IR 05000250/1988022
| ML17345A402 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 09/07/1988 |
| From: | Blake J, Kleinsorge W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17345A401 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-250-88-22, 50-251-88-22, IEB-88-005, IEB-88-5, NUDOCS 8809270022 | |
| Download: ML17345A402 (18) | |
Text
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>*+~ UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMNlISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTAST., N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-250/88-22 and 50-251/88-22 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler* Street Miami, FL 33102 Docket Nos.:
50-250 and 50-251 Facility Name:
Turkey int d 4 License Nos.:
DPR-31 and DPR-41 Inspection Co Inspector:
8-12,
eon or Approved by:J. J.
ake, Section Chief ter als and Processes Section ngineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety Dte i
d g ~C.
te Signed SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted in the areas of NRC bulletins, infrared thermography, action on previous inspection findings, and maintenance.
Results:
In the areas inspected no violations or deviations were identified.
The inspector determined that the licensee was not responsive to NRC initiatives as it related to followup on previous inspection findings.'s a contrast to the above the licensee management should be given high marks for involvement in assuring quality as evidenced by "one additional step" taken in response to NRC Bulletin 88-05 and their implementation of the infrared thermography program.
The inspector noted that the licensee was taking a methodical conserva-tive aggressive approach to the repair of the 3B containment spray pulllp ~
8809270022 88091 3 PDR ADOCK 05000250
PNU
REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- B. Abrisham, System Performance Supervisor
- J. Arias, Jr., Technical Department
- J. Books, guality Control (gC) Supervisor
- V. Chi lsen, Principal Engineer
.
- J. Ferrare, Supervisor
- R. Hurt, Acting Regulation and Compliance Supervisor
- E. Lyons, Compliance Engineer
- J. Oden, Site Vice President
- L. Pearce, Operating Superintendent
- F. Southworth, Technical Supervisor
- L. Wilson, gC Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included engineers, mechanics, technicians, and administrative personnel.
NRC Resident Inspectors
- T. HcElhinney, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview 2.
NRC Bulletins (NRCB)
a 0 (Closed)
IEB No. 87-02:
"Fastener Testing to Determine Conformance with Applicable Material Specifications,"
Units 3 and 4.
The bulletin requested licensees to review their receipt inspection requirements and internal controls for fasteners and independently determine, through testing, whether'asteners (studs, bolts, cap screws and nuts)
in stores at their facilities meet required mechanical and chemical specification requirements.
Supplements I
and 2 to the bulletin requested licensees to, I) provide a list of suppliers and manufacturers from which safety related ferrous fasteners I/4 inch in diameter or greater, that may have been purchased within the past ten years, an'd 2) provide similar information for no-safety related fastener suppliers.
The inspector has reviewed Florida Power and Light (FPKL) letters of January 12, 1988, February 12, 1988, and July 25, 1988, and determined that the requested actions of the bulletin have been acceptably addressed.
'he inspector held discussions with responsible FPEL representatives, reviewed supporting documentation and observed representative samples of work to verify that the
actions identified in the letter of response have been completed.
This matter is closed.
(Open)
NRC Bulletin No. 88-05:
"Nonconforming Materials Supplied By Piping Supplies, Inc.
at Folsom, New Jersey and West Jersey Manufacturing Company at Wi lliamstown, New Jersey",
Units 3 and 4.
This bulletin required licensees to submit information regarding materials supplied Piping Supplies Incorporate (PSI)
and West Jersey manufacturing (WJM)
Company and to take actions to assure that (I) materials comply with the American Society of Mechanical-Engineer s (ASME) code and design specification requirements or are suitable for their "intended use and (2) replace such.materials.
Supplement I, to this bulletin, provided additional information about PSI and WJM supplied materials, reduced the scope of the materials review, delineated actions licensee are required to take to identify materials, and clarified actions licensees are required to take once noncomplying materials have been identified.
Supplement 2 to this bulletin modified the schedule for actions requested by the Bulletin and Supplement I of the Bulletin and provided additional information about materials provided by WJM, PSI and recently identified company, Chews Landing Metal Manufactures Incorporated (CLM).
For full power licensee's, Supplement 2 to the Bulletin indicated, based on reported measurements and analytical results to date, that it is appropriate to suspend, temporarily, the field measurements, testing, records review, and the preparation of justifications for continued operations (JCOs)
that were requested by the Bu'Iletin and Supplement I unti 1 further notice.
Holders of full power operating licenses were required to report the results of their records review, testing, and analysis performed as of the date of Supplement 2 in accordance with the 120 day reporting requirements specified in Paragraph I of the Bulletin (May 6, 1988 Plus 120 days is September 3, 1988).
The licensee has identified 5,072 Purchase Orders (POs)
and 3251 Plant Change Modification (PCM)
packages within the window of the bulletin.
The licensee is reviewing the POs and PCMs placing all materials in a data base with the following fields:
PO/Supp.
Item No; gual Level; MSS/RPA Number; Dia/Size; Commodity; Material Description; MFG/CMTR Company Name; guantity; Part No./Heat Code/Lot Number; RIR No; Microfilm Cert.
8 Frame; Work Package No; and Suspect Code.
To date the licensee has reviewed 2583 PO/PCM packages, identified 245 suspect materials, located 243 items, of which 177 are safety-related.
The licensee has tested 230 items and failed
items.
The licensee has suspended the search for the location of items in the plant, and testing activities as of August 3, 1985, the date of Supplement 2.
However, they continue their document review and expect to have the document review complete by the end of October 1988.
The licensee considers the expenditure of time and money, to create the materials data base, an effort beyond that required by current NRC regulations and commitments, to be an
e investment in the future.
This data base will provide quick identification of materials, which may be identified as suspect in the future.
The above
"one additional step" is an example of the licensee's management's involvement to assure quality.
Within the areas examined no deviations or violations were identified.
3.
Infrared Thermography The 1 icensee has: developed a
formal program to routinely gather thermographic data as part of Turkey Point Plants Predictive Maintenance Program.
The data is collected by a
Model 600 portable infrared data Collect:";
System manufactured by Inframetries, Inc.
and analyzed by Thermoteknix microcomputer-based fermiware/software system produced by Thermoteknix Systems Limited.
The program covers over 200 components in both units with frequencies of testing from quarterly to annually.
The program has identified several components that had degraded, employing their thermal signature.
This early detection allowed the licensee to make planned repairs and avoid an unplanned outage.
The inspector observed the thermographic examination of the 3C charging pump and motor.
The above program is not mandated by any regulatory requirement.
The inspector perceives this program as positive example of the licensee management's involvement to assure quality.
Within the areas examined no deviations or violations were identified.
4.
Maintenance During recent testing of the 3B Containment Spray Pump (CSP),
the temperature for the "inboard" bearing (the thrust bearing and the bearing closest to the motor coupling)
has steadily increased to over 180'F, Operating Surveillance Procedure (OSP)
3-0SP-068.2,
"Containment Spray Pump Inservice Test", states that the maximum temperature value for the
"inboard" bearing is 180'F.
If this limit is exceeded, the respective CSP is declared inoperable and corrective action is initiated.
The 180'F limitation included in 3-0SP-068.2 is principally based upon a
reference to that value in the original manual for the CSPs from the pump manufacturer.
The manual is generic for the pumps and is not specific to this Turkey Point application.
Discussions with the pump vendor concerning bearing temperature occurred in 1979.
In their response, they indicated that a normal operating band of "180-181 F" was not a cause for alarm although it is above the expected ideal band for this model pump.
The letter further states that concern should be raised for upward changes in temperature 15-20'F above our
"normal operating range."
Comparison of the 1987 and 1988 test results show a temperature rise of 8'F, an increase of 5'A.
Based on this and the test conditions'nder which these temperatures were observed, the licensee evaluated the increased temperature and determined that the 3B CSP is operable in its current
configuration.
However, the bearing temperature and upward trend identify a less than ideal condi tion.
Therefore, the pullout assembly (a pullout assembly is the pump proper less the casing)
should be replaced as soon as practical.
On August 11, 1988, the licensee replaced the pullout assembly.
Subsequent testing revealed imboard pump bearing temperatures of 191.8'F and rising with much increased (1.2-1.5 mils to 4.0-4. 1 M.LS inboard ad outboard)
horizontal motor vibration.
After cold alignment on August 12, 1988, the inboard pump bearing stabilized at 197 F with high vibration on the motor inboard bearing.
At the end of this inspection the licensee continued work on the pump.
The inspector noted that the licensee was taking a methodical conservative aggressive approach to correct the pump bearing high temperature.
Within the areas examined no deviations or violations were identified.
5.
Actions On Previous Inspection Findings e
a
~
Followup On Items of Noncompliance ( I )
(Open)
Violation 50-250,251/85-05-01:
"Fai lure to Tes t Fail-Safe Valves in Accordance with the Code".
FPSL letters of response dated April 5, 1985, December 6,
1985 and May 2, 1986, have been reviewed and determined to be acceptable by Region II.
The inspector held discussions with members of the licensee's regulatory compliance staff and examined the corrective actions as stated in the letter of response.
The inspector noted that the May 2, 1986 letter, stated:
"(a)
Full compliance for Item 3.a above will be achieved by the end of the 1987 refueling outage for each unit.
(b)
Full compliance for Item 3.b above will be achieved within 30 days after the end of the 1987 refueling outage for each uni t.
(c)
Full compliance for Item 3.c above will be achieved by the end of the current Unit 4 refueling outage."
In should be noted that there was no Unit 4 refueling outage in 1987 because of unexpected extended conoseal outage.
Therefore full compliance for the Unit 4 items was not accomplished.
Further the licensee informed the inspector that the scope of modifications to the both units has changed from that stated in the letter of respons In view of the above the licensee. agreed to provide the NRC an amended response to this violation within 30 days of the date of this inspection.
(2)
(Open)
Viol at i on 50-251/86-06-01:
"Fai lure to Provi de Appropriate Acceptance Criteria for Inservice Testing Procedure.
FPEL letters of response dated May 15, 1986 and May 29, 1986, has been reviewed and determined to be acceptable by Region II.
The inspector held discussions with IST Program Manager.
The licensee stated in their May 29, 1986 letter the following:
"FPL does not concur with the findings for the following reasons:
a)
It is FPL's position that Paragraph IWP-3lll requires a
new set (or sets)
of reference values be determined after a
pump has been replaced.
However, after completion of repairs or routine servicing of a pump, which may have affected a-pump reference value (or sets of values),
Paragraph IWP-3111 requires that either the previous set (or sets) of reference values shall be reconfirmed, or a
new set (or sets) shall be determined by an inservice test run prior to, or within 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br /> after the pump is returned to service.
The acceptance criteria for reconfirming the previous set (or sets)
of reference va'lues are provided in Table IWP 3100-2.
b)
Subsection IWP "Inservice Testing of Pump in Nuclear Power Plants" is based in part on statistical techniques for the analysis of test data.
Table IWP-3100-2 "Allowable Ranges of Test guantities" provides ranges of inservice test quantities in relation to reference values.
Vibration amplitude has four ranges of Test guantity specified, depending on the reference vibration amplitude value.
Accordingly, a change in pump vibration amplitude from 1.5 mil to 0.5 mi 1 in the range 0.5 to 2.0 mil is not by itself statistically significant and did not require a change in reference value.
Furthermore, statistical analysis of No.
4B containment spray pump inservice test results from 1977, to date show that a test quantity of 0.5 mil is within one standard deviation of the median value for vibration amplitude for this pump and is well within the vendor recommended value."
The NRC stated in their July I, 1986 letter of response to the FPSL May 29, 1986 letter in part:
"The violation described in our letter pertained to an apparent failure to provide adequate acceptance criteria for inservice testing of containment spray Pump 4B as required by the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section XI Paragraph IWP-3111.
We will examine the basis for your denial of acceptance criteria discrepancies in a subsequent inspection."
The above examination has been completed and it has.
been determined that the violation stands.
It will be necessary for the licensee to respond to this violation within 30 days of'this inspection.
b.
Followup On Unresolved Items (I)
(Open)
Unresol ved Item 50-250,251/86-15-01:
"Check Valve Testing Adequacy".
Due to pressing operational considerations the licensee was unable to discuss this issue during the period of this inspection.
This matter remains open.
(2)
(Open)
Unresolved Item 50-250,251/88-04-01:
"Specification of Inspection Requirements" FPSL Procedure M-3.50, Revision B,
contains a
matrix of inspection/nondestructive examination requirements versus piping category/weld joint configuration.
The matrix specifies that the weld edge preparations be liquid penetrant or magnetic particle examined for ASME Class I systems, only if the joint to be welded is a full penetration butt weld, 2-inch and over wall thickness.
This is not consistent with ASME BKPV Code,Section III, Subsection NB, Paragraph NB-5130, which requires weld edge preparation be liquid penetrant or magnetic particle examined for all Class I weld joints, 2-inch wall thickness and over.
The inspector determined to the date of inspection 88-04; the licensee had not violated the code requirements in this area.
As of the date of this inspection the above issue has not been addressed in the current. Revision 04 to M-3.50.
This item remains ope (3)
the licensee had not violated the code requirements in this area.
As of the date of this inspection the above issue has not been addressed in the current Revision 04 to M-3.50.
This item remains open.
(Open)
Unresolved Item 50-250,251/88-04-02:
"OgE For Copper Analysis."
Filler material type ER-70S2, 3/32" x 36", heat number 412E2751 was procured under Purchase Order (PO No.) OA-35451-43921-27936.
That PO implements specification MN-2.16, Rev. 0, which requires, among other requirements, an analysis for copper in.
accordance with ASNE BSPV Code,Section III, paragraph NB-4623.
The licensee was unable to provide Objective guality Evidence (OgE) that the copper analysis was performed and acceptable to the requirements of NB4623 during inspection 88-04.
Subsequently, the licensee determined that the copper analysis was not performed and further, the lack of certification of copper analysis, though required, was not identified as a
discrepancy at the time of receipt inspection and document review for this heat of welding fillermaterial.
The licensee obtained a sample of the same heat of this welding filler material and had that sample analyzed for copper.
The analysis indicated that the copper content was acceptable to the requirements of the PO.
When questioned, as to whether there were any similar examples of material certification documentation, that were missing required elemental analysis and were nonetheless accepted, the licensee indicated that they did not know.
The licensee stated they would investigate further.
Pending NRC review of the licensee's investigation in this matter this item will remain open.
Followup On Inspector Followup Items'( IFI)
(Open)
Itern 50-250,251/87-31-01:
"Thread Engagement Final Report".
In response to violation 50-250,251/85-09-01 the licensee conducted an inspection of pressure
'boundary bolting in 13 systems.
The violation was closed in NRC Report 50-250,251/87-31, dated July 9, 1987, which (87-31)
opened this followup item, for NRC review of the final summary of results.
To date the licensee indicated that all fasteners that required imaediate corrective action have been correcte An additional listing of approximately 400 threaded fasteners were analyzed by the licensee and found to have full bolt strength in their present configuration; however, to comply with the governing codes and standards with respect to thread engagement, these threaded fasteners are being scheduled for rework during the next reasonable maintenance interval.
The licensee has not, as of this writing, scheduled the above rework.
Pending a scheduling program this matter will remain open.
(2)
(Open)
Item 50-250,251/87-52-02:
Piping Systems"
"Maintenance Procedures for This item concerns the lack of maintenance program for pipjng system supports, restraints and anchors.
The inspector of record for Report 50-250,251/87-52 noted such conditions as:
baseplate rusted; missing nuts; sliding supports unable to slide due to rust; and load plate for spring can missing or painted over.
At the time of that inspection the licensee did not have a maintenance program for periodic inspection of piping systems to find deficient items such as:
rust; bent members; missing nuts; loose nuts; load plate missing or painted over; and improper clearances.
At that time the licensee indicated that a
preventative maintenance program for piping systems was in development and would be completed by June 30, 1988.
On June 30, 1988, the licensee issued FPAL O-ADM-718, "Component Supports Preventive Maintenance Inspection Program" which, to date, has not been implemented.
Training Program, implementation procedures-and the inspection plan are still in the developmental stage.
The licensee has no estimate of when this program will be implemented.
Pending NRC evaluation of the program 's implementation this matter remains open.
d.
Observations The inspector determined that the licensee was not responsive to NRC initiatives as indicated by the following:
The inspector requested packages, on the first day of the inspection, that would support the closing of eight items identified in previous NRC inspections.
The packages were slow in coming.
Some packages were not received until the fourth day of the inspection.
Most of the packages were incomplete and had to be returned for more information.
One violation package required an additional response be provided by the licensee as the latest response concerning that matter was no longer accurate.
It appears that the licensee takes a narrow view of issues without considering the issues impact on simi.lar item The inspector discussed the above with the licensee who indicated that the inspector's observations were accurate, and were the result of limited expendi tatives of resources in this area.
In the past the system, that controlled the closure of NRC inspection findings and open items was implemented by part time contractor personnel.
The licensee stated that recently this condition had changed and now the program will be run by a full time FPSL employee with much more resources to pursue the addressing and closing of NRC inspection findings and open items.
Within the area examined no violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on August 12, 1988, with those persons indicated in Paragraph I.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results.
Proprietary information is not contained in this report.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
The licensee management was informed that two NRC Bulletins, two violations, three unresolved items and two inspector followup items were examined and one NRC bulletin was close I
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