IR 05000250/1988024
| ML17345A491 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 10/18/1988 |
| From: | Blake J, Chou R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17345A490 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-250-88-24, 50-251-88-24, IEB-79-02, IEB-79-14, IEB-79-2, IEIN-86-094, IEIN-86-94, IEIN-88-025, IEIN-88-25, NUDOCS 8811030348 | |
| Download: ML17345A491 (23) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTAST., N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-250/88-24 and 50-251/88-24 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102 Docket Nos.:
50-250 and 50-251 Facility Name:
Turkey Point 3 and
License Nos.:
DPR-31 and DPR-41 Inspection Conducted:
August 22-26, 1988 e
n Inspector:
Ric
.
o Approved by:J..
Blake, Chief Ma e ials and Processes Section
, E gi eering Branch Dsvision of Reactor Safety Date Signed
~c Date Signed SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection was conducted in the areas of the previous open items, base plate designs using concrete expansion anchor bolts ( IEB 79-02),
and seismic analysis for as-built safety-related piping system ( IEB 79-14).
Results:
In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.
One Unresolved Item (UNR)
was identified on piping system discrepancies, Paragraph 4.f.
The new drawings, which were compiled from all sources of documents, resulted in fewer discrepancies being found when they were compared to the as-installed conditions.
The licensee engineer s and licensing personnel have more positive attitude toward correcting the discrepancies within a reasonable time schedule.
They try to solve questions or concerns raised by the inspector as soon as possible.
8811030348 881025 PDR ADOCK 05000250
PNU
REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees J. Arias, Compliance Supervisor
"W. Bladow, Quality Assurance (QA) Superintendent
"J.
E. Cross, Plant Manager
"R. J. Earl, Quality Control (QC) Supervisor
~S.
Franzone, Technical Licensinq - Lead
"T.
F. Gilmore, Technical Licensing Engineer
~J.
C.
Gnecco, Civil Engineer - Juno Beach K. Greene, Civil Engineer Supervisor - Juno Beach
"R. Kart, Acting Regulation and Compliance Supervisor
"J.
W.
Kappes, Maintenance Superintendent
,"D. I. Lanier, Mechanical Engineer - Juno Beach
"J.
S.
Odom, Site Vice President
~G.
Salamon, Compliance Engineer
"F. Southworth, Technical Supervisor Other licerisee employees contacted during this inspection included craftsmen, engineers, mechanics, technicians, and administrative
.personnel.
Other Organizations K.
N.
Kassam, Supervising Engineer, Impell Corporation NRC Resident Inspectors
"R. Butcher, Senior Resident Inspector T. McElhinney, Resident Inspector 2;
"Attended exit interview Action On Previous Inspection Findings (92701)(92702)
a.
(Closed)
Unresolved Item (UNR) 50-250,251/85-12-01, Pipe Support Modification and Inspection.
This matter concerned two discrepancies:
first, Support No. A-6026 had an additional attachment which was not shown on the pipe support drawings and not identified by QC; second, Support No. A-8942 was a sliding-type support but adequate clearance for movement of the sliding support was not provided.
The first discrepancy was closed out on Inspection Report No. 50-250,251/86-13 based on the Letter No. 5875L-12, dated February 12, 1986, from the Teledyne Engineering Services (TES) to
Company.
The inspector discussed the second discrepancy with the,licensee's engineer and reviewed TES Technical Report No. TR-6589-1, Rev.
0, Sliding Type Pipe Support Evaluations for NRC Items 50-250,251/85-12-01, dated April 22, 1988.'ES reviewed all Turkey Point safety-related piping systems under its NRC IEB 79-14 responsibility for identification of sliding type supports which had potential interferences with oversized welds, anchor bolts, support structures, etc.
A total of twenty-five sliding type pipe supports were identified by TES as having characteristics which have the potential for precluding proper movement.
These supports were walked-down and recorded and evaluated by the licensee's engineers.
After the engineering evaluation, all suspect sliding type supports met Functionality and Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Criteria with four supports in Unit 3 and seven supports in Unit 4 requiring field modification due to inadequate clearances in the field.
The eleven supports requiring modifications will be modified around October 1988 for Unit 4 and November 1989 for Unit 3.
The eleven support modifications will be followed under the UNR 50-250,251/87-52-01 with the other modifications.
This UNR 50-250,251/85-12-01 is considered closed based on 'the licensee review, walkdown, evaluation, and the proposed
. modifications.
(Open)
UNR 50-250,251/86-13-01, Adequacy of Design Capacities Used for Installed Wej-It Concrete Anchor Bolts.
This matter concerned a
small number of Wej-It concrete expansion anchors used on site because the Mej-It capacities tested on-site at Crystal River Nuclear Plant were found to be 40K to 60K less than the catalog values.
The licensee agreed to review and test the Mej-It capacities on site.
The inspector held discussions with the licensee responsible engineer and reviewed the information provided.
The licensee reviewed all large bore pipe supports under the scope of IEB 79-14 and identified about 150 supports and 600 Wej-It anchor bolts used on site.
The licensee prepared Specification No. 5177-478-C-103. 2, Rev.
1, dated September 25, 1987, to test the Wej-It pull-out capacities using new concrete.
Results were lower than capacities provided in Mej-It catalog.
However, the licensee found that concrete had not met the specif)cation requirements.
Specification No.
CN 2. 19, Rev.
0, Site Specific Testing Program for Investigation of Pull-out Capacities of Wej-It Expansion Anchor, was prepared for a second test in existing concrete near a
feedwater recirculation system piping support foundation.
The above specification to test in existing concrete was reviewed by the inspector.
The inspector found that the test area is too small and test samples may not represent the actual capacities; the slip dimension for failure is not set for the slip failure criteria.
The licensee responsible engineer agreed to evaluate and revise the specification.
The licensee responsible engineer indicated the small area to be used would be the first test.
After the first test and evaluation, the licensee will consider the next step.
Pending the licensee testing, evaluation, and possible modification, this item remains ope (Closed)
UNR 50-250,251/87-01-02, Failure to Identify Discrepancies for Pipe Hangers/Restraints.
This matter concerned that the licensee did not identify numerous pipe support discrepancies which were found by the previous inspectors during the walkdown reinspection.
The licensee was requested to determine the root cause and present resolutions for the discrepancies.
The inspector held discussions with the licensee responsible engineers and licensing compliance engineers and reviewed the information provided.
Four root causes were determined by the licensee.
The breakdown of root causes and percentage are (j.) drawing discrepancies, field condition not deficient - 46K, (2) supports not maintained properly - 20K, (3). IEB 79-14 walkdown discrepancies
-- 20K, and (4) construction error - 6X.
The details of root causes and their resolutions are shown below:
(1)
Drawing Discrepancies, Field Condition Not Deficient DETAIL - The actual field condition was not deficient, but the drawings were discrepant or not up-to-date.
First example, information contained in Plant Change Modification (PCM),
Non-Conformance Report (NCR) or Technical Report (TR), but the drawing was not updated to include the information contained in the above documents.
Second example, the tolerances were allowed in Walkdown Specification but the engineers missed them in the first review.
RESOLUTION - The licensee's Inservice Inspection (ISI) redraw effort is currently in progress and is expected to be completed within two years.
This effort is an extensive reconstitution of all the isometric and support drawings used for the IEB 79-14 Pipe Analysis.
The inputs for the redraw effort include all affected design documents such as PCM, NCR, TR, and the existing IEB 79-14 Isometric and Support Drawings.
Punchlist Items will be created for any inconsistencies found in the supporting documentations and gC will perform an inspection to check the Punchlist Items and other important elements required by Engineering.
New revisions, sf required, will be issued to incorporate the correct and new information.
(2)
Support Not Maintained Properly DETAIL - Items probably resulted from inadequate maintenance of supports such as rust, missing nuts, loose nuts, etc.
RESOLUTION -
The licensee issued Turkey Point Procedure 0-ADM-718 "Component Supports Preventive Maintenance Inspection Program" on June 30, 1988.
This procedure provides instructions for the Maintenance Department to perform preventive maintenance on component supports.
This procedure, will perform the
inspection on supports and evaluate completed inspection packages and initiate additional action or documentation if required.
The inspected supports will be divided into three categories:
acceptable component supports with no repairs requ)red; unacceptable component supports with discrepancies requiring issuance of Plant Work Orders only for the minor repair; unacceptable component supports with discrepancies requiring Nonconformance Reports (NCR).
In addition, the ISI Program provides another level of inspection for safety-related component supports.
(3)
IEB 79-14 Walkdown Discrepancies DETAIL -
Items were the result of incorrect information on original isometric drawings or walkdown personnel mistakes such as orientation error, support location, dimension error, multiple supports not shown, the abandoned support not removed from the field, etc.
RESOLUTION -
The licensee hopes to reduce this type of discrepancies to a minimum by the implementations of the ISI redraw effort and the ISI redraw inspections as stated in Item No.
above.
The preventive maintenance program and the ISI program wi 11 provide additional inspections which help identify this type of discrepancies.
For the solution of multiple supports, see Paragraph 4d.
(4)
Construction Error DETAIL -
Items were the result of the implementation of IEB 79-14 modifications such as the new attachment not shown in the existing support drawing.
RESOLUTION -
Improved configuration control and work control practices in place should prevent this type of discrepancies in the future.
The licensee ISI redraw effort is a program to consolidate all the drawings or documents into a
new single drawing or document and it can eliminate some discrepancies.
In addition, the preventive maintenance program and the ISI program will reduce the discrepancies to a minimum.
Therefore, this item is considered closed.
d.
(Open)
UNR 50-250,251/87-52-01, Discrepancies On As-Built Drawings and Calculations of Piping Systems for IEBs 79-02 and 79-14.
Thss matter concerned the numerous discrepancies on the as-built drawings and calculations identified by the previous inspectors.
The inspector held discussions with the licensee responsible engineers and reviewed the information provided.
The licensee's A/E firm,
Teledyne Engineering Services (TES),
had finished the evaluation of operability due to the discrepancies and found them acceptable.
TES divided the discrepancies into three groups.
Group one, the revisions for the as-built drawings and calculations were required.
The separated and revised calculations have been done and will be inserted in the main body of calculations later during the incooperation of turn-over program.
Group two, the supports required maintenance.
Per FPL inter-office correspondence JPE-PTP-88-1135, Site File R-6. 1, dated June 16, 1988, TES had issued the maintenance packages for 19 supports such as replacing the bent rod, replacing the load plate on spring can, adding shim plate, removing the abandoned support from field, etc.
The maintenance department will implement them in the near future.
Group three, the supports required modifications.
The Design Equivalent Engineering Packages (DEEP) for modifications have been issued for the supports to be modified during the incominq outrage around September 1988 for Unit 4.
The remaining DEEP will be issued and the modifications will be completed during the next outage around November 1988 for Unit 3.
The completion of implementation for eleven sliding supports (one required maintenance and ten required modifications, see Paragraph 2a) will be inspected under this unresolved item since their maintenance and modifications will be combined with the solution of UNR 50-250,251/87-52-01 per the licensee.
The licensee sets schedule and makes progress trying to complete the NRC findings.
Pending the full completion of the discrepancies, this item remains open.
e (Open)
Inspector Fo1 1 owup Item (IFI)
50-250,251/87-52-02, Maintenance Procedures for Piping Systems.
This matter concerned the piping System Maintenance such as base plate rusted, missing nuts, sliding supports unable to slide due to rust, load plate for spring can missing or painted over, etc.
The licensee is requested to develop the maintenance procedures for the piping systems.
The inspector held discussions with the licensee responsible engineer.
Procedure No.
O-ADM-718, Component Supports Preventive Maintenance Inspection, Program, had been issued on June 30, 1988.
This procedure includes the personnel training, inspection package preparation, inspection, evaluation, and disposition of results.
The dispositions of the inspection results include acceptable component supports without repairs, unacceptable component supports with requiring issuance of Plant Mork Order (PRO)
due to minor discrepancies, and unacceptable component supports with requiring Nonconformance Reports (NCR)
due to major discrepancies.
Pending the licensee personnel training and implementation of this program, this item remains ope,
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or deviations.
One unresolved item identified during this inspection is discussed in paragraph 4.
(Closed)
Pipe Support Base Plate Design Using Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts (IEB 79-02)
and Seismic Analyses for As-Built Safety-Related Piping Systems (IEB 79-14) - Units 3 and 4 (25528, 25529, 50090).
a.
Walkdown Reinspection The licensee engineers offered the use of their newest completed isometrics and support drawings for the inspector walkdown reinspection to see the confidence and effectiveness of the new redraw program (ISI redraw effort) for the piping systems.
The new redraw program is designed to consolidate all outstanding documents such as nonconformance, design change notice, IEB 79-02 anchor bolt testing, IEB 79-14 walkdown inspection, plant change modification, technical report, etc.
into a
new single document of drawing or calculation.
Twenty-one supports in four piping isometrics were selected for walkdown re>nspection.
The piping and supports were reinspected with the assistance of gC inspectors and engineers.
The pipinq was reinspected against detail drawings for configuration, dimension, branch/tap location, support location, support identification, clearance with adjacent structure and/or pipe, valve identification, and valve operator orientation.
the supports were reinspected against their detai
drawings for configuration, identification dimension, clearance, member size, welding, base plate, fastner/anchor bolt installation, and damage protect>on.
Table 1 is a list of result to show the walkdown reinspection and calculation review (see Paragraph 4b).
All support reinspection and calculation review are for Unit TABLE 1 Malkdown Reinspection and.Calculation Review A.
Isometrics Malkdown Reinspection Piping Isometric Rev.
No.
Comment/Discrepancy-ISO 5613-P-597-S, Sheet 3 of 3
Notes
8
B.
Support Malkdown Reinspections and Calculation Review Piping Isometric/
Piping Supports
- ISO 5613-P-580-S Data Rev.
Walkdown Calculation Ptt N.
P N/A
- Support No. IC-225-1 10B
- Support No.
SR-164 llA
- Support No. 3-SIH-4
- Support No. 3-SIH-3
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ISO 5613-P-597-S, Sh. lof3
- Support No. 3-SIH-65 150
- ISO 5613-P-597-S, Sh. 2of3
- Support No. 3-SIH-64 490
- Support No. 3-SIH-68 500
None Note
Note 4 None N/A Note
N/A None Note
- Support No. 3-SIH-72 530
None
- Support No. 3-SIH-73 535
- Support No. 3-SIH-74 540
- Support No.
SR-128 470
- Support No.
SR-160 475
None Note
None None None None
- ISO 5613-P-597-S, Sh. 30f 3
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- Support No. A" 400
Notes 162 None None
Support No. 3-SIH-55 367
Support No. 3-SIH-62 427
Support No. 3-SIH-66 355
Support No. A" 260
- Support No.
A~
265
Support No.
C 190 0.
Support No.
125 170
Support No.
SR-126 210
Note 8 None Note
None None None Note 10 None None None None None None None None None N/A - Not Applicable Supports have the same name but the types and data points are different.
Notes (1)
Two 2")
HHSI Recirculation Test Line Branches at locations between Data Point (DP)
445 and 450 and between DP 385 and 390 were not shown in ISO drawing.
(2)
A vertical support located 12" west of Support No.
A (
DP 265)
was not shown in ISO drawing.
Nonconformance Report (NCR)
No. 88-0087 dated June 29, 1988, was issued for this discrepancy.
(3)
Cold load for spring can shows 820¹ in field.
The drawing says 738¹.
NCR No. 88-0076 dated June 10, 1988, was issued for this discrepancy.
(4)
Rod was bent and in contact with the floor pipe sleeve.
Also rod has rust.
NCR No. 88-0076 dated June 10, 1988, was issued for those discrepancies.
(5)
The anchor bolt center distance is 3-1/2") between the an'chor bolt (1/2"g ) at lower and left corner (Elevation Yiew A-A) for this support and anchor bolt (1/2") ) at upper and right corner for Support No. 3-SIH-68.
The minimum requirement for anchor bolt center distance is 5" per design criteria.
(6)
(a).
See Note 5 above.
(b)
Item No.
is L3 x 3xl/4 in field.
Drawing shows L4 x 3x3/8.
NCR No. 88-0087 dated June 29, 1988, was issued for this discrepanc (7)
Two nuts at near side of U-bolt are missing in field for 2")
pipe at the lowest elevation.
(8)
The clearances existing in field between 2"g stanchion and restricted angle are less than the movement required.
This condition was evaluated per TR-6589-1, Rev. 0, and was acceptable for system operability.
The support will be modified per TR-6589-1 to provide the required clearances as stress analysis showed.
(9)
Two abandoned U-Bolt holes at wide flange beam located 1" from the existing U-Bolt holes are not shown in drawing.
(10) 1/2") Mej-It anchor bolts were found in field.
Drawing showed 3/8") self-drill anchor bolts.
NCR was written before this inspection.
Support Calculation Review Eleven pipe support design calculations were partially reviewed and evaluated for thoroughness, clarity, consistency, and accuracy.
In general, the design calculations were of good quality.
The calculation contains the loading data, calculation and analysis, support sketch, computer input and output, and base plate analysis input and output.
Stress Calculation Review Stress Calculation Nos.
005, Rev.
0 and MS-2, Rev.
1 were reviewed.
Contents for review included input and output.
Input included geometry, pipe size, pipe material, valve, nozzle, support location, orientation, valve load, temperature, intensifying factors, pressure, dynamic factor, concentrate load, uniform load, etc.
Output included the stresses for dead weight analysis, thermal analysis, operating basis earthquake (OBE) analysis or design basis earthquake (DBE)
analysis, and their combinations.
The output loads at stress calculation were also checked against the loads used in the support calculations.
Isometric drawing 5177-102-SK-p-250, Rev.
D was used for basis of analysis for Stress Calculation No.
MS-2.
The drawing shows two different operating conditions for this system '- normal operating mode and dump mode.
The system at'ormal operating mode was divided at a safety valve into portion 1 with temperature
= 555'F and pressure
=
1110 psi and portion 2 with temperature
= 100'F and pressure
= Atmosphere.
The system at dump mode was divided at safety valve into portion 1 with temperature
= 555 F and pressure
= 1110 psi and portions 2 with temperature
= 350'F and pressure
= 150 psi.
The analysis for MS-2 considered the normal operating mode only.
The inspector questioned why the analysis did not consider dump mode since the temperature and pressure were higher at the system portion 2 than that at the normal operating mode.
The licensee
responsible engineers claimed the pipe on the system portion 2 is nonsafety-related and is not required to be analyzed.
The inspector pointed out that the thermal expansion at nonsafety-related piping might affect the safety related piping at portion 1 due to connecting together.
The licensee thru their A/E firm, Teledyne Engineering Services, immediately provided the hand calculations resulting in the larger thermal movement and loading.
The support at downstream provided the exce'ssive gap.
Therefore the system is acceptable under the dump mode condition.
The licensee responsible engineer agreed to incorporate, this dump mode analysis into the stress calculation No.
MS-2.
Review for the concern of Generic Multiple Pipe Supports The inspectors identified findings on the multiple support problem during previous walkdown reinspections.
Particularly, neither of the multiple supports (or gang supports)
were identified during the licensee walkdown nor were included in the main support calculations identified in walkdown.
The-licensee
'was requested to resolve this generic problem.
The inspector held discussions with the licensee responsible engineers and reviewed the information provided.
The TES Letter No.
6961D-1 to the licensee dated August 25; 1988, was reviewed.
The licensee claimed that TES had finished a review on support drawings and calculations through phase Nl of the Second Ten Year ISI redraw effort for a total of 1378 supports.
The letter stated that a total of 104 supports were identified as multiple supports containing two or more analyzed pipes.
Three out of the 104 were identified as potential problems.
This work has been performed and checked according to TES gA procedure.
The first and second supports, Support Drawing 5614-H-566 Sheet 4 and 5614-H-541 sheet
show the multiple supports but they did not include the loads from the other supports in the analyses.
The support analyses for the other supports did include the above support loads.
TES will revise the above two support calculations and verify the conditions in field.
Support Drawing 5610-H-617 sheet 7 shows a multiple support.
The third support, Supports SR-142 for stress problem CCW-27 and SR-305 for stress problem 038 share a
common W6 x 15.5 which is attached to building steel.
The combined loads on this W6 were not considered in either support calculation.
TES performed a separate calculation and this support meets all FSAR requirements.
In addition, a total of twelve supports were identified as multiple supports by TES but they were under Bechtel IEB 79-14 responsibility.
Per Bechtel Power Corporation Letter No.
SFB-5446, Files:
0112, S-18712-127, to FPL dated August 26, 1988, the 12 pipe support design calculations have been reviewed and have been determined that the all loads for the attachments identified by the walkdowns for IEB 79-14 have been included in the design calculations.
To prevent the multiple support loads missing in the design calculations, TES'
Second Ten Year ISI Drawing Program procedures will be revised to include a review of multiple pipe supports beginning with Phase 12.
Based on the licensee review, evaluation and the preventive procedure, this concern is considered resolved.
Bulletin Review The NRC Region II Inspection Report Numbers 50-250/79-17, 79-38, 80-05, 80-09, 80-18, 81-27, 82-12, 82-23, 85-12, 85-28, 86-13, 87-01, 87-52 for Unit 3 and 50-251/79-17, 79-38, 80-05, 80-09, 80-18, 81-27, 82-12, 82-23, 85-12, 85-28, 86-13, 87-01, 87-52 for Unit 4 were performed for IEB 79-02 to verify and review the procedures, inspection programs, analytical methods',
modifications, and documentations 'for the concrete expansion anchor bolts.
The NRC Region II Inspection Report Numbers 50-251/79-32, 79-38, 80-05, 80-09, 80-18.
89-26, 81-27, 82-12, 82-23, 85-12, 86-13, 87-01, 87-52 for Unit 3 and 50-251/79-32, 79-38, 80-05, 80-09, 80-18, 80-26, 81-27, 82-12, 82-23, 85-12, 86-13, 87-01, 87-52 for Unit 4 were performed. for IEB 79-14 to verify and review the, procedures, inspection programs, analytical methods,
-modifications, and documentation for the as-built safety-related piping systems.
The majority of the required modifications and documentations for IEB 79-02 and 79-14 has been completed by the licensee.
The revised final summary report (Letter No.
L-87-383, dated October 22, 1987)
for IEB 79-02 for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 was submitted to NRC for review.
The report and the associated modifications were determined to meet the bulletin requirements.
The licensee stated that the final summary report for IEB 79-14'as in the draft stage and would be submitted shortly to NRC for review.
Pending the licensee completion on final summary report for IEB 79-14, this item is identified as new open item IFI 50-250,251/88-24-01, Final Summary Report for IEB 79-14.
The inspector also performed walkdowns and reviews in this inspection as stated in Paragraphs
.4.a to 4.d to verify the licensee performance and commitments on IEBs 79-02 and 79-14.
Based on the previous inspection reports and this inspection, IEBs 79-02 and 79-14 for Units 3 and 4 are considered closed except for the open items.
Findings and Results The inspector found less discrepancies by using the new redrawn drawings at this inspection.
During the walkdown reinspection, the inspector was informed that the isometric and pipe support drawings were walkdowned by the licensee gC inspectors after they were redrawed to test the new drawing accuracy.
Some discrepancies were found such as Notes 2,
3, 4,
G.b and 10 in Table 1 during the inspector walkdown reinspection and the licensee responsible engineers claimed that the above items were not discrepancies since the items were already found by the licensee itself and Non-conformance Reports were written against them before the
inspector s
inspection.
The licensee will not do the full detail check for the new drawing but will develop a program to check the important elements in the drawing and assure the accuracy of the new drawings.
Pending the licensee program to verify the accuracy of the new drawings, this item is identified as a
new open item as IFI 50-250,251/88-24-02, Field Verifications for New Redraw Drawings of Isometrics and Pipe Supports.
Hilti anchor bolts were used in both units.
IEB 79-02 requires the licensee to determine the anchor bolt allowables based on the testing capacity in field or catalog capacity
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ublished by the manufacturer if gA document is available.
NRC nformation Notices No. 86-94 and 88-25 require the licensees who use the Hilti anchor bolts to review the allowables used in design calculations since the NRC found that the test capacity in field was 30K '40K below the catalog capacity due to the various concrete mixtures.
The licensee is requested to review the Hilti anchor bolt allowables per IEB 79-02, NRC Information Notices No. 86-94'nd 88-25.
This item is identified as a
new open item as IFI 50-250, 251/88-24-03, Hilti Anchor Bolt Allowables and Justifications for IEB 79-02, NRC Information Notices No. 86-94 and 88-25.
The above discrepancies found between the field and as-built drawings were discussed with the licensee engineers and gC Inspector.
The licensee responsible engineers had evaluated the discrepancies found and concluded no operability concern.
Pending the licensee review and revisions on the drawings and calculations, the discrepancies found during the walkdown reinspection as stated Notes 1,
5, 7, and 9 in Table 1, are identified as a
new open item UNR 50-250/88-24-04 Discrepancies in As-Built Drawings for Piping Systems.
No violations or deviations were identified during the inspection.
5.
-
Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on August 26, 1988, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed below.
Proprietary information is not contained in this report.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
(Open) IFI 50-250,251/88-24-01, Final Summary Report for IEB 79-14 (Open) IFI 50-250,251/88-24-02, Field Verification for New Redraw Drawings of Isometrics and Pipe Supports (Open)
IFI 50-250,251/88-24-03, Hilti Anchor Bolt Allowables and Justifications for IEB 79-02, NRC Information Notices No. 86-94 and 88-25 (Open)
UNR 50-250/88-24-04, Discrepancies in As-Built Drawings for Piping Systems
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