ML22339A174
| ML22339A174 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vallecitos Nuclear Center, Vallecitos |
| Issue date: | 12/13/2022 |
| From: | Greg Warnick NRC/RGN-IV/DRSS/DIOR |
| To: | Pedley C GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy |
| Anderson S | |
| References | |
| IR 2022002 | |
| Download: ML22339A174 (19) | |
See also: IR 05000018/2022002
Text
December 12, 2022
Mr. Charles Pedley, Site Manager
Vallecitos Nuclear Center
GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy
6705 Vallecitos Road
Sunol, CA 94586-8524
SUBJECT: GE HITACHI NUCLEAR ENERGY NRC INSPECTION REPORT 050-00018/2022-
002, 050-00070/2022-002, AND 050-00183/2022-002
Dear Mr. Pedley:
This letter refers to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection conducted on
November 7-9, 2022, at your Vallecitos Nuclear Center in Sunol, California. The inspection
covered the following shutdown reactors under the subject licenses, Vallecitos Boiling Water
Reactor (VBWR), General Electric Test Reactor (GETR), and Empire State Atomic Development
Associates Incorporated Vallecitos Experimental Superheat Reactor (EVESR). The NRC
inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and members of your staff on
November 9, 2022. The inspection results are documented in the enclosure to this letter.
During this inspection, the NRC inspectors examined activities conducted under your licenses
as they relate to public health and safety, the environment, and to confirm compliance with the
Commissions rules and regulations, as well as with the conditions of your license. Within these
areas, the inspection consisted of the examination of selected procedures and representative
records, tour of the reactors and supporting equipment, independent radiation surveys, and
interviews with personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has determined that one Severity Level IV
violation of NRC requirements occurred. The violation was evaluated in accordance with the
NRC Enforcement Policy. The current NRC Enforcement Policy is included on the NRCs
Web site at (https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html).
The violation cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice) and the circumstances
surrounding it are described in detail in the subject inspection report. The violation is being cited
in the Notice because it was identified by the NRC and corrective actions had not been fully
articulated on the docket at the time of the final exit meeting. Therefore, you are required to
respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when
preparing your response. If you have additional information that you believe the NRC should
consider, you may provide it in your response to the Notice. The NRC review of your response
to the Notice will also determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure
compliance with regulatory requirements.
C. Pedley 2
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Agency Rules of Practice and Procedure, a
copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be made available electronically for
public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRCs Agencywide
Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRCs
Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your response
should not include any personal privacy or proprietary, information so that it can be made
available to the Public without redaction.
If you have any questions concerning this inspection report, please contact Stephanie Anderson
at 817-200-1213, or the undersigned at 817-200-1249.
Sincerely,
Signed by Warnick, Gregory
on 12/12/22
Gregory G. Warnick, Chief
Decommissioning, ISFSI, and Operating
Reactor Branch
Division of Radiological Safety and Security
Docket Nos. 050-00018; 050-00070;
050-00183
License Nos. DPR-1; TR-1; DR-10
Enclosures:
1. Notice of Violation
2. Inspection Report 050-00018/2022-002;
050-00070/2022-002; 050-00183/2022-002
SUNSI Review ADAMS: Sensitive Non-Publicly Available Keyword
By: SGA Yes No Non-Sensitive Publicly Available NRC-002
OFFICE DRSS/DIOR DRSS/DIOR RI/DRSS/DIRHP NMSS/RDB
NAME SGAnderson RJEvans KRWarner JDParrott
SIGNATURE SGA RJE KRW JDP
DATE 12/06/2022 12/06/2022 12/06/2022 12/06/2022
OFFICE C:DIOR
NAME GGWarnick
SIGNATURE GGW
DATE 12/12/2022
NOTICE OF VIOLATION
GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy Docket Nos. 050-00018
Vallecitos Boiling Water Reactor 050-00070, 050-00183
GE Test Reactor License Nos. DPR-1; TR-1
ESADA Vallecitos Experimental Superheat Reactor DR-10
During an NRC inspection conducted on November 7-9, 2022, one violation of NRC
requirements of greater than minor significance was identified. In accordance with the NRC
Enforcement Policy, the violation is listed below:
10 CFR 20.1601(a) states, in part, The licensee shall ensure that each entrance or
access point to a high radiation area has one or more of the following features(3)
Entryways that are locked, except during periods when access to the areas is required,
with positive control over each individual entry.
Licensee Procedures WI-27-105-01, Posting and Control of Radiological Areas,
revision 3, and WI-27-105-15, High Radiation Area Access Control, revision 2,
implements the positive control provision of the regulation as stated above. Procedure
WI-27-105-01, section 4.6.2, describes several ways to establish controls for a high
radiation area when one is unlocked. These include assigning an attendant at the
entrance to prevent unauthorized access or providing a control device with a
conspicuous visible or audible alarm neither of which were implemented. Procedure
WI-27-105-15, section 4.1.4, states If a guard will be used to control high radiation area
(HRA) access, then ensure the Guard has been briefed and understands the
responsibilities of a Guard per Attachment 3, Access Control Guard Responsibilities.
Attachment 3 requires, in part, that the guard maintains direct line-of-sight surveillance
of the access to the high radiation area until it is locked/secured and prevents
unauthorized entry into the high radiation area by verifying individuals seeking access to
the high radiation area are authorized on the radiation work permit.
Contrary to the above, on November 9, 2022, GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy failed to
establish positive controls over an entry to a posted high radiation area. Specifically,
during an NRC tour of the Waste Evaporator Plant (WEP) building, the licensee failed to
assign and brief an attendant per procedures WI-27-105-01 and WI-27-105-15, and as a
result, the licensee failed to maintain positive control over the posted high radiation area.
This is a Severity Level IV violation (Section 6.3).
Pursuant to the provisions of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) 2.201, GE Hitachi
Nuclear Energy is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001,
with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region IV, 1600 E. Lamar Blvd., Arlington, TX 76011-
4511, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). This
reply should be clearly marked as a Reply to a Notice of Violation and should include for each
violation: (1) the reason for the violation, or if contested, the basis for disputing the violation or
severity level; (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved; (3) the
corrective steps that will be taken; and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved.
Your response may reference or include previously docketed correspondence, if the
correspondence adequately addresses the required response. If an adequate reply is not
received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be
Enclosure 1
issued requiring information as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or
revoked, or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Where good cause is
shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time.
If you contest this enforcement action, you should also provide a copy of your response, with
the basis for your denial, to the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-001, with a copy to the Regional
Administrator, Region IV.
Your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public
Document Room or in the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To
the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary or
safeguards information so that it can be made available to the public without redaction.
In accordance with 10 CFR 19.11, you may be required to post this Notice within two working
days of receipt.
Dated this 12 day of December 2022
2
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket Nos.: 050-00018; 050-00070; and 050-00183
License Nos.: DPR-1; TR-1; and DR-10
Report Nos.: 050-00018/2022-002; 050-00070/2022-002; and 050-00183/2022-002
Licensee: GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy
Facility: Vallecitos Boiling Water Reactor (VBWR)
GE Test Reactor (GETR)
ESADA Vallecitos Experimental Superheat Reactor (EVESR)
Location: 6705 Vallecitos Road
Sunol, California
Inspection Dates: November 7-9, 2022
Inspectors: Stephanie G. Anderson
Senior Health Physicist
Decommissioning, ISFSI, and Operating Reactor Branch
Division of Radiological Safety and Security
Robert J. Evans, PhD, CHP, PE
Senior Health Physicist
Decommissioning, ISFSI, and Operating Reactor Branch
Division of Radiological Safety and Security
Katherine R. Warner
Senior Health Physicist
Decommissioning, ISFSI, and Reactor HP Branch
Division of Radiological Safety and Security
Jack D. Parrott
Senior Project Manager
Reactor Decommissioning Branch
Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards
Accompanied By: Eric S. McManus
Health Physicist
Decommissioning, ISFSI, and Operating Reactor Branch
Division of Radiological Safety and Security
Approved By: Gregory G. Warnick, Branch Chief
Decommissioning, ISFSI, and Operating Reactor Branch
Division of Radiological Safety and Security
Enclosure 2
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy
NRC Inspection Report 050-00018/2022-002; 050-00070/2022-002; and 050-00183/2022-002
This U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection was a routine, announced inspection
of licensed activities being conducted at the three permanently defueled reactors at the Vallecitos
Nuclear Center. In summary, the inspectors identified one Severity Level IV violation. Other than
the one identified violation, the licensee was conducting these activities in accordance with site
procedures, license requirements, and applicable NRC regulations.
Decommissioning Performance and Status Review at Permanently Shutdown Reactors and
Class III Research and Test Reactors
The licensee conducted annual inspections and audits of the three shutdown reactors in
accordance with regulatory, license, and procedure requirements. (Section 1.2)
Safety Reviews, Design Changes, and Modifications at Permanently Shutdown Reactors
The licensee implemented its safety review program in accordance with its procedures and
regulatory requirements. (Section 2.2)
Problem Identification and Resolution at Permanently Shutdown Reactors
The inspectors concluded that the licensee was adequately implementing its corrective
action program in accordance with regulatory requirements. (Section 3.2)
Fire Protection Program at Permanently Shutdown Reactors
The licensee had implemented a fire protection program that reasonably prevented fires
from occurring and was capable of rapidly extinguishing those fires that occurred.
(Section 4.2)
Occupational Radiation Exposure at Permanently Shutdown Reactors
The inspectors concluded that the licensee conducted its radiation control program in
accordance with license conditions and regulatory requirements, with one exception of more
than minor significance. The inspectors identified one Severity Level IV violation in the high
radiation area controls area of occupational radiation exposure. The licensee monitored
occupational exposures, and the results for 2021 - to date in 2022 were less than regulatory
limits. The licensee continued to conduct annual radiological surveys within each of the
shutdown reactor structures as required by the three licenses, and the licensee reported the
results to the NRC in an annual report. (Section 5.2)
Radioactive Waste Treatment, and Effluent and Environmental Monitoring
The licensee collected and analyzed all required effluent and environmental monitoring
samples, and no sample result exceeded the respective regulatory or procedural limits. Site
operations had a negligible effect on public doses during 2021. (Section 6.2)
2
Report Details
Summary of Plant Status
The GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy Americas, LLC (GEH or Licensee) transitioned the three
shutdown reactors, Vallecitos Boiling Water Reactor (VBWR), General Electric Test Reactor
(GETR), and Empire State Atomic Development Associates Incorporated Vallecitos Experimental
Superheat Reactor (EVESR) from a possession-only, safe storage (SAFSTOR) condition, with
no fuel remaining in the reactors or spent fuel pools to DECON status.
On December 15, 2015, the licensee submitted a request for license continuance under Title
10 to the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.51(b) for reactor licenses DR-10 and TR-1
(Agencywide Documents Access and Management System [ADAMS] Accession No.
ML15349A045). That request was approved by letter dated January 2, 2019 (ML18352A450).
The licensee also submitted a request on July 10, 2015 (ML15195A088), for an alternate
decommissioning schedule as described in 10 CFR 50.82(a)(3) and 50.82(b)(4)(i), using the
exemption criteria of 10 CFR 50.12.
On March 19, 2021 (ML19304B459), the NRC staff submitted a SECY paper to the
Commissioners, SECY-21-0033, Request for an exemption from the decommissioning schedule
requirements for shutdown reactors at GE Hitachi Vallecitos Nuclear Center. In the SECY
paper, there were two options for the Commissions consideration. Option 1 was to approve a 10 CFR 50.12 exemption from the applicable decommissioning schedule requirements of 10 CFR 50.82(a)(3) and 10 CFR 50.82(b)(4)(i) for the EVESR and GETR and delegate to the staff only
the authority to grant or deny such an exemption for the VBWR based on GEHs demonstration
of the VBWRs continued structural integrity. Option 2 was to deny the exemption request for all
three shutdown reactors at the Vallecitos Nuclear Center (VNC). The NRC staff recommend
approving Option 1, a 10 CFR 50.12 exemption from the applicable decommissioning schedule
requirements of 10 CFR 50.82(a)(3) and 10 CFR 50.82(b)(4)(i) for the EVESR and GETR and to
delegate to the staff the authority to grant or deny such an exemption for the VBWR based on
the licensees demonstration of the VBWRs continued structural integrity.
On August 6, 2021 (ML21218A110), the Commission disapproved the staffs recommendation to
grant GEH an exemption of 10 CFR 50.12, to extend the decommissioning schedule for EVESR,
GETR, and VBWR and instead approved a denial of the request under Option 2. On August 25,
2021 (ML21237A064), GEH requested to withdraw its exemption request for the shutdown
reactors from an alternate decommissioning schedule. By letter dated October 12, 2021
(ML21258A042), the NRC staff sent a letter to GEH accepting the withdraw of the exemption
request and reviewed the requirements from 10 CFR 50.82 that apply to the decommissioning of
the shutdown reactors at the VNC.
On September 21, 2022 (ML22264A325), GEH submitted their Limited Post-Shutdown
Decommissioning Activities Report (LPSDAR) to demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(4), 10 CFR 50.82(a)(6), and 10 CFR 50.82(a)(7). Although 10 CFR 50.82(a)(4)
requirements for content of the PSDAR do not apply to VBWR and EVESR, GEH agreed to
prepare the LPSDAR consistent with the description in 10 CFR 50.82(a)(4) and Regulatory
Guide 1.185, Standard Format and Content for Post-Shutdown Decommissioning Activities
Report.
For 2023 inspection activities, in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 2561,
Decommissioning Power Reactor Inspection Program, the direct inspection effort associated
3
with the implementation of the core inspection procedures will increase as the site transitions to
a Category 3 site as defined as Actively Decommissioning (DECON), no fuel in the spent fuel
pool.
1 Decommissioning Performance and Status Review at Permanently Shutdown
Reactors (71801) and Class III Research and Test Reactors (69002)
1.1 Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees control and oversight of the three shutdown
reactors.
1.2 Observations and Findings
a. Vallecitos Boiling Water Reactor
The VBWR is a possession-only reactor under License No. DPR-1, Amendment 21. It
was a 50-megawatt (MW) power reactor that achieved full power operations in 1957,
after receiving its Construction Permit No. CPPR-3 on May 14, 1956. It was shut down
on December 9, 1963, for an extended period of time and subsequently was
deactivated. All fuel has been removed from the facility.
The possession-only facility license DPR-1, License Condition 4 states in part, that
there should be an audible control device maintained on the doors to the containment
building. In addition, License Condition 5 authorizes GEH to dispose of component parts
or devices from the VBWR facility in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR Part 20.
The licensee removed extensive components from the facility between October 2007
and November 2008. All reactor systems have been removed except for the reactor
vessel. The licensee does monitor the water level weekly in the reactor vessel and at the
time of the inspection, the manometer was not in service due to active work around the
reactor vessel to prepare the vessel for removal from the containment.
The inspectors toured the facility with licensee representatives. The inspectors
confirmed there was an audible control device functioning on the manual doors to the
containment building that provided an alarm at the 300-area alarm panel and at the
Central Alarm Station. The inspectors observed that the roll-up door was secured, which
was installed in place of the equipment hatch. The inspectors entered the basement
level to observe the condition and integrity of the retired facility. The inspectors identified
humidity and temperature sensors in the retired facility. The inspectors observed multiple
crack formation throughout the containment building. The cracks are being monitored by
the licensee to determine growth rate. During the inspection, the inspectors did not
identify any standing water on the floor of the basement. The sump pump was in
operation at the time of the inspection, and any water that is collected in the basement of
VBWR is pumped to the VBWR transfer tank, then ultimately transferred to the onsite
waste evaporator plant for processing.
b. ESADA Vallecitos Experimental Superheat Reactor
The ESADA Vallecitos Experimental Superheat Reactor (EVESR) is a possession-only
reactor under License No. DR-10, Amendment No. 7. The EVESR was a light water
moderated, steam cooled, superheat, experimental research reactor that used slightly
4
enriched uranium dioxide as fuel. It operated at a maximum of 17 MW thermal and was
initially licensed in 1963. It achieved full power operation in 1964, and was shut down on
February 1, 1967, and subsequently deactivated. All fuel and other special nuclear
material had been removed and shipped offsite. In addition, a significant amount of
equipment used to operate the reactor, such as nuclear instrumentation, piping, pumps,
and valves has been removed.
The inspectors toured the facility with licensee representatives. The inspectors
confirmed there was an audible control device functioning on the airlock door to the
containment building that provided an alarm at the 300 feet elevation area alarm panel
and at the Central Alarm Station. The licensee had a portable dehumidifier to remove
significant quantities of condensation that tended to buildup in the facility. The licensee
had lighting installed and it was operating sufficiently to ensure the passageways and
stairs were safely lit. The stack was no longer operational, and the licensee was using a
portable ventilation system.
c. General Electric Test Reactor
The GETR is a possession-only reactor under License No. TR-1, Amendment No. 17.
The reactor was a 50 MW thermal experimental test, development, and isotope
production reactor that utilized highly enriched plate fuel and was initially licensed to
operate in 1959. The reactor was shut down in 1977 and subsequently deactivated. All
fuel and isotope production targets containing special nuclear material have been
removed from the facility and shipped offsite. The reactor, systems and piping, and
spent fuel pool have been drained of water.
The inspectors toured the containment building, old control room, and tank farm. As
GETR has been shut down since 1977, there are no licensed operators nor a
requalification program, which is appropriate for the plant conditions. Staffing was
appropriate to meet the required weekly surveillance patrols, which were being
conducted in accordance with site procedures.
d. Other
The licenses for the three shutdown reactors require, in part, that activities involving
access to the facility area and use of any area shall be conducted under the direction of
a designated facility manager with functional responsibility and commensurate authority
to maintain the facility in a safe and secure condition at all times. The inspectors
reviewed the licensees organization and discussed the organizational structure with
members of the licensees organization. Based on discussions and observations, the
inspectors determined that the individual fulfilling the licensed responsibility as the facility
manager for the defueled reactors, adequately met the license condition requirements.
The licensee is managing the site as required by all regulatory and license requirements
including management of their decommissioning file as required by 10 CFR 50.75(g).
The inspectors evaluated the licensees decommissioning cost planning and
assessment, being an important part of the decommissioning process. The inspectors
determined that the licensees cost planning and assessment were inclusive of current
and planned major decommissioning activities as identified in the LPSDAR.
5
1.3 Conclusions
The licensee conducted annual inspections and audits of the three shutdown reactors in
accordance with regulatory, license, and procedure requirements.
2 Safety Reviews, Design Changes, and Modifications at Permanently Shutdown
Reactors (37801)
2.1 Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees control and oversight of the safety review
program to ensure design changes, tests, experiments and modifications were
effectively conducted, managed, and controlled during plant decommissioning.
2.2 Observations and Findings
There were three 10 CFR 50.59 modifications by the licensee related to the shutdown
reactors to review for 2022 to date. All three modifications were for the VBWR and
included the installation of a staircase in lieu of a ladder to the basement area,
radioactive characterization of the reactor vessel, and removal of shielding materials
around the vessel in preparation for vessel removal. The inspectors reviewed VSS 2.0,
Change Authorization, revision 24, and determined that the licensee had appropriately
followed the procedure to screen the changes. It was noted by the inspectors through
document review and interviews that cognizant licensee personnel were knowledgeable
and appeared to be appropriately trained.
2.3 Conclusions
The licensee implemented its safety review program in accordance with its procedures
and regulatory requirements.
3 Problem Identification and Resolution Action at Permanently Shutdown Reactors
(40801)
3.1 Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program related to the oversight
of the three shutdown reactors.
3.2 Observations and Findings
At the time of the inspection the licensee was implementing its corrective action program
under procedures CP-16-108, Corrective Action Program, revision 13.4, WI-16-108-01,
Condition Review Process, revision 12.0, WI-20-106-06, Corrective Action Program
Qualifications, revision 7.0, and CP-16-202, Common Cause Analysis, revision 6.0.
These procedures apply to all the GE-Hitachi nuclear sites including the facilities at the
VNC. The inspectors reviewed the implementation of those procedures and a list of
corrective action condition reports on the shutdown reactors generated between August
2021 and the time of the inspection, including several specific condition reports (CRs)
6
related to the shutdown reactors (i.e., CRs 38035, 40513, 40514, and 40551) for
adherence to the corrective action procedure.
The inspectors also reviewed CR-39044, a three-year trend analysis of CR categories
specific to the VNC for trends and common causes for identified trends, the process and
results of GEHs Vallecitos specific trend analysis of CR categories based on key words,
the recent efforts by GEH to better specify trend categories specific to the activities done
on site and related to the shutdown reactors for better identification of issues, and how
these trending issues are reviewed by management. Also reviewed was the 2022
Vallecitos Radiation Survey Audit, the identification of opportunities for improvement,
and the capture of those issues in the corrective action system.
3.3 Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that the licensee was adequately implementing its corrective
action program in accordance with regulatory requirements.
4 Fire Protection Program at Permanently Shutdown Reactors (64704)
4.1 Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the licensees fire protection program to support licensed
activities and regulatory requirements.
4.2 Observations and Findings
The licensee is required under 10 CFR 50.48(f) to maintain a fire protection program to:
(1) reasonably prevent fires from occurring; (2) rapidly detect, control, and extinguish
those fires that do occur and that could result in a radiological hazard; and (3) ensure
that the risk of fire-induced radiological hazards to the public, environment, and plant
personnel are minimized. The three shutdown reactors are required to have a fire
protection program; however, they are not required to maintain fire detection or
suppression equipment at their facilities because the majority of flammable materials
have been removed. The inspectors reviewed the fire protection program from an
emergency preparedness perspective to verify that the program can reasonably prevent
fires from occurring and rapidly extinguish those fires. The inspectors also reviewed the
fire drill report for 2022, fire extinguisher monthly surveillances, fire training, fire hoses
conditions, and the preventive maintenance monthly inspections.
4.3 Conclusions
The licensee had implemented a fire protection program that reasonably prevented fires
from occurring and was capable of rapidly extinguishing those fires that occurred.
5 Occupational Radiation Exposure at Permanently Shutdown Reactors (83750)
5.1 Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed occupational exposures and the results of the licensees
radiological surveys within the three shutdown reactors for compliance with license and
regulatory requirements.
7
5.2 Observations and Findings
The inspectors toured accessible areas within the site restricted areas, in part, to
observe radiological postings, area boundaries, and access controls. During site tours,
the inspectors conducted independent radiation measurements to ensure postings and
boundaries reflected actual radiological hazards. The inspectors independently
measured ambient gamma radiation levels using a Ludlum Model 2401-EC2 survey
meter (serial number 181580, calibration due date of 1/28/23, calibrated to cesium-137).
The inspectors toured the VBWR. The operating deck measured under 1 millirem per
hour. The basement area of the VBWR measured less than 5 millirem per hour, with the
sump area measuring around 3-4 millirem per hour. The general areas of the EVESR
and GETR measured under 5 millirem per hour, and areas that exceeded 5 millirem per
hour in GETR were properly posted as radiation areas as required by 10 CFR
20.1902(a). The inspectors also toured the onsite radiological count room and waste
evaporator plant. The count room and waste evaporator plant (WEP) measured less
than 5 millirem per hour with most areas at or near background levels.
The inspectors noted that the licensee performed several non-routine work activities in
the VBWR in 2022 as part of initial decommissioning activities. The inspectors reviewed
a sampling of documentation associated with these activities, including radiological
surveys and radiation work permits and did not identify any issues of more than minor
significance. The inspectors walked down the storage location of waste generated from
a recent activity involving removing shielding materials around the VBWR in preparation
for eventual shipment. The inspectors determined that the containers were appropriately
labeled, and the area was appropriately posted.
In the area of training, the inspectors reviewed procedure No. 1200, Qualification of
Radiation Monitoring Technicians, revision 0, and discussed its use with the radiation
safety officer. This new procedure provides a framework for the licensee to review the
qualifications of incoming radiation protection personnel and provide site-specific
training. The inspectors noted that the implementation of this process is timely given
increased use of radiation protection contractors for decommissioning work.
The occupational dose limits for adults are provided in 10 CFR 20.1201. The inspectors
reviewed the licensees occupational exposure records and discussed these records
with the radiation safety officer. The licensee divided the site staff into groups based on
major work activities. The groups included facilities management, nuclear test reactor,
and radiation protection. Worker exposures were primarily from external sources but
may include internal exposures based on air sample results.
During calendar year 2021, the onsite individual who received the highest total effective
dose equivalent exposure worked at the nuclear test reactor. This individual received
0.697 rem with a regulatory limit of 5 rem. The highest dose to a facilities worker was
0.424 rem, while the highest dose to a radiation protection worker was 0.330 rem. The
inspectors also reviewed the available occupational exposure records for calendar year
2022. At the time of the inspection, all doses were within the regulatory limit of 5 rem.
The licensee continued to monitor worker exposures using optically stimulated
dosimeters, electronic dosimeters, and air sampling as necessary based on the work
assignment.
8
The licenses for the three shutdown reactors include conditions, which state that a
general radiation survey shall be conducted at least annually, and the results of the
survey shall be submitted to the NRC on an annual basis. The radiological surveys of
the interiors of the three shutdown reactors were conducted in July and September
2021. The results of the surveys were submitted to the NRC by letter dated March 25,
2022 (ML22089A223). The radiological surveys included ambient and surface radiation
levels, removable contamination levels, and ambient air samples. The inspectors
reviewed the sample results for 2021. Although each building had variable levels of
contamination, according to the licensee, the overall radioactivity levels were found to
remain low. The licensee had completed their 2022 annual inspections and surveys of
the shutdown reactors, but at the time of this inspection, the report had not been issued.
The inspectors toured the WEP, in part, to observe radiological postings and access
controls. The licensee uses the WEP to process contaminated water from site facilities,
including the VBWR. The WEP is enclosed in one building, which is posted as a high
radiation area (HRA) and normally kept locked. As defined by 10 CFR 20.1003, a HRA is
an area, accessible to individuals, in which radiation levels from radiation sources
external to the body could result in an individual receiving a dose equivalent in excess of
0.1 rem (1 mSv) in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> at 30 centimeters from the radiation source or 30 centimeters
from any surface that the radiation penetrates. Within the WEP building, there are two
specific areas where radiation dose rates are expected to exceed high radiation dose
rate levels. One area is within the waste processing room and another under a holdup
tank. The waste processing room was verified to be locked. The area under the holdup
tank was accessible during the tour since the building was unlocked with access
available through a door and two roll up doors to the building. Recent surveys in July
and October 2022 both document a dose rate of 105 mrem/hour under the holdup tank,
which exceeded the HRA criteria stated above.
The inspectors identified one Severity Level IV notice of violation (NOV) of 10 CFR 20.1601(a) for the licensees failure to positively control an unlocked posted high
radiation area. 10 CFR 20.1601(a) states, in part, The licensee shall ensure that each
entrance or access point to a high radiation area has one or more of the following
features(3) Entryways that are locked, except during periods when access to the areas
is required, with positive control over each individual entry.
Licensee procedures WI-27-105-01, Posting and Control of Radiological Areas,
revision 3.0 and WI-27-105-15, High Radiation Area Access Control, revision 2.0
implements the positive control provision of the regulation as stated above. Procedure
WI-27-105-01, section 4.6.2, describes several ways to establish controls for a high
radiation area when one is unlocked. These include assigning an attendant at the
entrance to prevent unauthorized access or providing a control device with a
conspicuous visible or audible alarm neither of which were implemented. Procedure
WI-27-105-15, section 4.1.4, states, If a guard will be used to control HRA access, then
ensure the Guard has been briefed and understands the responsibilities of a Guard per
Attachment 3, Access Control Guard Responsibilities. Attachment 3 requires, in part,
that the guard maintains direct line-of-sight surveillance of the access to the HRA until
it is locked/secured and prevents unauthorized entry into the HRA by verifying
individuals seeking access to the HRA are authorized on the radiation work permit
(RWP).
9
Contrary to the above, on November 9, 2022, GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy failed to
establish positive controls over an entry to a posted HRA. Specifically, during the NRC
tour of the WEP building, the licensee failed to assign and brief an attendant per
procedures WI-27-105-01 and WI-27-105-15, and as a result the licensee failed to
maintain positive control over the posted HRA. (VIO 0500018/2022002-01)
The inspectors informed the significance determination using example 6.3.d.3 of the
NRC Enforcement Policy, dated January 14, 2022, regarding the failure to implement
procedures, where the failure has a low safety significance and the licensee
administrative requirement/limit issues example in the NRC Enforcement Manual,
Appendix E, Minor Violations - Examples, regarding the control of high radiation limits
where conditions exceed NRC regulatory limits. Additionally, the inspectors informed the
significance determination using the general screening criteria in section 6.0 of IMC 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, which describes the failure of one
radiological barrier to be of minor significance. The inspectors noted that this issue
involved a failure of multiple radiological barriers, including failure to follow procedures
WI-27-105-01 and WI-27-105-15, failure of radiation protection supervision oversight,
and failure to provide adequate instructions to workers of the area hazards, therefore the
issue is considered of more than minor significance.
The inspectors noted that while the building was posted as an HRA, the waste
processing room nor the area around the tank were posted or identified as having HRA
conditions. Further, until the inspectors queried the licensee, the higher dose areas were
not briefed. The inspectors were briefed to radiation work permit 2022-09 with a dose
rate limit of 100 mrem/hr. This RWP did not allow entry into HRA conditions. While no
actual entries to HRA conditions occurred, the inspectors noted that the above examples
are failures to provide adequate instructions to workers of radiological hazards.
5.3 Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that the licensee conducted its radiation control program in
accordance with license conditions and regulatory requirements, with one exception of
more than minor significance. The inspectors identified one Severity Level IV violation in
the HRA controls area of occupational radiation exposure.
The licensee monitored occupational exposures, and the results for 2021 - to date in
2022 were less than regulatory limits. The licensee continued to conduct annual
radiological surveys within each of the shutdown reactor structures as required by the
three licenses, and the licensee reported the results to the NRC in an annual report.
6 Radioactive Waste Treatment, and Effluent and Environmental Monitoring (84750)
6.1 Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees effluent and environmental monitoring program
for the facility. The objectives of this portion of the inspection effort were to ensure that
discharges of radioactive materials were adequately quantified and evaluated, and to
ensure that the radiological effluent and environmental program requirements were
effectively implemented.
6.2 Observations and Findings
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a. Radioactive Waste Treatment
The WEP is designed to receive, transfer, store, process, and dispose of aqueous
radioactive waste liquids generated at the VNC. The evaporation process separates
radioactive products from the liquid by boiling the liquid in a closed tank. The steam
effluent is condensed in a separate chamber to relatively pure water while the
radioactive products remain in the evaporator to eventually be transferred to drums for
solidification and/or disposal. The inspectors conducted a walkdown of the waste
evaporator plant and compared system operations to applicable operating procedures.
The plant systems were not in service at the time of the inspection.
The inspectors observed the status of the equipment in the building. The 30,000-gallon
storage tank was out of service due to an annulus leak. The inspectors observed the
ozone/ultraviolet system where process liquids containing organics were processed. A
licensee representative indicated that this system was rarely used since the liquid
wastes did not normally contain organic material. The inspectors observed the locations
where the water was sampled prior to final evaporation and where the gaseous effluent
was monitored prior to release. Licensee representatives discussed how the evaporation
plant equipment worked and how air and water samples were collected.
The inspectors reviewed recent water and air sample results collected from the waste
evaporator plants liquid and effluent release points and discussed the results with the
licensees staff. The air samples were collected from the outlet of the exhaust air filters,
while the water samples were collected from the monitor tanks prior to release to the
atmosphere as steam. The sample results were less than the procedural action levels.
b. Effluent and Environmental Monitoring
Licenses DR-10 and DPR-1 for the EVESR and VBWR, respectively, require the
licensee to maintain records showing the radioactivity released or discharged into the air
or water beyond the effective control of the licensee as measured at the point of such
release or discharge. At the time of the inspection, the licensee had established and
implemented effluent and environmental monitoring programs in accordance with the
instructions provide in the Environmental Monitoring Manual, revision 6, and procedure
7.2, Radioactive Effluent Control, revision 13. Section 3.1 of the Environmental
Monitoring Manual requires the licensee to submit the results from the previous year to
the NRC by May 1st of each calendar year. The inspectors reviewed the 2021 results
(ML22068A248) and discussed the results with licensee staff.
The licensees effluent monitoring program included gaseous and liquid effluents.
Airborne effluents were continuously monitored at four operating building discharge
stacks. Three other stacks remained idle during 2021. Liquid effluents included industrial
wastewater, sanitary wastewater, and stormwater runoff. The licensees records indicate
that all releases were within the action level limits established in the Environmental
Monitoring Manual and site procedures.
The licensees environmental monitoring program included groundwater monitoring,
stream sediment sampling, vegetation sampling, air sampling, and gamma radiation
monitoring. At the time of the inspection, the licensee was sampling 10 monitoring wells
on either a quarterly or annual basis. One sediment sample was collected from a local
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stream downgradient from the industrial wastewater and sanitary wastewater retention
basins. Vegetation was measured at two locations at the site boundary. In addition,
environmental air sampling was conducted at four stations generally located in the four
quadrants around the site. Finally, gamma radiation monitoring was conducted at 20
locations around the site. The inspectors noted that the 2021 sample results were less
than the respective action levels as presented in the Environmental Monitoring Manual
and site procedures.
To demonstrate compliance with the dose limits specified in 10 CFR 20.1101(d) and
10 CFR 20.1301(a), the licensee calculated the public doses at the site boundary using
the COMPLY computer code as allowed by Regulatory Guide 4.20, Constraint on
Releases of Airborne Radioactive Materials to the Environment for Licensees Other
Than Power Reactors. The inspectors reviewed some of the licensees input parameters
into the COMPLY code. Based on the data collected during 2021, the dose at the
property line from all gaseous emissions was calculated to be 0.5 millirem per year, a
calculated dose that was well below the annual limit of 100 millirem per year specified in
The inspectors observed the operation of one of four environmental air sampling
stations. The air sampler at that station was in service during the tour. The licensees
representative described the operation and calibration requirements for the air sampler.
The inspectors provided the licensee with potential design enhancements to reduce the
potential of rain damage to the filter element.
6.3 Conclusions
The licensee collected and analyzed all required effluent and environmental monitoring
samples, and no sample result exceeded the regulatory or procedural limits. Site
operations had a negligible effect on public doses during 2021.
7 Exit Meeting Summary
On November 9, 2022, the NRC inspectors presented the final inspection results to Mr.
Charles Pedley, Site Manager, and other members of the licensees staff. The inspectors
asked the licensee whether any material examined during the inspection should be
considered proprietary information. No proprietary information was identified.
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SUPPLEMENTAL INSPECTION INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee
C. Pedley, VNC Site Manager
J. Smyly, Environmental Health and Safety Manager
D. Heckman, Regulatory Affairs and Licensing Lead
K. Zanotto, Facilities Manager
J. Ayala, Project Management
D. Demore, Interim Radiation Safety Officer
INSPECTION PROCEDURES
IP 71801 Decommissioning Performance and Status Review at Permanently Shutdown Reactors
IP 69002 Class III Research and Test Reactors
IP 37801 Safety Reviews, Design Changes, and Modifications at Permanently Shutdown Reactors
IP 40801 Problem Identification and Resolution at Permanently Shutdown Reactors
IP 64704 Fire Protection Program at Permanently Shutdown Reactors
IP 83750 Occupational Radiation Exposure at Permanently Shutdown Reactors
IP 84750 Radioactive Waste Treatment, and Effluent and Environmental Monitoring
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
0500018/2022002-01 VIO Failure to positively control an unlocked posted high
radiation area to demonstrate compliance with 10
CFR 20.1601(a).
Closed
None
Discussed
None
LIST OF ACRONYMS
ADAMS Agency Documents Access and Management Systems
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CR Condition Report
EVESR Empire State Atomic Development Associates Incorporated Vallecitos
Experimental Superheat Reactor
GEH GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy Americas, LLC
GETR General Electric Test Reactor
LPSDAR Limited Post-Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report
MW megawatt
NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NOV Notice of Violation
RWP Radiation Work Permit
Attachment
VBWR Vallecitos Boiling Water Reactor
VIO Violation
VNC Vallecitos Nuclear Center
WEP Waste Evaporator Plant
2