IR 05000425/2007005
| ML080250002 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 01/24/2008 |
| From: | Scott Shaeffer NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB2 |
| To: | Tynan T Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| References | |
| IR-07-005 | |
| Download: ML080250002 (18) | |
Text
ary 24, 2008
SUBJECT:
VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT- NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000424/2007005 AND 05000425/2007005
Dear Mr. Tynan:
On December 31, 2007, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on January 18, 2008, with you and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.
In accordance with the Code of Federal Regulations 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Scott M. Shaeffer, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-424, 50-425 License Nos.: NPF-68 and NPF-81
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000424/2007005 and 05000425/2007005 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
REGION II==
Docket Nos.: 50-424, 50-425 License Nos.: NPF-68, NPF-81 Report Nos.: 05000424/2007005 and 05000425/2007005 Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Facility: Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 Location: Waynesboro, GA 30830 Dates: October 1, 2007 - December 31, 2007 Inspectors: G. McCoy, Senior Resident Inspector B. Anderson, Resident Inspector Approved by: Scott Shaeffer, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000424/2007-005, 05000425/2007-005; 10/01/2007 - 12/31/2007; Vogtle Electric
Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2; Routine integrated inspection report.
The report covered a three-month period of inspection by two resident inspectors. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process.
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Licensee-Identified Violations
None.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Both Unit 1 and Unit 2 operated near full rated thermal power for the entire inspection period.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
a. Inspection Scope
Seasonal Readiness Review. The inspectors performed a walkdown of the following two systems to verify they would remain functional during low temperature conditions.
The inspectors reviewed preventive maintenance activities associated with heat tracing and freeze protection systems to verify they were appropriately scheduled and completed prior to the onset of cold weather. The inspectors reviewed compensatory actions to verify they were implemented for degraded or inoperable heat trace and freeze protection equipment. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the condition report (CR) database to verify that adverse weather related items were being identified and appropriately resolved. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
C Unit 1 auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system C Unit 1 and Unit 2 refueling water storage tanks (RWSTs)
Impending Adverse Weather Condition Review. On November 7, the inspectors reviewed licensee procedure 11877-1 and 11877-2, Cold Weather Checklist, to verify the licensee had implemented actions to prepare the plant site for predicted severe weather conditions of sub-freezing temperatures. The inspectors walked down various safety-significant areas of the plant to verify the licensees ability to respond to the predicted adverse weather conditions.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
a. Inspection Scope
Partial Walkdowns. The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following three systems to verify correct system alignment. The inspectors checked for correct valve and electrical power alignments by comparing positions of valves, switches, and breakers to the procedures and drawings listed in the Attachment. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the condition report database to verify that equipment alignment problems were being identified and appropriately resolved.
C Unit 1 train B engineered safety features (ESF) chiller and chilled water system while the Unit 1 train A ESF chiller was out of service for planned maintenance C Unit 1 train B centrifugal charging pump (CCP) while the Unit 1 train A CCP was out of service for planned maintenance C Unit 2 AFW system when the Unit 2 B train emergency diesel generator (EDG) was out of service for planned maintenance.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
Fire Drill Observation. On November 8, inspectors observed a fire drill conducted in the control building, level A, room RA-63. The inspectors assessed the adequacy of the fire drill and fire brigade response using licensee procedures 92000-C, Fire Protection Program; 92005-C, Fire Response Procedure; 92030-C, Fire Drill Program; 92795-2, Zone 95 - Control Building - Level A , Train A Spreading Room Fire Fighting Preplan; 92854-1, Zone 154 - Control Building - Level A Fire Fighting Preplan; and 17103A-C, Annunciator Response Procedures for the Fire Alarm Computer. The inspectors evaluated the fire brigade performance to verify that they responded to the fire in a timely manner, donned proper protective clothing, used self-contained breathing apparatus, and had the equipment necessary to control and extinguish the fire. The inspectors assessed the adequacy of the fire brigades fire fighting strategy including entry into the fire area, communications, search and rescue, and equipment usage.
Fire Area Tours. The inspectors walked down the following six plant areas to verify the licensee was controlling combustible materials and ignition sources as required by procedures 92015-C, Use, Control, and Storage of Flammable/Combustible Materials, and 92020-C, Control of Ignition Sources. The inspectors assessed the observable condition of fire detection, suppression, and protection systems and reviewed the licensees fire protection Limiting Condition for Operation log and CR database to verify that the corrective actions for degraded equipment were identified and appropriately prioritized. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees fire protection program to verify the requirements of Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection Program, and Appendix 9A, Fire Hazards Analysis, were met. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
C Unit 1 auxiliary feedwater pump house C Unit 2 train A EDG building C Unit 2 south fire pump house C Unit 2 auxiliary building, level C C Unit 1 auxiliary building, level 2 C Unit 2 train A and B containment spray rooms
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R06 Flood Protection Measures
a. Inspection Scope
Internal Flood Review. The inspectors walked down the following areas which contained risk-significant structures, systems and components below flood level to verify flood barriers were in place. Motor controllers and terminal boxes that could become potentially submerged were inspected to ensure that the sealing gasket material was intact and undamaged. The inspectors reviewed selected licensee alarm response procedures to verify alarm setpoints and setpoints for sump pump operation were consistent with the UFSAR, the setpoint index, and Technical Specifications (TS).
C Unit 1 train A, B, and C AFW pump rooms
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R07 Heat Sink Performance
a. Inspection Scope
Annual Review. The inspectors reviewed the licensees records for the performance of inspections and performance tests of the coolers for the Unit 1 train A and B safety injection (SI) pumps. The inspectors reviewed the testing performed in 2006 and compared the results to tests performed in 2002 to ensure that there has been no unusual degradation. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the licensees CR database for heat exchanger performance issues to ensure that discrepancies were being identified and appropriately resolved. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated operator performance on October 16, during licensed operator simulator training described on simulator exercise guide Dynamic Simulator Scenarios V-RQ-SE-07600, V-RQ-SE-07601, and V-RQ-SE-07602. The simulator scenarios covered operator actions resulting from reactor trip and SI followed by a large break loss of coolant accident. Procedures reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors specifically assessed the following areas:
C Correct use of the abnormal and emergency operating procedures C Ability to identify and implement appropriate actions in accordance with the requirements of the Technical Specifications C Clarity and formality of communications in accordance with procedure 10000-C, Conduct of Operations C Proper control board manipulations including critical operator actions C Quality of supervisory command and control C Effectiveness of the post-evaluation critique
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed two equipment problems to evaluate the effectiveness of the licensees handling of equipment performance problems and to verify the licensees maintenance efforts met the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule) and licensee procedure 50028-C, Engineering Maintenance Rule Implementation. The reviews included adequacy of the licensees failure characterization, establishment of performance criteria or 50.65(a)(1) performance goals, and adequacy of corrective actions. Other documents reviewed during this inspection included control room logs, system health reports, the maintenance rule database, and maintenance work orders (MWOs). Also, the inspectors interviewed system engineers and the maintenance rule coordinator to assess the accuracy of identified performance deficiencies and extent of condition.
C CRs 2007101905 and 2007104381 describing two separate failures of the Unit 2 train B nuclear service cooling water tower fan number 1 to start.
C CR 2007102404, Unit 2 residual heat removal system loop suction valve did not open via the main control room handswitch, but opened from the remote shutdown panel.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed following four work activities to verify plant risk was properly assessed by the licensee prior to conducting the activities. The inspectors reviewed risk assessments and risk management controls implemented for these activities to verify they were completed in accordance with procedure 00354-C, Maintenance Scheduling, and 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). The inspectors also reviewed the CR database to verify that maintenance risk assessment problems were being identified at the appropriate level, entered into the corrective action program, and appropriately resolved.
C Unit 1 train A ESF chiller out of service for planned maintenance C Unit 1 group 2B ESF room cooler out of service for emergent repairs C Unit 2 train B CCP out of service for planned maintenance C Movement of a heavy load over the Unit 2 turbine while the unit was operating
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following four evaluations to verify they met the requirements of procedure NMP-GM-002, Corrective Action Program, and NMP-GM-002-001, Corrective Action Program Instructions. The scope of this inspection included a review of the technical adequacy of the evaluations, the adequacy of compensatory measures, and the impact on continued plant operation.
C CR 2007110565, 2HV9454 did not indicate fully closed during valve stroke testing C CR 2007110605, Lower than expected lubricating oil pressures during the Unit 2 train A SI pump operability test C CR 2007111169, Low oil level identified in Unit 1 component cooling water pump #4 C CR 2007110792, Parts for the pressurizer whip restraint for the pressurizer safety loop seal piping were procured as non-safety related.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors either observed post-maintenance testing or reviewed the test results for the following four maintenance activities to verify that the testing met the requirements of procedure 29401-C, Work Order Functional Tests, for ensuring equipment operability and functional capability was restored. The inspectors also reviewed the test procedures to verify the acceptance criteria was sufficient to meet the TS operability requirements.
C MWO 1071035401, Agastat relay calibration on Unit 1 train A ESF chiller system C T-ENG-2007-02, Unit 2 normal charging pump rotating element refurbishment C MWO 2054159501, Unit 2 train B CCP motor preventive maintenance C MWO 1071847901, Unit 1 pressurizer pressure channel P457 power supply card replacement
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following five surveillance test procedures and either observed the testing or reviewed test results to verify that testing was conducted in accordance with the procedures and that the acceptance criteria adequately demonstrated that the equipment was operable. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the CR database to verify that the licensee had adequately identified and implemented appropriate corrective actions for surveillance test problems.
Surveillance Tests C 24813-1, Delta T/T Avg Loop 4 Protection Channel IV 1T-441 Channel Operational Test and Channel Calibration C 14980A-2, Diesel Generator 2A Operability Test C 14510A-1, Train A Control Room Emergency Filtration System Operability Test C 14460-1, ECCS Flow Path Verification In-Service Tests (IST)
C 14805-2, Residual Heat Removal Pump and Check Valve IST and Response Time Tests
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the following Temporary Modification and associated 10 CFR 50.59 screening against the system design basis documentation and UFSAR to verify that the modification did not adversely affect the safety functions of important safety systems. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed licensee procedure 00307-C, Temporary Modifications, to verify if the modification was properly developed and implemented.
C 1071164201, Temporary fire protection piping for the Unit 1 train B reserve auxiliary transformer.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the facility activation exercise guide and observed the following emergency response activity to verify the licensee was properly classifying emergency events, making the required notifications, and making appropriate protective action recommendations in accordance with procedures 91001-C, Emergency Classifications, and 91305-C, Protective Action Guidelines.
C On November 7, the inspectors observed a simulator based exercise involving a primary coolant leak.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the listed PIs during the period from October 1, 2006 through September 30, 2007, for Unit 1 and Unit 2. The inspectors verified the licensees basis in reporting each data element using the PI definitions and guidance contained in procedures 00163-C, NRC Performance Indicator and Monthly Operating Report Preparation and Submittal.
Mitigating Systems Cornerstone C Safety System Functional Failures C Mitigating System Performance Index, Heat Removal Systems C Mitigating System Performance Index, Cooling Water Systems The inspectors reviewed portions of the operator log entries, the Vogtle MSPI basis document, condition reports, work orders, PI summary reports, and raw PI data to verify the licensee had accurately submitted the PI data.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
Daily Condition Report Review. As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensees corrective action program. This review was accomplished by either attending daily screening meetings that briefly discussed major CRs, or accessing the licensees computerized corrective action database and reviewing each CR that was initiated.
a. Inspection Scope
Focused Review. The inspectors performed a detailed review of the following two CRs to verify the full extent of the issue was identified, an appropriate evaluation was performed, and appropriate corrective actions were specified and prioritized. The inspectors evaluated the CR against the licensees corrective action program as delineated in licensee procedure NMP-GM-002, Corrective Action Program, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
C CR 2007105848, ECCS sump recirculation valves could experience excessive differential pressure when called upon to open.
C CR 2007100013, Unit 2 RWST sludge mixing isolation valves left in the incorrect position following maintenance Semi-Annual Trend Review. In accordance with IP 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, the inspectors performed a review of the licensees corrective action program to identify trends that could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The inspectors also focused on the results of daily inspector CR evaluation discussed above. The review also included issues documented outside the normal corrective action program in quality assurance audit /surveillance reports, system health reports, corrective MWOs, self assessment reports, and maintenance rule program reports. The inspectors review nominally considered the six-month period of January through June 2007, although some examples expanded beyond those dates when appropriate. Corrective actions associated with a sample of the issues identified in the licensees self assessment report were reviewed for adequacy. The inspectors also evaluated the trend reports against the requirements of the licensees corrective action program as specified in licensee procedure NMP-GM-002 Corrective Action Program and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA3 Event Follow-up
(Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000425/2006-001; Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Leads to Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications.
(Closed) LER 05000425/2006-001, rev 1; Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Leads to Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications.
(Closed) LER 05000425/2006-002; Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Leads to Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications.
On February 1, 2006, the licensee received indications of a reactor coolant system pressure boundary leakage on Unit 2 and shut the unit down. The licensee determined that the leak was from two welded connections on the bypass line around the Residual Heat Removal loop suction valve, 2HV8701B. On March 20, 2006, the licensee again received indications of reactor coolant system leakage, shut the unit down, and found another leak on the same bypass line, although at a different location. The licensee removed the bypass line prior to restarting the unit on April 1, 2006. These two conditions and the resulting root cause investigation were the subject of a special inspection (NRC Special Inspection Report 05000425/2006-010). The inspectors reviewed the LER, the condition report, and the associated action items. No findings of significance were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
On January 18, 2008, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. T.
Tynan and other members of his staff, who acknowledged the findings. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee personnel
- R. Brown, Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager
- C. Buck, Chemistry Manager
- W. Copeland, Performance Analysis Supervisor
- R. Dedrickson, Plant Manager
- K. Dyar, Security Manager
- I. Kochery, Health Physics Manager
- J. Robinson, Work Control Superintendent
- L. Mansfield, Engineering Support Manager
- T. Tynan, Site Vice-President
- D. Vineyard, Operations Manager
- J. Williams, Site Support Manager
- T. Youngblood, Site Engineering Manager
NRC personnel
- S. Shaeffer, Chief, Region II Reactor Projects Branch 2
LIST OF ITEMS
CLOSED
- 05000425/2006-001 LER Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Leads to Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications (Section 4OA3)
- 05000425/2006-001-01 LER Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Leads to Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications, revision 1 (Section 4OA3)
- 05000425/2006-002 LER Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Leads to Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications (Section 4OA3)