IR 05000155/1991002

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Safety Insp Rept 50-155/91-02 on 910101-0211.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Functional Areas,Surveillance Activities on Various Sys,Maint Activities on Various Components,Core Spray Sys & Liquid Poison Sys
ML20029B021
Person / Time
Site: Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png
Issue date: 02/22/1991
From: Defayette R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20029B015 List:
References
50-155-91-02, 50-155-91-2, NUDOCS 9103050253
Download: ML20029B021 (7)


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(1.5. NllCLEAR REGill ATORY COMMISSION J

REC 10N 111 Report No. 50-155/9100?(DRP)

Docket No, 50-155 License No. OPR-0 Licensee: Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 facility Name:

I;ig Rock Point Nuclear Plant Inspection At:

Charlevoix, Michigan Inspection Conducted: January 1 through I ebruary 11, 1991 Inspector:

E.A. plettner R.J. Stransky s_

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Approved By:

R. W. Def ayet te, Chie Reactor Projects Section ?ll (GTe

. Inspection sungary inspection on January 1 throu 11,~1991~~

TVefir~t'Yo'.'llf-TW/DMQTM$gh February

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KricaTTrisji>TtTd'i TlirfiisirectTon was routine, unannounced, and conducted by

'tWTi6 Tor ~^rWident inspector and project manager.

The functional areas inspected consisted of the following:

design changes and modifications dealing with a 10 CFR 50.59 revicw; surveillance activities on various systems; maintenance activities on various components; operational safety verification including the core spray system; and an engineered safety feature system walldown of the liquid poison system.

,Re su l _t s : The maintenance program appeared to bt implemented in a manner to ensure public health and safety.

Poor operation / engineering practices were

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identified in three surveillance procedures resulting in an open item. A problem also was identified with inconsistency in temperature control for rooms containing safety related equipment. One unresolved item was identified in the design change and modification program.

9103050253 910222 ADDCKODOOgD PDR

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Persons Contacted

'W. lieckman, Plant lianager

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  • L. Monshor, Quality Assurance Superintendent

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'H. Hoffman, Maintenance Superintendent

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W. Trubilowicz, Operations Superintu dent

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  • C. Withrow, Plant Engineering Superintendent
  • R. Alexander, Technical Engineer
  • P. Donnelly, Nuclear Assurance Administrator

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  • J. Beer, Chemistry / Health Physics Superintendent
  • G. Boss, Acting Operations Superintendent

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  • T. Dugan, Plant Safety Ccordinator
  • L. Darrah, Shift Supervisor
  • G. Petitjean, Outage and Planning Superintendent

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The inspector also contacted other licensee personnel in the Operations, i

Maintenance, Engineering, Radiation Protection, and Technical

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  • Denotes those present at the exit interview on february 8,1991.

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Ee.si,pngh_ayp,esandModifications(37700)

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The inspection was conducted to verify that design changes and modifici..; ions which have been determined by the licensee to not require t

approval by the HRC are in conformance with the requirements of the Technical Specifications (TS), 10 CFR 50.59 process, and the Safety

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Analysis report.

On October 15, 1990, the licensee notified the NRC of its intent to change the operating procedure used during single loop operation. The changes would alter the valve lineup which was stated in the Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP) Topic Analysis, and which became part of the the Safety

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Evaluation for Amendment No. 48. dated September P1, 1981, of the TS.

The SEP enalysis and the amendment required that for single loop operation the bypass and isolation valves in the inactive loop be closed. The licensee is proposing to change this requirement by requiring that only the bypass valve and the discharge valve be closed with the suction volve

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remaining open.

An analysis was performed by the licensee as required

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pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59 and submitted with the proposed changes to the-

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NRC.

The Nuclear Reettor Reguletion (NRR) project managtr reviewed the 10 CFR 50.59 documents ano determined that additional techn cal information was needed f rom-the licensee to complete the: evaluation p*ocess-to determine if the proposed procedure change involved an unr3 viewed safety question. The inspection period ended before the informatie could be obtained and reviewed by the project manager. _ Therefore, an unresolved item will be used to track this issue 50-15b/91002-01.

L One unresolved item was identifico in this area.

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!ip n t!OL.S u ryli_l,1_ancg 0 b sp1 vat,i,o n_( 61]E)

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Station surveillance activities listed below were observed to verify that the activities were conducted in accordance with the Technical Specifications and surveillance procedures.

The applicable procedures were reviewed for adequacy, test and process instrumentation were verified to be in their current cycle of colibration, personnel performing the tests appeared to be qualified, and test data was reviewed for accuracy and completeness.

The NRC inspector ascertained that any deficiencies identified were reviewed and resolved.

The NRC inspector observed the licensee's performance of the following surveillance tests:

January 8:

T7-18, " Bypass Valve Test," Rev.12, December 8,1909. The Wi!Tenilires that the bypass valve is operable while the reactor is at pressure.

The test was conducted in a professional manner with the equipment responding as required and the systen was returned to normal operation upon completion of the test.

It was noted that the recently licensed operator who was new to the shift walked through the entire

procedure first, before performing the procedure.

When the operator had a question he asked for ass 1 stance from the more experienced operator on shift to resolve his concern.

January 8:

T7-04, " Weekly Reactor protection Logic System Test," Rev.

F2',7Iigiis t 15, 1990. The test, which performs a circuitry and logic check of the system for operability and reliability, was conducted in a professional manner with the equipment responding as required and the system returned to normal operation upon completion of the test.

It was noted that the recently licensed operator who was new to the shif t willed through the.:ntire procedure first, before performing the procedure.

Januar T7-20, " Diesel Fire pump Auto Start," Rev. 22, October 29, RiW.' y 14 :Th'e test ensures that the auto start feature of the diesel engine is operable.

In addition, engine performance data is collected for review by the engineering department for analysis.

The procedure specified that if certain operating parameters were below a specified operating range a maintenance work request was to be generated to investigate and correct the problem.

However, the procedure was silent on what actions should be taken if the parameters were above the specified operating range.

During the performance of this test, the engine oil pressure was above the r ange specified in the procedure.

The senior resident inspector therefore questioned the auxiliary operator what actions he should tale.

The reply was that since the procedure only addresses action if the parameter is below the specified band, no action, other than recording the data, was required.

This appeared to be a potentially unsafe and poor operation / engineering practice.

Therefore, the senior resident inspector discussed the issue with licensee management.

As a result, the licensee evaluated the procedure to determine if there was a problem with the parameter being above the range specified. The evaluation revealed that high oil pressure was indicative of possible engine problems.

A procedure change form was initiated to make a permanent change to the procedure to require action when engine parameters are outside the set parameters.

The evaluation also revealed that the old range for engine oil pressure

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was incorrect; a new range was established and will be incorporated in the procedure.

The high engine oil pressure reading observed during the


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i test on January 14 was within the new established range of engine

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performance, and therefore no maintenance action was necessary for the diesel.

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The licensee.also has two other diesel eng)ines (the emergency diesel

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generator and the standby diesel generator which have weekly suryt:illances performed to test their operability functions.

The senior resident inspector reviewed the procedures for the two diesels and noted a similar problem as noted above that is, engine performance data was

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collected with no specified Dand for normal operatino conditions and no action statements. When questioned regarding oil pressure readings and corrective actions, another auxiliary operator responded th same as the one described above; that is the procedure required him tc take the data but did not require him to take any action regardless of the reading.

This was also discussed with licensee management and at the close of the inspection period,_ the licensee was evaluating the issue.

This issue will i

remain open pending further review (50-155/91002-02).

These procedures had recently been through the licensees procedure

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-improvement process, which apparently did not verify the existing vendor oil pressure required for the engine.

In addition, the fact that the plant review conanittee approved the surveillance procedures raises concerns about their attention to details during the review process.

February 6:

T7-33, " Weekly Check of ASD System Equipment," Rev. 3 TsiTary T4,1991. The test ensures the operability of the shutdown panel indicators located in the alternate shutdown building for steam drum level and pressure, and a check is also made of the battery float voltage to ensure proper operation of the battery charger.

The test was conducted in a professional manner with the equipment meeting the acceptance criteria stated in the procedure.

No-violations-or deviations were ident fied in this area.

4.

[iont_hlylaintenance 0bservat_i_o_n (62703J

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Station uaintenance activities of safety related systems and '

onents listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they we'e conducted i

in~ accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.

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The following items were considered during this review:

the Limiting Conditions for Operation v;ere met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional-testing and/or calibrations were

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performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality

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control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified-personnel; parts and materials used were certified; and radiological and fire prevention coatrols were implemented.

Work requests were reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority _was assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.

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l The NRC inspector observed the licensee's performance of the following maintenance work order on de indicated date:

FaTve~y 15:

fio. 90-RDS-0071, dated October 13, 1990, to repair RDS pilot Januar pTr procedure liRDS-6A, " Reactor Depressurization System Target Rock

j Model 73k' N10t Vdve Test and/or Repeat," Rev. 3, dated August 8,1990.

The work was performed correctly by maintenance personnel.

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Inspection report 50/155-90025 noted that the inspector would follow-up on

a maintenance activity conducted on December 28, 1990, associated with a possible clicking sound heard in the exciter of the emergency diesel generator.

The emergency diesel generator has successfully completed its weekly surveillance test five consecutive times with no clicking sound being heard in the exciter.

The clicking sound appears to have been

caused by the loose mount.ing bolt on the generator protective cover which was tightened by the licensee.

This follow-up item is closed.

110 violations or deviations were identified in this area.

5.

,0perational Safe _ty_ Verification (71707)

The NRC inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs, and conducted discussions with control room operators during the inspection period.

Instrumentation and recorder traces were examined for abnormalities and discussed with the control room operators, as was the status of control room annunciators.

The inspector conducted reviews to confirm that the required leak rate calculations were performed and were within.echnical specification limits.

The inspector observed the plant

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manager and the operations superintendent performing plant tours.

They also made frequent visits to the control room. The senior resident inspector performed a walkdown of the core spray system and noted no abnormalities.

The senior resident inspector toured the containment

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sphere and turbine building to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and 10 verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of naintenance. - Radiation protection controls were inspected, including iadiation Work permits, calibration of radiation detectors, and proper p..ing and observance of radiation and/or contaminated areas.

The inspectors observed site security measures including access control

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of personnel and vehicles, proper display of identification badges for personnel within the protected area, and site compensatory measures when security equipment had a failure or imprirment.

On January 24, 1991, at 2:00 p.m. during routine..ispection rounds the senior resident inspector noted room temperature conditions in the screenhouse (which houses emergency core cooling system equipment) were lower than normally expected and was concerned about the operability (a safety issue) of the emergency diesel fire pump.

The diesel fire pump is electrically started from storage batteries.

The pilot cell temperatures of the batteries were at 48 degrees Fahrenheit; their normal temperature is at or above (0 degrees Fahrenceit.

The concern was brought to the licensee's atte! tion and prompt at+. ion was taken by the shif t supervisor to place a porta 0le heater in the screenhouse to raise the temperature

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back to normal levels.

The licensee also provided an engineering analysis on the diesel engine and battery capacity that demonstrated engine operability down to 32 degrees fahrenheit thus removing the operability (safety) issue.

The original cause of the problem was thought to be a malfunctioning building he6ter that was unable to make up for the heat loss.

However, the licensee checked the heater and verified that it was performing as designed.

It was determined that low outside air temperatures combined with a northwest wind blowing at 15 to 33 miles per hour caused a cool-down of the building beyond the capacity of the heating unit.

The excessive cool-down of the building had been noted by the previous shift some 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> earlier but a decision was made not to correct the problem, but only to monitor the building temperature.

However, this information was not passed on to the next (day) shif t supervisor or control room operators. The turnover indicates poor communication between shifts.

This problem should have been entered ;nto the control room log.

This, coupled with the different response _taken by the (day) shift supervisor after it was brought to his attention by the senior resident inspector,

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identifies an inconsistency in dea'ing with low temperature conditions for

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this building.

It should be noted that other structures on site containing emergency safety related equipment have low temperature alarms associated with the structure and specific corrective actions to be performed when-an alarm is received.

The licensee agreed to implement measures to ensure t consistent response from all shifts by posting a sign in the screenhouse sp eifying the temperature at which action should be taken to correct the problem.

No violations or deviations were identified in this area.

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, Engineered Safet,v, f eature (ESFLS,vjLte,m_WalJdownl7]]_1,0)

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The NRC inspectors verified the operability of the liquid poison system which is an ESF system.

The verification included a complete walkdown of the accessible portions of the system.

Included were verification of valve labels, equipment condition, correct valve and breaker positions and apparent operability of support systems essential

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to-the ESF system.

A detailed review was conducted to confirm that the licensee's system lineup procedure matched the appitable as-built drawings; this included the following documents:

procedure 0-TGS-1-A-4,

" Reactor poison Syster Check Sheet,"

Revision 10, dated August 16, 1989.

Drawing No. 0740G44004,

" Liquid poison System Yalve Line-Up Diagram," Rev. 1, dated August 11, 1983.

Drawing No. 0740G40107,

" piping & Instrument Diagram, Reactor Clean-Up, Shut-Down and poison System,"

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Rev. AH, dated October 27, 1988.

P No Violation; or Deviations were noted in this area.

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Unresolved items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations or deviations. One unresolved item disclosed during this inspection is discussed in Paragraph 2.

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Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)

throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection period and sunmarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The licensee acknowledged these findings.

The inspector also ciscussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection.

The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as proprieta ry.

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