail-safe valves in accordance with the code.
The licensee performed an evaluation to determine fail-safe testing requirements and acceptance criteria for main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) in accordance with ASME B
and PV Code,Section XI.
These results were incorporated into the current inservice test (IST). of the MSIVs.
The licensee also incorporated this fail-safe testing criteria into existing plant procedures that implement Turkey Point's IST Program.
However, this item remains open as the licensee needs to provide fail-safe testing criteria for the modified design with the Plant Change Modification (PCM)
package for the MSIVs.
The licensee has committed to a due date of July 6, 1988. This item remains opens (Open)
Violation 250,251/85-37-01.
Failure to meet TS 4.5.2.B.3 Accumulator Check Valves Leak Testing, 85-24-07.
The licensee committed to:
(1)
Re-evaluate the test method presently being use (2)
Continue the engineering evaluation of the in-leakage test method to ensure accurate results in order to maintain the accumulator sample interval consistent with actual in-leakage.
The licensee achieved compliance with item
on November 6, 1985.
However, item 2 remains open and the licensee has committed to a due date of April 30, 1988.
This item is tracked by Commitment Tracking (CTRAC)
87-1339 and remains open.
(Closed)
Violation 250/86-33-01.
Failure maintenance procedure for the calibration circuitry.
The licensee concurred with the October 8, 1986.
The following actions have to establish an adequate of steam break protection finding in a
response dated been completed:
(1)
The individuals involved were counseled.
(2)
Procedure 3/4-PMI-072.2, Steam (Pressure)
Break Protection Instrument Set III Channels and Procedure 3/4-PMI-072.3, Steam (Pressure)
Break Protection Instrument Set IV Channels were developed.
(3)
Administrative Procedure (AP) 0190. 19, Control of Maintenance on Safety Related and guality Related Systems, contains guidelines for the control of maintenance.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Violation 250,251/86-33-06.
Failure to adequately maintain the Radiological Emergency Plan in that the public address (PA) system was not installed in the administration building, and health physics building, some general area PA system loudspeakers were not maintained and, finally, the PA system was not audible in several on-site high noise areas.
The licensee concurred with the findings in a response dated October 8, 1986
'he PA system has been added to the administration and health physics building.
The resident inspectors have conducted routine plant walk downs and the PA system has performed its function.
The licensee has implemented preventative maintenance procedures, Plant Maintenance Instruction (PMI) 1002, PA Annual Inspection and PMI-1001, PA Semi-Annual inspection to verify the operation of the system.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Licensee Identified Violation (LIV) 250/87-14-01.
The failure to maintain adequate control of design changes affecting the intake cooling water (ICW),
component cooling water (CCW)
and containment spray (CS)
systems.
In NRC letter dated July 21, 1987, the proposed violation was classified as licensee identi,fied in that prompt corrective action was taken to discover and correct wiring errors that affected the ICW, CCW and CS pumps.
This item is close (Closed)
Violation 251/87-14-02.
Failure to meet the requirements of TS 3. 10. 1, 3. 10.2, 3. 10.6 and 6.2.2.e, prior to the lifting of the Unit 4 reactor vessel upper internals.
The licensee concurred with the finding in response dated August 20, 1987.
The following corrective actions have been completed:
( 1)
Procedure 3/4-0P-038.9, Refueling Activities Checkoff List, was revised to include hold points.
(2)
Procedure 3/4-OP-038. 1, Preparation for Refueling Activities, was developed and implemented to provide the prerequisites, precautions/limitations and instructional guidance to perform the necessary checks and survei llances prior to starting any core alterations.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Violation 251/87-14-03.
Failure to follow Operating Procedure (OP)-16900. 16, Rod Cluster Control Tool.
The licensee concurred with the finding in response dated June 22, 1987.
The license counseled the individuals involved and conducted training.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Violation 250/87-06-01.,
Failure to implement Administrative Procedure (AP) 0103.4, In-Plant Equipment Clearance Orders.
The licensee concurred with the finding in response dated Apri 1 10, 1987.
The following actions were completed:
The clearance order 3-86-4-114 was revised, safety meetings were conducted to re-emphasize the importance of compliance with clearance boundaries and the event was reviewed by the Plant Advisory Training Board.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Licensee Identified Violation 250,251/87-14-04.
Failure to have an accurate drawing of safety-related wiring in Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG)
panel 4C12.
In NRC letter, dated July 21, 1987, the proposed violation was classified as licensee identified in that prompt corrective action was taken to document the errors and inspections were performed to identify other wiring error s which wer e corrected.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Violation 251/87-16-01.
Failure to properly evaluate the boric acid leak in terms of corrosion of ferritic steel components.
The licensee concurred with the finding in response dated August 20, 1987.
The following corrective actions were taken:
(1)
OP-0206. 1, Containment Visual Leak Inspection, was revised to ensure that there is no observable leakage on or affecting the Reactor Pressure Vessel and all leakage is documented and evaluated.
(2)
Supplement gI 3.2-4, Guidelines for Retrieval of Nuclear Plant Operating Experience Data and Nuclear Licensing Related Data was developed and implemented for the Engineering Departmen (3)
Power Plant Engineering issued guidelines, dated May 15, 1987, which gives guidance on things that need to be considered when performing a safety evaluation on leaks in the reactor coolant system and requires senior discipline engineers to review the evaluations.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Violation 251/87-16-02.
Failure to properly adhere to the installation and drawing accuracy/control of the Conoseal
~
The licensee concurred with the finding in response dated August 20, 1987.
AP 0190. 15, Plant Changes and Modifications (PC/M), contains the requirement for the review, approval and implementation of PC/M.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Violation 250,251/87-27-01.
Missed TS Surveillance.
The surveillance was missed due to personnel error of misinterpretation of the footnote on procedure 0-OSP-200.
1 that governs the scheduling of TS survei llances.
The licensee concurred with the finding in letter L-87-341, dated August 17, 1987.
The following actions were taken by the licensee:
( 1)
The monthly surveillance was performed and the Unit 3 Spent Fuel Pit monitor passed satisfactorily.
(2)
The other surveillance procedures that address TS required surveillances were reviewed to determine if they are also subject to similar mi sinterpretations and no other similar cases were found.
(3)
The Plant Training Department reviewed this item to determine appropriate training methods.
(4)
The surveillance test schedule was changed to list each Specific Particulate, Iodine and Noble Gas (SPING)
monitor separately as opposed to listing them as a group.
(5)
The inspector verified the revised test schedule procedure.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Violation 251/87-33-01.
Failure to meet TS 3. 18 requirements for operability of the auxiliary feedwater system (AFWS).
NRC issued this notice of violation on October 19, 1987.
The licensee concurred with the finding in letter L-87-479, dated November 18, 1987.
The inspector verified that the actions, committed to by the licensee in this letter, have been implemented.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Violation 251/87-33-02.
Failure to meet the requirement of
CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, in that the significance of an AFWS steam leak was not promptly evaluated.
The notice of violation regarding
the failure to promptly evaluate the sigpificance of an AFWS steam leak was issued on August 7, 1987.
The licensee concurred with the finding in letter L-87-371, dated September 8,
1987.
The inspector reviewed the corrective actions taken by the licensee and found them to be acceptable.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Violation 251/87-33-03.
Failure to meet requirements of TS 3.2.6.h.
for reducing Reactor Protection Trip Settings.
The Notice of Violation regarding the quadrant to average power tilt exceeding a value of 2 percent and the hot channel factors not determined within two hours was i ssued on August 7, 1987.
The licensee concurred with the findings in letter L-87-371, dated September 8,
1987.
The inspector reviewed the actions taken by the licensee and found them acceptable.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Violation 250,251/87-33-04.
Failure to meet the requirements of TS 6.8. 1, in that a fire protection procedure was not adequate.
The licensee concurred with the finding in letter L-87-371, dated September 8,
1987.
The Fire Protection Water System Procedure, 0-OP-016. 1, was revised to include the valves that were omitted when the procedure was upgraded.
A letter of instruction was also written to the procedure writers to ensure that all appropriate valves are included in the applicable procedures.
The inspector examined the upgraded procedure, 0-OP-016. 1, dated November ll, 1987, and verified that the necessary valves were included in the upgraded procedure.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Violation 250,251/87-35-02.
Failure to meet TS 6.8. 1,
examples:
Valve not properly controlled locked closed and compensatory Firewatch found asleep.
The licensee concurred with the findings in letter L-87-406, dated October 12, 1987.
For item B. 1, valve 3-40-856, found not to be locked.
The following actions were taken by the licensee:
( 1)
The handwheel was promptly secured with the locking device as required to prevent manipulation of the valve.
(2)
A training brief was written to emphasize the necessity to properly secure the locking devices to valve in a position to preclude unauthorized valve manipulation.
The inspector reviewed the training brief.
As for item B.2, compensatory Firewatch found asleep, an additional similar violation occurred.
This item is administratively closed here and it will be tracked under new item 250,251/87-54-02.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Violation 250,251/87-43-01.
Three examples of failure to implement approved procedures:
The failure to properly implement off-normal operating procedures for removal of a nuclear instrument from service and for adjustment of a critical heat tracing circuit thermostat and for fai lure to properly implement an administrative procedure that
ensures control of locked valves.
The licensee concurred with the findings in letter dated December 14, 1987.
Procedure O-ONOP-048, Off-Normal Critical Heat Tracing System Temperature, was revised to assure that heat tracing thermostats are adjusted only by Electrical Maintenance personnel.
Procedure 3/4-0NOP-059.8, Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunction, was developed and requires step-by-step signoffs for actions that remove malfunctioning channels from service.
Procedure O-ADM-205, Administrative Control of Valves, Locks and Switches, Attachment 2, Table 6,
was completed to insure that no other discrepancies for locked valves existed.
Additionally, Training Brief 209 was issued to address the proper usage of cable padlocks for locked valves.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Proposed Violation 250,251/87-44-01.
Manipulation of a control by a non-licensed individual.
In NRC letter, dated March 17, 1988, the violation was not cited due to the action required by NRC Order (EA 87-85),
"The Independent Management Appraisal and The Management-on-Shift Program".
This item is closed.
Fol lowup on Unresolved Items (URIs), Inspector Fol 1owup Items (IFIs),
Inspection and Enforcement Information Notices (IENs),
IE Bulletins (IEBs)
(information only), IE Circulars (IECs),
and NRC Requests (92701)
(Open)
IFI 250,251/85-02-04.
An engineering task will be expedited to evaluate the monitoring of loss of control voltage at EDGs.
This item is being tracked by CTRAC 87-1118.
The licensee has committed to provide the evaluation by April 28, 1988.
This item remains open.
(Closed) IFI 250,251/85-06-04.
Corrective actions required as a result of November 30, 1984, TS Operability review should be reviewed prior to completion of Spring 1985 Refueling Outage.
The licensee provided a copy of the Status Report.
The inspector reviewed the report and found the actions acceptable.
This item is closed.
(Open)
IFI 250,251/86-05-03.
Licensee modify IST program to delete exemption request for Steam Generator (S/G)
Blowdown Valves.
This item remains open pending modification of the IST program for valves to delete
.
the exemption request for S/G Blowdown Isolation Valves'his item is tracked under CTRAC 86-0363.
(Closed)
IFI 251/83-39-07.
Evaluate the discrepancy between Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation.
The licensee provided an Inter Office correspondence, dated December 6,
1983, which stated, a varying difference in detector response is not an indication of detector or channel problem but an indication of rod movement differences and geometry differences.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
URI 250/84-23-05.
Replacement of oil vent pipe.
Plant Work Order (PWO)
361009 dealing with CS Pump (3A) oiler was reviewed by the inspector and found to be acceptable.
This URI is close (C l o sed)
URI 250,251/87-20-01.
Sa fety Va 1 ve s Setpo int Drift due to Ambient Temperature Changes.
In a letter from Crosby Valve and Gauge Company to FPL dated July 30, 1987, they state, the test results listed above again demonstrate no significant variation that can be specifically attributed to a difference in thermal conditions for the specific valve size and style tested.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
URI 251/83-39-05.
Post Maintenance cleanup inside the containment appeared not to be thorough.
The licensee developed and implemented procedure O-SMM-051.3, Containment Closeout Inspection.
This procedure provides the instructions, steps and data necessary to ensure a
proper closeout inspection of Primary Containment.
This item is closed.
Onsite Followup and In-Office Review of Nonroutine Events (92700/92712)
The Licensee Event Reports (LERs)
discussed below were reviewed and closed.
The inspectors verified that reporting requirements had been met, root cause analysis was performed, corrective actions appeared appropriate, and generic applicability had been considered.
Additionally, the inspectors verified that the licensee had reviewed each event, corrective actions were implemented, responsibility for corrective actions not fully completed was clearly assigned, safety questions had been evaluated and resolved, and violations of regulations or TS conditions had been identified.
(Closed)
ICW system.
This issue involved a potential concern relative to the ability of the ICW system to meet specific accident flow requirements.
The inspector determined that the licensee had revised procedures to control the positioning of system valves and the facility was currently operating under a Justification for Continued Operation (JCO-86-03) that requires monitoring of the ICW heat exchangers operability in accordance with Temporary Procedure 419.
LER 250/86-08 is closed.
(Open)
Reactor trip due to personnel error during turbine trip test.
As previously documented in inspection report, 50-250/86-39 and 251/86-39, this event was being investigated by the licensee relative to human factors and potential turbine trip test equipment anomalies.
As documented in Performance Monitoring Summary POMN PTN 86-003 subsequent attempts to perform the periodic surveillance testing of the main turbine trip mechanism have been aborted due to abnormal operation of the turbine automatic stop oil system.
Pending permanent corrective action by the licensee, LER 250/86-34 will remain open.
It is noted that the periodic surveillance testing of the turbine trip mechanism is not required by current TS.
(Closed)
Inadvertent auto-start of ICW pumps This event was attributed to the inadvertent jarring of the 3B ICW pump breaker cubical during construction activities in the area.
The jarring of the 3B ICW pump breaker cubical resulted in an indication of an over current
condition for the 3B ICW pump coincident with the 3C ICW pump breaker being open completed the protection logic and caused the auto-start of the 3C ICW pump.
The inspector determined that the licensee had modified general operating procedures to restrict construction activities in sensitive areas during critical plant evolutions.
These measures appear to be adequate to preclude the occurrence of similar events in the futures LER 250/87-11 is closed.
(Closed)
Reactor trip due to feedwater flow control valve failing closed.
As previously documented in inspection report 50-250/86-45 and 50-251/86-45, the cause of the subject reactor trip was attributable to a failed instrument air solenoid coil for the 4C feedwater flow control valve.
The inspector reviewed the failure mode analysis performed by the solenoid valve manufacturer which confirmed the licensee's conclusion as stated in the subject LER.
The inspector also determined that the existing coils for the main feedwater flow control valves for Unit
have been replaced with new coils designed for high temperature applications in battery-charging DC systems and a
PH is being developed to replace the coils on Unit 4.
LER 86-25 is closed.
(Closed)
Reactor trip due to one channel of OPDT and OTDT reactor trip channels being tripped and receiving a
spike on another channel.
In addition to the attendant circumstances as documented in inspection report 50-250/86-50 and 50-251/86-50, the licensee determined that the associated high voltage power supply for channel I,II OTDT and OPDT was intermittently causing voltage spikes.
This power supply was replaced as was the high voltage power supply for N-44.
The inspector determined that a predictive maintenance schedule has been developed for periodic overhaul of the nuclear instrumentation drawers that will preclude future occurrences of this nature.
LER 251/87-01 is closed.
(Closed)
Ina'dvertent CCW pump auto-start.
This event was documented in inspection report 50-250/87-06 and 50-251/87-06.
LER 251/87-02 is closed.
(Closed)
Automatic actuation of the 4C CCW pump due to low system pressure.
As reported in LER 251/87-02 (see cl ose-out documentation this report)
a similar occurrence involving the inadvertent auto-start of a
CCW pump due to low CCW header pressure occurred on January 12, 1987.
The licensee determined the cause of this event was a
failed tube in the 4A CCW heat exchanger that lowered the surge tank level and header pressure.
The 4A heat exchanger was subsequently repaired and the system was returned to service.
LER 251/87-11 is closed.
(Closed)
Partial actuation of train A safeguards equipment due to sticking block switch.
The details of this event are documented in inspection reports 50-250/87-26, 87-27 and 50-251/87-26, 87-27.
LER 250/87-16 is close (Closed)
Train A safeguards actuation due to containment high pressure signal.
The details of this event are documented in inspection report 50-250/87-33 and 50-251/87-33.
The inspector reviewed the corrective actions implemented by the licensee and determined they appeared adequate to preclude future occurrences of similar events in the future.
LER 250/87-21 is closed.
CFR Part 21 Reviews (90713)
(Closed)
P21 84-01 'ncreased vibration in pillow block bearings on low pressure coolant injection motor generator sets.
This Part 21 is not applicable to Turkey Point.
This item is closed.
(Open)
P21 85-02.
Technology for Energy Corporation (TEC)
Model 914-1, Acoustic Valve Flow Monitor Module defect.
The defect results in a
failure of the flow module to reset upon removal of the input signal.
These modules are installed on the pressurizer Safety Relief Valve at Turkey Point.
The failure would provide a false indication that relief valves had failed to reset even though the valves had closed.
The licensee stated in Inter Office Correspondence, dated January 23, 1986, Subject, Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 Acoustic Valve Flow Monitor 10 CFR 21 Evaluation, that:
"In either case, the reactor operator will be given indication that causes him to take corrective action as if a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) existed.
Since his actions lead him to protect the RCS pressure boundary, the results of the potentially misleading flow indication would not have adverse consequences on plant safety".
"Accordingly, since plant procedures are in place, which address SRV and PORV mi soperation and an alternate indication is available, a substantial safety hazard is not considered to exist relative to the operation of TEC Model 914-1 Acoustic Valve Flow Monitor Modules".
The corrective actions taken appear adequate for short term, but the reliance of procedures and other systems for a
known design deficiency is not adequate for a long term fixe This item will remain open for further NRC review.
(Open)
P21 85-04.
Control wire insulation on K-line Circuit Breakers may be cut by the top edge of the duct shield when the circuit breaker is racked out.
The licensee stated in Inter Office Correspondence, dated September 19, 1895, (REA TPN-85-58),
the following actions are required, Maintenance Procedure 9507. 1, 480 Volt Switchgear-Periodic Inspection will be revised and conduct an inspection of the auxiliary contact wiring for the subject breakers
.
This item will remain open until the documentation showing completion is provided to the inspecto (Closed)
P21 86-01.
Evaluation of EDG loading discovered that certain EDG non-safety loads had the potential for over-loading an EDG.
The licensee conducted an EDG Load Evaluation, dated June 12, 1986.
All PMs and procedure revisions necessary to support the above evaluation were completed prior to the last Unit 4 restart.
These corrective actions were documented in NRC inspection reports 250,251/86-34.
Additionally, the NRC issued a
Safety Evaluation Report, dated December 15, 1986, which concluded that loads for the various conditions are in conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.9, Position C.2.
This item is closed.
6.
Monthly and Annual Surveillance Observation (61726/61788)
The inspectors observed TS required surveillance testing and verified:
The test procedures conformed to the requirements of the TS, testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated, limiting conditions for operation ( LCO) were met, test results met acceptance criteria requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, deficiencies were identified, as appropriate, and were properly reviewed and resolved by management personnel and system restoration was adequate.
For completed tests, the inspectors verified testing frequencies were met and tests were performed by qualified individuals.
The inspectors witnessed/reviewed portions of the following test activities:
4-PMI-028.2 Axial Flux Rod Deviation and Rod Position Indication Monthly Test a
~
3-0SP-072.2 MSIV N-2 Backup Periodic Test 3-OSP-023.
Emergency Diesel Generator Operability Test Missed Surveillance Surveillance procedure 3-0SP-072.2, entitled MSIV N-2 Backup Periodic Test, is scheduled to be performed each Friday on day shift.
This procedure provides guidance to verify adequate pressure in the MSIV Nitrogen Station Bottles, and also includes instructions for verifying the proper output pressure of the pressure regulating valves and changing nitrogen bottle alignment.
The surveillance was performed on March 11, 1988, and was next required to be performed on March 18, 1988.
The procedure was not performed on March 18, 1988, and was performed next on March 27, 1988.
The licensee tracks each surveillance in accordance with 0-OSP-200. 1, entitled Schedule of Plant Checks and Survei llances.
The responsible supervisor for the surveillance initials the appropriate attachment to the procedure upon satisfactory completion of the surveillance.
The PS-N then signs the daily attachment at the end of each shift signifying that
surveillances satisfactorily completed during the shift have been signed off.
The next verification that completed survei llances have been initialed in the attachments is performed by the Operations Maintenance Co-ordinator.
This person is required to notify the responsible supervisor if the block is not initialed and to request the required information concerning the reason for this omission.
If the missed surveillance is TS related the (}C Surveillance Technician is contacted to determine the latest acceptable performance date and the attachments are then forwarded to the gC Surveillance Technician.
The licensee indicated that in this case, the reason for the missed surveillance was personnel error.
Apparently the required reviews did not catch the omission.
The licensee plans to initiate a
computerized surveillance tracking program that should minimize the chances for recurrence of this incident.
The purchase orders have been initiated and the plant plans to begin work on the program in May 1988
'S 6.8. 1 required that written procedures and administrative policies be established, implemented and maintained that meet or exceed the requirements and recommendations of Section 5. 1 and 5.3 of ANSI N18.7-1972 and Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33.
Regulatory Guide 1.33, Section 1.F, requires that APs be developed for Scheduling of Surveillance Tests and Calibrations.
AP 0190. 16, entitled Scheduling and Surveillance of Periodic Test and Checks Required by Technical Specifications, described the overall scope and intent of Turkey Point Plant scheduling and surveillance program.
Procedure 0-OSP-200. 1, entitled Schedule of Plant Checks and Survei llances, provides a schedule for performing TS required survei llances, as well as other tests, checks and instructions necessary for continued operation of the plant.
Section 7.0 of this procedure provides instructions to assure that the required survei llances are satisfactorily completed each day.
Contrary to the above, on March 18, 1988, 3-0SP-072.2, entitled MSIV N-2 Backup Periodic Test was not performed and the required reviews did not identify this omission.
The fai lure to perform the surveillance test is a violation.
However, discussions between the resident inspectors and regional management were held and it was determined that, no notice of violation will be issued as this violation met all the tests delineated in
CFR 2, Appendix C.
7.
Maintenance Observations (62703/62700)
Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components were observed and reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes and standards and in conformance with TS.
The following items were considered during this review, as appropriate:
That LCOs were met while components or systems were removed from service; that approvals were obtained prior to initiating work; that activities
were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; that procedures used were adequate to control the activity; that troubleshooting activities were controlled and repair records accurately reflected the maintenance performed; that functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; that QC records were maintained; that activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; that parts and materials used were properly certified; that radiological controls were properly implemented; that QC hold points were established and observed where required; that fire prevention controls were implemented; that outside contractor force activities were controlled in accordance with the approved QA program; and that housekeeping was actively pursued.
The inspectors witnessed/reviewed portions of the following maintenance activities in progress:
Wiring Checks and Calibration of "B" EDG Low Prelube Pressure Switch'-PMI-023.
1, EDG Instrument Calibration for "B" Diesel.
O-PMM-022.2, EDG Quarterly Preventative Maintenance for "B" Diesel.
0-PMM-022. 1, EDG Monthly Preventative Maintenance for
"B" Diesel.
0-SME-104. 1, Self Contained, Battery Powered, Emergency Lighting Monthly Performance Test.
O-SME-104.2, Self Contained, Battery Powered, Emergency Lighting Quarterly Inspection Test.
O-SME-104.3, Self Contained, Battery Powered, Emergency Lighting annual Performance Test.
TP-430, ICW/CCW Basket Strainer Fullflow Backwash (see paragraph a. below).
Repairs to Unit 4 Control Valve Oil Supply Piping.
Replacement of Unit 3 Generator Air Side Seal Oil Pumps On April 9, 1988, a backflush of the Unit 3A ICW strainer was in, progress in accordance with TP-430, ICW/CCW Basket Strainer Fullflow Backwash.
The MOS observer for the shift proceeded to the area to observe backflushing of the strainer and noted the Nuclear Operator performing the evolution was not in the vicinity as required by the procedure.
In addition, the MOS observer noted when the operator returned to the area he was not in continuous contact with the Control Room, which is also required by the procedur The
CFR 50.59 evaluation performed to accomplish the strainer backf lush with this new method required that:
An operator shall be stationed in the vicinity of the strainer drain valve, have continuous contact with the control room; and be capable of closing the valve within five minutes after the initiation of a MHA during the time the strainer valve is open.
These requirements are satisfied by TP-430, steps 3.4 and 5. 1.2, which requires an operator to be stationed in the vicinity of the basket strainer to be backwashed in continuous radio contact with the Control Room.
In addition, step 5. 1.2 contains a
space for the operators initials to indicate the step had been accomplished.
The evolution described above constitutes a violation of TS 6.8. 1.
However, because the NRC wants to encourage and support licensee initiative for self-identification and resolution of problems, the five tests delineated in
CFR 2,
Appendix C,
were applied.
Discussions between the resident inspectors and regional management were held and it was determined this violation meets the criteria of
CFR 2, Appendix C, therefore, no notice of violation will be issued.
Engineered Safety Features Walkdown (71710)
The inspectors performed an inspection designed to verify the operability of the Unit 3 Residual Heat Removal System outside containment.
This was accomplished by performing a
complete walkdown of all,accessible equipment.
The following criteria were used, as appropriate, during this inspection:
'a
~
Systems lineup procedures match plant drawings and as built configuration.
b.
C.
Housekeeping was adequate and appropriate levels of cleanliness are being maintained.
Valves in the system are correctly installed and do not exhibit signs of gross packing leakage, bent stems, missing handwheel s or improper labeling.
Hangers and supports are made up properly and aligned correctly.
e
~
f.
Valves, in the flow paths are in correct position as required by the applicable procedures with power available and valves were locked/lock wired as required.
Local and remote position indication was compared and remote instrumentation was functional.
~
Major system components are properly labele The inspectors reviewed the following documents during the course of the inspection:
3-OSP-050. 11, Residual Heat Removal/Safety Injection (RHR/SI)
Manual Valve Operability Test, revision dated February 10, 1987; 3-0P-050, RHR System, revision dated February 2,
1988; and Operating Diagram 5610-T-E=4510, Sheet 1,
revision 79, SI and RHR Systems Outside Containment.
No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspected.
9.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs, conducted discussions with control room operators, observed shift turnovers and confirmed operability of instrumentation.
The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, verified that maintenance work orders had been submitted as required and that followup and prioritization of work was accomplished.
The inspectors reviewed tagout records, verified compliance with TS LCOs and verified the return to service of affected components'y observation and direct interviews, verification was made that the physical security plan was being implemented.
Plant housekeeping/cleanliness conditions and 'mplementation of radiological controls were observed'ours of the intake structure and diesel, auxiliary, control and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions including potential fire hazards,'luid leaks and excessive vibrations.
The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the following safety related systems to verify operability and proper valve/switch alignment:
A and B Emergency Diesel Generators Control Room Vertical Panels and Safeguards Racks Intake Cooling Water Structure 4160 Volt Buses and 480 Volt Load and Motor Control Centers Unit 3 and 4 Feedwater Platforms Unit 3 and 4 Condensate Storage Tank Area Auxiliary Feedwater Area Unit 3 and 4 Main Steam Platforms Unit 3 Residual Heat Removal System Outside Containment Unit 3 and 4 Refueling Water Storage Tank Areas.
AFW Nitrogen Backup Valve Mispositioned On March 28, 1988, while performing 3-0SP-075.5, entitled AFW System Flowpath Verification, operations personnel discovered valve 3-40-1617 was mispositioned.
The procedure requires this valve to be lockwired closed.
The valve was found lockwired open.
This valve is
the root valve for pressure indication (PI)-3-7001, which measures system header pressure.
The PI is normally isolated as it is not seismically qualified.
The inspectors expressed a
concern to licensee management with regards to personnel attention to duty.
This valve was independently verified to be lockwired closed by.a senior reactor operator (SRO)
on March 25, 1988.
The licensee indicated that the topic of proper valve alignment and attention to duty is being discussed with each shift of operators on a rotating weekly basis.
A system of specific concern is the AFW Nitrogen Backup System.
The number of valve manipulations and the complexity of the system have attributed to two violations over the past four months (87-54-02 and 88-07-01).
The licensee recently replaced the PIs for the AFW Nitrogen Backup System with seismically qualified gauges.
This should help reduce the number of valve manipulations required by the operators.
This valve mi spositioning is similar to a previous violation (88-07-01), therefore, a notice of violation will not be issued.
However, the inspectors indicated to licensee management that their response to 88-07-01 should include the additional circumstances and corrective actions surrounding the most recent occurrence.
10.
Plant Events (93702)
The following plant events were reviewed to determine facility status and the need for further followup action.
Plant parameters were evaluated during transient response.
The significance of the event was evaluated along with the performance of the appropriate safety systems and the actions taken by the licensee.
The inspectors verified that required notifications were made to the NRC.
Evaluations were performed relative to the need for additional NRC response to the event.
Additionally, the following issues were examined, as appropriate:
details regarding the cause of the event; event chronology; safety system performance; licensee compliance with approved procedures; radiological consequences, if any; and proposed corrective actions.
The licensee plans to issue LERs on each event within 30 days following the date of occurrence.
On March 30, 1988, at 0441, Unit 3 was returned to service following a shutdown on March 24, 1988, to repair a sheared main condenser tube.
On April 4, 1988, power on Unit 3 was reduced to 500 MWE to repair a
pump casing oil leak on the generator air side seal oil pump.
The pump was subsequently replaced and the unit was returned to 100% power on April 5, 1988.
On April 6, 1988, Unit 4 was shut down from 100% power due to an oil leak in the control oil supply to P3 control valve.
The leak was caused by a crack in the weld at the joint between the piping and the control valve body.
The root cause appeared to be insufficient weld buildup at this joint, which failed due to vibration.
The licensee repaired the failed
joint and added additional weld buildup to all control oil pipes in that location for all Unit 4 control valves.
The unit was returned to service at 0849 on April 8, 1988.
Management Meeting On April 22, 1988, the monthly NRC/FPL Management Meeting was conducted at the site.
The meeting was attended by NRC Regional and Headquarters Management and FPL Site and Corporate Management.
The topics of discussion included:
Plant status; Management on Shift Program (MOS);
Status of SALP improvements in Engineering, Training, and Security; status of the TS Upgrade Program; and a guality Improvement Team discussion on Lost Time Accidents and Reduction of Contaminated Floor Space.
FPL announced a
management change during this period.
Mr. F.
H. Southworth was selected to replace Mr. J.
A. Labarraque as Technical Department Supervisor.
Mr. Labarraque has taken the position of Senior Technical Advisor.
12.
Acronyms and Abbreviations ADM ANSI AP ASME AFWS CCW CFR CS CTRAC EDG FPL ICW IEB IFI IST JCO LCO LER LIV MOS MHA MP MSIV NCR NRC ONOP OP OTDT OPDT Administrative
'merican National Standards Institute Administrative Procedures American Society of Mechanical Engineers Auxiliary Feedwater System Component Cooling Water Code of Federal Regulations Containment Spray Commitment Tracking Emergency Diesel Generator Florida Power 5 Light Intake Cooling Water Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin Inspector Followup Item Inservice Test Justification for Continued Operation Limiting Condition for Operation Licensee Event Report Licensee Identified Violation Manager-on-shift Maximum Hypothetical Accident Maintenance Procedure Main Steam Isolation Valve Non-conformance Report Nuclear Regulatory Commission Off Normal Operating Procedure Operating Procedure Overtemperature delta temperature Overpressure delta temperature
OTSC PA PC/M QC RHR RCO S/G SI SPING SRO TEC TS URI On The Spot Change Public Address Plant Changes and Modifications Quality Control Residual Heat Removal Reactor Control Operator Steam Generator Safety Injection Specific Particulate, Iodine and Noble Gas Senior Reactor Operator Technology for Energy Corporation Technical Specification Unresolved Item