IR 05000155/1993004
| ML20035E025 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png |
| Issue date: | 04/09/1993 |
| From: | Cox C, Mccormickbarge, Ploski T, Simons H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20035E019 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-155-93-04, 50-155-93-4, NUDOCS 9304140193 | |
| Download: ML20035E025 (18) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
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Report No. 50-155/93004(DRSS)
Docket No. 50-155 License No. DPR-6 Licensee:
Consumers Power Company
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I 1945 West Parnall Road
Jackson, Michigan
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Facility Name:
Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant Inspection At:
Big Rock Point site, Charlevoix, Michigan i
Inspection Conducted: March 22-26, 1993
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l Inspectors:
T. Ploski Date
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C. Cox '
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H. Simons Date
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f T. Reidinger V Date.
Approved By:
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. W. McCormick-Barger, Chiff Dath
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f Non-Power Reactor Section
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Inspection Summary Inspection on March 22-26. 1993 (Recort No. 50-155/93004(DRSS))
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Areas Insoected:
Routine, announced inspection of the Big Rock Point Plant's
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annual emergency preparedness exercise (IP 82301), including a review of the
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exercise scenario (IP 82302) and followup on licensee actions on previously i
identified items (IP 82301 and IP 82701). The inspection was performed by
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four inspectors.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified. The licensee's overall response to the exercise scenario was very good. Actions taken to minimize
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l the simulated exposures to onsite emergency workers and nonessential personnel
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I were excellent. Coordination among key staff in the emergency response l
facilities was very good. Some communicators in the emergency operations
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facility (E0F) were slow M be ready to perform their duties, which caused a
delay in the transfer of command and control to the E0F Director.
Based on
9304140193 930409 i
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records review and 1993 exercise performance, corrective actions on all
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j concerns identified during.the previous exercise were acceptable.
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Challenging aspects of the scenario were the assembly of and accounting for all onsite personnel, deployment of offsite monitoring teams and the use of'a
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response cell to roleplay the NRC headquarters operations officer.
The use of the control room simulator (CRS) in the static mode reduced the
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J impact of the exercise on the real control room; however, CRS staff's ability i
to demonstrate realistic responses to scenario events was limited. Several
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minor examples of incorrect performance by inplant team controllers were
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noted. The use of a mixture of actual and simulated meteorological information unintentionally affected protective action decision making and may
have adversely impacted offsite officials' ability to demonstrate an exercise i
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objective.
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l DETAILS
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1.
NRC Observers and Areas Observed
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T. Ploski, Control Room Simulator (CRS), Simulated Technical Support Center (TSC)
T. Reidinger, CRS, Simulated TSC C. Cox, Operational Support Center (OSC) and inplant teams H. Simons, Emergency Operations Facility (E0F)
2.
Licensee Representatives
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G. Withrow, Engineering Superintendent E. Bogue, Chemistry and Health Physics Superintendent B. Turner, Maintenance Superinteadent R. Sarki, Maintenance Supervisor S. Beachum, Special Projects Supervisor D. Moeggenberg, Engineering Supervisor J. Horon, Shift Supervisor A. Katarsky, Corporate Emergency Planning Administrator M. Mitchell, Corporate Emergency Planner K. Wooster, Emergency Planner T. Fisher, Senicr Maintenance Analyst T. Petrosky, Public Affairs Officer R. Hill, Nuclear Performance Assessment Analyst The above licensee representatives attended the exit interview on March 25, 1993. The inspectors contacted other licensee staff during the inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previously identified Items (IP 82301 and IP 82701)
(Closed) Inspe: tion Followup Item No. 155/92012-01: During the 1992 exercise, the technical support center's (TSC's) health physics staff did not maintain logs or status boards to adequately document the movements and survey results of the licensee's offsite monitoring teams.
During the 1993 exercise, the health physics group leader and her staff maintained good records of their activities, including the activities of the offsite monitoring teams. This item is closed.
(Closed) Inspection Followup Item No. 155/92012-02: During the 1992 exercise, TSC decision makers failed to follow procedural guidance regarding the proper destination of simulated plant evacuees.
Evac 2es would have been sent to the emergency operations facility (EOF), rather than to a predesignat9d location in Petosky, Michigan.
As indicated in Inspection Report No. 50-155/92023(DRSS), the licensee changed the predesignated destination for plant evacuees who may require monitoring and decontamination, since neither the E0F nor the Petosky locations was appropriate. Records review indicated that the
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relevant emergency plan implementing procedure (EPIP) and lesson plans were appropriately revised. During the 1993 exercise, a prudent decision was made to simulate the evhcuation of nonessential onsite i
personnel shortly before the scenario postulated a radiological hazard
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to such persons. This item is closed.
(Closed) Inspection Followuo Item No. 155/92012-03: During the 1992 exercise, a performance weakness was identified when TSC staff failed to
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provide State officials with accurate and timely information regarding the General Emergency (GE) declaration and the associated offsite protective etion recommendation (PAR).
As indicated in Sections 5.a 5.b and 5.d of this inspection report, i
state officials were notified of all emergency declarations and any
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associated PARS in an adequately detailed and timely manner during the
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1993 exercise.
State officials provided training to select licensee staff on the state's information needs and handling of information t
messages in mid-1992 and February 1993. This item is closed, (Closed) Inspection Followuo item No. 155/92012-04: During the 1992 exercise, several high priority inplant repair teams were not briefed and dispatched from the operational support center (OSC) in a timely manner.
l As indicated in Section 5.c of this Inspection Report, inplant teams I
were dispatched from the OSC in a timely manner after receiving good
briefings. This item is closed.
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(Closed) Inspection Followuo Item No. 155/92023-01:
EPIP-6F and
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associated lesson plans contained incorrect guidance on the requirement of 10 CFR 50.72 (c)(3)' for maintaining continuous communications with the NRC Headquarters Operations Center following an event reported per i
the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 (a) or (b).
Records indicated that EPIP-6F and appropriate lesson plans were revised during this inspection to accurately reflect 10 CFR 50 72 (c)(3). This item is closed.
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General (IP 82301)
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t An announced, daytime exercise of the Big Rock Point Plant's emergency plan was conducted at tM Big Rock Point site on March 23, 1993. This
was a partial participation exercise for the State of Michigan and a full participation exercise for Eme.et and Charlevoix Counties. This exercise tested the capabilities of the licensee, state and local
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organizations to respond to an accident scenario involving the simulated release of radioactive effluent. The attachments to this inspection
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repart summarize the licensee's scope of participation, exercise objectives and the scenario.
The performances of state and local response organizations were evaluated by representatives of the Federal Emergency Management Agency
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(FEMA), who will document their evaluation in a separate report. NRC and FEMA representatives summarized their preliminary exercise findings at a Public Critique hosted by FEMA at the plant's Visitors' Center on March 26, 1993.
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The licensee successfuily responded to the accident scroario in an orderly and generally timely manner in accordance with its emergency plan and implementing procedures.
If scenario events were real, the licensee's actions would have been sufficient to allow state and local officials to take appropriate actions to protect the public's health and safety.
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5.
Specific Observations (IP 82301)
a.
Control Room Simulator (CRS)
The CRS remained in the " static mode" during the exercise. While use of the CRS workspace minimized the impact of the exercise on actual control room activities, the " static" simulator reduced the degree of realism that the CRS crew could demonstrate with respect to some operator actions such as equipment problem detection and associated operator responses.
The shift supervisor (SS) provided a good initial briefing to his crew on initial plant conditions, which included a small unidentified primary leak and the electric fire pump being tagged out of service for maintenance. The SS promptly dispatched auxiliary operators (A0s) to investigate these problems, while CRS personnel performed several leak rate calculations for Technical Specification (TS) applicability. TS review was also demonstrated with respect to the unavailability of the electric fire pump. The SS demonstrated good concern for feedback from the A0s and had the A0s paged whenever they did not prcmptly respond to a radio call.
The SS had operators make courtesy notifications to the oncall plant superintendent and the load dispatcher to inform them of the unidentified leak and the associated plan to commence reactor shutdown if the leak rate exceeded the TS's limiting value. The oncall superintendent reported to the CRS and was briefed by the SS. When the calculated leak rate exceeded the TS limit, the superintendent promptly relieved the SS of site emergency director (SED) duties and correctly declared an unusual event (UE).
State and county officials were initially notified in an adequately detailed and timely manner.
However, the SED did not review and approve the notification message form until after a communicator completed separate calls to state and county officials, who were given slightly different details on plant conditions related to the emergency declaration.
The SS promptly directed the operators to begin a reactor shutdown. However, the operators did not fully demonstrate
implementation of the reactor shutdown and generator load reduction procedures on the " static" simulator. When symptoms of
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high containment temperature, generator load drop and feed flow / steam flow mismatch became apparent, the SS correctly recognized them as entry conditions for an emergency operating ~
procedure and ordered the procedurally required manual reactor scram. However, the operators' immediate action verification steps were inconsistently demonstrated.
When condensate and feedwater pumps subsequently tripped, the SS and operators aggressively tried to operate these and other pumps
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to maintain reactor vessel level. As vessel level continued to
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drop due to insufficient makeup capability, the reactor depressurization system (RDS) was allowed to actuate j
automatically. The system could have been manually actuated about 15 minutes sooner, when the operators noted control rod drive pump
l cavitation, low level in the condensate storage tank and a continued downward trend in reactor vessel level.
The operators later recognized that the containment ventilation valves failed in the open position after the containment sprays failed to stop. After slight confusian in recognizing the correct power supply, the operators correctb attempM to de-energize the valves' solenoids. However, the scenarin postulated thM th9 action was unsuccessful. The valves were later postulated to close without operator action. Once repairs to the electric fire pump's power supply were completed, the operators promptly initiated core and containment sprays.
CRS personnel usually demonstrated the good practice of repeating back information told to them in order to reduce the potential for misunderstanding. Although a status board was available for listing equipment out of service, it was not always promptly updated.
No violations or deviations were identified.
b.
Simulated Technical Support Center (TSC)
The simulated TSC, located adjacent to the CRS, was quickly staffed after the Alert declaration. The site emergency director i
(SED) gave a detailed initial briefing to the TSC staff.
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demonstrated good command and control of the efforts to mitigate the accident. He conducted a good number of concise briefings on major events, decisions and priorities, while key staff contributed updates on their activities. The SED directed his staff as needed and kept the OSC and EOF Directors well informed of changes in plant status, response actions and accident mitigation priorities.
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Two TSC communicators provided initial and frequent followup
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notification messages to state officials and a simulated NRC
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headquarters operations officer (H00). A facsimile machine operator transmitted the associated message forms to the state and
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the E0F. When the communicators had temporary difficulty in l
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contacting the simulated H00, they researched the relevant EPIP for guidance. The EPIP had no guidance for contacting a simulated
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NRC official. As a result, the initial notification messages to
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the simulated NRC on the Unusual Event and Alert declarations were delayed, but were completed within the regulatory time limit.
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TSC staff closely monitored the operability of the two remaining l
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assessed the related need for a site area emergency (SAE)
declaration, the-health physics group leader (HPGL) prudently
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recommended the early evacuation of nonessential onsite personnel.
Their early evacuation was appropriate since the plant's i
evacuation route was downwind and an initiation of core damage would rapidly cause high dose rates due to containment shine, whether or not a release would begin. The simulated evacuation of nonessentials was ordered before they would have been exposed to radiation fields from a plume or containment shine.
Once satisfied that there was little hope of restoring a reliable source of sufficient coolant-to the reactor, the SED correctly declared a SAE. State officials, the simulated H00 and staff in all response facilities were promptly informed of the SAE and its
basis.
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The SED and his EOF counterpart resumed coordination for the transfer of lead responsibilities from TSC to E0F staff. The transfer time goal was met, with the exceptions that the HP group briefly retained responsibilities for offsite dose assessment and
control of field monitoring teams until EOF counterparts were
ready to assume these duties. The transfers of these and other
lead responsibilities were orderly and well understood by TSC and E0F staffs.
Shortly after 11:00 a.m., the SED learned that the only means of injecting coolant to the reactor had-been lost and that containment pressure reduced sufficiently to cause the automatic opening of its ventilation valves. The valves then failed to close for unknown reasons. The SED correctly recognized that a release path to the environment was created and that core damage was imminent. He promptly advised the EOF Director to declare a general emergency (GE). The EOF Director made this decision, which the SED quickly relayed to all onsite responders.
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Key staff correctly recognized that their top priorities were re-
establishing containment integrity and continuing repairs to either of the two systems capable of providir.g coolant to the reactor. The HPGL correctly advised that dose rates near the
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containment valves were too high to permit attempts to manually close these valves, while dose rates were sufficiently low to allow continued repairs to the electric and diesel powered feed pumps. The HPGL also advised that plans to have a pumper unit.
from a local fire department come onsite to provide some water to the reactor coolant system were not feasible due to the very high onsite dose rates due to containment shine.
TSC staff closely monitored the progress of repairs of the electric and diesei powered feed pumps. The SED promptly informed his EOF counterpart when one pump was returned to service, which was soon followed by the containment ventilation valves closing without operator action. Work on the second pump was allowed to continue in order to have redundant systems to supply water to the reactor. The SED correctly recommended no emergency reclassification until at least the following actions were completed: inspection of the containment ventilation valves; repairs to the second pump; and offsite radiological surveys.
No violations or deviations were identified.
c.
Operational Support Center (OSC) and Inolant Teams OSC staff assembled in the mail room to be accounted for after the Alert declaration was announced. The OSC Director accounted for everyone and provided an update on plant status. OSC personnel then went to the OSC to activate that facility, which was operational about 35 minutes after the Alert declaration.
Overall operation of the OSC was very good. The OSC Director provided frequent briefings on plant status and priorities. The A0s and maintenance teams were well briefed and dispatched in a timely manner. Their progress and simulated exposures were well tracked. OSC habitability was continuously monitored. Good health physics practices were demonstrated.
A total of two repair teams were dispatched, while the two A0s were dispatched on several occasions. Repair activities were limited due to the high dose rates from containment shine postulated by the scenario.
The Health Physics Supervisor (HPS) demonstrated good exposure control and good use of available resources when onsite dose rates rapidly escalated. An electric feed pump breaker repair team was at the screen house when the dose rates escalated. The team was directec to stay in the screen house and to continue repairs.
Their doses were carefully estimated so that the regulatory limit would not be exceeded. The HPS and one A0 also used this team to investigate a problem with the nearby diesel fire pump. The A0 talked the team through a procedure to stop the diesel, in order to avoid having the OSC Director dispatch a second team through
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the very high radiation field postulated to exist between the OSC and the screen house.
While the progress of the teams was well tracked, the team briefing sheets t 4ere used did not match the forms found in'
Revision 138 of i B, " Activation of the OSC".
While every team was well brieteo, A0s were sometimes dispatched without a briefing sheet being filled out.
In such cases, personal notes did not always document the A0s' briefings.
No violations or deviations were identified.
d.
Emeroency Operations Facility (E0F)
Modifications to the E0F, completed after the 1992 exercise, resulted in an improved available workspace. The E0F was activated by an interim staff of plant personnel following the Alert declaration, per procedures.
Perr.cnnel began arriving about 30 minutes after the Alert declaration. lhe E0F Director, who was the first to arrive, quickly set up a contamination control point at the entrance to the E0F before calling the TSC to get an update on plant conditions.
Activation of the facility proceeded in an orderly and timely manner with the exception of the communications group, who exhibited difficulty in performing their required activation tasks.
It took them about 10 minutes to synchronize the E0F's clocks with the TSC's clocks and another 30 minutes to contact the state.
E0F communicators did not relieve TSC counterparts until about one hour after the EOF was adequately P.affed. Although this hindered the transfer of command snd control from the TSC to the E0F, the overall effectiveness of communications with state officials were apparently not degraded by this delay.
Command and control of the emergency response was excellent. The E0F Director provided timely, informative briefings to the EOF staff. He effectively managed his resources and did not become overly involved in any one area. The EOF Director and the corporate Emergency Officer (E0) effectivcly coordinated their efforts and provided uniform direction.
The engineering group did an excellent job of trending plant parameters and staying aware of changing plant conditions. They worked very hard to develop ways to supply water to the reactor's core; however, none of their good solutions were allowed to be successful so that offsite officials could meet their exercise objectives.
The health physics group did an excellent job of monitoring meteorological conditions and the offsite release.
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assessments were correctly performed using field measurements and containment radiation monitor readings. Direction of tha field monitoring teams was also excellent.
When the E0F Director was informed tnat a field team measured 500 millirem per hour at the site boundary, he immediately began considering protective action recommendations (PAR) for the
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public.
Based on this one data point, the preliminary decision was made to recommend sheltering persons in all sectors up to five miles from the site. A forecast wind shift, such that the wind would blow towards sectors J, K and L affected this and subsequent PAR decision making.
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l The EOF Director was then informed by the TSC's SED that a general emergency (GE) declaration was necessary based on the loss of all three fissica product barriers. The EOF Director immediately declared the GE and called the state emergency operations center (SE0C) to inform his counterpart of the declaration and the initial PAR.
After receiving more information on the lack of core cooling, the EOF Director and E0 reevaluated the initial PAR. The proceduralized PAR flowchart guided them to recommend sheltering all areas that could not be evacuated prior to plume arrival and evacuating all others in the _5 mile radius. However, the revised PAR given to the state was to " evacuate the five mile radius startino with sectors J, K, L".
Although this PAR did not exactly follow the PAR flowchart, excellent health physics judgment was used in deciding to evacuate rather than shelter the three downwind sectors, based on the extent of core damage and the limited value of sheltering during a major release.
However, the wording of this PAR had the potential to confuse offsite officials by.dvising them where to begin the evacuation.
Preplanned, protective action implementation details are the responsibility of offsite officials and are not needed in a licensee's PAR. Offsite officials implemented the evacuation PAR in accordance with their preplanning.
The exercise concluded with several thorough recovery discussions.
A recovery organization was properly assigned. The discussions inclurted long term staffing needs, site access, determination of offsite contamination levels and interface with NRC incident response and investigation teams.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Exercise Obiectives and Scenario (IP 82302)
The licensee submitted its proposed scope of exercise participation, objectives and copies of the scenario within the established deadlines, with the exception of some information regarding proposed inplant team activities. The licensee was responsive to questions on the scenario.
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Challenging aspects of the scenario were the assembly and accounting of all onsite personnel, the deployment of two offsite monitcring teams, activation of the joint public information center and the use of a response cell to simulate the NRC headquarters operations officer (H00).
The use of a mixture of simulated and actual meteorological information caused confusion to some exercise participants. Simulated,15 minute averaged meteorological data represented " current" conditions, while -
actual weather forecasts were acquired and used. The forecast information included a significantly different wind direction than the 15 minute averaged data. The artificiality of using a mixture of simulated and actual meteorological information affected protective action decision making in this exercise and may have adversely affected the ability of offsite officials to demonstrata one of their exercise objectives.
The i, m r' a simulated TSC contributed to some difficulty in
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demonstrai.ing notification capabilities to the NRC. A telephone was-labeled to represent the NRC's emergency notification system (ENS)
telephone. The communicators could not, however, establish contact with
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the simulated H00 for some time using this telephone..As a result, initial notifications to the simulated H00 were somewhat delayed.
l No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Exercise Control (IP 82301)
Several minor instances of improper controller action were noted
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regarding inplant team activities. On several occasions, a controller l
displayed a dose rate map while providing a team's health physics technician with an earned dose rate reading. A controller also provided several dose rate readings which were beyond the survey instrument's scale.
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Prestaging of some equipment in the room reconfigured to serve as the plant's OSC was noted. The OSC's fax machine and a table were in place prior to the arrival of exercise participants.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Licensee Critioues (IP 82301)
i The licensee's controllers held initial critiques in each facility with the participants immediately following the exercise. Several of these critiques were observed and considered to be thorough.
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At the exit interview, the licensee's lead controller provided a summary of preliminary, self-identified performance strengths and weaknesses, which were in good agreement with the inspectors' preliminary findings.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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9.
Exit Interview On March 25, 1993, the inspectors met with those licensee representatives identified in Section 2 in order to present and discuss the preliminary inspection findings. The licensee indicated that none of the matters discussed were proprietary in nature.
Attachments:
1.
Scope of Participation and Exercise Objectives 2.
Exercise Scenario Summary
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BREX-93 SCOPE AND OBJECTWES
SCOPE
BREX-93 is designed to meet exercise requirements specified in 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F. BREX-93 will postulate events which would require activation of major portions of the SEP and response by State and local governments. The exercise will involve participation by Emmet County, Charlevoix County and the State of Michigan. The Joint
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Public Information Center will be activated during the exercise.
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OBJECTRTS The following objectives will be demonstrated as dictated by the exercise scenario.
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i 1.
Assessment and Classification Assess conditions which warrant classification within fifteen minutes of being a.
provided those conditions.
b.
Classify posed conditions in accordance with Emergency Action Levels within fifteen minutes of determination that conditions warrant classification.
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Communications Upon making an emergency classification, complete initial notifications within a.
i fiftu:n minutes to the State and locals and as soon as possible, but within one hour to the NRC using the Notification form.
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Complete subsequent notifications to the State, locals, and NRC on a routine fifteen minute basis or as mutually agreed at an Alert or above.
Contact other organizations such as contractors, utilities, fire or medical
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support within one hour of recognizing that conditions exist that warrant their assistance.
d.
Provide accurate press release information on plant conditions within one hour after occurrence.
Provide updates between appropriate Emergency Response facilities at least e.
every 30 minutes.
3.
Radiological Assessment and Control Collect, analyze, document and trend radiological smvey data.
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Analyze plant radiological conditions and implement protective actions for site
personnel in accordance with procedures.
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Prepare and brief personnel for activities required in high radiation areas.
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Monitor, track and document radiation exposure to maintenance, operations, and monitoring team personnel.
Calculate dose projections based on sample results or monitor readings.
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Identify appropriate protective action recommendations.
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Perforin environmental monitoring in accordance with procedures and as i
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directed by the Controller.
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Emergency Response Facilities j
Staff and activate onsite Emergency Response Facilities within approximately i
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30 minutes of an Alert classification.
b.
Staff and activate the Emergency Operations Facility within about an hour and i
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a half of the Site Area Emergency declaration.
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c.
Update status boards at least every 30 minutes.
d.
Document field team activities in logs and on appropriate status boards.
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Track and prioritize status of key in plant jobs.
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Direction and Control
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Command and control all Emergency Response Facilities in accordance with
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assigned functions.
b.
Coordinate maintenance activities.
i Take appropriate measures to secure emergency equipment, supplies, and c.
suppon.
d.
Dispatch field teams in accordance with procedures.
e.
Direct and monitor field team actions.
f.
Transfer Command and control in accordance with the Site Emergency Plan.
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Perform accountability within approximately 30 minutes of the Alert classification.
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Control site access and site evacuation as directed.
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Brief Emergency Response Facility stafft approximately every 30 minutes on changes in plant status, emergency classification, field team progress, and offsite actions as appropriate.
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Effectively coordinate with State as appropriate.
k.
Demonstrate reentry and recovery in accordance with procedures.
6.
Exercise Control Allow adequate free play for players to demonstrate tha.ir capabilities.
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Accurately assess performance of exercise players and controllers.
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BREX-93 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
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0815/0000 The plant has been operating for the last 60 days at approximately 230 M W t.
The electric fire pump has been tagged out for maintenance to replace i
the local breaker and as a result, the plant has entered a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> LCO.
The T1-02 surveillance test performed on 'A' Shift showed the
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unidentified leak rate at 0.6 gpm. This is up from 0.2 gpm the previous night. (l'he largest increase was ir. the air component.) The 'A' Shift AOs have just started another leak rate before tumover.
0830/0015 Following shift briefing, the AOs should be instructed to bepin investigation of the unidentified leak. (The source of the leak will be a steam drum relief valve leaking.)
0845/0030 The Control Room has determined, using SOP-29, that the unidentified leak rate has gone up to 1.3 gpm with most of the increase in the air.
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i The Shift Supervisor should direct the Operators to begin to shut down the reactor and declare a " Notification of Unusual Event".
Since this LCO has 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> to begin shutting down, the Shift Supervisor may decide to wait awhile. If he does walt, the Shift Supervisor will be directed to take these actions in order to preserve the scenario l
time line.
0915/0100 The plant is provided with the symptoms for a steam drum relief valve
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stuck full open. This would include.
J Steam flow - feed flow mismatch
Drop in generator load
100 degree Farenheit containment temperature
These are the entry conditions for EOP-02, and an " Alert" should be declared. The Site Emergency Plan is activated and mandatory actions for an " Alert" carried out.
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The containment pressure will reach an isolation SCRAM setpoint in I
about 20 seconds. The containment sprays will also come on soon.
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(Throughoutthe scenario,the containment sprays will not be
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allowed to close.).
i The TSC and OSC are activated and accountability initiated.
Plant personnel assigned to the EOF leave to activate the EOF at initiation of the siren.
The General Office Response Team (GORT) is mobilized and placed on standby. GORT personnel will be prestaged and allowed to conduct
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discussions with the EOF or TSC by phone. The GORT will be granted
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access to the EOF as directed by the EOF Lead Controller.
t The Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) is activated.
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0945/0130 The feedwater pumps trip on low suction pressure. The condensate pumps and a feedwater pump may be restarted and run until the CST and DST run out. The plant will not be allowed to supply any other water than what is in these two tanks, t
0955/0140 Plant personnel begin to arrive at the EOF in Boyne City and prepare to assume responsibility for notification of offsite authorities.
1000/0145 The water level in the steam drum will begin to drop since no other water supply is available.
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1015/0200 The Joint Public information Center (JPIC) is operational.
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1045/0230 The reactor water level approaches 29' above the active core region.
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At this point, a " Site Area Emergency" should be declared, and mandatory actions for the classification should be carried out.
The RDS system will actuate, and core sprays will come on.
By this time, command and control has been turned over to the EOF which has been staffed to this time by plant and Northwestern Region personel.
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Remaining General Office, Midland Training Center and Palisades EOF support personnel will be prestaged and allowed access to the EOF once key decisions related to protective actions and classification have been made. The EOF Lead Controller will direct access.
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1100/0245 Containment pressure falls to -0.85 psig and the containment vent valves come open as designed. (Thevent valves will not be allowed to close when the pressure reaches -0.5 psig.)
If the SED concludes that this is a loss of containment integrity, a
" General Emergency" will be declared and mandatory actions of the EPIPs should be carried out.
The initial mandatory shelter Protective Actica Recommendation will be made to offsite authorities at this time. A followup Protective Action Recommendation will be made to offsite authorities as soon as possible.
1105/0250 The c esel fire pump stops due to broken pump coupling bolts.
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u If a ' General Emergency" was not declared at 1100, it will be at this point.
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The pressure in containment goes slightly positive and a release occurs t
through the open vent valves from the uncovered fuel.
~1300/0445 The electric fire pump becomes available. (The breaker replaced or alternate power supplied.) (A source of water is available for cooling the core.)
The core is being cooled and covered. The release is terminated.
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The vent valves which had failed in the open position due to the solenoid valves sticking in the energized position will go closed.
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Plant conditions begin to stabilize.
The exercise is terminated for the Control Room, OSC and JPIC.
EOF and TSC personnel discuss plans for reentry and recovery operations.
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~1400/0545 The exercise is terminated.
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