IR 05000455/1985021

Insp Rept 50-455/85-21 on 850618-0715.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Action on Previous Insp Findings,Ie Bulletins,Ser Items,Deficiency Repts, Housekeeping & Allegations

ML20133F125
Person / Time
Site:	Byron
Issue date:	08/02/1985
From:	Forney W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20133F108	List: IR 05000455/1985021 ML20133F104
References
50-455-85-21, NUDOCS 8508080155
Download: ML20133F125 (8)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No.: 50-455/85021(DRP)

Docket No.: 50-455 License No.: CPPR-131 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Byron Station, Unit 2 Inspection at: Byron Station, Byron, IL Inspection Conducted: June 18 - July 15, 1985 Inspectors: J. M. Hinds, J K. A. Connaughton R. M. Leg Approved By: 'Lh *M f - -EE Reactor Projects Section IA Date Inspection Summary Inspection on June 18 - July 15, 1985 (Report No. 50-455/85021(DRP))

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced safety inspection by two resident inspectors and a regional inspector of licensee action on previous inspection findings; IE Bulletins; SER Items; 10 CFR 50.55(e) reports; containment polar crane bolting; housekeeping; ar.d allegations. The inspecticn consisted of 115 inspector-hours onsite by 3 NRC inspectors including 11 inspector-hours during off-shift Results: No violations or deviations were identified and no issues were identified which indicate potential public health and safety concern gsS9%s Bi8%p

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DETAILS Persons Contacted Commonwealth Edison Company T. Maiman, Manager of Projects V. Schlosser, Byron Project Manager R. Querio, Station Superintendent

• G. Sorensen, Project Construction Superintendent R. Tuetken, Byron Startup Superintendent

• M. Loehman, Project Construction Assistant Superintendent E. Martin, Quality Assurance Superintendent J. Borgner, Quality Assurance Group

• R. Klingler, Quality Control Supervisor J. Binder, Lead Electrical Engineer

• F. Hornbeak, Unit 2 Technical Staff Supervisor D. Pyatt, Project Construction J. Maholovich, Lead Structural Engineer J. Langan, Compliance J. Binder, Project Electrical Supervisor Blount Brothers Incorporated B. Bay, Quality Assurance / Quality Control Manager D. Hoffman, Level II Quality Control Inspector Hunter Corporation M. Somsag, Quality Assurance Manager Hatfield Electric Company A. Smith, Quality Assurance / Quality Control Manager

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The inspectors also contacted and interviewed other licensee and contractor personnel during the course of this inspectio * Denotes those present at the exit interview on July 15, 198 . Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701) (Closed) Open Item (455/85006-02(DRP)): Shimming of Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) battery rack side rails. The inspector reviewed completed Nuclear Work Requests tNWRs) B17549 and B17550 which documented installation of permanent washer shims on ESF battery racks 211 and 212, respectively. The NWRs correctly specified that a 0 to 3/8 inch gap between the cells and side rails be established utilizing the washers. The inspector visually examined the battery racks and verified that temporary shimming material had been removed and the battery cell-to-side rail gaps were in accordance with the NWR .___ . -

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. (Closed)OpenItem(455/85017-01(DRP)): Prevention of equipment problems experienced on Byron Unit 1. During a management meeting held on July 2, 1985, the licensee presented the " Byron Unit 2 Lessons Learned Program." The inspectors were provided with written program descriptions as well as sample documentation for each of the program elements. The program outlined source documents for the development of preoperational and startup test procedures as well as test procedure writing and review methods. The inspectors determined that the program, as described, provided for a comprehensive review of knowledge gained during the Unit 1 preoperational and startup test phases as well as commerical operating experience. The program provided documentation of this review and described how preoperational and startup test procedures would be revised, as necessary, to preclude repetition of problems encountered on Unit . Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin (IEB) Followup (92703)

(Closed)IEB(454/84001-BB): Cracking in boiling water reactor Mark I Containment Vent Headers. The subject IEB was dispositioned by licensee review as not applicable since Byron Unit 2 is a PWR. No further action was required with regard to the subject IE . Byron Safety Evaluation Report (SER) Items (92719) (Closed)SEROpenItem(455/83000-03): Class 1E emergency power to remote-manual isolation valves on Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal injection line The inspector reviewed Sargent and Lundy drawing #M-138, " Diagram of Chemical and Volume Contrcl and Boron Thermal Regeneration," which indicated that valves 2CV8355A,B,C&D were the RCP seal injection isolation valves. The inspector also reviewed electrical drawings 6/20E-2-4030CV25 and 6/20E-2-4030CV26, the schematic diagran fc.-

Reactor Coolant Pumps 2A, 2B, 2C and 2D seal injection isolation valves 2CV8355A,B,C&D. Valves 2CV8355A&D were powered from 480VAC motor control center (MCC) 231. Valves 2CV8355B&C were powered from 480VAC Motor Control Center 232. MCCs 231 and 232 are fed from Class 1E emergency power buse (Closed)SEROpenItem(455/83000-04): The addition of containment isolation valves immediately outside containment on the redundant hydrogen recombiner supply and return line The inspector reviewed Sargent & Lundy drawing M-150, " Diagram of Offgas System for Hydrogen Recombiners," which identified the containment isolation valves outside containment, as 20G082, 20G083, 20G084, and 20G085. By visual inspection, the valves were verified installed at penetrations P-13, P-69, P-13 and P-23 respectivel Sargent & Lundy drawings 6/20E-2-40300G11 and 6/20E-2-40300G12,

" Schematic Diagrams for Hydrogen Recombiner Suction and Supply

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Containment Isolation Valves," were also reviewed. The Class IE electrical division, phase A isolation contacts and controls and position indications in the main control room agreed with SER

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description Byron SER, Supplement 5, Section 6.2.5 described the electrical division for both units hydrogen recombiners and the suction and discharge valves 00G059, 00G060, 00G065, and 00G066. Review of Sargent & Lundy drawings M-47, " Diagram of Offgas System Hydrogen Recombiners," for Unit 1 and M-150 for Unit 2 showed electrical division between Class 1E power supply divisions E11 and E12 as described. In addition, the SER described a licensee commitment to

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administratively control the discharge valves open during normal operation. Byron Operating Procedures B0P OG-M3, " Hydrogen Recombiner Valve Lineup," dated 05/14/84 specified that the Unit 1 and Unit 2 discharge valves be in the open position. No problems or inconsistancies were identifie (Closed)SEROpenItem(455/83000-05): Containment isolation valves added to chilled water return lines inside containmen The inspector reviewed Sargent & Lundy drawing M-118, " Diagram of Containment Chiller Water System". The isolation valves inside containment for the chilled water return lines were motor operated, Nos. 2W0056A and 2W0056B. The inspector reviewed Sargent & Lundy drawing 6/20E-2-4030W012. " Schematic Diagram Chilled Water i Containment Isolation Valves 2W0056A and 2W0056B," which showed the i phase A isolation contacts, main control room controls, position indications, and electrical Class 1E divisions. The design was in

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agreement with the SER description. By visual inspection, these valves were verified installe (Closed) SER Open Item (455/83000-06): Upgrade Essential Service Water (ESW) lines to and from containment fan coolers to quality group B. Debris screen added to miniflow purge system supply duc The inspector reviewed Sargent & Lundy Drawing hM-126, " Diagram of Essential Service Water (Primary Containment Vent System)," which identified the previous quality group B to C boundary at the valves isolating the ESW coils on the four reactor containment fan coolers

, (RCFC). There were two coolers per RCFC, their boundary valves were:

2SX018A,B,C&D to 2SX021A,B,C&D

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2SX022A,B,C&D to 2SX025A,B,C&D The inspector reviewed Hunter Corporation main isometric drawings and packages SX-48, SX-49, SX-52 and SX-53 for cooler trains A& In train A, drawings and packages SX48-9, 48-33 and 48-34 for spool rework to one side of one A cooler train were reviewed. All documentation tracked from isometric weld joint numbers to weld joint documentation and showed the rewelds and

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non-destructiveexaminations(NDE)requiredtoupgradethelinesto quality group B. The package included weld process sheets, NDE requests and final inspection reports. The inspector examined the miniflow purge system supply duct. The licensee has installed a debris screen made of flat bar steel welded in a mesh pattern inside the duc No violations or deviations were identifie . 10 CFR 50.55(e) Reports (92700)

(Closed)50.55(e) Report (455/82001-EE): Defective lube oil strainer basket in standby diesel generator lube oil systems. This item was previously reviewed in NRC Inspection Report No. 455/84029 and remained open pending installation of the replacement lube oil strainer basket in diesel generator 2DG0108. The inspector was informed by licensee personnel that installation was performed on June 14, 1985, and that the only remaining work related to this item was installation of a closure gasket on the strainer housing cover. The inspector reviewed Hunter Corporation Mechanical Joint Process Sheet for Job Traveler Package N P-DG-868 which was written to require installation and inspection of the gasket and reassembly of the strainer housin . Containment Polar Crane Bolting (92706) Background On June 17, 1985, the inspector was informed by NRC resident inspection personnel assigned to the licensee's Braidwood Station of problems with bolting on the Braidwood polar crane ring girder supports. Specifically, bolts were observed to be loose, installed without required washers, and in one case, missing. Quality control inspection documentation associated with the Braidwood installation indicated that bolt installation including torque had been verified in accordance with applicable design requirements. It was therefore believed that the bolts may have loosened over time as a result of polar cran operation. Based upon the foregoing, the inspector reviewed the Byron Unit 2 polar crane bolting installation to determine whether or not problems similar to those observed at Braidwood were presen Inspection The inspector reviewed Sargent and Lundy structural drawings S-922,

" Containment Building Crane Girder Plan Sections and Details,"

Revision A0, dated 5-24-85 and S-941, " Containment Building Liner Embedment Sections and Details," Revision T dated 4-27-84. The drawings provided details of the ring girder flange-to-support bolted connections, including washer requirements and bolt torque requirement _

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On June 18, 1985, the inspector discussed the NRC findings at Braidwood with licensee personnel and inquired as to whether or not loosening of the bolts subsequent to original installation and torqueing had been observed at Byron. Licensee personnel stated that they had no Subsequently, on June 19, 1985, the inspector visually examined several of the bolted connections in the presence of quality control personnel from Blount Brothers, Inc. The inspector determined that all bolts examined could not be loosened by hand unlike many of the bolts at Braidwood. On June 20, 1985, Blount Brothers, In performed a surveillance of the bolting to assure that the jam nuts and strength nuts were at least snug tight while taking care not to disturb the torque values previously established and documented in quality control inspection reports. Of 260 total jam and strength nuts surveyed 260 nuts were found to be greater than or equal to snug-tight as defined in the AISC cod Based upon direct inspection and the reported results of the surveillance performed by Blount Brothers, Inc., the inspector was satisfied that the deficient conditions identified at Braidwood did not exist at Byron Unit No violations or deviations were identifie . Housekeeping / Care and Preservation of Safety Related Components (92706)

The inspectors conducted plant tours of Unit 2 between June 18 and July 15, 1985. Areas of the Unit 2 plant observed during the tours included the containment, fuel handling and storage areas, auxiliary building areas including the Unit 2 portion of the control room, and the turbine building. Areas were inspected for work in progress, state of cleanliness, overall housekeeping, state of fire protection equipment and I

methods being employed, and the care and preservation of safety-related components and equipmen No violations or deviations were identifie . Allegations Provided by the Licensee Regarding Drug Use at Byron (99014) Allegation 1: On June 17, 1985, the licensee notified the inspector of an allegation related to drug use. This allegation was verbally received on June 16, 1985, by a corporate manager from a concerned citizen at a social function. The citizen identified an employee at the Byron Station whom the alleger had reason to believe may be using drugs off-site in a recreational manner. The corporate manager relayed this information to the Byron Site Superintendent who subsequently notified the inspecto _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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Findings: In keeping with the licensee's drug awareness program, on June 17, 1985, the individual was relieved of all duties at Byron Station, his site security clearance was revoked and he was notified of a review board to be convened on June 18, 1985. On June 18, 1985, a board consisting of Byron Station managers and union representatives reviewed the allegation with the individual. As a result of the Board's evaluation and reconinendations, the individual was escorted to the Chicago General Office medical facility where the individual was interviewed by a senior coordinator of the Commonwealth Edison Employee Assistance Program (EAP). The individual also submitted to an observed specimen urinalysis following the interview. The test results of the urinalysis were negative. Based on the negative test results, recommendations of the EAP coordinator, and endorsement by the company physician, the individual was restored to security status and returned to full duty on June 20, 198 The licensee's managemer.c and supervisory personnel and the inspectors have monitored the individual's performance and no abnormal behavior during current work day observations have been observed. This allegation is considered close b. Allegation 2: On June 13, 1985, the licensee notified the inspectors of an allegation related to alcohol and drug use at Byron Station in parking lots and areas of the plant. This allegation was received in the form of a telephone call on June 12, 1985, at 2100 to the Byron Site-Security Administrator at his home. The caller identified himself as a long time contractor employee and provided sufficient detailed information to the Security Administrator to establish reasonable creditability. The caller also identified 10 individuals, including some badge numbers and three contractor shops, whom he had reason to believe were using drugs and/or alcohol in the south parking lot during the lunch period and implied certain other site areas and times. The caller further stated that he may, in the future, elect to become further involved by coming forth with additional specific information and revealing his identity pending his first hand observations of the licensee's corrective measures to resolve this issue. 'he licensee has had no further contact from this individual as of the closing date of this repor Findings: Based on the information received from the alleger, the licensee contacted the 10 individuals identified and arranged for them to report to the station security gate house at 1000 on June 20, 1985. At the gate house the individuals, together with union representatives, were met by security officers and escorted to an isolation area inside the gate house. Inside the gate house four teams consisting of two CECO security managers each, began individual interviews of the identified individuals. The interview teams used a battery of questions designed to gain information from the individuals related to the Byron Drug and Alcohol Abuse Policy

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awareness, personal information, including type of work and location, and to specifically address the use or sale of drugs or alcohol on and off CECO property including observations or rumors of the use or sale of drugs or alcohol at Byro Simultaneously with the interviews the licensee conducted meetings with Project Construction Department (PCD), contractor supervisors, and station supervisors. The purpose of these meetings was to reiterate the CECO position as related to the CECO Drug and Alcohol Abuse Policy and to disseminate information, of a general nature, concerning the allegations and the Byron Station corrective measures to resolve these issue In addition, while the interviews were in progress, a search of the plant was made. Three teams, each consisting of a handler and a narcotics detection trained dog, made searches of a number of work site areas inside the plant buildings and other contractor controlled work site buildings on the grounds inside the security fence. The search areas included tool, equipment and material storage boxes, field desks and lockers, and lunch area The inspectors attended the dog team searches, the policy meetings and the interviews. During the dog team searches no drugs were detected in any of the areas searche The inspector reviewed the licensee's report on the investigation of anonymous allegations concerning actions of contractor personnel at the Byron Station issued by the CECO Nuclear Security Director on June 26, 1985. The report describes the action plan and

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implementation schedule developed to investigate these allegations together with the results of the interviews and narcotics detection dog team searches. Based on the responses obtained from the individuals during the interviews and the failure to find any illegal drugs, substances, or paraphernalia during the searches", the licensee was unable to substantiate these allegations. Therefore, based on the licensee's findings and observation made by the '

resident inspector this allegation is considered close No violations or deviations we. , identifie . Exit interview (30703)

The inspectors met with licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the inspection on July 1, 1985. The inspectors summarized the purpose and scope of the inspection and the findings. The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietary.