ML19163A294
| ML19163A294 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vallecitos, Vallecitos Nuclear Center |
| Issue date: | 06/24/2019 |
| From: | Greg Warnick Division of Nuclear Materials Safety IV |
| To: | Feyrer M GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy Americas |
| S. Anderson | |
| References | |
| IR 2019001 | |
| Download: ML19163A294 (21) | |
See also: IR 05000018/2019001
Text
June 24, 2019
Mr. Matt Feyrer, Site Manager
Vallecitos Nuclear Center
GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy
6705 Vallecitos Road
Sunol, CA 94586-8524
SUBJECT: GE HITACHI NUCLEAR ENERGY - NRC INSPECTION REPORT
050-00018/2019-001; 050-00070/2019-001; 050-00183/2019-001 AND NOTICE
OF VIOLATION
Dear Mr. Feyrer:
This letter refers to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection conducted on
March 25-28, 2019, at your Vallecitos Nuclear Center in Sunol, California. The inspection
covered the following shutdown reactors under the subject licenses, Vallecitos Boiling Water
Reactor (VBWR), General Electric Test Reactor (GETR), and Empire State Atomic Development
Associates Incorporated Vallecitos Experimental Superheat Reactor (EVESR). A debrief
meeting was conducted on March 28, 2019, with you and members of your staff, and
representatives from the Wilmington, North Carolina office. The NRC inspectors performed
further in-office evaluation of the violations identified during the inspection. Upon completion of
the in-office evaluation, the NRC inspectors presented the results of the inspection and the
significance of the violations identified during the inspection to you and members of your staff,
during a final, telephonic exit meeting on May 16, 2019. The inspection results are documented
in the enclosure to this letter.
During this inspection, the NRC inspectors examined activities conducted under your licenses
as they relate to public health and safety, the environment, and to confirm compliance with the
Commissions rules and regulations, as well as with the conditions of your license. Within these
areas, the inspection consisted of the examination of selected procedures and representative
records, tour of the reactors and supporting equipment, independent radiation surveys, and
interviews with personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has determined that four Severity Level IV
violations of NRC requirements occurred. These violations were evaluated in accordance
with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The current NRC Enforcement Policy is included on the
NRCs Web site at (https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html).
The violations are cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice) and the circumstances
surrounding them are described in detail in the subject inspection report. The violations are
being cited in the Notice because they were identified by the NRC and corrective actions had
not been fully articulated on the docket at the time of the final exit meeting. Therefore, you are
required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed
M. Feyrer 2
Notice when preparing your response. If you have additional information that you believe the
NRC should consider, you may provide it in your response to the Notice. The NRC review of
your response to the Notice will also determine whether further enforcement action is necessary
to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Agency Rules of Practice and Procedure, a
copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response will be made available electronically for
public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRCs Agencywide
Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRCs
Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your response
should not include any personal privacy or proprietary, information so that it can be made
available to the Public without redaction.
Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, please contact Stephanie Anderson,
Health Physicist, at 817-200-1213 or the undersigned at 817-200-1223.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Gregory G. Warnick, Chief
Reactor Inspector Branch
Division of Nuclear Materials Safety
Docket Nos.: 050-00018; 050-00070;
and 050-00183
License Nos.: DPR-1; TR-1; and DR-10
Enclosures:
1. Notice of Violation
2. Inspection Report 050-00018/2019-001;
050-00070/2019-001; 050-00183/2019-001
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
cc:
S. Murray, GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy Americas, LLC.
NOTICE OF VIOLATION
GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy Docket Nos.: 050-00018;
Vallecitos Boiling Water Reactor 050-00070; 050-00183
GE Test Reactor License Nos.: DPR-1; TR-1;
ESADA Vallecitos Experimental Superheat Reactor DR-10
During an NRC inspection conducted on March 25-28, 2019, four violations of NRC
requirements were identified. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, the violations
are listed below:
A. NRC License No. DPR-1, Amendment 21, License Condition 3.a. requires, in part, that
the licensee shall possess the facility in the condition described in the Final Report on
Deactivation of Vallecitos Boiling Water Reactor, dated February 5, 1965.
Final Report on Deactivation of Vallecitos Boiling Water Reactor,Section V., states, in
part, that the condition, security, and integrity of the retired facility will be checked during
the inspection, and the integrity of the reactor vessel will be verified.
Licensee Procedure 6.2, Patrols and Inspections, Revision 11, implements the license
requirements as stated above, and establishes the periodicity of the inspections.
Section 4.6, Annual Inspections and Radiation Surveys states, in part, that an
inspection, radiation and contamination surveys, and other surveillance activities for the
deactivated area, including the interior of the containment building for Vallecitos Boiling
Water Reactor (VBWR) are required to be performed by the facility license. The
conditions/requirements described in the Final Report on Deactivation of Vallecitos
Boiling Water Reactor include the following, in which the basement will be inspected for
water intrusion and sump pump system is properly functioning.
Contrary to the above, on September 13, 2018, the licensee failed to properly adhere to
License Condition 3.a., and adequately inspect the condition, security, and integrity of
the retired facility during the annual inspection. Specifically, during the licensees annual
inspection, the licensee failed to adequately inspect the spent fuel pit area of the VBWR
containment building, and as a result the licensee failed to identify standing water in the
spent fuel pit area of VBWR. Per the Final Report on Deactivation of Vallecitos Boiling
Water Reactor, dated February 5, 1965, the spent fuel pit was drained, the fuel racks
removed, and a cover had been installed on the top.
This is a Severity Level IV violation (Section 6.3).
B. 10 CFR 20.1501(a) requires, that the licensee shall make or cause to be made, surveys
of areas, including the subsurface, that: (1) may be necessary for the licensee to comply
with the regulations in this part; and (2) are reasonable under the circumstances to
evaluate: (i) the magnitude and extent of radiation levels; (ii) concentrations or quantities
of residual radioactivity; and (iii) the potential radiological hazards of the radiation levels
and residual radioactivity detected.
10 CFR 20.1003 defines survey, as an evaluation of the radiological conditions and
potential hazards incident to the production, use, transfer, release, disposal, or presence
of radioactive material or other sources of radiation. When appropriate, such an
evaluation includes a physical survey of the location of radioactive material and
Enclosure 1
measurements or calculations of levels of radiation, or concentrations or quantities of
radioactive material present.
Contrary to the above, on September 13-14, 2018, the licensee failed to make or cause
to be made, surveys of areas, including the subsurface, that: (1) may be necessary for
the licensee to comply with the regulations in this part; and (2) are reasonable under the
circumstances to evaluate: (i) the magnitude and extent of radiation levels; (ii)
concentrations or quantities of residual radioactivity; and (iii) the potential radiological
hazards of the radiation levels and residual radioactivity detected. Specifically, during
annual entries into the VBWR, General Electric Test Reactor (GETR), and Empire State
Atomic Development Associates Incorporated Vallecitos Experimental Superheat
Reactor (EVESR) containment buildings, the licensee failed to perform adequate
surveys in these buildings to demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR 20.1902, which
contains the posting requirements for radiation areas, high radiation areas, very high
radiation areas, airborne radioactivity areas, and areas or rooms in which licensed
material is used or stored. On March 26, 2019, multiple postings were observed by the
NRC inspectors in the VBWR, GETR, and EVESR containment buildings that did not
reflect current radiological conditions in those buildings because the licensee had not
fully evaluated the magnitude and extent of radiation levels in the areas that were
posted.
This is a Severity Level IV violation (Section 6.7).
C. 10 CFR 20.1501(c) requires, that the licensee shall ensure that instruments and
equipment used for quantitative radiation measurements (e.g., dose rate and effluent
monitoring) are calibrated periodically for the radiation measured.
Contrary to the above, on September 13-14, 2018, the instruments and equipment used
for quantitative radiation measurements during the annual surveys of the VBWR, GETR,
and EVESR containment buildings were not calibrated for the radiation measured
because the licensee failed to determine the radionuclide composition in these buildings.
Specifically, the licensee had not sampled and analyzed for hard-to-detect radionuclides
(i.e., low-energy beta emitters such as carbon-14 and nickel-63) or transuranics in the
reactor buildings, even though such radionuclides could exist in the buildings due to the
sites operational history.
This is a Severity Level IV violation (Section 6.7).
D. 10 CFR 20.1703(c)(1) requires, that the licensee shall implement and maintain a
respiratory protection program that includes air sampling sufficient to identify the
potential hazard, permit proper equipment selection, and estimate doses.
Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to implement and maintain a respiratory
protection program that includes air sampling sufficient to identify the potential hazard,
permit proper equipment selection, and estimate doses, as evidenced by the following
two examples:
1. On December 3, 2018, February 1 and 26, 2019, and March 26-28, 2019, the
licensee allowed workers to access multiple floors of the VBWR, GETR, and EVESR
containment buildings (including radioactively contaminated areas) but did not take air
2
samples on each floor level as required by Procedure 6.1, Access Control, Revision
8. In Appendix A, B, and C of Procedure 6.1, Access Control, Revision 8, there is a
step that states, in part, samples for air activity, lower explosive limit, and O2 should
be taken at each floor level visited. The licensee only took air samples on the entry
floor level of each containment building and failed to assess potential airborne
radiological hazards to workers on the other floor levels of the containment buildings.
2. On March 22, 2019, the licensee did not perform air sampling during non-routine
work activities that involved cleaning and vacuuming radioactively contaminated
sediment from the floor of the VBWR basement. Because no air sampling was
performed, the licensee failed to identify whether airborne radioactive material was
generated during these activities, and thus failed to identify the potential hazards to
workers. In addition, the failure to identify what airborne concentrations of radioactive
material may have been generated from the activities, resulted in a failure to estimate
potential doses to the workers.
This is a Severity Level IV violation (Section 6.7).
Pursuant to the provisions of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) 2.201, GE Hitachi
Nuclear Energy is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington,
DC 20555-0001, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region IV, 1600 E. Lamar Blvd.,
Arlington, TX 76011-4511, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of
Violation (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation and
should include for each violation: (1) the reason for the violation, or, if contested, the basis for
disputing the violation or severity level; (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the
results achieved; (3) the corrective steps that will be taken; and (4) the date when full
compliance will be achieved.
Your response may reference or include previously docketed correspondence, if the
correspondence adequately addresses the required response. If an adequate reply is not received
within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be issued
requiring information as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked, or why
such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Where good cause is shown,
consideration will be given to extending the response time.
If you contest this enforcement action, you should also provide a copy of your response, with
the basis for your denial, to the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with a copy to the Regional
Administrator, Region IV.
Your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public
Document Room or in the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html.
To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary or
safeguards information so that it can be made available to the public without redaction.
In accordance with 10 CFR 19.11, you may be required to post this Notice within two working
days of receipt.
Dated this 24th day of June 2019
3
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket Nos.: 050-00018; 050-00070; and 050-00183
License Nos.: DPR-1; TR-1; and DR-10
Report Nos.: 050-00018/2019-001; 050-00070/2019-001; and 050-00183/2019-001
Licensee: GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy
Facility: Vallecitos Boiling Water Reactor (VBWR)
GE Test Reactor (GETR)
ESADA Vallecitos Experimental Superheat Reactor (EVESR)
Location: 6705 Vallecitos Road
Sunol, California
Inspection Dates: March 25-28, 2019
Inspectors: Stephanie G. Anderson, Health Physicist
Reactor Inspector Branch
Division of Nuclear Materials Safety
Chris D. Steely, Health Physicist
Reactor Inspector Branch
Division of Nuclear Materials Safety
Jack D. Parrott, Senior Project Manager
Reactor Decommissioning Branch
Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards
Anthony M. Huffert, CHP, Senior Health Physicist
Reactor Decommissioning Branch
Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards
N. Jeff Griffis, CHP, Senior Health Physicist
Specialized Technical Training & Support Branch
Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer
Accompanied By: Bruce A. Watson, CHP, Branch Chief
Reactor Decommissioning Branch
Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards
Approved By: Gregory G. Warnick, Branch Chief
Reactor Inspector Branch
Division of Nuclear Materials Safety
Enclosure 2
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy
NRC Inspection Report 050-00018/2019-001; 050-00070/2019-001; and 050-00183/2019-001
This U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection was a routine, announced inspection
of licensed activities being conducted at the three permanently defueled reactors at the Vallecitos
Nuclear Center. In summary, the inspectors identified four Severity Level IV violations and opened
one unresolved item, associated with various regulatory and license requirements. Other than the
four identified violations and one unresolved item, the licensee was conducting site activities in
accordance with regulatory, license, and procedure requirements.
Decommissioning Performance and Status Review at Permanently Shutdown Reactors and
Class III Research and Test Reactors
- The licensee conducted annual inspections and audits of the three shutdown reactors in
accordance with regulatory, license, and procedure requirements, with one exception. The
inspectors identified a violation of license requirements associated with the adequacy of the
annual inspection of the Vallecitos Boiling Water Reactor containment building. (Section 1.2)
Organization, Management and Cost Controls at Permanently Shutdown Reactors
- The NRC inspectors concluded that the licensee was adequately implementing their
organization that reflected the shutdown reactors license requirements and adequately
managed the workload to support the shutdown reactors activities. One unresolved item
was identified by the inspectors related to regulatory compliance of 10 CFR 50.71(e)(4)
requirements for submitting a revision to the final safety analysis report every 24 months.
(Section 2.2)
Safety Reviews, Design Changes, and Modifications at Permanently Shutdown Reactors
- The licensee implemented its safety review program in accordance with its procedures and
regulatory requirements. (Section 3.2)
Self-Assessment, Auditing, and Corrective Action at Permanently Shutdown Reactors
- The NRC inspectors concluded that the licensee had not been fully implementing the
corrective action program Procedure, CP-16-108, Corrective Action Program, Revision 11,
and that licensee personnel were not consistently identifying conditions adverse to quality or
conditions needing improvement. These findings are not considered violations of the
regulations or the Vallecitos Boiling Water Reactor license requirements, however, the
failure to fully implement the corrective action program procedure should be entered into the
licensees corrective action program for resolution. (Section 4.2)
Occupational Radiation Exposure
- The inspectors concluded that the licensee conducted its radiation control program in
accordance with license conditions and regulatory requirements, with three exceptions.
The inspectors identified three violations in program areas related to occupational radiation
exposure. (Section 5.2)
2
Report Details
Summary of Plant Status
The GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy Americas, LLC (GEH or Licensee) continued to maintain the
three shutdown reactors, Vallecitos Boiling Water Reactor (VBWR), General Electric Test
Reactor (GETR), and Empire State Atomic Development Associates Incorporated Vallecitos
Experimental Superheat Reactor (EVESR) in a possession-only, safe storage (SAFSTOR)
condition, with no fuel remaining in the reactors or spent fuel pools. The condition of SAFSTOR
is a decommissioning alternative in which the licensee is authorized to maintain the facility in a
condition that allows the nuclear facility to be safely stored and subsequently decontaminated to
levels that permit release for unrestricted use within 60 years of permanent cessation of
operations. Licensees who choose the SAFSTOR option must meet all NRC financial and safety
regulations, both prior to and during the SAFSTOR period.
On April 24, 2015 (ADAMS Accession Number Nos. ML15114A437 and ML15114A438) the
licensee submitted a request for a partial site release of approximately 610 acres of non-impacted
property on the northern section of Vallecitos Nuclear Center (VNC) site, for unrestricted use
pursuant to Title 10 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) 50.83(b). The NRC approved the partial
site release of 610 acres by letter dated May 3, 2016 (ADAMS Accession Number No.
ML16007A348). The property continues to remain under the ownership of GEH.
On December 15, 2015, the licensee submitted a request for license continuance under
10 CFR 50.51(b) for reactor licenses DR-10 and TR-1 (ADAMS Accession Number No.
ML15349A045). That request was approved by letter dated January 2, 2019 (ADAMS
Accession Number No. ML18352A450). The licensee also submitted a request on July 10,
2015 (ADAMS Accession Number No. ML15195A088) for an alternate decommissioning
schedule as described in 10 CFR 50.82(a)(3) and 50.82(b)(4)(i), using the exemption criteria of
On May 16, 2017, the NRC staff issued a request to GEH for additional information on the
structural integrity of the reactor buildings and how the integrity would be ensured during the
extended decommissioning period, in order to assess whether the request would result in undue
risk to public health and safety (ADAMS Accession Number No. ML17138A121). The licensee
responded to this request by letter dated July 31, 2017 (ADAMS Accession Number No.
Based on this response and a site visit conducted by NRC on September 13, 2017, the NRC
determined that certain additional information must be provided by GEH to show how the
licensee is ensuring the confinement of residual radioactivity associated with the shutdown
reactors at the VNC and evaluating and monitoring the long term physical safety of the reactor
structures. The NRC requested more detailed information by letter dated January 18, 2018
(ADAMS Accession Number No. ML17312B359). On March 28, 2018 (ADAMS Accession
Number No. ML18087A384) GEH provided a response indicating that it would provide an interim
status report for the hydrological and structural analyses in approximately 6 months and
anticipated completing the actions within approximately 12 months, which would be March 2019.
On May 31, 2018 (ADAMS Accession Number No. ML18151A861), GEH submitted a partial
response to the request for additional information. On October 23, 2018 (ADAMS Accession
Number No. ML18296A159), GEH provided an interim status report on the efforts to respond to
the two-remaining request for additional information. On March 28, 2019 (ADAMS Accession
Number No. ML19087A221), GEH provided the response to the additional information to the
3
NRCs request for the information needed to support the exemption request for an alternate
decommissioning schedule.
On December 14, 2018 (ADAMS Accession Number No. ML18348A425), the licensee
submitted a request for a partial site release of approximately 7 acres of non-impacted property
along Vallecitos Road to be made available to Alameda County Transportation Commission to
support road development and widening. The NRC held a public meeting in Dublin, CA on
March 28, 2019, as required by 10 CFR 50.83, Release of part of a power reactor facility or site
for unrestricted use, to discuss the request for the partial site release.
1 Decommissioning Performance and Status Review at Permanently Shutdown
Reactors (71801) and Class III Research and Test Reactors (69002)
1.1 Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees control and oversight of the three shutdown
reactors.
1.2 Observations and Findings
a. Status and tours of the shutdown reactors
1. Vallecitos Boiling Water Reactor
Vallecitos Boiling Water Reactor (VBWR) is a possession-only reactor under License
No. DPR-1, Amendment 21. It was a 50-megawatt (MW) power reactor that achieved
full power operations in 1957, after receiving its Construction Permit No. CPPR-3 on
May 14, 1956. It was shutdown on December 9, 1963, for an extended period of time
and subsequently was deactivated. All fuel has been removed from the facility.
The possession-only facility license DPR-1, License Condition 4 states in part, that
there should be an audible control device maintained on the doors to the containment
building. In addition, License Condition 5 authorizes GE Hitachi (GEH) to dispose of
component parts or devices from the VBWR facility in accordance with the provisions
of 10 CFR Part 20. The licensee removed extensive components from the facility
between October 2007 and November 2008. All reactor systems have been removed
except for the reactor vessel. The licensee monitored the water level in the reactor
vessel and the inspectors confirmed that it had remained essentially constant at
approximately 95 inches of water, since the last NRC inspection conducted in August
2018. Due to groundwater intrusion, the licensee has installed a sump pump and piping
in the basement of containment in order to remove any groundwater intrusion or
condensation to a transfer tank located adjacent to the containment structure. This
water is ultimately transferred to the onsite waste evaporator plant (WEP) for processing.
The inspectors toured the facility with licensee representatives. The inspectors
confirmed there was an audible control device functioning on the manual doors to the
containment building that provided an alarm at the 300-area alarm panel and at the
Central Alarm Station. The inspectors observed that the roll-up door was secured, which
was installed in place of the equipment hatch. The inspectors entered the basement
level to observe the condition and integrity of the retired facility. The inspectors
observed crack formation and water seepage down the walls. The cracks are being
4
monitored by the licensee to determine growth rate. During the tour, the NRC inspectors
questioned the condition and integrity of the spent fuel pit area, which had accumulation
of water at least several inches deep after observing it from the main floor of the VBWR
containment building looking down between the gaps in the steel plates covering the
area. This area had not been previously identified by the licensee during the annual
surveys to have standing water. The Final Report on Deactivation of Vallecitos Boiling
Water Reactor,Section V., states, in part, that the condition, security, and integrity of
the retired facility will be checked during inspection and the integrity of the reactor vessel
will be verified. Also, per the Final Report on Deactivation of Vallecitos Boiling Water
Reactor, the spent fuel pit was drained, the fuel racks removed, and a cover had been
installed on the top.
License Condition 3.a. states, in part, that the licensee shall possess the facility in the
condition described in the Final Report on Deactivation of Vallecitos Boiling Water
Reactor dated February 5, 1965. Procedure 6.2, Patrols and Inspections,
Revision 11, implements the license requirements as stated above. Section 4.6, Annual
Inspections and Radiation Surveys states, in part, that inspections, radiation and
contamination surveys, and other surveillance activities for the deactivated area,
including the interior of the containment building for VBWR are required to be performed
by the facility license. The conditions/requirements described in the Final Report on
Deactivation of Vallecitos Boiling Water Reactor include the following, in which the
basement will be inspected for water intrusion and sump pump system is properly
functioning. The inspectors determined that during the licensees annual inspection, the
licensee failed to adequately inspect the spent fuel pit area of the VBWR containment
building, and as a result the licensee failed to identify standing water in the spent fuel pit
area of VBWR, and as described above, this is considered a violation of License
Condition 3.a. (VIO 0500018/2019001-01).
During the previous NRC inspection in August 2018, the NRC inspectors identified a
violation (VIO 05000018/2018001-01) associated with License Condition 3.a., which
requires the licensee to possess the facility in the condition described in the Final
Report of Deactivation of Vallecitos Boiling Water Reactor. Licensee Procedure 6.2,
Patrols and Inspections, Revision 7, required the licensee to inspect the condition and
integrity of the retired facility and verify the integrity of the reactor vessel during the
annual inspection, as well as on a weekly basis check the VBWR reactor vessel water
level (ADAMS Accession No. ML18261A410).
The licensee responded to the Notice of Violation (NOV) by letter dated October 19,
2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18292A751). During a telephonic conference on
December 19, 2018, between GE Hitachi and NRC staff, the licensee was requested to
submit additional information to describe their corrective actions. The supplemental
information regarding GE Hitachis response to the NOV was received by letter dated
January 23, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19023A306). The licensees corrective
actions included revising Procedure 6.2, Patrols and Inspection, to inspect the
condition and integrity of retired facility monthly to check for water intrusion in the VBWR
basement. The licensee also installed a transfer tank in the building next to the VBWR
containment building and installed a sump pump in the basement, to pump the water
from the basement to the transfer tank. The licensee replaced the broken manometer
and purchased a spare manometer to measure water in the VBWR reactor vessel on the
required weekly basis. The implementation of these corrective actions closes the
violation.
5
2. ESADA Vallecitos Experimental Superheat Reactor
The ESADA Vallecitos Experimental Superheat Reactor (EVESR) is a possession-only
reactor under License No. DR-10, Amendment No. 7. The EVESR was a light water
moderated, steam cooled, superheat, experimental research reactor that used slightly
enriched uranium dioxide as fuel. It operated at a maximum of 17 MW thermal and was
initially licensed in 1963. It achieved full power operation in 1964, and was shut down on
February 1, 1967, and subsequently deactivated. All fuel and other special nuclear
material has been removed and shipped offsite. In addition, a significant amount of
equipment used to operate the reactor, such as nuclear instrumentation, piping, pumps,
and valves had been removed.
The inspectors toured the facility with licensee representatives. The inspectors
confirmed there was an audible control device functioning on the airlock door to the
containment building that provided an alarm at the 300 feet elevation area alarm panel
and at the Central Alarm Station. The licensee had a portable dehumidifier to remove
significant quantities of condensation that tended to build-up in the facility. The licensee
had temporary lighting installed and it was operating sufficiently to ensure the
passageways and stairs were safely lit. The stack was no longer operational, and the
licensee was using a portable ventilation system.
The radiation levels were generally less than 1 milliroentgen per hour (mR/hr) throughout
the facility, except in certain areas. The inspectors measured 1.8 mR/hr on the two
emergency cooling discharge valves located on the 534-ft level, using a Thermo
Scientific RadEye G gamma survey meter (Serial No. 30728, calibration due date of
December 12, 2019). The licensee maintained concrete blocks over the reactor vessel
and the head/shield plug storage pit. In addition, a wooden cover was installed over the
empty spent fuel storage pool, with an installed railing to prevent entry since the wooden
cover was not designed to support a load. The licensee maintained control of the keys
to the locked cover installed over the stairwell that provided access to areas below the
main 549-ft level.
3. General Electric Test Reactor
The General Electric Test Reactor (GETR) is a possession-only reactor under License
No. TR-1, Amendment No. 17. The reactor was a 50 MW thermal experimental test,
development, and isotope production reactor that utilized highly enriched plate fuel and
was initially licensed to operate in 1959. The reactor was shutdown in 1977 and
subsequently deactivated. All fuel and isotope production targets containing special
nuclear material have been removed from the facility and shipped offsite. The reactor,
systems and piping, and spent fuel pool have been drained of water. The licensee
explained that the containment polar crane was functional, and only required
recertification for it to be considered operable.
The tank farm located outside the control room building had three underground tanks
and one above ground tank, with each one having a capacity of 25,000 gallons. The
licensee stated the underground tanks were monitored on a quarterly basis. As needed,
the water from the tanks was transferred by piping to the above ground tank and the
water was subsequently transported by a mobile tank to the onsite WEP for processing.
6
The inspectors toured the containment building and GETR auxiliary buildings
immediately adjacent to the containment structure. It was noted by inspectors that
Building 202, which was empty of equipment and personnel, was in very poor physical
condition with the structure being open to the elements via degradation of the roof and
sides. This allows rain intrusion and animals ingress and egress to/from the structure
with the possibility of potentially contaminated material being carried away to outside the
structure. A radiation survey of the wash-outs and boundary area near the building did
not identify any radiological contamination.
As GETR has been shutdown since 1977 there are no licensed operators nor a
requalification program which is appropriate for the plant conditions. Staffing was
appropriate to meet the required weekly surveillance patrols which were being
conducted in accordance with site procedures.
1.3 Conclusions
The licensee conducted annual inspections and audits of the three shutdown reactors in
accordance with regulatory, license, and procedure requirements, with one exception.
The inspectors identified a violation of license requirements associated with the
adequacy of the annual inspection of the VBWR containment building.
2 Organization, Management and Cost Controls at Permanently Shutdown Reactors
(36801)
2.1 Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the licensees organizational structure to support licensed
activities and regulatory requirements.
2.2 Observations and Findings
The licenses for the three shutdown reactors require in part, that activities involving
access to the facility area and use of any area shall be conducted under the direction of
a designated facility manager with functional responsibility and commensurate authority
to maintain the facility in a safe and secure condition at all times. The NRC inspectors
reviewed the licensees organization and discussed the organizational structure with
members of the licensees organization. The Vallecitos Nuclear Center (VNC)
organization was structured under two divisions, identified as Operations and
Support. The VNC Site Manager had operational and support experience as a result of
past work experience in multiple areas within the GEH system. The Manager reported
to Services Operations in Wilmington, North Carolina. The inspectors observed there
was good communications and support between the VNC facility and operations in
Wilmington, North Carolina. Based on discussions and observations, the NRC
inspectors determined that the individual fulfilling the licensed responsibility as the facility
manager for the defueled reactors, adequately met the license condition requirements.
The NRC inspectors reviewed the routine activities performed at the three defueled
reactors and reviewed the organization structure that supported those activities. Based
on the review and discussions with licensee representatives, there had not been any
significant changes to the organization or new personnel hired to perform the routine
radiological safety activities at the shutdown reactors. Since the last inspection, GEH
7
hired a new regulatory affairs and licensing lead to be onsite at GEH. The inspectors
observed that the staff have a great deal of historical knowledge of processes that may
not be completely captured in training documents or procedures.
The inspectors completed a review of various license and regulatory requirements while
onsite. The inspectors were unable to complete the review of the decommissioning files
required to be maintained by the licensee pursuant to 10 CFR 50.75(g).
Title 10 CFR 50.71(e)(4) requires in part, subsequent revisions of the final safety
analysis report (FSAR) must be filed annually or 6 months after each refueling outage
provided the interval between successive updates does not exceed 24 months. The
revisions must reflect all changes up to a maximum of 6 months prior to the date of
filling. For nuclear power reactor facilities that have submitted the certifications required
by 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1), subsequent revisions must be filed every 24 months. During the
review of the requirements of 10 CFR 50.71(e)(4) and applicability to the two shutdown
power reactors, VBWR and EVESR, the inspectors concluded that there was not enough
information to determine if the licensee was in compliance with the regulatory
requirement, and this issue was identified as an unresolved item
2.3 Conclusions
The NRC inspectors concluded that the licensee was adequately implementing
their organization that reflected the shutdown reactors license requirements and
adequately managed the workload to support the shutdown reactors activities.
One unresolved item was identified by the inspectors related to regulatory compliance
of 10 CFR 50.71(e)(4) requirements for submitting a revision to the FSAR every
24 months.
3 Safety Reviews, Design Changes, and Modifications at Permanently Shutdown
Reactors (37801)
3.1 Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees control and oversight of the safety review
program to ensure design changes, tests, experiments and modifications are effectively
conducted, managed, and controlled during plant decommissioning.
3.2 Observations and Findings
Within the past three years, the licensee has only made one modification to the existing
plant systems of VBWR, EVESR, and GETR. This is due to the length of time since
shutdown for VBWR, EVESR, and GETR that most, if not all, reactor systems, with the
exception of the vessels, have been removed. All three reactors have been in
SAFSTOR status for several decades.
In 2018, the licensee added a sump pump and transfer piping from the basement sump
of the VBWR to an outside adjacent transfer tank to collect accumulated water, which
will then be transferred to the WEP for processing. The inspectors were able to review
the process of this modification against licensee Procedure 2.0, Change Authorization,
8
Revision 18. This procedure adequately details the necessary change process and
management reviews in order to safely modify any existing equipment.
The inspectors determined that the addition of the sump pump and transfer piping from
the VBWR basement to the outside transfer tank was properly planned, performed, and
managed through the licensee change process. At the time of the inspection, the
automatic function of the sump pump was not in operation but was performed manually
on an as needed basis.
3.3 Conclusions
The licensee implemented its safety review program in accordance with its procedures
and regulatory requirements.
4 Self-Assessment, Auditing, and Corrective Action at Permanently Shutdown
Reactors (40801)
4.1 Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program related to the oversight
of the three shutdown reactors.
4.2 Observations and Findings
At the time of the inspection the licensee was implementing its corrective action program
under procedure CP-16-108, Corrective Action Program, Revision 11. The procedure
applies to the GEH nuclear sites and facilities at VNC. According to the procedure, any
employee may initiate a condition report.
The priority levels for issues identified in the corrective action program ranged from A
to D, with A being a significant condition adverse to quality, B was a condition
adverse to quality, C was similar to broke/fix or conditions that had minimal effect on
the safe or reliable operation of a component or facility, and D was considered an
improvement item.
A condition report of a Priority Level B, was initiated by GEH from the observation made
by the NRC during the August 2018 inspection that water discovered and left for an
extended period of time in the basement of the VBWR was evidence of a failure to
implement procedure 6.2, Patrols and Inspections, Revision 7, for the activities
associated with VBWR, which was a violation of license requirements.
According to procedure CP-16-108, Corrective Action Program, Revision 11, the
resolution of the Level B condition report written in response to the violation required the
licensee to conduct an extent of condition review of water intrusion into the VBWR.
Contrary to that requirement, and the requirement in the license to fully inspect the
condition and integrity of the retired facility, the area of the VBWR identified as the spent
fuel pit had an accumulation of water at least several inches deep that had gone
unidentified by the licensee and was only identified when the NRC inspectors questioned
the condition of that area after observing it from the main floor of the VBWR containment
building looking down between gaps in the steel plates covering that area. On
9
September 13, 2018, the VBWR annual survey was completed with one abnormality
observed, which was approximately one inch of water on the basement floor.
However, this corrective action program observation, of failure to perform an extent of
condition review when evaluating the violation from August 2018 per the corrective
action program procedure, CP-16-108, Corrective Action Program, Revision 11 is not a
violation. The VBWR license does not have a license condition to require the site to
implement procedures, therefore failing to follow a procedure cannot be a violation of the
VBWR license and therefore is described here as an inspection observation.
The inspectors also reviewed a summary of the condition reports generated since the
January 1, 2017, for those whose scope focused primarily on the shutdown reactors at
VNC. Six condition reports were identified that were primarily focused on the shutdown
reactors. Review of these condition reports revealed that they were all written in
response to NRC observations made during inspection of the facility or were in response
to NRC questions in relation to the licensee request for an alternate decommissioning
schedule for the shutdown reactors. In other words, none of the shutdown reactor
specific condition reports identified and reviewed by the NRC inspectors were initiated
directly from licensee personnel observations of the conditions of the shutdown reactors.
Even though NRC inspectors and technical reviewers have observed and identified
apparent conditions adverse to safety at these facilities, none were identified and
documented by site personnel.
4.3 Conclusions
The NRC inspectors concluded that the licensee had not been fully implementing the
corrective action program Procedure, CP-16-108, Corrective Action Program,
Revision 11, and that licensee personnel were not consistently identifying conditions
adverse to quality or conditions needing improvement. These findings are not
considered violations of the regulations or the VBWR license requirements, however, the
failure to fully implement the corrective action program procedure should be entered into
the licensees corrective action program for resolution.
5 Occupational Radiation Exposure (83750)
5.1 Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees radiation protection program related to the
oversight of the three shutdown reactors.
5.2 Observations and Findings
Each of the shutdown reactors have license conditions that require annual surveys be
performed and submitted to the NRC. On September 13-14, 2018, the licensee entered
the VBWR, EVESR, and GETR containment buildings to perform the annual surveys.
Since the last annual inspection, the licensee had also performed non-routine work in
the basement of the VBWR containment building. This work involved cleaning
radioactively contaminated sediment out of the VBWR basement sump and installation
of drain lines to remove standing water. Licensee personnel wore coveralls, booties and
gloves to minimize contamination when entering the shutdown containment buildings for
both the routine surveys and non-routine work. During the inspection, the NRC
10
inspectors toured all accessible areas within the VBWR, EVESR, and GETR
containment buildings to observe radiological postings and perform independent
radiation surveys to ensure that the postings adequately reflected the radiological
hazards. During those tours on March 27, 2019, the inspectors identified multiple
postings that did not reflect the radiological conditions that currently existed in the areas
that were observed. In addition, inspectors identified multiple locked rooms within the
containment buildings that were posted as high radiation areas or airborne radioactivity
areas, and there were no documented surveys of these rooms or knowledge of the
current radiological conditions within the rooms to demonstrate that they were
appropriately posted.
Title 10 CFR 20.1501(a) requires that the licensee shall make or cause to be made,
surveys of areas, including the subsurface, that: (1) may be necessary for the licensee to
comply with the regulations in this part; and (2) are reasonable under the circumstances
to evaluate: (i) the magnitude and extent of radiation levels; (ii) concentrations or
quantities of residual radioactivity; and (iii) the potential radiological hazards of the
radiation levels and residual radioactivity detected. Title 10 CFR 20.1003 defines
survey, as an evaluation of the radiological conditions and potential hazards incident to
the production, use, transfer, release, disposal, or presence of radioactive material or
other sources of radiation. When appropriate, such an evaluation includes a physical
survey of the location of radioactive material and measurements or calculations of levels
of radiation, or concentrations or quantities of radioactive material present. The
inspectors determined that during the annual entries into the VBWR, GETR, and EVESR
containment buildings the licensee failed to perform adequate surveys in these buildings
to demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR 20.1902, which contains the posting
requirements for radiation areas, high radiation areas, very high radiation areas, airborne
radioactivity areas, and areas or rooms in which licensed material is used or stored, and
as described above, this is considered a violation of 10 CFR 20.1501(a)
In addition to the tours of the containment buildings, the inspectors reviewed the
procedures that the licensee used to quantify contamination levels within the three
containment buildings during the performance of their annual surveys. From this review
and subsequent discussions with licensee staff, inspectors determined that the licensee
had not verified the radionuclide mixture in the three containment buildings. Without
knowing the specific radionuclides that were present in the containment buildings, the
licensee could not design a survey program that could adequately detect or quantify the
radioactivity in those buildings. Also, the licensee did not have the information
necessary to determine accurate detection efficiencies for survey instruments used to
make quantitative measurements during their annual surveys.
Title 10 CFR 20.1501(c) states the licensee shall ensure that instruments and equipment
used for quantitative radiation measurements (e.g., dose rate and effluent monitoring)
are calibrated periodically for the radiation measured. The inspectors determined that
the licensee had not sampled and analyzed for hard-to-detect radionuclides (i.e., low-
energy beta emitters such as carbon-14 and nickel-63) or transuranics in the
containment buildings, even though such radionuclides could exist in the buildings due
to the sites operational history, and as described above, this is considered a violation
of 10 CFR 20.1501(c) (VIO 0500018/2019001-03).
11
The inspectors reviewed elements of the licensees radiation protection program
associated with occupational radiation safety for staff who perform work around or within
the three shutdown reactors. This included a review of the licensees procedures for
conducting radiation and contamination surveys, posting and communicating radiological
hazards to workers, air sampling, surveying and release of personnel and equipment
from contaminated areas, and calibration and use of portable radiation survey
instruments and counting equipment. In addition, the inspectors reviewed procedures
for personnel entry into the three containment buildings, and how the licensee conducted
radiological monitoring of employees who entered the containment buildings.
During interviews with the licensee, the inspectors discussed how air sampling was
performed for workers entering the VBWR, EVESR, and GETR containment buildings.
In addition, air sample results were reviewed for multiple containment building entries
from December 2018 through March 2019. The licensee considered the collection of air
samples that were gathered were routine samples that were taken in the containment
buildings prior to personnel entry into the containment buildings part of their routine
survey procedures. In some instances, air sampling was performed only on one floor
level of a given containment building, even though staff had entered other floor levels of
the containment buildings to perform work.
In addition, inspectors identified that air samples were taken prior to entry into the
containment buildings, but no air sampling was done while workers were actually
performing activities in the buildings. After further discussions with the licensee, it was
determined that workers had entered the VBWR basement on at least one occasion to
perform non-routine work that involved vacuuming and cleaning of radioactive
sediments. No air samples were taken during these non-routine activities to determine
whether radioactive material in the sediments had become airborne and posed an
internal hazard to the workers. Because no air sampling was performed, the licensee
failed to identify whether airborne radioactive material was generated during these
activities, and thus failed to identify the potential hazards to workers. In addition, the
failure to identify what airborne concentrations of radioactive material may have been
generated from the activities resulted in a failure to estimate potential doses to the
workers.
Title 10 CFR 20.1703(c)(1) states that the licensee shall implement and maintain a
respiratory protection program that includes air sampling sufficient to identify the
potential hazard, permit proper equipment selection, and estimate doses. The
inspectors determined that the licensee failed to perform sufficient air sampling to
identify potential radiological hazards to workers entering the VBWR, GETR, and
EVESR containment buildings, and as described above, this is considered a violation
10 CFR 20.1703(c)(1) (VIO 0500018/2019001-04).
During the inspection, the inspectors conducted independent radiation surveys in the
VBWR, GETR and EVESR containment buildings. The inspectors used a Thermo
Fisher Scientific Model SX with a Thermo Fisher Scientific SPA-3 sodium iodide (NaI(Tl))
detector (Serial Nos. 52210 and 19212, calibration due date March 3, 2020) for
measuring dose rates, and a Thermo Fisher Scientific E-600 with a Thermo Fisher
Scientific HP-380AB alpha-beta scintillation probe (Serial Nos. 02463 and 00906,
calibration due date November 13, 2019) for measuring alpha and beta contamination
levels. In general, dose rate levels within each containment building were consistent
with information contained in the licensees 2018 annual shutdown reactor report, dated
12
March 27, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19087A125). However, radiation levels in
specific containment building locations were elevated in comparison to information
contained in the licensees 2018 annual shutdown reactor report.
At locations where elevated radiation levels were measured within VBWR and GETR,
the inspectors collected a total of fifteen dry smear samples to identify radionuclides that
were present as removable contamination on concrete surfaces. The dry smear
samples were analyzed by the U.S. Department of Energys Radiological and
Environmental Sciences Laboratory, which served as the NRCs independent
radioanalytical laboratory for this inspection. The results were evaluated to identify the
presence of radionuclides using a 95 percent confidence interval (plus and minus two
standard deviations) of the measurement result. Although the sample collection size
limited the number of radioanalytical procedures that could be performed on each dry
smear sample, collectively the analyses identified a spectrum of radionuclides in
removable surface contamination within both buildings.
The inspectors collected seven dry smear samples in VBWR. On the entry floor level of
VBWR, cesium-137 and strontium-90 were identified in the inspectors samples. On the
VBWR basement floor level, americium-241, cesium-137, cobalt-60, plutonium-238/239,
strontium-90, and uranium-234/235/238 were identified in the inspectors smear
samples. The licensee collected nine dry smear samples near the inspectors smear
sample locations and provided duplicate samples to the inspectors. Analysis of the
licensees dry smears samples by the NRCs independent radioanalytical laboratory
identified similar radionuclides as the dry smears collected by the inspectors, with the
addition of nickel-63 on a VBWR basement floor level sample.
The inspectors collected eight dry smear samples in GETR. On the entry and top floor
levels of GETR, americium-241, cesium-137, cobalt-60, strontium-90, technecium-99,
and uranium-234/235/238 were identified. Cesium-137 and cobalt-60 were identified on
the basement floor level. The licensee provided five duplicate samples of their dry
smear samples collected on the entry floor level. The NRCs independent
radioanalytical laboratory identified cesium-137, nickel-63, and technicium-99 in the
licensees samples.
5.3 Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that the licensee conducted its radiation control program in
accordance with license conditions and regulatory requirements, with three exceptions.
The inspectors identified three violations in program areas related to occupational
radiation exposure.
6 Exit Meeting Summary
On May 16, 2019, the NRC inspectors presented the final inspection results to Mr. Matt
Feyrer, Site Manager and other members of the licensees staff. The inspectors asked
the licensee whether any material examined during the inspection should be considered
proprietary information. No proprietary information was identified.
13
SUPPLEMENTAL INSPECTION INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee
M. Feyrer, Site Manager
B. Lockwood, GEH Senior VP Manufacturing
J. Smyly, Environmental, Health and Safety Manager
S. Murray, GEH Licensing Manager
D. Hart, Senior VP Environmental, Health, and Safety
D. Heckman, Regulatory Affairs and Licensing Lead
K. Zanotto, Lead Manufacturing Projects
J. Ayala, Radiation Protection Supervisor
H. Stuart, Radiation Monitor Technician
INSPECTION PROCEDURES
IP 71801 Decommissioning Performance and Status Review at Permanently Shutdown Reactors
IP 69002 Class III Research and Test Reactors
IP 36801 Organization, Management, and Cost Controls at Permanently Shutdown Reactors
IP 37801 Safety Reviews, Design Changes, and Modifications at Permanently Shutdown Reactors
IP 40801 Self-Assessment, Auditing, and Corrective Action at Permanently Shutdown Reactors
IP 83750 Occupational Radiation Exposure
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
05000018/2019001-01 VIO Failure to implement Procedure 6.2, Patrols and
Inspections, Revision 11, for activities associated with
VBWR.05000018/2019001-02 VIO Failure to perform adequate surveys in VBWR, GETR,
and EVESR containment buildings to demonstrate
compliance with 10 CFR 20.1501(a).05000018/2019001-03 VIO Failure to ensure that instruments and equipment used
for radiation measurements in the containment
buildings are calibrated for the radiation measured in
compliance with 10 CFR 20.1501(c).05000018/2019001-04 VIO Failure to implement and maintain a respiratory
protection program, for activities associated with air
sampling of the containment buildings in compliance
with 10 CFR 20.1703(c)(1).05000183/2019001-01 URI Regulatory Compliance with 10 CFR 50.71(e)(4)
requirements for final safety analysis report.
Closed
05000018/2018001-01 VIO Failure to implement Procedure 6.2, Patrols and
Inspections, Revision 7, for activities associated with
VBWR.
Attachment
LIST OF ACRONYMS
ADAMS Agency Documents Access and Management Systems
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CR Condition Report
EVESR Empire State Atomic Development Associates Incorporated Vallecitos
Experimental Superheat Reactor
FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report
GEH GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy Americas, LLC
GETR General Electric Test Reactor
MW Megawatt
NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NOV Notice of Violation
URI Unresolved Item
VBWR Vallecitos Boiling Water Reactor
VIO Violation
VNC Vallecitos Nuclear Center
WEP Waste Evaporator Plant
2
SUNSI Review ADAMS: Sensitive Non-Publicly Available Keyword
By: SGA Yes No Non-Sensitive Publicly Available NRC-002
OFFICE DNMS/RIB DNMS/RIB DNMS/MIB OCHFO
NAME SGAnderson CDSteely JFKatanic NJGriffis
SIGNATURE /RA/ /RA/via email /RA/ /RA/via email
DATE 6/17/19 6/24/19 6/14/19 6/14/19
OFFICE NMSS/RDB NMSS/RDB C:RIB
NAME JDParrott AMHuffert GGWarnick
SIGNATURE /RA/via email /RA/via email /RA/
DATE 6/18/19 6/14/19 6/24/19