IR 05000155/1993006
| ML20044H244 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png |
| Issue date: | 05/28/1993 |
| From: | Phillips M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20044H243 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-155-93-06, 50-155-93-6, NUDOCS 9306080106 | |
| Download: ML20044H244 (9) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION III
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Report No.
50-155/93006(DRP)
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Docket No.
50-155 License No. DPR-6 Licensee: Consumers Power Company I
212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 4920]
Facility Name:
Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant Inspection At:
Charlevoix, Michigan
inspection Conducted: April 7 through May 25, 1993
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l Inspector:
E. A. Plettner
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R. J. Leemon
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'f-w ;Q Approved By: M.'P.hhillips, Chief, 7/
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Reactor Projects Section 2B Date
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J Inspection Summary
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inspection on April 7 through May 25.1993 (Report No. 50-155/93006(DRP)).
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Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced, inspection by the resident. inspectors of operational safety verification; engineered safety feature system walkdown;
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maintenance and surveillance activities; outage planning and control; engineering and technical support activities; safety assessment and quality
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verification activities; followup of previous identified items;. followup of
Licensee Event Reports; and Temporary Instruction-(TI). 2515/119.
l Results: Of the eight areas inspected no violations or deviations were
identified.
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Operations: Operation of the plant was normal.throughout the inspection -
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period. Operators continued to monitor the No. 2 recirculation pump seal-
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leakoff after signs of failure of the internal seal.
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Maintenance / Surveillance:
Surveillance activities were conducted and l
completed in a timely manner, Maintenance activities were performed in an
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acceptable manner.
- Radiation Protection:
Steps were taken to reduce the amount of iron and'
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copper in the feedwater system, which should help reduce radiation' exposure to
workers from activated corrosion products.
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9306080106 930528 PDR ADDCK 05000255 G
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Engineering: The operability issuc concerning motor operated valve 7061 was identified and resolved in a timely manner. The licensee's approach to this issue'was conservative and well-coordinated with the NRC staff.
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Safety Assessment / Quality Verification: Activities were carried out in an
acceptable manner.
Recommendations were made by the licensee's offsite assessment group to improve the training department's performance.
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DETAILS.
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1.
Persons Contacted Consumers Power Company l
- P. Donnelly, Plant Manager d
D. Hughes, Executive Engineer l
- W. Trubilowicz, Operations Superintendent
- G. Withrow, Plant Engineering Superintendent
- R. Alexander, Technical Engineer
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- E. Bogue, Chemistry / Health Physics. Superintendent M. Bourassa, Senior Licensing Technologist
- R. Scheels, Planning and Scheduling Administrator
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K. Wooster, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
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- T. Petrosky, Public Affairs Director
- D. Turner, Maintenance Superintendent
- G. Boss, Reactor Engineer
- E. Zienert, Human Resources Director
- R. McCaleb, NPAD Specialist
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- G. Petitjean, NPAD Specialist j
NRC Personnel i
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- M. Gamberoni, Project Manager, NRR
- T. Tongue, Project Engineer, Region III
- D. Passehl, Resident Inspector, Palisades l
The inspectors also contacted other licensee employees including members
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of the technical and engineering staffs, and the reactor and auxiliary j
operators.
- Denotes-those attending the resident inspectors' exit meeting on l
May 25, 1993.
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2.
Plant Operations a.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
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The inspectors verified that the facility was being operated in
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conformance with the license and regulatory requirements and. that
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the licensee's management was effectively implementing its
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responsibilities for safe operation of the facility. These.
j sessions were beneficial to the individuals.
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The inspectors verified proper control room staffing and
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j coordination of plant activities; verified operator adherence with-
procedures and Technical Specifications;' monitored the ' control
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room for abnormalities; verified that electrical power was
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i available; observed that management frequently toured the control room; and observed shift turnovers.
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The inspector held facility performance reviews with five resident.
shift supervisors to discuss the mission of the NRC and how the
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mission is implemented through its inspection process. A plant'
i tour was conducted with each supervisor to discuss and identify the process that an NRC inspector uses during plant tours.
The inspectors reviewed various records, such as hold and secure card records, jumpers and bypasses, shift logs and surveillances,
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daily orders, and maintenance items.
On May 3,1993, the No. 2 recirculation pump inner seal failed.
This was the same seal that had been replaced on February'28, 1993, after a previous failure of the inner seal. The outer seal
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continued to hold. Operators continued to monitor pressures and.
temperatures at the outer seal to evaluate degradation. An action plan had been developed to shut the loop isolation valves and isolate the pump from the system if degradation reached a stage
indicating potential outer seal failure.
By the end of the
inspection period, the plant had entered coastdown, and was within
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approximately one week of being able to isolate the pump withoct r
any affect on plant operations.
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All operations were considered acceptable. No violations or deviations were identified.
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Chemistry Reduction in Corrosion and Activation products
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A significant reduction in iron and copper levels was achieved in j
the feedwater in March 1993 when a new GL-320 condensate demineralizer resin was placed in service. The GL-320 resin l
showed very good corrosion product removal characteristics.
'i concentration was reduced from 14 to 5 parts per billion _(ppb) and-ll copper concentration was reduced from 1 to 0.5 ppb. This-reduction in corrosion product concentration in the primary system
should reduce activation products.and thus help reduce future radiation levels in the plant.
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Enaineered Safety Feature System Walkdown (71710)
The inspectors performed a walkdown of the batteries, diesels,.
service water, core spray, fire, and reactor depressurization
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systems.
During the inspection, the material condition of the
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valves, pumps, hangers, supports, labeling, housekeeping, and major system components were assessed.
Few problems were
identified, however, the need for attention to localized cleaning
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and loose parts was noted. The housekeeping throughout the
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station was acceptable in the major traffic areas.
During this i
inspection period, the licensee formed a committee to work on
methods to improve plant cleanliness.
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No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
3.
Maintenance / Surveillance (61726 & 62703)
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Work Observations The inspectors observed station maintenance and surveillance activities and determined that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes and standards, and in conformance with Technical Specifications.
The following items were considered during this review: Approvals were obtained prior to initiating work; test instrumentation was calibrated; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by
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qualified personnel; results were within specification and
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properly reviewed, and any deficiencies identified were properly
'l resolver The following maintenance and surveillance activities
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were obs_.ved:
Maintenance
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M093-EPS-0075
" Monthly PM on Spare Batteries" Surveillance
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t T7-28
" Emergency Diesel Generator. Auto Test Start"
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All maintenance and surveillance activities observed were i
completed in an acceptable and timely manner.
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Outaae Plannina and Control l
On May 19, 1993, the inspector attended an outage team scheduling
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meeting. There were good discussions and assignment of tasks
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involving the responsibilities for the upcoming refueling outage.
Meetings were planned for a weekly basis prior to the outage.
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During the outage, the staff plans to work _three-nine hour shifts, seven days per week. The resident staff will continue to monitor outage activities.
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No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
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Enaineerina and Technical Sucoort (37700)
The inspectors evaluated the extent to which engineering principles and
evaluations were integrated into daily plant activities.
This'was
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accomplished by assessing the technical staff involvement in non-routine
events, outage related activities, and assigned TS surveillances; observing on-going maintenance work and troubleshooting; and reviewing
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deviation investigations and root cause determinations.
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i Motor Operated Valve 7061 Operability Determination i
On April 30, 1993, at 9:30 a.m., at a Corrective Action Review Board
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meeting, the Motor Operated Valve (MOV) 7061 (Primary Core Spray Header
Isolation valve) was declared inoperable along with the Core Spray system in accordance with Technical Specification 11.3.1.4.E.
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decision was made because of recent engineering unknowns involving the
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motor operator thrust capability on MOV-7061. The licensee was made i
aware of the problem through a recent 10 CFR Part 21 notification, l
Potential Thrust Limit Exceedance. The licensee's engineering review recalculation showed the applied thrust to be significantly higher than
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the valve's rating.
Problems in the original calculations were noted-as
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follows:
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An underestimate of applied thrust'due to test equipment calibration problems identified in the 10 CFR Part 21 notification.
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An MOV thrust rating (structural) capability being lower than l
assumed in the Generic letter 89-10 torque / thrust calculation.
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A higher than required thrust load due to an incorrect assumption in the calculauon associated with the differential pressure (D/P).
i These problems, when properly taken into account, resulted in a closure l
thrust calculation of 17,200 pounds force for MOV-7061. This value was j
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significantly above the structural rating of 10,000 pounds force for-
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both actuator and valve. This difference lead the licensee to conclude that the valve may have been unreliable until additional information was t
obtained.
Powell Valve Company _(the valve manufacturer) verbally confirmed that t
the valve was structurally capable of withstanding 17,500 pounds of
thrust. This conclusion was based on engineering judgement that the stem would be the weakest link. A verbal confirmation with Limitorque
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(the actuator manufacturer) indicated that the valve operator could
withstand two and one half times the rated thrust, or 25,000 pounds.
This valve had been successfully stroke tested 18 times since the
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1991/92 refueling outage, and the actuator was scheduled for replacement during the upcoming 1993 outage.
lq The safety-function of MOV-7061 is to open for'the operation of the
.i Primary Core Spray system.
In the open direction, the valve operation l
is controlled by a limit switch. Therefore, a thrust consideration is
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not directly applicable to the valve's safety function.
The applicable
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emergency procedure does not require this valve to be closed to mitigate an accident.
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f On April 30, 1993, after a conference call between the licensee,- Region III, and NRR staffs, the licensee held a Plant Review Committee meeting-and determined that the valve was operable. The licensee's approach to-the problem was conservative and well-coordinated with the NRC staff.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
5.
Safety Assessment /0uality Verification (40500)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of management control,
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verification, and oversight in the jobs observed during this inspection.
The inspectors also attended management and supe'rvisory meetingr
involving plant status to observe the coordination between' departments.
Additionally, the inspectors routinely monitored the results of.the
licensee's corrective action programs by attending.rcutine meetings, through di.scussions with the plant staff, and review of deviation and'
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root cause evaluation reports.
During the week of May 17, 1993, a three member team of the licensee's staff audited the training department.
The audit covered operator training, requalification training, the plant training committee,
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department training coordinators, and quality verification and certification. Additionally, plant staff qualifications, instructor qualifications, class records, follow-up from previous audits, and previously-identified regulatory and industry concerns were also
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reviewed by the team.
No safety significant concerns were identified by the team. The team t
did have recommendations to improve the program.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
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Followuo of Previousiv-Identified Items (92702)
(Closed) Open item 155/91017-02(DRP):
" Emergency Operations of the Fuel i
Transfer Cask." This open item involved the lack of formal contingency plans for emergency operation of the fuel transfer cask. The licensee'
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established formal contingency plans by developing an off normal-
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procedure and adding a step to existing maintenance procedures to ensure emergency equipment would be operational prior to using the fuel i
transfer cask. This item is closed.
i (Closed) Violation 155/92003-01(DRS):
" Failure to Specify an Adequate
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Post-modification Test for the Fire Water Ring Header Piping Replacement." The inspector reviewed the licensee response, dated
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June 15, 1992, and considered the corrective actions to be adequate, j
This violation is closed.
l (Closed) Unresolved item 155/92003-02(DRS):
"Use of Flonet computer i
code and minimum margins may mean that ECCS pumps may not provide.
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sufficient flow to meet design requirements." The inspector reviewed the licensee's technical evaluation contained in a letter to the NRC
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dated April 15, 1993, and discussed the issues with NRR.
The inspector concluded that the licensee had-adequately addressed the concerns. This
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item is closed.
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l (Closed) Violation 155/92015-01(DRP):
" Compression Fittings Installed l
Without a Procedure." This violation involved the incorrect
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installation of a compression fitting on a primary system boundary pipe-l
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i The corrective actions taken by the licensee were to develop new instructions / inspection checklists for installation, develop. lesson
plans, conduct training on the installation procedure, and upgrade the j
safety related Q-list to carry the equipment classification as Q.
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resident inspector verified that the above actions were accomplished.
This violation is closed.
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(Closed) Violation 155/92015-02(DRP):
" Auxiliary. Relays Calibrated
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Outside of Procedure Requirements." This violation involved the failure -
to separately remove, test, and restore to service under voltage and l
over voltage relays on the emergency diesel generator.
The corrective l
i actions taken were to update the periodic activity control (PAC) sheet for the relays to include a restriction that only one relay could be-
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released for maintenance at one time, and distribute a memorandum to the
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operations department describing the required action to be taken when issuing PAC sheets for the relays. The resident inspector verified that the above actions were accomplished. This violation is closed.
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7.
Followun of Licensee Event Reports (LERs) (90712 & 927.00)
The inspector reviewed the following Licensee Event Reports (LERs). for
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compliance to reporting requirements, adequacy of proposed corrective l
actions and schedule, and, as applicable, implementation of the
associated corrective actions.
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(1)
(Closed) LER 91-013: " Check Valve Failure Resulting in Degraded
Shutdown Cooling Loop."
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(2)
(Closed) LER 92-005: " Diesel Fire Pump Flow Testing Anomaly."
(3)
(Closed) LER 92-009: " Reactor Scram During Plant Startup for Cycle I
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(4)
(Closed) LER 92-016: " Temporary Change to Procedure Did Not
Receive Subsequent Plant Review Committee (PRC) Approval."
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No violations, or deviations were identified in this area.
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8.
(Closed) Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/119 j
This TI was issued to verify licensee implementation of operator j
guidance and training to ensure appropriate operator actions would be
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performed even with the potential for improper reactor vessel water
.i level indication following rapid depressurization transients. The_TI l
was applicable to all BWRs, but only concerned those with cold reference
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f leg water level instruments, not those with heated reference leg l
instruments known as Yarways. The inspectors verified that all-l
reference legs at Big Rock Point were heated Yarways, and.therefore, no corrective actions were required. This was confirmed by the NRC's Office of Nuclear. Reactor Regulation in a letter dated November 5, 1992,
from Mr. R. Stransky to Mr. W. L. Beckman. Therefore, this issue is l
closed.
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Exit Meetino The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on May 25, 1993. The inspectors'
summarized the purpose and scope of the inspection and the. findings.
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The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the l
inspection report, with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did not identifyfany such documents or processes as proprietary.
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