ML17059A355

Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Eals.

ML17059A355
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Site:	Nine Mile Point
Issue date:	06/10/1994
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ML17059A356	List: ML17059A355 ML18040A132
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00<awZODUI,aoOQDARO'4Ul>OO00'OsUQPOEAILUoc~edePit'exeat PlantSpecificEALGuideline (PEG)NineMilePointUnit26/10/94Operations SupportServices, Inc.233WaterStreet2ndFloorPlymouth, MA02360

ICg:AU1Op.ModeApplicability EU1.1PlantSpecificEA~uideline (A,H,S)NineMh.wintUnit2Anyunplanned releaseofgaseousorIlquldradloactlvlty totheenvironment thatexceedstwotimestheradlologlcal Technical Speclflcatlons for60minutesorlonger.51(PwrOps)

Q2(HSB)Q3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)

Q6(Defuel) 5AIIAU1.2<validreadingononeormoreofthefolhwingmonitorsthatexceedsthe"valueshowniRRREKisis;2aha5hmn".

~~hrmConfirmed sampleanalysesforgaseousorliquidreleasesindicates concentrations orreleaserateswithareleasedurationof60minutesorlongerinexcessofVote:Ifthemonitorreadingsm~

sustained forlongerthan60minutesandtherequiredassessments cannotbecompleted withinthisperiod,thenthedeclaration mustbemadebasedonthevalidreading.Bases

PlantSpecificEA~uideline (A,H,S)NineMii.~ointUnit2RetermUnplanned",

asusedinthiscontext,indudesanyreleaseforwhicharadioactive discharge permitwasnotprepared, orareleasethatexceedstheconditions (e.g.,minimumdilutionhw,maximumdischarge fhw,alarmsetpoints, etc.)ontheapplicable permit.Validmeansthataradiation monitorreadinghasbeenconfirmed bytheoperators tobecorrect.Jnplanned releasesinexcessoftwotimesthesitetechnical specifications thatcontinuefor60minutesorbngerrepresent anuncontrolled situation andhence,apotential degradation intheevelofsafety.Thefinalintegrated dose(whichisveryhwintheUnusualEventemergency class)isnottheprimaryconcernhere;itisthedegradation inplantcontrolimpliedbythefactthathereleasewasnotisolatedwithin60minutes.Therefore, itisnotintendedthatthereleasebeaveragedover60minutes.Forexample,areleaseof4timesT/Sfor30minutesdoesnotexceed'hisinitiating condition.

Further,theEmergency Directorshouldnotwaituntil60minuteshaselapsed,butshoulddeclaretheeventassoonasitisdetermined thatthereleasedurationhasorsilllikelyexceed60minutes.Monitorindications

~should'alculated onthebasisofthemethodohgy ofthesiteOffsiteDoseCalculation Manual(ODCMcompliance with10CFR20a~10CFR50 AppendixIrequirements.

Annualaveragemeteorology shoukkhahusedukoca4lowocL todemonstrate Ihftalarmmdmnh hrlhftlhhd.fnfuulgn mme.'~ualnfftiy.aai hmmmIftghnignl laftgirhalignmfhagtiYily.mlmmlimihaHt ngifnzmdad.Iht~~br.ftnghmgniint:

humfiauuQmrftflahrmmhginthr lhftDiaha!

BufiaihnHgnilzing Sxshm.

ICN'U2PlantSpecificEA~uideline(A,H,S)NineMl>.ntUnit2Unexpected IncreaseInplantradlatlon orairborneconcentration.

Op.ModeApplicability iU2.101(PwrOps) 02(HSB)03(HSD)04(CSD)05(Refuel) 06(Defuel)

~AllAU2-4~~tgjagttdirectarearadiation monitorreadinge>399fjamfhRalarmaQiatQfafhaahhhhrmltinufrummmzunfrull&arm~

'ava@0Bases

PlantSpecificEP'uideline (A,H,S)NineMhointUnit2Validmeansthataradiation monitorreadinghasbeenconfirmed bytheoperators tobecorrect.Oiloftheaboveeventstendtohavelongleadtimesrelativetopotential forradiohgical releaseoutsidethesiteboundary, thusimpacttopublichealthandsafetyisverylow.InlightofReactorCavitySealfailure,incidents attwodifferent PWRsandlossofwaterintheSpentFuelPit/FuelTransferCanalataBWRalloccurring since1984,explicitcoverageofthesetypesofeventsviaEALs¹1and¹2isappropriate giventheirpotential forincreased dosestoplantstaff.Classification asanUnusualEventiswarranted asaprecursor toamoreseriousevent.hhR2rftauirmritmlzatlgnuf aahhuiifthefuftlhtt:aammuztrttrfttI.

mmh~allirmdiatftrf fufdsumublimrmnaiainaauftifttfhxnahr" umdifttfhftf mitiaitnftt;mrmt.

EALL~appliestoplantswithlicenseddrystorageofolderirradiated spentfueltoaddressdegradation ofthisspentfuel.EAL¹4~addresses unplanned increases inin-plantradiation levelsthatrepresent adegradation inthecontrolofradioactive

material, andrepresent apotential degradation inthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.~tittnrtf

~~fjgtignhtrfthingr~ingtnp~~tht~~gg~~htttn~hgttttfQggg~thftmr~mrnltrft~jfftrtgig~

~ginuitiitift gfJEBEL"lQYQI22KR8%%9fQQIQiR KRQQEIQQllK RQiQnftdKRdkQYQCQQQQRl~~~thftgfaunMrtgintgirtY~gg~ittntthr~I.ThisEALescalates toanAlertperICAA3,iftheincreases imPairthftftttrftfrtfsafeoPeration.

Qglyguhrtgfttf 53hlrhtfiagRglaaH1SIlfttrfttf inthLtKhl.0KQ?MunnfKQRRE SrtftrgMK rfKIREthn ffufrtrtingrrtQrtfRE KHfitttrtQgrnEmfiathnhuthtfhtthrittibr mmd1Kfiaiaathtalarmadvent.

ICN:AA1Op.ModeAppllcablllty LA1.1PlantSpecificEP'ideline (A,H,S)NineMlt.ntUnit2Anyunplanned releaseofgaseousorIlquldradloactlvlty totheenvironment thatexceeds200timesradlologlcal Technical Speclficatlc for15minutesorlonger.Q1(PwrOps)Q2(HSB)Q3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)Q6(Defuel)gAIIAA1.25validreadingononeormoreofthefollowing ggg+lftmonitorsthatexceedsthe"valueriterionandindicates theneedtoassessthereleasewithConfirmed sampleanalysesforgaseousorliquidreleasesindicates concentrations orreleaseratesinexcessofdote:Ifthemonitorreadings~~

sustained forhngerthan15minutesandtherequiredassessments cannotbecompleted withinthisperiod,thenthedeclaration mustbemade>asedonthevalidreading.iA1.3AA1.4Bases

PlantSpecificEP'ideline(A,H,S)NineMhntUnit2Validmeansthataradiation monitorreadinghasbeenconfirmed bytheoperators tobecorrect.Thiseventescalates fromtheUnusualEventbyescalating themagnitude ofthereleasebyafactorof100.Prorating the500mR/yrcriterion forbothtime(8766hr/yrandthe200multiplier, theassociated siteboundarydoseratewouldbe10mR/hr.Therequiredreleasedurationwasreducedto15minutesinrecognition oftheincreased severity.

Monitorindications shouklhe~calculated onthebasisofthemethodology ofwho~~Annualaveragemeteorology 4touldka~usedwher+4iowed.

ICff:AA2PlantSpecificEPuideline(A,H,S)NineMii..ntUnit2MajordamagetoIrradiated fuelorlossofwaterlevelthathasorwillresultIntheuncovering ofIrradiated fueloutsidethereactorvessOp.ModeApplicability iA2.1Qt(PwrOps)Q2(HSB)Q3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)

Q6(Defuel)

~AllAA2.2ltttmlttggI grreportof~~observation ofirradiated fueluncovered.

WA2.38.0QQZ8.0B9ZBases

PlantSpecificEP'ideline (A,H,S)NineMii.0ntVnit2ThisICappliestospentfuelrequiring watercoverageandisnotintendedtoaddressspentfuelwhichislicensedfordrystorage,whichisdiscussed inNUMARCICAU2,Unexpected increaseinPlantRadiation orAirborneConcentration.

NUREG-0818,

'Emergency ActionLevelsforLightWaterReactors,"

formsthebasisfortheseEALs.'hmhamEALs~j18ftfibythespecificareawhereirradiated fuelislocatedsuchasreactorcavity,reactorvessel,orspentfuelpooLThereistimeavailable totakecorrective actions,andthereislittlepotential forsubstantial fueldamage.Inaddition, NUREG/CR-4982, "SevereAccidentinSpentFuelPoolsinSupportofGenericSafetyIssue82,"July1987,indicates thatevenifcorrective actionsarenottaken,nopromptfatalities arepredicted, andthatriskofinjuryislow.Inaddition, NRCInformation NoticeNo.9048,"KR-85HazardsfromDecayedFuel"presentsthefollowing ititsdiscussion:

"Intheeventofaseriousaccidentinvolving decayedspentfuel,protective actionswouldbeneededforpersonnel onsite,whileoffsitedoses(assuming anexclusion arearadiusofonemilefromtheplantsite)wouldbewellbehwtheEnvironmental Protection Agency'sProtective ActionGuides.Accordingly, itisimportant tobeabletoproperlysurveyandmonitorforKr-85intheeventofanaccidentwithdecayedspentfuel.Licensees maywishtoreevaluate whetherEmergency ActionLevelsspecified intheemergency planandprocedures governing decayedfuelhandlingactivities appropriately focusonconcernforonsiteworkersandKr-85releasesinareaswheredecayedspentfuelaccidents couldoccur,forexample,thespentfuelpoolworkingfloor.Furthermore, licensees maywishtodetermine ifemergency plansandcorresponding implementing procedures addressthemeansforlimitingradiohgical exposures ofonsitepersonnel whoareinotherareasoftheplant.Amongotherthings,movingonsitepersonnel awayfromtheplumeandshuttingofbuildingairintakesdownwindfromthesourcemaybeappropriate."

Thus,anAlertClassification forthiseventisappropriate.

Escalation, ifappropriate, wouldoccurviaAbnormalRadIeveURadiological EffluentorEmergency Directorjudgement.

ICy:AA3Op.ModeAppllcablllty iA3.1PlantSpecificE~uideline (A,H,S)NineMt..'OintUnit2Releaseofradioactive materialorIncreases Inradlatlon levelswlthlnthefacllltythatImpedesoperation ofsystemsrequiredtomalntasafeoperations ortoestablish ormalntalncoldshutdown.

Q1(PwrOps)

Q2(HSB)Q3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)

Q6(Defuel)

QAIIAA3.2lalidradiation monitorreadinggreaterthan15mR/hrinfbi;vali+st~pecitic) radiation monitorreadingsgreaterthan(site-specific)

QE!Z~inareasrequiring infrequent accesstomaintainplantsafetyfunctions.

Bases

PlantSpecificE/"uideline(A,H,S)NineNit.ntVnlt2Validmeansthataradiation monitorreadinghasbeenconfirmed bytheoperators tobecorrect.Qaly~gngQdfLBQLQQdjngQ~

QQQQJdQI'Qd iaihQRhlfaaYai{}fiaQQQQQmL ftQ1QIQQIIGK IlQQiara&mduahmgamaIQzQigffhmuummLQIjiQIhalmhthat hrjQfjy.Q jMII'.ThisIGaddresses increased radiation levelsthatimpedenecessary accesstooperating

stations, orotherareascontaining equipment thatmustbeoperatedmanually, inordertomaintainsafeoperation orperformasafeshutdown.

Itisthisimpairedabilitytooperatetheplantthatresultsintheactualorpotential substantial degradation ofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.Thecauseand/ormagnitude oftheincreaseinradiation levelsisnotaconcernofthisIC.TheEmergency Directormustconsiderthesourceorcauseoftheincreased radiation levelsanddetermine ifanyotherIGmaybeinvolved.

Forexample,adoserateof15mR/hrinthecontrolroommaybeaprobleminitself.However,theincreasemayalsobeindicative ofhighdoseratesinthecontainment duetoaLOCA.Inthislattercase,anSAEorGEmaybeindicated bythefissionproductbarriermatrixICs.TheseEALscouldresultindeclaration ofanAlertatoaawaitNMP-2duetoaradioactivity releaseorradiation shineresulting fromamajoraccidentatthe-Thisisappropriate iftheincreaseimpairsoperations attheoperating unit.ThisIGisnotmeanttoapplytoincreases inthecontainment chmoradiation monitorsastheseareeventswhichareaddressed inthefissionproductbarriermatrixICs.Norisitintendedtoapplytoanticipated temporary increases duetoplannedevents(e.g.,incoredetectormovement, radwastecontainer

movement, depleteresintransfers, etc.)'NMP-2abnormaloperating procedures, emergency operating procedures, the10GFR50AppendixRanalysis, identifying areascontaining safeshutdownequipment.

Areasrequiring continuous occupancy gQQJ~includethecontrolrooman~oraocacentral~QQ~~securityalarmstation.Thevalueof15mR/hrisderivedfromtheGDC19valueof5remin30dayswithadjustment forexpectedoccupancy times.AlthoughSectionIII.D.3ofNUREG4737, "Clarification ofTMIActionPlanRequirements",

providesthatthe15mR/hrvaluecanbeaveragedoverthe30days,thevalueisusedherewithoutaveraging, asa30daydurationimpliesaneventpotentially moresignificant thananAlert.asedonQbrtgrmQi radiation levelswhichresultinexposurecontrolmeasuresintendedtomaintaindoseswithinnormaloccupational exposureguidelines andlimits(i.e.,10CFR20),

andindoingso,willimpedenecessary access.10

ION:AS1Op.ModeAppllcablllty

'LS1.1PlantSpecificE~uideline(A,H,S)NineNit.0ntUnit2Boundarydoseresulting fromanactualorlmmlnentreleaseofgaseousradloactlvlty exceeds100mRWholeBodyor500mRChildThyroidfortheactualorproJected durationoftherelease.01(PwrOps) 02(HSB)03(HSD)04(CSD)05(Refuel)

Q6(Defuel)

~All<validreadingononeormoreofthefollowing monitorsthatexceedsorisexpectedtoexceedheabovecriterion andidicatestheneedtoassessthereleasewith(SPDSonly)dote:lfthemonitorreading(s) issustained forlongerthan15minutesandtherequiredassessments cannotbecompleted withinthisperiod,thenthedeclaration mustbemade)asedonthevalidreading.WS1.3/aliddoseassessment capability indicates doseconsequences greaterthan100mRJ92f.vholo4ody or500mRcM4QDEthyroid.AS1.4Fieldsurveyresultsindicatesiteboundarydoseratesexceeding 100mR/hr~expectedtocontinueformorethanonehour;oranalysesoffieldsurveysamplesindicate4@dQQQthyroiddosecommitment of500mRforonehourofinhalation.

Bases11

PlantSpecificE'ideline (A,H,S)NineMli.ntUnit2Validmeansthataradiation monitorreadinghasbeenconfirmed bytheoperators tobecorrect.The100mRIf'ntegrated doseinthisinitiating condition isbasedontheproposed10CFR20annualaveragepopulation exposure.

Thisvaluealsoprovidesadesirable gradient(oneorderofmagnitude) betweentheAlert,SiteAreaEmergency, andGeneralEmergency classes.Itisdeemedthatexposures lessthanthislimitarenotconsistent withtheSiteAreaEmergency classdescription.

The500mRintegrated4@444yroid

~fbggjffdosewasestablished inconsideration ofthe1$ratiooftheEPAProtective ActionGuidelines for~whotakody andgZthyroid.asiteboundatydoseof100mR/houreholahody TEDEor500mR/hourQQ~IILgjtichilcL4hyceid, whichever ismorelimiting(dependsonsourcetermassumptions).

basedonTheFSARsourcetermsapplicable toeachmonitored pathwayshouldbeusedinconjunction withannualaveragemeteorology indetermining indications forthemonitorsonthatpathway.12

ICyAG1Op.ModeAppllcablllty KG1.1PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMlle..ttUnit2Boundarydoseresulting fromanactualorImminentreleaseofgaseousradloactlvlty exceeds1000mRWholeBodyor5000mRChildThyroidfortheactualorprojected durationoftherelease.Q1(PwrOps)

Q2(HSB)Q3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)

Q6(Defuel) gAIIAQ4'4'tvalidreadingononeormoreofthefollowing monitorsthatexceedsorisexpectedtoexceedheabovecriterion and2@m2mf~~+(SPDSonly)gj~(SPDSonly)Vote:Ifthemonitorreading(s) issustained forlongerthan15minutesandtherequiredassessments cannotbecompleted withinthisperiod,thenthedeclaration mustbemadeiasedonthevalidreading.AG1.3Validdoseassessment capability indicates doseconsequences greaterthan1000mR~~halo4~or5000mRQDEcM4thyroid.AG1.4Fieldsurveyresultsindicatesiteboundarydoseratesexceeding 1000mR/hrIEQf.expectedtocontinueformorethanonehour;oranalysesoffieldsurveysamplesindicatecbildgZthyroiddosecommitment of5000mRforonehourofinhalation.

Bases13

PlantSpecificEAI+uideline (A,H,S)NineMilePciiitUnit2Validmeansthataradiation monitorreadinghasbeenconfirmed bytheoperators tobecorrect.The1000mR~mhotahody andthe5000mRQQfchiMthyroidintegrated dosearebasedontheEPAprotective actionguidancewhichindicates thatpublicprotective actionsareindicated ifthedoseexceeds1rem3EfKwhoh4odyor 5remQZcNdthyroid.Thisisconsistent withtheemergency classdescription foraGeneralEmergency.

Thislevelconstitutes theupperlevelofthedesirable gradientfortheSiteAreaEmergency.

Actualmeteorology isspecifically identified intheinitiating condition sinceitgivesthemostaccuratedoseassessment.

Actualmeteorology (including forecasts) shouldbeusedwheneverpossible.

dbasedonsiteboundarydosesforeitherwhoiahc4y TEDEorMkLthyroicl

~yfgigwhichever ismorelimiting(dependsonsourcetermassumptions(s).

TheFSARsourcetermsapplicable toeachmonitored pathwayshouldbeusedinconjunction withannualaveragemeteorology indetermining indications forthemonitorsonthatpathway.14

ICg:HU1PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMile..cUnit2Naturalanddestructive phenomena affectintheprotected area.Op.ModeAppllcablllty lU1.1Q1(PwrOps) 02(HSB)Q3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)

Q6(Defuel) gAIIHU1.2Reportbyplantpersonnel oftornadostrikingwithinprotected area.tU1.3'assessment bythecontrolroomthataneventUihaMttahasoccurred.

HU1.4Vehiclecrashintoareaboundary.

plantstructures orsystemswithinprotected HU1.5Reportbyplantpersonnel ofanunanticipated explosion withinprotected areaboundaryresulting invisibledamagetopermanent structure orequipment.

HU1.6Reportofturbinefailureresulting incasingpenetration ordamagetoturbineorgenerator seals.HU1.715

PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMllec...itUnit2Bases,Theprotected areaboundaryis~ical'hat partwithinthesecurityisolation zoneandisdefinedinthesitesecurityplan.F~EAL¹~1,NMP-2seismicinstrumentation actuatesat0.01g.Damagemaybecausedtosomeportionsofthesite,butshouldnotaffectabilityofsafetyfunctions tooperate.Methodofdetection caahohbasedoninstrumentation, validated byareliablesourcAsdefinedintheEPRI-sponsored "Guidelines forNuclearPlantResponsetoanEarthquake, datedOctober1989,a"feltearthquake" is:"Anearthquake ofsufficient intensity suchthat:(a)theinventory groundmotionisfeltatthenuclearplantsiteandrecognized asanearthquake basedonaconsensus ofcontrolroomoperators ondutyatthetime,and(b)forplantswithoperableseismicinstrumentation, theseismicswitchesoftheplantareactivated.

Formostplantswithseismicinstrumentation, theseismicswitchesaresetatanacceleration ofabout0.01g."EAL¹EJ12isbasedontheassumption thatatornadostriking(touching down)withintheprotected boundarymayhavepotentially damagedplantstructures containing functions orsystemsrequiredforsafeshutdownoftheplant.Ifsuchdamageisconfirmed visuallyorbyotherin-plantindications, theeventmaybeescalated toAlert.EAL¹Jjgf3allowsforthecontrolroomtodetermine thataneventhasoccurredandtakeappropriate actionbasedonpersonalassessment asopposedtoverification (i.e.,anearthquake isfeltbutdoesnotregisteronanyplant-specific instrumentation, etc.).lull."'"""""*I"'.',.""i'f'tructures containing functions andsystemsrequiredforsafeshutdownoftheplant.Ifthecrashisconfirmed toaffectaplantvitalarea,theeventmaybeescalated toAlert.ForEAL¹~5,onlythoseexplosions ofsufficient forcetodamagepermanent structures orequipment withintheprotected areashouldbeconsidered.

Asusedhere,anexplosion isarapid,violent,unconfined combustion, oracatastrophic failureofpressurized equipment, thatpotentially impartssignificant energytonearbystructures andmaterials.

NoattemptismadeinthisEALtoassesstheactualmagnitude ofthedamage.Theoccurrence oftheexplosion withreportsofevidenceofdamage(e.g.,deformation, scorching) issufficient fordeclaration.

TheEmergency Directoralsoneedstoconsideranysecurityaspectsoftheexplosion, ifapplicable.

EAL¹~6isintendedtoaddressmainturbinerotatingcomponent failuresofsufficient magnitude tocauseobservable damagetotheturbinecasingortothesealsoftheturbinegenerator.

Ofmajorconcernisthepotential forleakageofcombustible fluids(lubricating oils)andgases(hydrogen cooling)totheplantenvirons.

Actualfiresandflammable gasbuildupareappropriately classified viaHU2andHU3.ThisEALisconsistent withthedefinition ofanUnusualEventwhilemaintaining theanticipatory naturedesiredandrecognizing therisktonon-safety relatedequipment.

Escalation oftheemergency dassification isbasedonpotential damagedonebymissilesgenerated bythefailureorbytheradiological releasesTheselattereventswouldbedassified bytheradiological ICsorfissionproductbarrierICs.EAL¹~7coversevents.eprecursors ofmoreserious16

IQy:HU2PlantSpecificEAluideline (A,H,S)NineMilePt...itUnit2Firewlthlnprotected areaboundarynotextinguished within15minutesofdetection.

Op.ModeApplicability lU2.1Q1(PwrOps)

Q2(HSB)Q3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)

Q6(Defuel)

RAIIfireinbuildings orareascontiguous toanyofthefollowin~~cif+

areasnotextinguished within15minutesofcontrolroomnotification 4acm:Bases17 l0 PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMilei.itUnlt2 niepurposeofthisICistoaddressthemagnitude andextentoffiresthatmaybepotentially significant precursors todamagetosafetysystems.Thisexdudessuchitemsasfireswithinadministration buildings, waste-basket fires,andothersmallfiresofnosafetyconsequence.

ThisICappliestobuildings andareasthatarecontiguous orimmediately adjacenttoplantvitalareas.Escalation toahigheremergency classisbyICHA2,"FireAffecting theOperability ofPlantSafetySystemsRequiredfortheCurrentOperating Mode".18

Icy:HU3PlantSpecificEAIuideline (A,H,S)NineMlleP~..itUnit2Releaseoftoxicorflammable gasesdeemeddetrimental tosafeoperation oftheplant.Op.ModeApplicability

<U3.1Q1(pwrOps)

Q2(HSB)Q3(HSD)Q4(GSD)Q5(Refuel)Q6(Defuel)

%AllHU3.2disportordetection oftoxicorflammable gasesthatcouldentertreaboundaryinamountsthatchggghfaffect~operation oftheplant.withinthesiteReportbylocal,countyorstateofficials personnel basedonoffsiteevent.forpotential evacuation ofsiteBases19

PlantSpecificEAIuideline (A,H,S)NineMilePt..itUnit2ThisIGisbasedonreleasesinconcentrations withinthesiteboundatythatwillaffectthehealthofplantpersonnel oraffecting thesafeoperation oftheplantwiththeplantbeingwithintheevacuation areaofanoffsiteevent(i.e.,tankertruckaccidentreleasing toxicgases,etc.).Theevacuation arealsasdetermined fromtheDOTEvacuation TablesforSelectedHazardous Materials, intheDOTEmergency ResponseGuideforHazardous Materials.

20

icy:HU4PlantSpecificEAIuideline (A,H,S)NineMileP~..itUnit2Confirmed securityeventwhichIndicates apotential degradatlon lnthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.Q1(Pwrops)

Q2(HSB)Q3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)

Q6(Defuel)

AAIIlU4.1HU4.2lombdevicediscovered withinplantprotected areaandlttttoutsidethefgjjttittjttg plantvital~rea~Othersecurityeventsasdetermined from~~pecitio)

Qggtirj~Safeguards Contingency Plan.Bases

PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMlle.,tUnit2thisEALisbasedo.Securityeventswhichdonotrepresent atleastapotential degradation inthelevelofsafetyoftheplant,arereportedunder10CFR73.71 orinsomecasesunder10CFR50.72.

Theplantprotected areaboundaryistypically thatpartwithinthesecuritysoiationzoneandisdefinedinthe(site-specific) securityplan.22

ICN:HU5PlantSpecificEAuideline (A,H,S)NineMllePt..tUnit2Othercondltlons exlstlngwhichInthejudgement oftheEmergency Directorwarrantdeclaration ofanUnusualEvent.Op.ModeApplicability fU5.1Q1(PwrOps)

Q2(HSB)Q3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)

Q6(Defuel)

~All)therconditions existwhichinthejudgement oftheEmergency Directorindicateapotential legradation ofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.Bases23

PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMllet..tUnit2%isEALisintendedtoaddressunanticipated conditions notaddressed explicitly elsewhere butthatwarrantdeclaration ofanemergency becauseconditions existwhicharebelievedbythe"mergency DirectortofallundertheUnusualEventemergency class.Fromabroadperspective, oneareathatmaywarrantEmergency Directorjudgement isrelatedtolikelyoractualbreakdown ofsitespecificeventmitigating actions.Examplestoconsider'ncludeinadequate emergency responseprocedures, transient responseeitherunexpected ornotunderstood, failureorunavailability ofemergency systemsduringanaccidentinexcessofthatassumedinaccidentanalysis, orinsufficient availability ofequipment and/orsupportpersonnel.

ItisalsointendedthattheEmergency Directors judgement notbelimitedbyanylistofeventsasdefinedhereorasaugmented bythesite.Thislistisprovidedsolelyasexamplesforconsideration anditisrecognized thatactualeventsmaynotalwaysfollowapre-conceived description.

24

!CD:HA1PlantSpecificEAIuideline (A,H,S)NineMilePc..tUnit2Naturalanddestructive phenomena affecting theplantvitalarea.Op.ModeAppllcablllty 3A1.1Q1(PwrOps)

Q2(HSB)Q3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)

Q6(Defuel) gAIIHA1.2indicates seismiceventgreaterthan~~Tornadoor4igh~i~windsgreaterthan(sit~ci~QQmphstrikewithintheprotected areaboundary.

3A1.3HA1.4hefolhwingplantstructures:

HA1.5Vehiclecrashaffecting plantvitalareas.HA1.?HA1.625

BasesPlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMilec..rUnit2EachoftheseEALsisintendedtoaddresseventsthatmayhaveresultedinaplantvitalareabeingsubjected toforcesbeyonddesignlimits,andthusdamagemaybeassumedtohaveoccurredtoplantsafetysystems.Theinitialreportshouldnotbeinterpreted asmandating alengthydamageassessment priortodassification.

NoattemptismadeinthisEALtoassesstheactualmagnitude ofthedamage.Escalation toahigheremergency dass,ifappropriate, willbebasedonSystemMalfunction, FissionProductBarrierDegradation, AbnormalRadReleases/Radiohgical

Effluent, orEmergency DirectorJudgement ICs.EAL¹~1shouldbebasedo+sit~pociflc)

FSARdesignbasisofMZ~.Seismiceventsofthismagnitude cancausedamagetosafetyfunctions.

EAL¹~2shouldbebasedo+alt~cific)

FSARdesignbasisof9Qmph.Windhadsofthismagnitude cancausedamagetosafetyfunctions.

EAL¹~3shouldspecify~~pociflc) structures containing systemsandfunctions requiredfor~~gggzgfigft EAL¹55i4EAL¹~5isintendedtoaddresssuchitemsasplaneorhelicopter crash,oronsomesites,traincrash,ocbargecrashintoaplantvitalarea.tlal."~-~-i-"">>"'"iincludeallareascontaining safety-related equipment, theircontrols, andtheirpowersupplies.

ThisEALis,therefore, consistent withthedefinition ofanALERTinthatifmissileshavedamagedorpenetrated areascontaining safety-related equipment thepotential existsforsubstantial degradation ofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.EALgM~covers TheseEALscanalsobegprecursors ofmoreseriousevents.Inparticular, sitessubjecttosevereweatherasdefinedintheNUMARCstationblackoutinitiatives, shouldincludeanEALbasedonactivation ofthesevereweathermitigation procedures (e.g.,precautionary shutdowns, dieseltesting,staffcall-outs, etc.).26

fog:HA2PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMilet..itUnit2Fireorexplosion affectintheoperablllty ofplantsafetysystemsrequiredtoestablish ormalntalnsafeshutdown.

Q1(PwrOps)

Q2(HSB)Q3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)

Q6(Defuel) gAIISA2.1rhefolhwingconditions exist:i.Fireorexphsioninanyofthareas:ANDa.Affectedsystemparameter indications showdegradedperformance orplantpersonnel

.eportvisibledamagetopermanent structures orequipment withinthestructures orequipment withinthespecified area.Bases27

PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMile...(Unit2III~I'"""""'i'.t'~i~EM"'"'onsulted forequipment andplantareasrequiredfortheapplicable mode.Thiswillmakeiteasiertodetermine Nithefireorexplosion ispotentially affecting oneormoreredundant trainsof:afetysystems.Escalation toahigheremergency class,ifappropriate, willbebasedonSystemMalfunction, FissionProductBarrierDegradation, AbnormalRadReleases/Radiological

=ffluent, orEmergency DirectorJudgement ICs.Withregardtoexplosions, onlythoseexphsions ofsufficient forcetodamagepermanent structures orequipment requiredforsafeoperation withintheidentified plantareasshouldbeconsidered.

Asusedhere,anexplosion isarapid,violent,unconfined combustion, oracatastrophic failureofpressurized equipment, thatpotentially impartssignificant energytonearby-tructures andmaterials.

Theinclusion ofa"reportofvisibledamage"shouldnotbeinterpreted asmandating alengthydamageassessment priortodassification.

NoattemptismadeinthisEALtoassesstheactualmagnitude ofthedamage.Theoccurrence oftheexplosion withreportsofevidenceofdeclaration ofanAlertandtheactivation oftheTSCwillprovidetheEmergency Directorwiththeresources neededtoperformthesedamageassessments.

TheEmergency Directoralsoneedstoconsideranysecurityaspectsoftheexplosions, ifapplicable.

28

ICy:HA33p.ModeApplicability IA3.1PlantSpecificEAIuideline (A,H,S)NineI@liePt..itUnit2Releaseoftoxicorflammable gaseswlthlnafacllltystructure whichJeopardizes operation ofsystemsrequiredtomalntalnsafeoperatortoestablish ormalntalncoldshutdown.

Gi(pwrops)

G2(HSB)03(HSD)D4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)

Q6(Defuei)

QAIIHA3.2leportordetection oftoxicgaseswithinalltfLfgllttttf jttftfacilitystructure inconcentrations satwillbelifethreatening toplantpersonnel:

Reportordetection offlammable gaseswithina~ttilmiftg structure inconcentrations thatwill~thesafeoperation oftheplant:Bases29

PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMilet..itUnit2ThisIChbasedongasesthathaveenteredaplantstructure&fectlng thesafeoperation oftheplant.ThisICappliestobuildings andareascontiguous toplantvitalareasorothersignificant buildings orareas(i.e.,ServiceWaterPumphouse).TheintentofthisICisnottoincludebuildings

[i.e.,warehouses) orotherareasthatarenotcontiguous orimmediately adjacenttoplantvitalareas.Itisappropriate thatincreased monitoring bedonetoascertain whetherconsequential damagehasoccurred.

Escalation toahigheremergency class,ifappropriate, willbebasedonSystemMalfunction, FissionProductBarrierDegradation, AbnormalRadReleases/Radiological

Effluent, orEmergency DirectorJudgement ICs.30

ICyHA4PlantSpecificEAluideline (A,H,S)NineMilePc..'Unit2Securityeventlnaplantprotected area.Op.ModeAppllcablllty lA4.1Q1(Pwrops)

Q2(HSB)Q3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)

Q6(Defuel)

~AllHA4,2ntrusionintoplantprotected areabyakosga4orco yna~gZyl.Othersecurityeventsasdetermined from~~cific)

Rgffffl~Safeguards Contingency Plan.Bases31

PlantSpecificEAuideline (A,H,S)NineMlleP~.itUnit2Thisdassofsecurityeventsrepresents anescalated threattoplantsafetyabovethatcontained intheUnusualEvent.ForthepurposesofthisIG,thiseventtoaSiteAreaEmergency.

32

ICy:HA54~PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMilePi.itUnit2Controlroomevacuation hasbeenlnltlated.

Op.ModeAppllcablllty 3A5.1Q1(pwrOps)

Q2(HSB)Q3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)

Q6(Defuel)

~All=ntryinto~forcontrolroomevacuation.

Bases33

PlantSpecificEAIO:uideline (A,H,S)NineMllePi..itUnit2Withthecontrolroomevacuated, additional support,monitoring anddirection throughtheTechnical SupportCenterand/orotherEmergency Operations Centerisnecessary.

Inability toestablish plantcontrolfromoutsidethecontrolroomwillescalatethiseventtoaSiteAreaEmergency.

34

ICg:HA6PlantSpecificEAIuideline (A,H,S)NineMilePi.itUnit2Otherconditions exlstlngwhichIntheJudgement oftheEmergency Directorwarrantdeclaration ofanAlert.Op.ModeAppllcablllty

)A6.1Q1(PwrOps)

Q2(HSB)Q3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)

Q6(Defuel)

~All7therconditions existingwhichinthejudgement oftheEmergency Directorindicatethatplantefetysystemsmaybedegradedandthatincreased monitoring ofplantfunctions isvarranted.

Bases35

PlantSpecificEAiO'Uideline (A,H,S)NineMilePi..itUnit2ThisEALisintendedtoaddressunanticipated conditions notaddressed explicitly elsewhere butthatwarrantdeclaration ofanemergency becauseconditions existwhicharebelievedbytheEmergency DirectortofallundertheAlertemergency class.36

lCN:HS1PlantSpecificEAluideline (A,H,S)NineMilePi.itUnit2SecurityeventInaplantvitalarea.Op.ModeAppllcablllty

)S1.1Q1(PwrOps)

Q2(HSB)Q3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)

Q6(Defuel)

QAIIHS1.2ntrusioninto~gjj~jpgplantvitalarear'yakostikorea~~ggOthersecurityeventsasdetermined from~~ecitic)

Gguirjl~Safeguards Contingency PlanBases37

PlantSpecificEAIO'Uideline (A,H,S)NineMllePi.itUnit2Thisclassofsecurityeventsrepresents anescalated threattoplantsafetyabovethatcontained intheAlertIGinthatakostilaforce mad~g,hasprogressed fromtheprotected areatothevitalarea.38

fC¹:HS2PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NlneMlle~..<Unlt2 PW4aaelaaRNOp.ModeApplicability

)S2.1Q1(PwrOps)

Q2(HSB)Q3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)

Q6(Defuel)

%Allihefollowing conditions exist:t.Controlroomevacuation hasbeeninitiated.

ROC04UCIRsi~cifio)

~minutes.cannotbeestablished per~acpecTiic)-

withinBases39

PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMileointUnit2Expeditious transferofsafetysystemshasnotoccurredbutfissionproductbarrierdamagemaynotyetbeIndicated.~it~cifg timefortransferiabasedonanalysisorassessments astohowquicMycontrolmustbereestablished withoutcoreuncovering and/orcoredamage.Thistimeshouklnotexceed15minutes.Incoklshutdownandrefueling modes,operatorconcernisdirectedtowardmaintaining corecoolingsuchasisdiscussed inGenericLetter88-17,'LossofDecayHeatRemoval.Inpoweroperation, hotstandby,andhotshutdownmodes,operatorconcernisprimarily directedtowardmaintaining criticalsafetyfunctions andtherebyassuringfissionproductbarrierintegrity.

Escalation ofthisevent,ifappropriate, wouldbebyFissionProductBarrierDegradation, AbnormalRadReleases/Radiological

Effluent, orEmergency DirectorJudgement ICs.5dhraartagt tnarntmfiannf thatuhliaantiaafaaslantanaratiana.~

aztrnLmtiathm arimarilxrtnihaabilitlr hrnairttainiharaaahzin amahd.auuhtian.

IharahrLitiaartnrunriata trt~thaGannetE6Lartihaiitftmuhasizaathanaaffhr amaulinunhanmatrglling thauiantfrgmnirhhhtha QantrulHaun.

40

ICgHS3PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMile.rttUnit2Othercondltlons whichlnthejudgement oftheEmergency Directorwarrantdeclaration ofSiteAreaEmergency.

Op.ModeAppltcablllty RS3.1Q1(PwrOps)

Q2(HSB)Q3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)

Q6(Deluel)

~All3therconditions whichinthejudgement oftheEmergency Directorwarrantdeclaration ofSitebreaEmergency.

Bases41

PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMile..ttUnit2ThisEALisintendedtoaddressunanticipated conditions notaddressed explicitly elsewhere butthatwarrantdeclaration ofanemergency becauseconditions existwhicharebelievedbythe=mergency Directortofallundertheemergency classdescription forSiteAreaEmergency.

42

ICy:HG1PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMlle~.hattUnit2Securityeventresulting lnlossofabllltytoreachandmaintaincoldshutdown.

Q1(PwrOps)

Q2(HSB)Q3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)

Q6(Defuel) gAllAppllcablllty 4G1.1HG1.2ossof~~ysicalcontrolc4Qgmthecontrolroomduetosecurityevent.uuafalmhalpatrolaffhaaunuh~hhmnmuahililx dmh.mmuily.

mumt.Bases43

PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMile..itUnit2ThisICencompasses conditions underwhichahostileforcehastakenphysicalcontrolofvitalarearequiredtoreachandmaintainsafeshutdown.

Ihft~gftrahtrfrhrhr~gl gbQy>ahuhlmaihftrmhr xdmaiahmammliaa ItmrftfmfhhEhLhmhmnmttdififtrliumhmtahaartf uhntaziulfatmhdhlhfrmalrrtl catmmfftmuhCrtddfttframmh.

44

fCy.HG2PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMlle..itUnit2Otherconditions existingwhichlntheJudgement oftheEmergency Directorwarrantdeclaration ofGeneralEmergency.

Q1(PwrOps)

Q2(HSB)Q3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)

Q6(Defuel)

~All3G2.17therconditions existingwhichinthejudgement oftheEmergency Directorindicate:

(t)tctualorimminentsubstantial coredegradation withpotential forlossofcontainment, or(2)etentialforuncontrolled radionuclidereleases.

Thesereleasescanreasonably beexpectedoexceedEPAPAGplumeexposurelevelsoutsidethesiteboundary.

Bases45

PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMile..tUnit2thisEALisintendedtoaddressunanticipated conditions notaddressed explicitly elsewhere butthatwarrantdeclaration ofanemergency becauseconditions existwhicharebelievedbytheEmergency DirectortofallundertheGeneralEmergency dass.46

fC¹:SU~PlantSpecificEAf+uideline (A,H,S)NineMilePt...itUnit2Lossofalloffsltepowertoessential bussesforgreaterthan15minutes.Op.ModeApplicability 3U'f.1Q1(PwrOps)

Q2(HSB)Q3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)-

Q6(Defuel)

%Allrhefolhwingconditions exist:s.Lossofpowert~i~pocTiic) lreaterthan15minutes.ANDforxAtleast~~pocTiic) tttfttemergency generators aresupplying powertoemergency buses;Bases47

PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NlneMilet.tUnit2Prolonged hssofAGpowerreducesrequiredredundancy andpotentially degradesthelevelofsafetyoftheplantbyrendering theplantmorevulnerable toacompletehssofACpower(stationblackout).

Fifteenminuteswasselectedasathreshold toexdudetransient ormomentary powerlosses.48

iC¹:SU2PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMile..itUnit2Inablllty toreachrequiredshutdownwlthlnTechnical Speclflcatlon Llmlts.Op.ModeAppllcablllty SU2.1S1(PwrOps)

R2(HSB)~3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)

Q6(Defuel)

QAIIPlantisnotbroughttorequiredoperating modewithiQei~ocific)

Technical Specifications LCOActionStatement Time.Bases49

PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMilei.itUnit2LimitingConditions ofOperation (LCOs)requiretheplanttobebroughttoarequiredshutdownmodewhentheTechnical Specification requiredconfiguration cannotberestored.

Depending onthecircumstances, thismayormaynotbeanemergency orprecursor toamoreseverecondition.

Inanycase,theinitiation ofplantshutdownrequiredbythesiteTechnical Specification requiresaonehourreportunder10CFR50.72 (b)nonwmergency events.Theplantiswithinitssafetyenvehpewhenbeingshutdownwithintheallowable actionstatement timeintheTechnical Specifications.

Animmediate Notification ofanUnusualEventisrequiredwhentheplantisnotbroughttotherequiredoperating modewithintheallowable actionstatement timeintheTechnical Specifications.

Declaration ofanUnusualEventisbasedonthetimeatwhichtheLCO-specified actionstatement timeperiodelapsesunderthesiteTechnical Specifications and,isnotrelatedtohowlongacondition mayhaveexisted.OtherrequiredTechnical Specification shutdowns thatinvolveprecursors tomoreseriouseventsareaddressed byotherSystem,malfunction Hazards,orFissionProductBarrierDegradation ICs.50

ICg:SU3PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMllet...tUnlt2Unplanned lossofmostorallsafetysystemannunclatlon orlndlcatlon Inthecontrolroomforgreaterthan15minutes.81(PwrOps)~2(HSB)~3(HSD)Q4(CSD)05(Refuel)06(Defuel)0AllIU3.1hefolhwingconditions exist:uLossofannunciatore ANDforgreaterthan15minutes.AND.IntheopinionoftheShiftSupervisor, thelossoftheannunciators orindicators requiresncreasedsurveillance tosafelyoperatetheun.ANDLAnnunciator orindicator lossdoesnotresultfromplannedaction.Bases51

PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMile..itUnit2ThisICanditsassociated EALareintendedtorecognize thedNicultyassociated withmonitoring changingplantconditions withouttheuseofamajorportionoftheannunciation orindication equipment.

Recognition oftheavailability ofcomputerbasedindication equipment isconsidered (SPDS,plantcomputer, etc.).'Unplanned'oss ofannunciators orindicator excludesscheduled maintenance andtestingactivities.

'Compensatory non-alarming indications:

inthiscontextincludescomputerbasedinformation suchasSPDS.ThisshouldIncludeallcomputersystemsavailable forthisusedepending onspecificplantdesignandsubsequent retrofits.

h~lIb'SklMhmfhagfaahhrthamf fthm,ihhr lm.'tisnotintendedthatplantpersonnel performadetailedcountofinstrumentation lostbutfhausegfthw4~judgement hgfha5455gggudm mfhathreshold fordetermining theseverityoftheplantconditions.

Thisjudgement issupported bythespecificopinionoftheShiftSupervisor thatadditional operating personnel willberequiredtoprovideincreased monitoring ofsystemoperation tosafelyoperatetheunit~.Itisfurtherrecognized thatmostplantdesignsprovideredundant safetysystemindication poweredfromseparateuninterruptable powersupplies.

Whilefailureofalargeportionofannunciators ismorelikelythanafailureofalargeportionofindications, theconcernisincludedinthisEALduetodifficulty associated withassessment ofplantconditions.

Thelossofspecific, orseveral,safetysystemindicators shouldremainafunctionofthatspecificsystemorcomponent operability status.Thiswillbeaddressed bytheirspecificTechnical Specification.

Theinitiation ofaTechnical Specification imposedplantshutdownrelatedtotheinstrument hsswillbereportedvia10CFR50.72.

Iftheshutdownisnotincompliance withtheTechnical Specification action,theUnusualEventisbasedonSU2,Inability toReachRequiredShutdownWithinTechnical Specification Limits."(Site-speci~

Annunciators

~catorforthisEALmustincludethoseidentified intheAbnormalOperating procedures, intheEmergency Operating Procedures, andinotherEALs(e.9.,area,process,and/oreffluentradmonitors, etc.).(Sitaepecfflc)

Annunciators oc4adicaW forthisEALmustincludethoseidentified intheAbnormalOperating procedures, intheEmergency Operating Procedures, andinotherEALs(e.g.,area,process,and/oreffluentradmonitors, etc.).Fifteenminuteswasselectedasathreshold toexcludetransient ormomentary powerlosses.Duetothelimitednumberofsafetysystemsinoperation duringcoldshutdown, refueling, anddefueledmodes,noICisindicated duringthesemodesofoperation.

ThisUnusualEventwillbeescalated toanAlertifatransient isinprogressduringthelossofannunciation orindication.

52

ICttf:SU4Fuelcladdegradatlon.

PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMile..tUnit2Op.ModeApplicability 3U4.1Q1(PwrOps)

Q2(HSB)Q3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)

Q6(Defuel)

~AllSU4.2coolantsampleactivityBases53

PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMile..iUnit2ThisICisincludedasanUnusualEventbecauseitisconsidered tobeapotential degradation inthelevelofsafetyoftheplantandapotential precursor ofmoreseriousproblems.

EAL¹~1addresses g~pecIIQ~

radiation monitorreading,thatprovideindication offuelcladintegrity.

~EAL¹Qfl4gaddresses coolantsamplesexceeding coolanttechnical specifications forIodinespike.Escaiatiori ofthisICtotheAlertlevelisviathefissionproductbarrierdegradation monitoring ICs.54

ICgSU5RCSleakage.PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMilet...itUnit2Op.ModeApplicability SU5.1~1(PwrOps) 52(HSB)~3(HSD)D4(CSD)05(Refuel)

Q6(Defuel)

QAIIEitherofthefollowing conditions exist:a.Unidentified togpmOR~~gghmlg~

leakagegreaterthanb.identified cgggfgZ~gy2gmg~leakagegreaterthan25gpm.Bases55 0

PlantSpecificEAUideline(A,H,S)NineMllea...itVnit2ThisICisincludedasanUnusualEventbecauseitmaybeaprecursor ofmoreseriousconditions and,asaresult,isconsidered tobeapotential degradation ofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.The10gpmvaluefortheunidentified andpressureboundaryleakagewasselectedasitisobservable withnormalcontrolroomindications.

Lesservaluesmustgenerally bedetermined throughtime~nsuming surveillance test(e.g.,massbalances).

TheEALforidentified leakageissetatahighervalueduetothelessersignificance ofidentified leakageincomparison tounidentified orpressureboundaryleakage.Ineithercase,escalation ofthisICtotheAlertlevelisviaFissionProductBarrierDegradation ICsorICSA3,"Inability toMaintainPlantinColdShutdown.'nly operating modesinwhichthereisfuelinthereactorcoolantsystemandthesystemIspressurized arespecified.

56

iC¹:SU6PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMlle.itUnit2Unplanned lossofallonslteoroffsltecommunications capabllltles.

Op.ModeAppllcablllty 3U6.1Q1(PwrOps)

Q2(HSB)Q3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)

Q6(Defuel)

%All=itherofthefollowing conditions exist:Urdu'l'b"'labilitytoperformroutineoperations:

3R>.Lossofall~hLlttlitt)ftlttg offsitecommunications capability:

Bases57

PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMile..tUnit2thepurposeofthisICanditsassociated EALsistorecognize ahssofcommunications capability thateitherdefeatstheplantoperations staffabilitytoperformroutinetasksnecessary.

forslantoperations ortheabilitytocommunicate problemswithoffsiteauthorities.

Thehssofoffsitecommunications abilityisexpectedtobesignificantly morecomprehensive thanthecondition addressed.

by10CFR50.72.

Zi"'-'"-'"-'"'-l--'--'t'.',""'--""'-".'W'"adios/walkie talkies).

Xlanddedicated EPPphonesystems.ThisEALisintendedtobeusedonlywhenextraordinary meansarebeingutilizedtomakecommunications possible(relaying ofinformation fromradiotransmissions, individuals beingsenttooffsitelocations, etc.).58

ICy:SU7Op.ModeApplfcablllty 3U7.1PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMile..itUnit2Unplanned lossofrequiredDCpowerduringcoldshutdownorrefueling modeforgreaterthan15minutes.Q1(PwrOps)

Q2(HSB)Q3(HSD)g4(CSD)~5(Refuel)

Q6(Defuel)

QAII@hot~ofthefollowing conditions exist:>usvoltageindications AND'BKxhi.FailuretorestorepowertoatleastoneacquiredDCbuswithin15minutesfromthetimeofOss.Bases59

PlantSpecificEAiideline(A,H,S)NineMilei..Unit2ThepurposeofthisICanditsassociated EALsistorecognize ahssofDCpowercompromising theabilitytomonitorandcontroltheremovalofdecayheatduringcoklshutdownorrefueling operations.

ThisEALisintendedtobeanticipatory inasmuchastheoperating crewmaynothavenecessary indication andcontrolofequipment neededtorespondtotheloss.Unplanned isIncludedinthisICandEALtoprecludethedeclaration ofanemergency asaresultofplannedmaintenance activities.

Routinely plantswillperformmaintenance onatrainrelatedbasisduringshutdownperiods.Itisintendedthatthelossoftheoperating (operable) trainistobeconsidered.

Ifthishssresultsintheinability tomaintaincoldshutdown, theescalation toanAlertwillbeperSA3"Inability toMaintainPlantinColdShutdown."

Pi~pec~~busvoltageshoul4bohbasedontheminimumbusvoltagenecessary fortheoperation ofsafetyrelatedequipment.

Thisvoltagevalueshouldincorporate amarginofatleast15minutesofoperation beforetheonsetofinability tooperatethoseloads.Thisvoltageisusuallyneartheminimumvoltageselectedwhenbatterysizingisperformed.

Typically thevaluefortheentirebatterysetisapproximately 105voltspercell.Fora56stringbatterysettheminimumvoltageistypically 1.81voltspercell.60

ICy.SA1Op.ModeAppllcablllty 3A1.1PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMile~;.itUnit2LossofalloffsltepowerandlossofallonslteACpowertoessential bussesduringcoldshutdownorrefueling mode.lQ1(PwrOps)

Q2(HSB)Q3(HSD)~4(CSD)~5(Refuel) 56(Defuel)

QAIIAllofthefollowing conditions exist:~.LossofpowertQcitezpocific) transformers ANDxFailureof~te.specific)

AND"FailuretorestorepowertoMeastene.

anorgcncykuc within15minutesfromthetimeoflossofbothoffsiteandonsiteACpower.Bases61

PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMile~..itUnit2LossofallAGpowercompromises allplantsafetysystemsrequiring electricpoweriWhenincoldshutdown, refueling, ordefueledmodetheeventcanbeclassTiiedasanAlert,becauseofthesignificantly reduceddecayheat,lowertemperature andpressure, increasing thetimetorestoreoneoftheemergency busses,relativetothatspecified fortheSiteAreaEmergency EAL.Escalating totheSiteAreaEmergency, ifappropriate, isbyAbnormalRadLevels/Radiological

Effluent, orEmergency DirectorJudgement ICs.Fifteenminuteswasselectedasathreshold toexcludetransient ormomentary powerlosses.62

lCN:SA2Op.ModeAppllcablllty lA2.1PlantSpecificEAIuideline (A,H,S)NineMilePt.tUnit2Y""PaReactorProtection systemsetpolnthasbeenexceededaad~manualscram~1(PwrOps)

~2(HSB)Q3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)

Q6(Defuel)

QAIIyreactorscram hhwhrBases63

PlantSpecificEA>>ideline (A,H,S)NineMilei...Unit2Thiscondition indicates failureoftheautomatic anrfrnanttatprotection systemtoscramthereactortuihaatrtantzdgghurttultrrfaa iharaauturitalnurnada attb~tjua[.

Thiscondition ismorethanapotential degradation ofasafetysysteminthatafrontlineautomatic protection systemdidnotfunctioninresponsetoaplanttransient andthustheplantsafetyhasbeencompromised, anddesignlimitsofthefuelmayhavebeenexceeded.

AnAlertisindicated becauseconditions existthatleadtopotential lossoffuelcladorRCS.Amanualscramisanysetofactionsuttahhtttun:~

mudamitah urhBO.EbiaEanrfiamrltinuEBLh~rahtanmauifiualitr roufifiarf tunIuiaautriatttitr tfttIinathauuitrlitIundmuiihtttfhxtbauanariuhamtaaaauuiitttf tuhuilinumahr raautuia.

Ibafailmufatrtuinatiu 5fiatiunufaiaautuimamfulhntttfhx2ruumhi~initiatiunautiunauhhhuanharauJdlxtalranat tharaauhzmntruluunauiarfuaanut uuaaauutantialiuuufaithtr fttalulatfurfKRhunIfarbq.

fhuatraafaituiatummauufitiunain BEEharafafinaifnuthxtbamatttnuaufuriTiualihrhufhxthaatraiiabiamaruinufmhuiitiuality.tbauttna1luuuilIi~amuRiauuira alamTiiuatiunufanhhd furmnditiunainmhhhthaqautur lainfautahuttfumaaamultuf tbaaurammmL Jfiatbauuntintrarfuritiua!Itx trntfaruunditIunamuirinua iaauturauiainnhhb uumta1hauutantial tbiaattuBSQurfuelularfintagrity.

ltiaahuirnuurtant tunutathattbafailtriauftbaraautui urutautiunairabun iuinitiata anautumatiuaurarnrfuaa nutinfarauttraluiuutantlal laituraauf uthtrmstttrnanuriait.in anrfufitattlf.auDtutrraur iufiaaiun rrutftrutharriar dauralfatiun.

IhaHERaanraanuuthttraafatxfunutlunbtrttuinitaiiaraauturmrama.Iharttfurrt.unua tharmbzhaahtanzzaaattlkmammttrL faihiaaintbaBERmhmuanftatranuuiantaafttthiinuaut.

Ifintrnttdiatamanualautiunatumamtba iaauturarazzmfulfulluninurauuunitiunufan atrturnatiumamfailtra.thtrahnutbittat tuaitbttiulantaafatxurMhnurudtrut Jnttturity.

ttiatatftutbaautuntatiuauramfahrh Ihhrftt~uniauunmatantmithtbaubilumtMuf maitinua~trratam uunaartratbrauiaamfiuatiuna

{Hah;an'tfaiturauf anatituinatiu azamsignaltuinitiataamuuauftd auramnuuldhaimmttdiatabr fullunatfhxanuuaratur initiatatf rnaimlmam.Ibarttfura 1haEhl.zurdinuinihaIBabailunlxmakarttfaranua iuihafaiturauf irnrnttdiatamanual aurainal64

lingSA3PlantSpecificEAUideline(A,H,S)NineMile..itUnit2lnablllty tomaintainplantlncoldshutdown.

Op.ModeAppllcablllty SA3.1Q1(Pwrops)

Q2(HSB)Q3(HSD)~4(CSD)55(Refuel)

Q6(Defuel)

QAIIThefollowing conditions exist:ORBases65

PlantSpecificEA~sideline (A,H,S)NineMllei..Unit2ThisEALaddresses completelossoffunctions requiredforcorecoolingduringrefueling andcoldshutdownmodes.Escalation toSiteAreaEmergency orGeneralEmergency wouklbeviaAbnormalRadLevels/Radiohgical EffluentorEmergency DirectorJudgement ICs."Uncontrolled" meansthatsystemtemperature increaseisnottheresultofplannedactionsbytheplantstaff.TheEALguidancerelatedtouncontrolled temperature riseisnecessary topreservetheanticipatory philosophy ofNUREG-0654 foreventsstartingfromtemperatures muchhwerthanthecoldshutdowntemperature limit.Escalation totheSiteAreaEmergency isbyICSSS,"LossofWaterLevelintheReactorVesselthathasorwillUncoverFuelintheReactorVessel,"orbyAbnormalRadLevels/Radiological EffluentICs.66

ICy:SA4Op.ModeAppllcablllty iA4.1PlantSpecificEAle'uideline (A,H,S)NineMllePi.tUnit2Unplanned lossofmostorallsafetysystemannunclatlon orIndlcatlon Incontrolroomwith.either (1)aslgnlfleanttransient Inprogress(2)compensatory non-alarming Indicators areunavailable.

~1(PwrOps)

~2(HSB)S3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)

Q6(Defuel)

QAIIrhefollowing conditions exist:t.Lossofannunciatore ANDforgreaterthan15minutes.).lntheopinionoftheShiftSupervisor, thelossoftheannunciators orindicators requiresncreasedsurveillance tosafelyoperatetheunit(e).ANDAnnunciator orindicator lossdoesnotresultfromplannedaction.AND3.Eitherofthefollowing:

~Asignificant planttransient isinprogressOR~Careunavailable.

Bases67

PlantSpecificEAIOluideline (A,H,S)NineMilePi.tUnit2ThisICanditsassociated EALareintendedtorecognize thedNicultyassociated withmonitoring changingplantconditions withouttheuseofamajorportionoftheannunciation orIndication equipment duringatransient.

Recognition oftheavailability ofcomputerbasedindication equipment isconsidered (SPDS,plantcomputer, etc.).Plannedlossofannunciators orindicators includedscheduled maintenance andtestingactivities.

Itisnotintendedthatplantpersonnel performadetailedcountoftheinstrumentation lostbuttheusegf4~~~judgement threshold fordetermining theseverityoftheplantconditions.

Thisjudgement issupported bythespecificopinionoftheShiftSupervisor thatadditional operating personnel willberequiredtoprovideincreased monitoring ofsystemoperation tosafelyoperatetheunit(s).Itisfurtherrecognized thatmostplantdesignsprovideredundant safetysystemindication poweredfromseparateuninterruptable powersupplies.

Whilefailureofalargeportionofannunciators ismorelikelythanafailureofalargeportionofindications, theconcernisincludedinthisEALduetodifficulty associated withassessment ofplantconditions.

Thelossofspecific, orseveral,safetysystemindicators shouldremainafunctionofthatspecificsystemorcomponent operability status.Thiswillbeaddressed bythespecificTechnical Specification.

Theinitiation ofaTechnical Specification imposedplantshutdownrelatedtotheinstrument hsswillbereportedvia10CFR50.72.

Iftheshutdownisnotincompliance withtheTechnical Specification action,theUnusualEventisbasedonSU2"Inability toReachRequiredShutdownWithinTechnical Specification Limits."(SI!e-specific)

Qnnunciators cu-hdicatore forthisEALmustincludethoseidentified intheAbnormalOperating Procedures, intheEmergency Operating Procedures, andinotherEALs(e.g.,area,process,and/oreffluentradmonitors, etc.)."Significant Transient" includesresponsetoautomatic ormanuallyinitiated functions suchasscrams,runbacksinvolving greaterthan25%thermalpowerchange,ECCSinjections, orthermalpoweroscillations of10%orgreater."Compensatory non-alarming indications" inthiscontextIndudescomputerbasedinformation suchasSPDS.Thisshouldincludeallcomputersystemsavailable forthisusedepending onspecificplantdesignandsubsequent retrofits.

Ifbothamajorportionoftheannunciation systemandallcomputermonitoring areunavailable totheextentthattheadditional operating personnel arerequiredtomonitorIndications, theAlertisrequired.

Duetothelimitednumberofsafetysystemsinoperation duringcoldshutdown, refueling anddefueledmodes.NoICisindicated duringthesemodesofoperation.

ThisAlertwillbeescalated toaSiteAreaEmergency iftheoperating crewcannotmonitorthetransient inprogress.

68

fc¹:SA5Op.ModeAppllcablllty 3A5.1PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMile.itUnit2ACpowercapablllty toessential bussesreducedtoasinglepowersourceforgreaterthan15minutessuchthatanyadditional singlefailurewouldresultlnstationblackout.

51(PwrOps) 52(HSB)53(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)

Q6(Defuel)

QAIIfhefollowing conditions exist(aandb):a.Lossofpowert+si~pecific) greaterthan15minutes.ANDtransformers forxOnsitepowercapability hasbeendegradedtogaiy.oneggitfLlgll~ittg~iaef) emergency Bases69

PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMlle..Unit2ThisICandtheassociated EALsareintendedtoprovideanescalation fromICSU1"LossofAllOffsitePowertoEssential BussesforGreaterthan15Minutes."

Thecondition indicated bythisICisthedegradation oftheoffsitepowerwithaconcurrent failureofoneemergency generator tosupplypowertoitsemergency busses.Anotherrelatedcondition couldbethelossofalloffsitepowerandhssofonsiteemergency dieseiswithonlyonetrainofemergency bussesbeingbaddedfromtheunitmaingenerator, orthelossofonsiteemergency dieselswithonlyonetrainofemergency bussesbeingbackfedfromoffsitepower.Thesubsequent hssofthissinglepowersourcewouldescalatetheeventtoaSiteAreaEmergency inaccordance withICSS1"LossofAllOffsiteandLossofAllOnsiteACPowertoEssential Busses."ExampleEAL¹QE5.1bshouldbeexpandedtoidentifythecontrolroomindication ofthestatusgfoffsite-specific powersourcesanddistribution bussesthat,ifunavailable, establish asinglefailurevulnerability.

70

ICy:SS1PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMilei'nit2LossofalloffsltepowerandlossofallonslteACpowertoessential busses.Op.ModeApplicability SS1.151(PwrOps) 52(HSB)83(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)

Q6(Defuel)

QAIILossofalloffsiteandonsiteAGpowerasindicated by:a.Lossofpowerto~~ecifie)

ANDtransformers.

>.Failureof~~pecific)

AND=.FailuretorestorepowertoMeastoao-

~rgoacy4ve within~~ueific)

~minutesfromthetimeofhssofbothoffsiteandonsite4,Cpower.Bases

PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMile.tUnit2LossofallACpowercompromises allplantsafetysystemsrequiring electricpoweriProlonged lossofallAC.powerwillcausecoreuncovering andlossofcontainment integrity, thusthiseventcanescalatetoaGeneralEmergency.

Th+sitaspecifg timedurationshouldbeselectedtoexcludetransient ormomentary powerhsses,butshouldnotexceed15minutes.Escalation toGeneralEmergency isviaFissonProductBarrierDegradation orICSG1,'Prolonged LossofAllOffsitePowerandProlonged LossofAllOnsiteACPower."72

lC¹:SS2Op.ModeAppllcablllty 3S2.1PlantSpecificEAUideline(A,H,S)NlneMilei.tUnlt2FailureofReactorProtection systemInstrumentatlon tocompleteorInitiateanautomatic reactorscramonceaReactorProtection syslsetpolnthasbeenexceededandmanualscramwasnotsuccessful nninrir~1(PwrOps)

~2(HSB)Q3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)

Q6(Defuel)

QAIIBases73

PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMile.<Unit2Undertheseconditions, thereactorisproducing moreheatthanthemaximumdecayheatloadforwhichthesafetysystemsaredesigned.

ASiteAreaEmergency isindicated becauseconditions existthatleadtoimminentlossorpotential hssofbothfuelcladandRCS.AlthoughthisICmaybeviewedasredundant totheFissionProductBarrierDegradation IC,itsinclusion isnecessary tobetterassuretimelyrecognition andemergency response.

Escalation ofthiseventtoaGeneralEmergency wouldbeviaFissionProductBarrierDegradation orEmergency DirectorJudgement ICs.74

iC¹:SS3PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMile.tUnit2LossofallvltafDCpower.Op.ModeApplicability 3S3.151(PwrOps) 52(HSB)g3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)

Q6(Defuel)

QAIIr,busvoltageindications forgreaterthan15minutes.Bases75

PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMile.tUnit2LossofallDCpowercompromises abilitytomonitorandcontrolplantsafetyfunctions.

ProhngedhssofallDCpowerwillcausecoreuncovering andlossofcontainment integrity whenthereissignificant decayheatandsensibleheatinthereactorsystem.Escalation toaGeneralEmergency wouldoccurbyAbnormalRadLevels/Radiological

Effluent, FissionProductBarrierDegradation, orEmergency DirectorJudgement ICs.Fifteenminuteswasselectedasathreshold toexdudetransient ormomentary powerlosses.76

ICy:SS4PlantSpecificEAUideline(A,H,S)NineMile.tUnit2Completelossoffunctionneededtoachieveormalntalnhotshutdown.

Op.ModeApplicability 3S4.151(PwrOps)

~2(HSB)~3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)

Q6(Defuel)

QAIIBases77

PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMile.tUnit2ThisEALaddresses completelossoffunctions, including ultimateheatsinkandreactivity control,requiredforhotshutdownwiththereactoratpressureandtemperature.

Undertheseconditions, thereisanactualmajorfailureofasystemintendedforprotection ofthepublic.Thus,declaration ofaSiteAreaEmergency iswarranted.

Escalation toaGeneralEmergency wouldoccurbyAbnormalRadLevels/Radiohgical

Effluent, FissionProductBarrierDegradation, orEmergency DirectorJudgement ICs.78

ling:SS5PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMile.tUnit2LossofRPVwaterlevelthathasorwilluncoverfuelIntheRPV.51(PwrOps) 52(HSB)~3(HSD)S4(CSD)S5(Refuel)

Q6(Defuel)

QAII3S5.1SS5.2Bases79

PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMilei.tUnit2Undertheconditions specified bythisIC,severecoredamagecanoccurandreactorcoolantsystempressureboundaryintegrity maynotbeassured.'IIIIhIh'lldl~d5'hhlazmmiraii~tnia mtnarallxagnaldaradilm herhttuadanr rtffbarangaiamhhhhzalizmf dafiagratignamaxrtmr.

Iuganaraiazzba amzaniraiignrtf mahttaiihhgaa.

Raartfhttihibahai ahdandBGRharrlaramttaihatramurrad.

Ztmrahra.dat;larafhnaf a2hhamEmargarmxianarranfttd.

ifbmdmgan auzaniraiiunalncraaaainmaiuziitIn mdhihauraaant:artf ntmanittghhaldaflagraihn huraia{Lh)Pkhttiruganand aPlmtfgtuQ.mmiiaurtfilmrttniainmani irraammibnr refihaaffaiia radhat;iharaiaaaa rafafrttttidharattttiradhx EZaanddat:laraihnof aQamalEmargantnt rartttlrad Thus,declaration ofaSiteAreaEmergency iswarranted undertheconditions specified bytheIC.Escalation toaGeneralEmergency isviaradiological effluence ICAG1harrhrlaaa.

80

ICO:SS6PlantSpecificEAUideline(A,H,S)NineMile..itUnit2lnablllty tomonitoraslgnlfleanttransient tnprogress.

Op.ModeAppllcablllty SS6.1~1(PwrOps)

~2(HSB)53(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)

Q6(Defuel)

QAIIWlofthefollowing conditions exist:s.Lossof~e-spociTIe) annunciators AND:.Indications neededtoinonitor~~cific) areunavailable.

ANDf.Transient inroress.Bases81

PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMile,tUnit2ThisICanditsassociate EALareintendedtorecognize theinability ofthecontrolroomstafftomonitortheplantresponsetoatransient.

ASiteAreaEmergency isconsidered toexistifthecontrolroomstaffcannotmonitorsafetyfunctions neededforprotection ofthepublic.(Q~oci~Annunciators forthisEALshouldbelimitedtoincludethoseidentified intheAbnormalOperating Procedures, IntheEmergency Operating Procedures, andinotherEALs(e.g.,radmonitors, etc.).Compensatory non-alarming indications" inthiscontextindudescomputerbasedinformation suchasSPDS.Thisshouldincludeallcomputersystemsavailable forthisusedepending onspecificplantdesignandsubsequent retrofits.

'Significant Transient includesresponsetoautomatic ormanuallyinitiated functions suchasscrams,runbacksinvolving greaterthan25%thermalpowerchange,ECCSinjections, orthermalpoweroscillations of10%orgreater.@to.spec~

Indications neededtomonitorsafetyfunctions necessary forprotection ofthepublicmustincludecontrolroomindications, computergenerated indications anddedicated annunciation capability.

Thespecificindications shouldbethoseusedtodetermine suchfunctions astheabilitytoshutdownthereactor,maintainthecorecooledandinaeoolablegeometry, toremoveheatfromthecore,tomaintainthereactorcoolantsystemintact,andtomaintaincontainment intact.Planned"actionsareexcludedfromtheisEALsincethelossofinstrumentation ofthismagnitude isofsuchsignificance duringatransient thatthecauseofthelossisnotanameliorating factor.82

iC¹:SG1PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMile..itUnit2Prolonged lossofalloffsltepowerandprolonged lossofallonslteACpower.Op.ModeApplicability SG1.1R1(Pwrops)

~2(HSB)~3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)

Q6(Defuel)

QAIIprolonged lossofalloffsiteandonsiteAGpowerasindicated by:a.Lossofpowertospecific)

ANDtransformers.

xFailureof~~pecific)

.Atleastoneofthefolhwingconditions exist:~Restoration ofggmttLtaatleastoneemergency buswithin~~pocTiic) 2hoursisnotlikelyOR~(Bases83

PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMile..itUnit2LossofallACpowercompromises allplantsafetysystemsrequiring electricpoweri.Prolonged lossofallACpowerwillleadtohssoffuelclad,RCS,andcontainment.

Thgai~peciflc) hourstorestoreACpowercanbebasedonsiteblackoutcopinganalysisperformed inconformance with10CFR50.63 andRegulatory Guide1.155,"StationBlackout, asavailable, withappropriate allowance foroffsiteemergency response.

AlthoughthisICmaybeviewedasredundant totheFissionProductBarrierDegradation IC,itsinclusion isnecessary tobetterassuretimelyrecognition andemergency response.

ThisICisspecified toassurethatintheunlikelyeventofprolonged stationblackout, timelyrecognition oftheseriousness oftheeventoccursandthatdeclaration ofaGeneralEmergency occursasearlyasisappropriate, basedonareasonable assessment oftheeventtrajectory.

Thelikelihood ofrestoring atleastoneemergency busshouldbebasedonarealistic appraisal ofthesituation sinceadelayinanupgradedecisionbasedononlyachanceofmitigating theeventcouldresultinahssofvaluabletimeinpreparing andimplementing publicprotective actions.Inaddition, undertheseconditions, fissionproductbarriermonitoring capability maybedegraded.

Althoughitmaybedifficult topredictwhenpowercanberestored, itisnecessary togivetheEmergency Directorareasonable ideaofhowquickly(s)hemayneedtodeclareaGeneralEmergency basedontwomajorconsiderations:

1.Arethereanypresentindications thatcorecoolingisalreadydegradedtothepointthatLossorPotential Lossoffissionproductbarriersisimminent'?

(RefertoTables3and4formoreinformation.)

2.Iftherearenopresentindications ofsuchcorecoolingdegradation, howlikelyisitthatpowercanberestoredintimetoassurethatalossoftwobarrierswithapotential lossofthethirdbarriercanbeprevented?

Thus,indication ofcontinuing coracoolingdegradation mustbebasedonfissionproductbarriermonitoring withparticular emphasisonEmergency Directorjudgement asitrelatestoimminentlossorpotential lossoffissionproductbarriersanddegradedabilitytomonitorfissionproductbarriers.

84

ICe:SG2Op.ModeAppllcablllty 3G2.1PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMlle..itUnit2FailureoftheReactorProtection systemtocompleteanautomatic scramandmanualscramwasnotsuccessful andtherelsIndlcatlott anextremechallenge totheabllltytocoolthecore.g1(PwrOps) 52(HSB)Q3(HSD)Q4(CSD)Q5(Refuel)

Q6(Defuel)

QAIIAND>Eitherofthefollowing:

a.(Sb.(s'RBases85

PlantSpecificEAuideline(A,H,S)NineMile~..itUnit2Automatic andmanualscramarenotconsidered successful ifactionawayfromthereactorcontrolconsoleisrequiredtoscramthereactor.Undertheconditions ofthisICanditsassociated EALs,theeffortstobringthereactorsubcritical havebeenunsuccessful and,asaresult,thereactorisproducing moreheatthanthemaximumdecayheathadforwhichthesafetysystemsweredesigned.

Althoughtherearecapabilities awayfromthereactorcontrolconsole,suchas'tandbyliquidcontrolinBWRs,thecontinuing temperate riseindicates thatthesecapabilities arenoteffective.

Thissituation couldbeprecursor foracoremeltsequence.

reactorvesselwaterlevelisbelow2/3coverageofactivefuelForBWRs,theextremechallenge totheabilitytocoolthecoreisintendedtomeanthattheAnotherconsideration istheinability toinitially removeheatduringtheearlystagesofthissequence.

BWRs,~~peelsconsiderations includeinability toremoveheatviathemaincondenser, orviathesuppression pooloc4oruc(e.g.,duetohighpoolwatertemperature).

Intheeventeitherofthesechallenges existatatimethatthereactorhasnotbeenbroughtbelowthepowerassociated withthesafetysystemdesign(typically 3to5%power)acoremeltsequenceexists.Inthissituation, coredegradation canoccurrapidlyForthisreason,theGeneralEmergency declaration isintendedtobeanticipatory ofthefissionproductbarriermatrixdeclaration topermitmaximumoffsiteintervention time.86

PlantSpecificEAlsideline(FPB)NineMilePointUnit2BWRFPBtC¹'C1Barrier:FuelCladdinDescription:

PrimaryCoolantActivityLevelType:LossFC1.1CoolantactivitygreaterthanBases:Assessment bytheNUMARGEALTaskForceindicates thatthisamountofcoolantactivityiswellabovethatexpectedforiodinespikesandcorresponds toabout2%to5%fuelcladdamage.Thisamountofcladdamageindicates significant cladheatingandthusthefuelcladbarrierisconsidered hst.Thereisnoequivalent

'Potential Loss"EALforthisitem.87

PlantSpecificEAIjideline(FPB)NineMilePointUnit2BWRFPBIC¹'C2Barrier:FuelCladdinDescripttoll:ReactorVesselWaterLevelType:Loss/Pot.

LossFC2.1Levellessthan-bioJEBBBases:The"Loss"EA+si~poci~

valuecorresponds tothelevelwhichisusedinEOPstoindicatechallenge ofcorecooling.o~tiuo-fuel.

Thisistheminimumvaluetoassurecorecoolingwithoutfurtherdegradation ofthedad.The"Potential Loss"EAListhesameastehRCSbarrier"Loss"EAL4belowandcorresponds tothe~~pecifg waterlevelatthetopoftheactivefuel.Thus,thisEALindicates a"Loss"ofRCSbarrieranda"Potential Loss"oftheFuel.CladBarrier.ThisEALappropriately escalates theemergency classtoaSiteAreaEmergency.

88

PlantSpecificEAlsideline(FPB)NineMilePointUnit2BWRFPBIC¹:FC3Barrier:FuelCladdinDescrfptloit:

DrywellRadiation Monitoring Type:LossDrywellradiation monitorreadinggreatertha+sitaepecific)

+R/hr.Bases:~isavaluewhichindicates thereleaseofreactorcoolant,withelevatedactivityindicative offueldamage,intothedrywelLThereadingshouldbecalculated assumingtheinstantaneous releaseanddispersal ofthereactorcoolantnoblegasandiodineinventory associated withaconcentration of300pCi/gmdoseequivalent 1-131intothedrywallatmosphere.

Reactorcoolantconcentrations ofthismagnitude areseveraltimeslargerthanthemaximumconcentrations (including iodinespRing)allowedwithintechnical specifications andarethereforeindicative offueldamage(approximately 2'/a-5%dadfailuredepending oncoreinventory andRCSvolume).Thisvalueishigherthanthatspecified forRCSbarrierlossEAL¹3.Thus,thisEALindicates alossofbothfueldadbarrierandRCSbarrier.Caution:itisimportant torecognize thatintheeventtheradiation monitorissensitive toshinefromthereactorvesselorpipingspuriousreadingswillbepresentandanotherindicator offuelcladdamageisnecessary.

Thereisno"Potential LossEALassociated withthisitem.89

PlantSpecificEAIsideline(FPB)NineMilePointUnit2BWRFPBIC¹:FC4BaggiestFuelCladdinDescrlptlotl:

Other(Site-Specific)

Indications Type:LossBases:ThisEAListocoverother~Wpec~

indications thatmayindicatelossorpotential hssofthefuelcladbarrier,Including indications fromcontainment airmonitorsoranyotherQ~ocif+instrumentation.

~I90

PlantSpecificEAIlideline(FPB)NineMilePointUnit2BWRFPBICN:FCSBarrier:FuelCladdinDescription:

Emergency DirectorJudgement Type:LossIPot.

LossFC5.1Anycondition inthejudgement oftheEmergency Directorthatindicates lossorpotential lossofthefuelcladdingbarrier.Bases:ThisEALaddresses anyotherfactorsthataretobeusedbytheEmergency Directorindetermining whetherthefuelcladbarrierislostorpotentially lost.Inaddition, theinability tomonitorthebarriershouldalsobeincorporated inthisEALasafactorinEmergency Directorjudgement thatthebarriermaybeconsidered lostorpotentially lost.(SeealsoICSG1,"Prolonged LossofAllOifsitePowerandProlonged LossofAllOnsiteACPower",foradditional information.)

91

PlantSpecificEAsideline(FPB)NineMilePointUnit2BWRFPBIC¹:RCS1Description:

RCSLeakRateBarrfer:RCSType:LossRCS1.1Q~pec~Indicationg ofmainsteamlinebreak:Bases:The'Loss"EALisbasedondesignbasisaccidentanalyseswhichshowthatevenifMSIVclosureoccurswithindesignlimits,doseconsequences offsitefroma"puffreleasewouldbeinexcessof10millirem.

Thus,thisEALisincludedforconsistency withtheAlertemergency classlcation.

92

PlantSpecificEAIsideline(FPB)NineMilePointUnit2BWRFPBIC¹:RCS1Description:

RCSLeakRateBarrier:RCSType:Potential LossRCS1.2RCSleakagegreaterthan50gpminsidethedrywellRCS1.3Bases:Thepotential lossofRCSbasedonleakageissetatalevelindicative ofasmallbreachoftheRCSbutwhichiswellwithinthemakeupcapability ofnormalandemergency highpressuresystems.Coreuncoveryisnotasignificant concernfora50gpmleak,however,breakpropagation leadingtosignificantly largerlossofinventory ispossible.

ManyBWRsmaybeunabletomeasureanRCSleakofthissizebecausetheleakwouldlikelyincreasedrywellpressureabovethedrywellisolation setpoint.

'Thesystemnormallyusedtomonitorleakageistypically isolatedaspartofthedrywellisolation andistherefore unavailable.

Ifprimarysystemleakrateinformation isunavailable, otherindicators ofRCSleakageshouldbeused.Potential lossofRCSbasedonprimarysystemleakageoutsidethedrywallisdetermined fromsite-specific hfgzimllm3gh Qptttatittg Lgygh4acaaintheareasofthemainsteamlinetunnel,rnaia4urbiao-etc.,whichindicateadirectpathfromtheRCStoareasoutsideprimarycontainment.

93

PlantSpecificEAIjideline(FPB)NineMilePointUnit2BWRFPBIC¹:RCS2Description:

DrywellPressureBarrier:RCSType:LossRCS2.1EQIBREKQiginlmltt pressure~psigBases:The+~ciTQ drywallpressureisbasedonthedrywellhighpressurealarmsetpoint'highervaluemaybeusedifsupporting documentation isprovidedwhichindicates thechosenvalueislessthanthepressurewhichwouldbereachedfora50gpmreactorcoolantsystemleak.Thereisno'Potential Loss"EALcorresponding tothisitem.94

PlantSpecificEALideline(FPB)NineMllePointUnit2BWRFPBIC¹:RCS3Barrier:RCSDescriptlotl:

DrywellRadiation Monitoring Type:LossRCS3.1Drywellradiation monitorreadinggreatertha+sft~ocific) 39@R/hrBases:Ihlaal<<-'--dispersal ofthereactorcoolantnoblegasandiodineinventory associated withnormaloperating concentrations (I.e.,withinT/S)intothedrywellatmosphere.

Thisreadingwillbelessthan-thatspecified forfuelcladbarrierEAL¹3.Thus,thisEALwouldbeindicative ofaRCSleakonly.Iftheradiation monitorreadingincreased tothatvaluespecified bythefuelcladbarrierEAL¹3,fueldamagewouldalsobeindicated.

However,ifthesite-specific physicallocationofthedrywallradiation monitorissuchthatradiation fromacloudofreleasedRCSgasescouldnotbedistinguished fromradiation fromadjacentpipingandcomponents containing elevatedreactorcoolantactivity, thisEALshouldbeomittedandothersite-specific indications ofRCSleakagesubstituted.

Thereisno"Potential Loss"EALassociated withthisitem.95

PlantSpecificEAlideline(FPB)NineMilePointUnit2BWRFPBIC¹:RCS4Barrier:RCSDescription:

ReactorVesselWaterLevelType:LossRCS4.1Levellessthan'BfDBases:This"Loss"EAListhesameas"Potential Loss"fuelcladbarrierEAL¹2.Th+sit~cif+

waterlevelcorresponds tothelevelwhichisusedinEOPstoindicatechallenge ofcorecooling.Depending ontheplantthismaybetopofactivefuelor2/3coverageofactivefuel.ThisEALappropriately escalates theemergency dasstoaSiteAreaEmergency.

Thus,thisEALindicates alossoftheRCSbarrierandapotential tossofthefuelcladbarrier.96

PlantSpecificEAI'sideline (FPB)HineMilePointUnit2BWRFPBIC¹:RCS5Barrier:RCSDescrlptloll:

Other(site-specific) indications Type:LossRCS5.1Bases:ThisEAListocoverother~~cif+

indications thatmayindicatelossorpotential lossoftheRCSbarrier.97

PlantSpecificEAIsideline(FPB)NineMilePointUnit2BWRFPBIC¹:RCS5Barrier:RCSDescription:

Other(site-specific) indications Type:Potential LossRCS5.2Bases:ThisEAListocoverother~~pecTilc) indications thatmayindicatehssorpotential lossoftheRCSbarrier.98

PlantSpecificEAI>ideline(FPEI)NjneMllepojntUnit2BWRFPBICC:RCSSBarrier:RC8Description:

Emergency DirectorJudgmentType:Loss/Pot.

LossRCS6.1Anycondition inthejudgmentoftheEmergency Directorthatindicates lossorpotential lossoftheRCSbarrierBases:ThisEALaddresses anyotherfactorsthataretobeusedbytheEmergency Directorindetermining whethertheRCSbarrierislostorpotentially tost.Inaddition, theinability tomonitorthebarriershouldalsobeincorporated intheEALasafactorinEmergency Directorjudgement thatthebarriermaybeconsidered hstorpotentially lost.(SeealsoICSG1,"Prolonged LossofOffsitePowerandProlonged LossofAllOnsiteACPower,,foradditional information.)

99

PlantSpecificEAIideline(FPB)NineMllePointUnit2BWRFPBICO:PC1Oescrlptlon:

DrywellPressureBarrier:PrimaContainment Type:LossPC1.1PC1.2Bases:100

PlantSpecificEAIsideline(FPB)NineMilePointUnit2BWRFPBIC¹:PC1Description:

DrywallPressureBarrier:PrimaContainment Type:Potential LossPC1.3PC1.4Exphsivemixtureof'xists.Bases:ofanexplosive mixturemeansahydrogenandoxygenconcentration ofatleastthelowerdeflagration limitcuaco exists.Existence 101

PlantSpecificEAlsideline(FPB)NineMilePoIntUnit2BWRFPB1C¹:PC2Barffat';PrimaContainment Type:LossDescriptloll:

Containment Isolation ValveStatusafterContainment Isolation SignalPC2.1bhin2aamlina BQIQ2thtmiim PC2.2Intentional ventingperEOPs:PC2.3~~~hfttm~g~~g~ittiiTtgrtot

~Jggggtt~uatfttr~ggrttfitj~,

Inaddition, thepresenceofarearadiation ortemperature alarmsindicating unisolable primarysystemleakageoutsidethedrywellarecovered.Also,anintentional ventingofprimarycontainment perEOPstothesecondary containment and/ortheenvironment toconsidered alossofcontainment.

Thereisno'Potential Loss"EALassociated withthisitem.hurimarymhunhdht;htrrtittututhhh arimarxmafaiuamrtt mirtithttr; BmtgrBuildIrtahrmImnuttraturmabm thtirmazimum~fmttmtirtg lmhQBHugerBuiirhrtahum Bafiatignlmhahm thttirmaximum~urtttmtint lychBases:ThisEALisintendedtocovercontainment isolation failuresallowingadirectflowpathtotheenvironment suchasfailureofbothMSIVstoclosewithopenvalvesdownstream totheturbineortothecondenser.

102

PlantSpecificEAIsideline(FPB)NineMilePointUnit2BWRFPB1C¹:PC3Barrier:PrimaContainment

==

Description:==

Significant Radioactivity Inventory inContainment Type:Potential LossPC3.1Containment radiation monitorreadinggreaterthBases:RIKEt""""'""'"'"'""'"""""i""'"'"""'"ofradioactivity requiring offsiteprotective actionsfromcoredamageisnotpossibleunlessamajorfailureintothereactorcoolant.Regardless ofwhethercontainment ischallenged, thisamountofactivityincontainment, ifreleased, couldhavesuchseverconsequences thatitisprudenttotreatthisasapotential lossofcontainment, suchthataGeneralEmergency declaration iswarranted..

NUREG-1228, "SourceEstimations DuringIncidentResponsetoSevereNuclearPowerPlantAccidents, indicates thatsuchconditions donotexistwhentheamountofcladdamageislessthan20%.aradiation monitorreadingcorresponding to20%fuelcladdamagshe~specified here.Thereisno'LossEALassociated withthisitem.103

PlantSpecificEAI'sideline (FPB)NineMilePointUnit2BWRFPB)C¹:PC4Barrier:PrimaContainment

==

Description:==

ReactorVesselWaterLevelType:Potential LossPC4.1Bases:Theconditions inthispotential hssEALrepresent imminentmeltsequences which,ifnotcorrected, couldleadtovesselfailureandincreased potential forcontainment failure.Inconjunction withthelevelEALsinthefuelandRCSbarriercolumns,thisEALwillresultlnthedeclaration ofaGeneralEmergency

-lossoftwobarriersandthepotential lossofathird.Iftheemergency operating procedures havebeenineffective inrestoring reactorvessellevelfggJthereisnota"success" path.~'nSevereaccidentanalysis(e.g.,NUREG-1150) haveconcluded thatfunctionrestoration procedures canarrestcoredegradation withthereactorvesselinasignificant fractionofthecoredamagescenarios, andthelikelihood ofcontainment failureisverysmallintheseevents.Giventhis,itisappropriate toprovideareasonable periodtoallowemergency operation procedures toarrestthecoremeltsequence.

Whetherornottheprocedures willbeeffective shouldbeapparentwithinthetimeprovided.

TheEmergency Directorshouldmakethedeclaration assoonasitisdetermined thattheprocedures havebeen,orwillbeineffective.

Thereisno"loss"EALassociated withthisitem.104

PlantSpecificEAIsideline(FPB)NineMilePointUnit2BWRFPBIC¹:PC5Barrier:PrimaContainment Descrlptlort:

Other(site-specific) indicathns Type:LossPC5.1Bases:ThisEAListocoverother~~ocific) indications thatmayindicatetossorpotential hssofthecontainment barrier.105

PlantSpecificEAIiideline(FPB)NineMilePointVnlt2BWRFPBIC¹:PC5Bayriey:PrimaContainment

==

Description:==

Other(site-specific) indications Type:Potential LossPC5.2Bases:ThisEAListocoverother~~pec~

indications thatmayindicatelossorpotential hssofthecontainment barrier.106

PlantSpecificEAIjideline(FPB)NineMilePointUnit2BWRFPBIC¹:PC6Barrier:PrimaContainment

==

Description:==

Emergency DirectorJudgmentType:Loss/Pot.

LossPC6.1Anycondition inthejudgmentoftheEmergency Directorthatindicates lossorpotential lossofthecontainment barrierLmaafamtaiamftatindiaatnramaxiadttdL'aamhtttat gt:unttltnftgtmf LQQhmmumHaahfuafatglaimddamaaahljtattina jaitialirzreminmataiamttaturmum Bases:ThisEALaddresses anyotherfactorsthataretobeusedbytheEmergency Directorindetermining whetherthecontainment barrierislostorpotentially lost.Inaddition, theinability tomonitorthebarriershouldalsobeincorporated inthisEALasafactorinEmergency Directorjudgement thatthebarriermaybeconsidered lostorpotentially lost.(SeealsoIGSG1,'Prohnged LossofAllOffsitePowerandProlonged LossofAllOnsiteAGPower",foradditional information.)

107

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2 NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation, Rev.0FissionProductBarrierEvaluation Revision0N'raMohawkPowerCoNineMilePointUnit2Operations SupportServices, Inc.233waterStreet2ndFloorPlymouth, MA02360

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2 NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation, Rev.0Evaluation ofNMP-2FissionProductBarrierEmerencActionLevelsTheFissionProductBarrier(FPB)degradation categoryforaBWRplantisillustrated inthefollowing tablewhichisdesignated "Table3"inNESP-007,Revision2.TheInitiating Condition (IC)foreachofthefouremergency classifications (UnusualEvent,Alert,SiteAreaEmergency, andGeneralEmergency) aredesignated FUl,FAl,FSl,andFGl,respectively.

EachICisdefinedbyoneormoreEALsorcombination ofEALswhichareindicative ofalossorpotential lossofoneormoreofthethreefissionproductbarriers.

Thethreefissionproductbarriersare:~FuelClad(FC)~ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)~PrimaryContainment (PC)NESP-007, Revision2,prescribes exampleEALsforeachofthethreefissionproductbarriers.

AnEALisdefinedbyoneormoreplantconditions.

Formcaznple, therearefiveFCbarrierexample$W,Ls,sixRCSbarrieracampleEALs,andsixPCacampleEALs.EachEALmayconsistofoneormoreconditions representing alossofthebarrierandapotential lossofthebarrier.SomeEALsmayhaveonlylossconditions, othersonlypotential lossconditions, somehavebothlossandpotential lossconditions.

EachEALisgivenasequential numberinTable3.InthefoQowinglistunderthecolumnlabeled"NESP-007",NUMARCKALawithadefinedcondition (i.e.,labeledasneeding"site-specific" inputinTable3)areidentified witha"yes",andthosewithoutadefinedcondition (i.e.labeled"notapplicable" inTable3)areidentified witha"no".Similarly, EALconditions applicable toNMP-2areidentified withayes/nounderthecolumnlabeled"NMP-2".

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2 NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation, Rev.0~BrrfrEAL¹NUMARCLoss~PNMP-2mPiLumFCRCSPClalb23456lalb2a2b2c356YesNoYesYesYesNoYesYesYesYesYesYesNoYesYesNoYesNoYesNoYesYesYesYesYesYesYesYesYesNoYesNoYesNoNoYesNoYesYesYesYesYesYes(FC1.1)

Yes(FC2.1)

Yes(FC3.1)

Yes(FC4.1)

Yes(FC5.1)

Yes(RCS1, 1)NoYes(RCS2.1)

Yes(RCS3.1)

Yes(RCS4.1)

NoYes(RCS6.1)

NoNoYes(PC2.1)

Yes(PC2.2)

Yes(PC2.3)

NoNoNoYes(PC6.1)

NoYes(FC2.1)

NoNoYes(FC5.1)

Yes(RCS1.2)

Yes(RCS1.3)

NoNoNoNoYes(RCS6.1)

Yes(PC1.3)Yes(PC1.4)NoNoNoYes(PC3.1)

Yes(PC4.1)

NoYes(PC6.1)

BasedontheclassiQcation keygivenatthebeginning ofTable3,thenumberofexampleEALs,andthenumberoflossandpotential lossconditions, thesetofconditions thatcanyieldagivenemergency classiQcation canbecomputed.

Themaximum,theoretically possiblesetofconditions thatcanyieldanUnusualEventclassification isgivenincolumn1ofTableA.TheseconsistofthePClossandPCpotential lossconditions.

Themaximum,theoretically possiblesetofconditions thatcanyieldanAlertclassification isgivenincolumn1ofTableB.TheseconsistofFClossandpotential lossconditions, andRCSlossandpotential lossconditions.

Themaximum,theoretically possiblesetofconditions thatcanyieldaSiteAreaEmergency classification isgivenincolumn1ofTableC.Theseconsistofanyofthefollowing conditions:

~LossofFCandRCS,or~Potential lossofFCandRCS,or~Potential lossofFCorRCS

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2 NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation, Rev.0BIldLossofanotherbarrierThethirdsetofconditions listedabovecanberepresented bythefollowing conditions toeliminate reference to"lossofanotherbarrier":

~Potential lossofFCandlossofRCS,or~Potential lossofFCandlossofPC,or~Potential lossofRCSandlossofFC,or~Potential lossofRCSandlossofPCThemaximum,theoretically possiblesetofconditions thatcanyieldaGeneralEmergency classification isgivenincolumn1ofTableD.Theseconsistofthefollowing conditions:

~Lossofanytwobarriers, and~Potential lossofathirdTheseconditions canberepresented bythefollowing conditions tocorrelate barrierlossandpotential losstothethreespecificbarriers:

~LossofFCandlossofRCSandpotential lossofPC,or~LossofRCSandlossofPCandpotential lossofFC,or~LossofPCandlossofFCandpotential lossofRCSSincetheEALconditions arelistednumerically inTable3,TablesAthroughDutilizeasimilarnumbering systemwhichismodifledbyletterabbreviations todefineeachsetofconditions.

Forexample,condition "FCl-loss" corresponds toalossoftheFuelCladbarrierduetoprimarycoolantactivitylevelgreaterthanthesite-specific value.Similarly, "RCSlb-pot.

loss"corresponds toapotential lossoftheReactorCoolantSystembarrierduetounisolable primarysystemleakageoutsidethedrywell,andsoon.Anevaluation ofeachcondition orsetofconditions listedinTablesAthroughDismadetodetermine ifitproperlydefinestheappropriate threshold fortheclassification.

Ifacondition orsetofconditions isappropriate, acommentreflecting thisconclusion isrecordedinthe"Remarks" column.Ifacondition orsetofconditions isdetermined tobeinappropriate, itislinedoutandthereasonforthisconclusion issimilarly recordedinthe"Remarks" column.Whereadditional spaceisrequiredtocompletecomments, thecommentsarerecordedby

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2 NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation, Rev.0numberinAppendix1ofthisdocument.

Thenumbersofthecommentsarerecordedinthe"Remarks" columnwiththeassociated condition orsetofconditions towhichtheyapply.AsummaryoftheresultsoftheQssionproductbarrierevaluation ispresented inAppendix2.

RECOGNITION CATEGORYFFISSIONPRODUCTBARRIERDEGRADATION INITIATING CONDITION MATRIXTABLESBWRUNUSUALEVENTSITEAREAEMERGENCY GENERALEMERGENCY FU1Anylossoranypotential lossofcontainment Op.Modes:PoweroperaUonHotStandby/Startup (BWR)HotShutdownAnylossoranytentfallossofeitherelcladorRCS.Op.Modes:Poweroperation HotStandby/Startup (BWR)HotShutdownLossofbothfuelcladandRCSORPotentfal lossofbothfuelcladandRCSORPotentfal lossofeitherfuelcladorRCS,andlossofanyadditional barrfer.Op.Modes:Poweroperation HotStandby/Startup (BWR)HotShutdownFG1LossofanytwobarriersANDPotential lossofthirdbarrfer.Op.Modes:Poweroperation HotStandby/Startup (BWR)HotShutdownNOTES:l.AlthoughthelogicusedforthesefnfUatfng condfUons appearsoverlycomplex,ftlsnecessary toreflectthefollowing consfderations:

~ThefuelcladbarrferandtheRCSbarrierareweightedmoreheavilythanthecontainment barrier(seeSections3.4and3.8formorefnformaUon onthispoint).UnusualEventICsassociated withRCSandFuelCladbarriersareaddressed underSystemMalfuncUon ICs.~AttheSiteAreaEmergency level.theremustbesomeabilitytodynamically assesshowfarpresentcondfUons areforGeneralEmergency.

Forexample.ifFuelCladbarrferandRCS~er"Loss"EALsexisted,thiswouldindicatetotheEmergency Dfrectorthat,inadditional tooffsltedoseassessments.

conUnualassessments ofradioactive inventory andcontainment integrity mustbefocusedon.If,ontheotherhand.bothFuelCladbarrierandRCSbarrier"PotenUal Loss"EALsexisted,theEmergency Directorwouldhavemoreassurance thattherewasnofmmedfate needtoescalatetoaGeneralEmergency.

~'Iheabilitytoescalatetohigheremergency classesasaneventgetsworsemustbemaintained.

Forexample,RCSleakagesteadilyincreasing wouldrepresent anincreasing risktopublichealthandsafety.2.FfssfonProductBarrierICsmustbecapableofaddressing eventdynamfcs.

'Ihus,theEALReference Tables3and4statethatIMMINENT(Le.,withinIto2hours)lossorpotenUallossshouldresultfnaclassfflcaUon asfftheaffectedthreshold(s) arealreadyexceeded, partfcularly forthehfgheremergency classes.O

1.PrimlantAtivlRECOGNITION CATEGORYFINITIATING CONDITION MATRIXTABLE8BWRFuelCladBarrierEzampleEALs'otential Loss0(8(0OzCoolantactivitygreaterthan(site-specfAc) valueNotApplicable 2.RtVWaLevLevellessthan(site-speciAc) valuedatoonitorlnDrywellradiation monitorreadinggreaterthan(site-speciAc)

RfhrLevellessthan(site-spcciAc) valueNotApplicable 4.tAd(site-specfAc) asapplfcable (site-specfAc) asapplicable tJdAnycondition lnthe]udgment oftheEmergency Directorthatfndfcates lossorpotential lossofthefuelcladbarrierDetermine whichcombfnatlon ofthethreebarriersarelostorhaveapotential lossandusethefollowing keytoclassifytheevent.Also.aneventformultipleeventscouldoccurwhichresultintheconclusion thatexceeding thelossorpotential lossthresholds fsimminent(l.e.,withinIto3hours).Inthisimminentlosssituation, use]udgment andclassffyasffthethresholds areexceeded.

RECOGNITION CATEGORYFINITIATING CONDITION MATRIXTABLE3BWRRCSBarrierExampleEAL8'CO0)O1.Lt~~~kRag(site-speciQc) fndfcatfon ofmainsteamlinebreakPotential LossRCSleakagegreaterthan50gpmfnsfdethedrywellORunisolatble prfmarysystemleakageoutsidedrywellasindfcated byareatemperature orarearadiation alarmPressuregreaterthan(site-speclQc) psfgNotapplicable 1dafoloDvgarellradiation monitorreadinggreaterthan(site-specfQc)

RfhrNotapplicable 4.toVesselWater1Levellessthan(site-speciQc) valueNotapplicable (site-speciQc) asapplicable (site-speci Qc)asapplicable torJudenAnycondition fnthe]udgment oftheEmergency Directorthatindicates lossorpotential lossoftheRCSbarrierKOp

RECOGNITION CATEGORYFINITIATING CONDITION MATRIXTABLESBWRPrimaryContainment BarrierExampleEALs'Co0)(0ORapidunexplained decreasefollowing fnftfalincreaseORDrywellpressureresponsenotconsistent withLOCAconditions (site-specfffc) psfgandincreasing ORexplosive mixtureexists2.tasolatfoValvataetoFailureofbothvaluesfnanyonelfnetodoseanddownstream pathwaytotheenvironment existsORIntentional ventingperEOPsORUnfsolable prfmarysystemleakageoutsfdechywellasindicated byareatemperature orarearadiation alarmNotapplicable 4.aVesselWateNotapplfcable Notapplfcable Notapplicable Notapplfcable Containment radiation monitorreadinggreaterthan(site-specific)

R/hrReactorvesselwaterlevellessthan(site-specific) valueandthemaxtmumcoreuncovertimelimitfsfntheunsaferegionROfO9(sfte-specific) asapplfcable torJudAnycondftfon fnthejudgmentoftheEmergency Directorthatindicates lossorpotential lossofthecontainment barrier(site-specfffc) asapplicable KQpO

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2 NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation, Rev.0TableA-BWRFissionProductBarrierUnusualEventsNESP-007RemarksLossorpot.1ossofPCQua-lessPC4b-1ess Pea-lessDCRb-less PCQe-1ess PCS-1essQCG-1essCondition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.212Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.33,254,265,27Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.10

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2 NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation, Rev.0TableB-BWRFissionProductBarrierAlertsNESP-007RemarksLossorpot.lossofPCgsstu>>eeeSueSs8%4oss">>s

'>>~"sp~'$"'"'::""'"'4'.@r+44l"

~'3".CoolQnt'.8ctivitv"@~"

~>@4:+r"'+'s~~"""~'p

~>>".'CQ-less8FCS-lessSubsumedtn"Judgment" EAL.8Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Lossorpot.lossofRCSRCS~ess6RC34-less 8RCSS-less Condition notsupported inPEG.RCSGMssSubsumedin"Judgment" EAL.1523Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2 NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation, Rev.0TableC-BWRFissionProductBarrierSiteAreaEmergencies NESP-007LossofFCandRCSRemarks16I":-i!i::::-.:ii'"

':::::::!xiii::,i:::::::::::::,:-::---::--'-o--:::ii"':

188Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.,'-.":ii"':-:iii,:--!iii i~iii":ii('!.',:::,.ll""'i"":l"""

I~i889Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judent"EAL.FW%"-'-'-'.:i':"

t*,:,::i:::

'::::.."-::":"-

-"-'-":::

iii"':lid'""""

1i-:::""'di'll"""iii::-;:-:"1910llCondition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.2424248Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.12121212Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Pot.lossofPCandRCS8ess812

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2 NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation, Rev.0TableC-HWRFissionProductBarrierSiteAreaEmergencies MESP-007RemarksCondition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedln"Judgment" EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Pot.lossofFCandlossofRCS888Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported lnPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Subsumedln"Judgment" EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Pot.lossofFCandlossofPCCondition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported lnPEG.813

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2 NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation, Rev.0TableC-HWRFissionProductBarrierSiteAreaEmergencies NESP-007Remarks88Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported fnPEG.Condition notsupported fnPEG.Condition notsupported fnPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedfn"Judgment" EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Pot.lossofRCSandlossofFC198192012238192412Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2 NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation, Rev.0TableD-HWRFissionProductBarrierGeneralEmergencies MESP-007RemarksLossofFC+lossofRCS+pot.lossofPC"":""'""'-kpCti-:

pesoreiti tossIfrtp'rES"icountsiisniienitpnrsepsdsnsre>bWpl"':::gIj'""

'::i'l::@

I'-""'-"'-"".'.O'CIS-:yet.

Condition notsupported InPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.25252627essCondition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.25252627Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL,25252627Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment" EALSubsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.16

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2 NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation, Rev.0TableD-BWRFissionProductBarrierGeneralEmergencies NESP-007RemarksCondition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.25252627CondiUonnotsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.25252627Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.25252627Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.25252627CondiUonnotsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Condition notsupported inPEG.CondiUonnotsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL17

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2 NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation, Rev.0TableD-BWRFissionProductBarrierGeneralEmergencies NESP-007RemarksSubsumedin"Judgment" EALCondition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.25252627Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.25252627Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.25252627Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.25252627Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.18

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2 NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation, Rev.0TableD-HWRFissionProductBarrierGeneralEmergencies NESP-007RemarksSubsumedin"Judgment" EALSubsumedin"Judgment" EAL.-Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.25252627Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.25252627CondiUonnotsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.25252627Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.25252627Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.CondiUonnotsupported inPEG.CondiUonnotsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.19

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2 NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation, Rev.0TableD-BWRFissionProductBarrierGeneralEmergencies NESP-007RemarksSubsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.12121212Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.12121212Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.12252627Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.25121212Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.20

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2 NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation, Rev.0TableD-BWRFissionProductBarrierGeneralEmergencies NESP-007RemarksSubsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.LossofRCS+lossofPC+pot.lossofPCCondiUonnotsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.CondiUonnotsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.28CondiUonnotsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.28Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.25Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Condition notsupported inPEG.CondiUonnotsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.CondiUonnotsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG,Condition notsupported inPEG.21

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2 NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation, Rev.0TableD-BWRFissionProductBarrierGeneralEmergencies NESP-007Remarks28Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL28Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.25Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EALCondition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.28Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.28Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.25Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Condition notsupported inPEG.22

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2 NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation, Rev.0TableD-BWRFissionProductBarrierGeneralEmergencies NESP-007RemarksSubsumed'in"Judgment" EAL.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported lnPEG.Condition notsupported fnPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.CondfUonnotsupported lnPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.28CondlUonnotsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.28Condition notsupported fnPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.25Condition notsupported fnPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Condition notsupported inPEG.CondlUonnotsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported fnPEG.Subsumedfn"Judgment" EAL.Condition notsupported lnPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.CondiUonnotsupported inPEG.CondfUonnotsupported lnPEG.CondiUonnotsupported fnPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.CondlUonnotsupported lnPEG.Condition notsupported lnPEG.Condition notsupported fnPEG.Condition notsupported fnPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported fnPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2 NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation, Rev.0TableD-SWRFissionProductBarrierGeneralEmergencies NESP-007RemarksCondition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported fnPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported fnPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported fnPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condftfon notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Condftfon notsupported inPEG.Subsumedfn"Judgment" EAL,Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Condition notsupported fnPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Condition notsupported fnPEG.Condition notsupported fnPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.LossofPC+lossofFC+pot.lossofRCSCondition notsupported fnPEG.Condition notsupported fnPEG.Condition notsupported fnPEG.Condition notsupported fnPEG.24

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2 NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluaUon, Rev.0TableD-BWRFissionProductBarrierGeneralEmergencies NESP-007RemarksCondlUonnotsupported lnPEG.CondlUonnotsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported lnPEG.'ondition notsupported lnPEG.Condition notsupported lnPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.CondlUonnotsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported lnPEG.CondlUonnotsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.CondlUonnotsupported lnPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.CondiUonnotsupported lnPEG.Condition notsupported lnPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported lnPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported lnPEG.Condition notsupported lnPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported lnPEG.Condition notsupported lnPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.25

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2 NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation, Rev.0TableD-BWRFissionProductBarrierGeneralEmergencies NESP-007RemarksCondition notsupported inPEG.""*"""*'PC'-"-l"""'"-'-*-"~i""'!ilia Si'llI!i!ii@tiki"""'0ii&Alhi""'dpi"

'"29Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.PCS:3688:,

>$+%FC2-."Toss

"""i'"""'""i28'"'-'f8il to~fsol':eamWc'An'FAF'N'0Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.i".'1Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.24,2824,28Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL1212Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL2222Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.22,22Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.2222Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.222226

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2 NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation, Rev.0TableD-SWRFissionProductBarrierGeneralEmergencies NESP-007RemarksCondition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.1212CondiUonnotsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.I,::-'"""":llilia'i'Fi'3CondiUonnotsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.'si'eii"e'4"::""'8*,:.'":""':::w:;:.*"i!i:.

'-i'i!i):::

32Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedtn"Judent"EAL.34Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.2424CondiUonnotsupported inPEG.assSubsumedin"Judgment" EAL.1212Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EALCondition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.CondiUonnotsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.essCondiUonnotsupported inPEG.CondiUonnotsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.27

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2 NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation, Rev.0TableD-HWRFissionProductBarrierGeneralEmergencies NESP-007RemarksCondition riotsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Condition notsupported inPEG,Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment" EALSubsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.LossofPC+lossofFC+lossofRCSCondition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2 NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation, Rev.0TableD-HWRFissionProductBarrierGeneralEmergencies

-NESP-007 RemarksCondition notsupported fnPEG.Condition notsupported fnPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.CondfUonnotsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.CondiUonnotsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.CondfUonnotsupported fnPEG.Condition notsupported fnPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported fnPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported fnPEG.CondfUonnotsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.CondiUonnotsupported fnPEG.Condition notsupported fnPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported fnPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condftfon notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported fnPEG.Condition notsupported fnPEG.Condition notsupported fnPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported fnPEG.29 I

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2 NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation, Rev.0TableD-HWRFissionProductBarrierGeneralEmergencies NESP-007RemarksCondition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.CondiUonnotsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.CondiUonnotsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG,Condition notsupported inPEG.CondiUonnotsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.CondiUonnotsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.CondiUonnotsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.CondiUonnotsupported inPEG.CondiUonnotsupported inPEG.3535353535Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.3535353535Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.

0 OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2 NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation, Rev.0TableD-BWRFissionProductBarrierGeneralEmergencies NESP-007Remarks35353535353524,2824,2824,2824,2824,28Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.3535353535Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.2525252525Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.2525252525Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.252525252531

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2 NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation, Rev.0TableD-SWRFissionProductBarrierGeneralEmergencies NESP-007RemarksSubsumedin"Judgment" EAL.2525252525Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.2525252525Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.3535353535Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.3535353535Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.3535353535Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.24,2824,2824,2824,2832

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2 NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation, Rev.0TableD-SWRFissionProductBarrierGeneralEmergencies NESP-007Remarks24,28Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.3535353535Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.CondlUonnotsupported lnPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported lnPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported lnPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported lnPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported lnPEG.Condition notsupported lnPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported lnPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported lnPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.

i.

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2 NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation, Rev.0TableD-BWRFissionProductBarrierGeneralEmergencies NESP-007RemarksCondition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Condition notsupported inPEG.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment" EALSubsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment" EALSubsumedin"Judgment" EAISubsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.'ubsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment" EALSubsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.Subsumedin"Judgment" EAL.

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2 NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation, Rev.0AppencHx1-FissionProductBarrierRemarks2.Althoughintentional ventingpertheEOPsinEAL¹PC2.2isavoluntary lossoftheprimarycontainment

boundary, declaration ofanUnusualEventattheDrywellPressureLimit{DWPL)orcombustible gasconcentrations requiresanemergency responsebeyondtheUnusualEventrequirements.

Drywellpressureabovethescramsetpointisanindication ofalossoftheRCSbarrier(EAL¹RCS2.1).LossoftheRCSbarrierisalwaysanAlertdeclaration.

Itisreasonable toassumethattheDWPLandcombustible gasconcentrations willalwaysbereachedwithdrywellpressureabove3.5psig.SincetheRCS2.1willalwaysbereachedbeforePC2.2,EAL¹PC2.2isunnecessary andcanbedeleted.Althoughunisolable primarysystemleakageoutsidethedrywellasindicated bysecondary containment radiation levelsatthemaximumsafeoperating levelinEAL¹PC2.3isalossoftheprimarycontainment, EAL¹RCS1.3requiresanAlertdeclaration atthemaximumnormaloperating radiation level.SinceRCS1.3willalwaysbereachedbeforePC2.3,EAL¹PC2.3isunnecessary andcanbedeleted.3.4.5.AlthoughdrywellpressureabovetheDWPLandthepresenceofcombustible gasconcentrations isanindication ofapotential lossoftheprimarycontainment

boundary, emergency classiQcation attheselimitsrequiresanemergency responsebeyondtheUnusualEvent.Drywellpressureabovethescramsetpointisanindication ofalossoftheRCSbarrier(EAL¹RCS2.1).LossoftheRCSbarrierisalwaysanAlertdeclaration.

Itisreasonable toassumethatthedrywellpressureattheDWPLandcombustible gasconcentrations willalwaysbereachedwithdrywellpressureabovethescramsetpoint.

SincetheRCS2.1willalwaysbereachedbeforePC1.3andPC1.4,EAL¹sPC1.3andPC1.4areunnecessary andcanbedeleted.EAL¹PC3.1wouldrequireanUnusualEventdeclaration atacontainment radiation levelwhichiswellinexcessofthatrequiredforthelossofRCS.SincelossofRCSisanAlertclassiQcation, EAL¹PC3.1isunnecessary andcanbedeleted.EntrytotheDrywellFloodingEOPisidentified inEAL¹PC4.1asacondition representing animminentmeltsequencewhereRPVwaterlevelcannotberestoredabovethetopofactivefuel.Thispotential lossEALrequiresanUnusualEventdeclaration.

However,EAL¹FC2.1requiresanAlertdeclaration whenRPVwaterlevelislessthanthetopofactivefuel.SinceFC2.1willalwaysbereachedbeforePC4.1,MHtPC4.1isunnecessary andcanbedeleted,

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2 NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation, Rev.0Appendix1-FissionProductBarrierRemarks6.7.8.Amainsteamlinebreakinsidetheprimarycontainment wouldresultindrywellpressureabovethescramsetpointandisaddressed byEAL¹RCS2.1.Amainsteamline breakoutsideprimarycontainment wouldresultinalossoftwoQssionproductbarriersandisaddressed bythecombination ofconditions requiring aSiteAreaEmergency.

Therefore, thisEALisunnecessary andcanbedeleted.EAL¹FC3.1andEAL¹RCS3.1identifydrywellradiation monitorreadingsrequiring anAlertclassification.

SincethemonitorreadinginEAL¹FC3.1isalwaysgreaterthanthatusedinEAL¹RCS3.1,EAL¹FC3.1isunnecessary andcanbedeleted.RPVwaterlevellessthanTAPisaSiteAreaEmergency basedonEAL¹SS5.1.Therefore, thisportionoftheEALisunnecessary andcanbedeleted.910.EAL¹FC2.1andEAL¹RCS4.1identifyRPVwaterlevellessthanTAFasacondition requiring anemergency classiQcation.

Sincetheyarethesamecondition, theappropriate classiQcation isprovidedattheAlertlevelunderEAL¹FC2.1.Therefore, thiscombination ofconditions asaSiteAreaEmergency classification isunnecessary andcanbedeleted.EAL¹FC3.1andEAL¹RCS3.1identifydrywellradiation asacondition requiring anemergency classification.

sincetheyarethesamecondition, theappropriate classification isprovidedattheAlertlevelunderRCS3.1.Therefore, thiscombination ofconditions asaSiteAreaEmergency classification isunnecessary andcanbedeleted.FC3-loss+RCS4-loss isidentical toFC2-loss+RCS3-loss.

SincetheseSiteAreaEmergency conditions areredundant, FC3-loss+RCS4-loss canbedeleted.12.Theemergency directorhasthelatitudetodeclareanemergency classification atanylevelbasedonhisassessment ofcombinations ofplantconditions.

Therefore, anyjudgement decisioninvolving FC5-lossandanothercondition isthesameasthejudgement madeforFC5-lossaloneandcanbedeleted.13.EAL¹PC2.3andEAL¹RCS1.3(whichaddresses areatemperatures andradiation levelsatthemaximumsafeoperating level)areredundant.

Sinceeithercondition warrantsdeclaration ofaSiteAreaEmergency bythemselves, thisEALcombination canbedeleted.1-2

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2 NMP2FissionProductHarrierEALEvaluation, Rev.0Appendix1-FissionProductBarrierRemarks14.N/A15.RCSleakageintothedrywellmustalsoresultinahighdrywellpressureabovethescramsetpoint.

Thiscondition isaddressed under$MLNRCS2.1.Therefore, thiscondition isunnecessary andcanbedeleted.16.17.Forleaksinsidethedrywellthiscombination ofconditions isadequately addressed underEAL¹FC3.1.Forleaksoutsidethedrywellwithsuccessful containment isolation thiscombination wouldbeadequately coveredunderASl.l.Forconditions inwhichthecontainment doesnotsucessfully isolate,aGeneralEmergency wouldberequired.

N/A18.19.Thedrywellradiation levelgiveninEAL¹RCS3.1islessthanthedrywellradiation levelassociated withthecoolantactivityofEAL¹FCl.l.Eh'C1.1coolantactivitycombinedwithEAL¹RCS3.1isadequately addressed byEAL¹FC3.1.EAL¹FC3.1isbasedonallofthecoolantactivityofEAL¹FCI.1deposited intotheprimarycontainment.

Suchacondition mustresultfromthelossofthefuelcladandRCSbarriers.

Therefore, EAL¹RCS1.1isunnecessary fortheSiteAreaEmergency condition andcanbedeleted.20.21.RCSla.pot.

lossis>50gpmdrywellleakage.FC4lossisveryhighoffgasactivity.

Highoffgasactivityunderconditions wheresteamflowtothemaincondenser isongoing(i.e.offgasreadingsvalid)aloneisindicative ofaMSLfaQuretoisolatewithdownstream pathwaytotheenvironment.

Thiscondition requiresdeclaration ofaSiteAreaEmergency underEALPC2.1.Therefore, thiscombination ofconditions isunnecessary andcanbedeleted.FaQureofasteamline toisolatewithadirectpathtotheenvironment canonlyoccurwiththelossofthePrimaryContainment boundaryandthelossoftheRCSboundary.

Bydeflnition, thiscombination ofconditions byitselfrequiresdeclaration ofaSiteAreaEmergency.

Therefore, declaration oftheUnusualEventisunnecessary andanySiteAreaEmergency combination ofthiscondition canbedeleted.1-3

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2 NMP2FissionProductBarrierEAIEvaluation, Rev.0Appendix1-FissionProductBarrierRemarks22.23.Tointentionally venttheprimarycontainment inaccordance withtheEOPs,twoQssionproductbarriersmusthavebeenlostandathirdbarrierisabouttobelostduetoventing.BydeQnition, thiscombination oflosseswarrantsdeclaration ofaGeneralEmergency.

Thecombination ofaprimarysystemdischarging intosecondary containment andsecondary containment parameters atthemaximumsafeoperating levelsisalossoftwobarriers.

Bydeflnition, thisrequiresaSiteAreaEmergency declaration.

EAL¹PC2.1isequivalent tothiscombination ofconditions.

24.25.26.27.28.Offgasmonitorsarenotareliableindicator offuelfailureunderseverelydegradedconditions inthatthesystemwouldbeisolatedandprocessmonitorswouldnotbemonitoring anunisolated processstream.Highoffgasactivityunderconditions wheresteamflowtothemaincondenser isongoing(i.e.offgasreadingsvalid)aloneisindicative ofaMSLfailuretoisolatewithdownstream pathwaytotheenvironment.

Therefore thiscondition requiresdeclaration ofaSiteAreaEmergency underEALPC2.1.Primarycontainment pressureatorabovedesignorthepresenceofcombustible gasconcentrations eachrequiresventingoftheprimarycontainment inaccordance withtheEOPs.Lossoftwofissionproductbarriersmusthaveoccurredanditmustbeassumedthatthefuelcladbarrierislostorabouttobelost.Therefore, EAGANPC1.3,EAL¹PC1.4orEAL¹PC2.2alonewarrantsdeclaration ofaGeneralEmergency.

According totheNUMARCguidancegiveninthebasisforIC¹PC3,thelevelofactivitydeposited intheprimarycontainment asaresultofthecondition ofEAL¹PC3.1warrantsdeclaration ofaGeneralEmergency.

DrywellFloodingisrequiredwhenmeansofrestoring andmaintaining adequatecorecoolingcannotbeestablished.

Thiscondition isadirectprecursor tocoremeltwhichwarrantsdeclaration ofaGeneralEmergency.

EAL¹PC2.1orEALPC2.3isalossoftheRCSandprimarycontainment.

EAL¹FC1.1,FC2.1andFC3.1areeachlossesofthefuelclad.Theseconditions alonemeetthedefinition ofaGeneralEmergency.

Therefore, anycombinations oftheseEALsareredundant andcanbedeleted.1-4

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP2 NMP2FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation, Rev.0Appendix1-FissionProductBarrierRemarks29.Thiscombination ofconditions isasubsetofthepreviously listedcombination (EAL¹PC2.1andEAL¹FCl.l)andcan,therefore, bedeleted.30.Thiscombination ofconditions isasubsetofthepreviously listedcombination (EAL¹PC2.1andEAL¹FC2.1)andcan,therefore, bedeleted.31.Thiscombination ofconditions isasubsetofthepreviously listedcombination (EAL¹PC2.1andEAL¹FC3.1)andcan,therefore, bedeleted.32.Thecombination ofaprimarysystemdischarging intosecondary containment andsecondary containment parameters atthemaximumsafeoperating levelsisalossoftwobarriers.

RPVwaterlevellessthanthetopofactivefuelisapotential lossofathirdbarrier.Bydefinition, thisrequiresaGeneralEmergency declaration.

33.Thecombination ofaprimarysystemdischarging intosecondary containment andsecondary containment parameters atthemaximumsafeoperating levelsisalossoftwobarriers.

Elevatedcoolantactivityisapotential lossofathirdbarrier.BydeAnition, thisrequiresaGeneralEmergency declaration.

34.Thecombination ofaprimarysystemdischarging intosecondary containment andsecondary containment parameters atthemaximumsafeoperating levelsisalossoftwobarriers.

Elevatedprimarycontainment radiation isapotential lossofathirdbarrier.Bydefinition, thisrequiresaGeneralEmergency declaration.

35.EAL¹PC2.1orEAL¹PC2.3incombination withanyofEM@FCl.l,FC2.1orFC3.1haspreviously beenevaluated asjustiQcation ofGeneralEmergency.

Therefore thiscombination ofconditions isredundant andcanbedeleted.1-5

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP 1NMP1FissionProductBarrierEALEvaluation, Rev.0Appendix2-SuaunaryofFissionProductBarrierEvaluation Thefollowing summarizes theEALswhichresultedfromtheanalysisperformed ofthefissionproductbarriermethodology ofNVMARC-007 forNMP-2:~Emergency DirectorJudgement FC1.1-loss FC4.1-loss RCS2.1-loss RCS3.1-loss Emergency DirectorJudgement

~FC2.1-loss

~FC3.1-loss

~RCS2.1-loss

~PC2.1-loss

~PC2.3-loss

~Emergency DirectorJudgement

OSSI92-402A-2-NMP1 NMP1FissionProductBarrierEAI.Evaluation, Rev.0Appendix2-SuamaaxyofFissionProductBarrierEvaluation

~PC1.3-pot.

loss~PC1.4-pot.

loss~PC3.1-pot.

loss~PC4.1-pot, loss~PC2.1-loss

+FC1.1-loss, FC2.1-loss orFC3.1-loss

~PC2.3-loss

+FC1.1-loss, FC2.1-loss orFC3.1-loss Emergency DirectorJudgement 1-2

OSSI92<02A-3-BWR BWREALBinningDocument, Rev.0EALBinninDocumentKQY>~>R2NewYorkPowerAuthoriJ;A.EErpatrtck NuclearPowerPlantIndianPointNuclearPowerPlantUnit3NiaraMohawkPowerCoorationNineMilePointUnit1NineMilePointUnit2Consolidated EdisonComanIndianPointStationUnit2Rochester GasandElectricComanR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerStationOperations SupportServices, Inc.233WaterStreet2ndfloorPlymouth, MA02360

OSSI92<02A-3-BWR BWREALBinningDocument, Rev.01.0ReactorFuelCoolantActivitySU4.2FC1.1(Alert)Off-gasActivitySU4.1FC4.1(Alert)Contaixunent Radiation RCS3.1(Alert)FC3.1(SAE)PC3.1(General)

OtherRadiation MonitorsAU2.4AA2.1AA3.1AA3.2Refueling Accidents AU2.1AA2.22.0ReactorPressureVessel2.12.2RPVWaterLevelSU5.1SS5.1FC2.1(SAE)PC4.1(General)

ReactorPower/Reactivity ControlSA2.1SS2.1SG2.1

OSSI92<02A-3-BWR BWREALBinningDocument, Rev.03.0Contaixxment 8.13.28.8PrimaryContaixxment PressureRCS2.1(Alert)FC1.1+RCS2.1(SAE)PC1.3(General)

PC2.2(General)

Suppression PoolTemperature SS4.1(SAE)ICombustible GasConcentration SS5.2(SAE)PC1.4/PC2.2 (General)

Contaixxment Isolation StatusPC2.1(SAE)PC2.1+FC1.1(General)

PC2.1+FC2.1(General)

PC2.1+FC3.1(General)

4.0 Secondary

Containment ReactorBuildingTemperatures PC2.3(Temp)/RCS1.3 (SAE)PC2.3+FC1.1(Temp)(General)

.PC2.3+FC2.1(Temp)(General)

PC2.3+FC3;1(Temp)(General) 4.2ReactorBuildingRadiation LevelsPC2.3(Rad)/RCS1.3 (SAE)PC2.3+FC1.1(Rad)(General)

PC2.3+FC2.1(Rad)(General)

PC2.3+FC3.1(Rad)(General)

OSSI92-402A-3-BWR BWREALBinningDocument, Rev.05.0Radioactivity Release5.15.2EffluentMonitorsAU1.1AA1.1AS1.1AG1.1DoseProjections/

Environmental Measurements AU1.2IAA1.2AS1.3AS1.4AG1.3AG1.46.0Electrical Failures6.16.2'LossofACPowerSourcesSU1.1SA1.1SA5.1SS1.1SG1.1LossofDCPowerSourcesSU7.1SS3.17.0Equipment Failures7.17.27.3Technical Speci6cation Requirements SU2.1SystemFailuresorControlRoomEvacuation HU1.6HA5.1SA3.1HS2.1LossofIndications/Alarm/Communication Capability SU3.1SU6.1SA4.1SS6.1

OSSI92-402A-3-BWR BWREALBinningDocument, Rev.08.0Hazards8.18.28.88.4SecurityThreatsHU4.1HU4.2HA4.1HA4.2HS1.1HS1.2HG1.1HG1,2FireorExplosion HU2.1HA2.1Man-MadeEventsHU1.4HU1.5=HU3.1HU3.2HA1.5HA3.1HA3.2'aturalEventsHU1.1.HU1.2HU1.3HU1.7HA1.1HA1.2HA1.3HA1.79.0OtherHU5.1PC6.1HA6.1FC5.1RCS6.1HS3.1PC1.1PC1.2HG2.1

NIAGARAMOHAWKPOWERCORPORATION NINEMILEPOINTNUCLEARSTATIONEMERGENCY PLANNINGMAINTENANCE PROCEDURE EPMP-EPP-0102 REVISION00UNIT2EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASISTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIREDApprovedby:J.H.MuellerPlantnager-Ui2DateEffective Date:NOTTOBEUSEDAFTERSUBJECTTOPERIODICREVIEW

~PN.JCCNCoversheet

.1o~o~2.345.'6~~~~7.8~~~~9.=10.~-~.~~12~~~~13o~~~14~~~~15.16.17~~~~18.19.20.21LISTOFEFFECTIVE PAGES~PN.~CIN22~~~~2324.25~~~~26o~~~27~~~~28.29~~'~30~~~~31~~~~32~~~~33.34.35.36~~~~37~~~~38~o~~39~~~~40.4142.43~~~~44.45.46.~PN.~ChN.47.48.49.50.51oo~~52.5354.55.5657~~o~58.59.60.6162.6364~~o~65.66.6768.69.70.71Hay1994PageiEPHP-EPP-0102 Rev00

LISTOFEFFECTIVE PAGES(Cont)~PN.~CNN72.73.74.75~~~~76~~~~77~~~~78o~~~79~~~~80.8182.83.84.85.86.87.88~~'~89.90.9192.93~o~94.95.96.~PN.~CNN97~~0~98~o~~99100.101102.103104.105.106.107.108.109.~PN.~CNNNay1994PageiiEPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

SECTION1.0PURPOSE.2.0PRIMARYRESPONSIBILITY

3.0 PROCEDURE

.TABLEOFCONTENTS3.1Emergency Preparedness Group......PAGE11113.2Responsible Procedure OwnerforTechnical BasisReferences

.14.0DEFINITIONS

.

5.0REFERENCES

ANDCOMMITMENTS

6.0 RECORDREVIEWANDDISPOSITION

.~~~22ATTACHMENT 1:UNIT2EMERGENCY ACTIONLEVELTECHNICAL Basis.......

3INTODUCTIONPURPOSE.DISCUSSION

~~~3~~~3NAIINIALBAI1.0REACTORFUEL2.0REACTORPRESSUREVESSEL(RPV)3.0PRIMARYCONTAINMENT (PC)4.0SECONDARY CONTAINMENT (SC)5.0RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE.6.0ELECTRICAL FAILURES.7.0E(UIPMENT FAILURES8.0HAZARDS.8~~~~23293844~~~~5663~~~~749.0OTHER.94ATTACHMENT 2:WORDLIST/DEFINITIONS

.101May1994PageiiiEPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

1.0 PURPOSETodescribetheTechnical

BasisfortheEmergency ActionLevelsatUnit2.2.0PRIMARYRESPONSIBILITY 2.1EmerencPrearednessGrouMonitor/solicit anychangestotheTechnical BasisofeachEmergency ActionLevelAssessthesechangesforpotential impactontheEmergency ActionLevelMaintaintheEmergency ActionLevel(EAL)Technical Basis,EPIP-EPP-02,andtheEmergency ActionLevelMatrix/Unit 2.3.0PROCEDURE 3.1EmerencPrearednessGrou3.1.'13.1.2'3.1.3MaintainamatrixofTechnical Basisreferences foreachEmergency ActionLevel.EvaluateeachTechnical BasisReference ChangeforimpactontheAffectedEmergency ActionLevel.Modify'EPIP-EPP-02, Emergency ActionLevelMatrix/Unit, andAttachment 1ofthisprocedure, asneeded.4.0DEFINITIONS SeeAttachment 2.May1994Page1EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

5.05.15.25.35.

45.5REFERENCES

ANDCOMMITMENTS LicenseeDocumentation NoneStandards ReulationsandCodesNUHARCNESP-007, Methodology forDevelopment ofEmergency ActionLevelsPoliciesProramsandProcedures EPIP-EPP-02, Classification ofEmergency Condition atUnit2.SulementalReferences NineNilePointUnit2Plant-Specific EALGuideline Commitments None6.0ECODREVIEWANDDISPOSITION NoneNay1994Page2EPNP-EPP-0102 Rev00

URPOSEATTACHMENT 1UNIT2EMERGENCY ACTIONLEVELTECHNICAL BASISThepurposeofthisdocumentistoprovideanexplanation andrationale foreachoftheemergency actionlevels(EALs)includedintheEALUpgradeProgramforNineMilePoint2(NHP-2).Itisalsointendedtofacilitate thereviewprocessoftheNMP-2EALsandprovidehistorical documentation forfuturereference.

Thisdocumentisalsointendedtobeutilizedbythoseindividuals responsible forimplementation ofEPIP-EPP-02 "Classification ofEmergency Conditions Unit2"asatechnical reference andaidinEALinterpretation.

DISCUSSIO EALsaretheplant-specific indications, conditions orinstrument readingswhichareutilizedtoclassifyemergency conditions definedintheNHP-2Emergency Plan.WhiletheupgradedEALsaresitespecific, anobjective oftheupgradeprojectwastoensureconformity andconsistency betweenthesitestotheextentpossible.,

TherevisedEALswerederivedfromtheInitiating Conditions andexampleEALsgivenintheNMP-2Plant-Specific EALGuideline (PEG).ThePEGistheNHP-2plantinterpretation oftheNUHARCmethodology fordeveloping EALs.Hay'1994Page3EPHP-EPP-0102 Rev00

DISCUSSIO(Cont)STTACHMtNT 1(Ct)ManyoftheEALsderivedfromtheNUMARCmethodology arefissionproductbarrierbased.Thatis,theconditions whichdefinetheEALsarebaseduponlossorpotential lossofoneormoreofthethreefissionproductbarriers.

Theprimaryfissionproductbarriersare:A.B.C.ReactorFuelCladdinFC:Thefuelcladdingiscomprised ofthezirconium tubeswhichhousetheceramicuraniumoxidepelletsalongwiththeendplugswhichareweldedintoeachendofthefuelrods.ReactorCoolantSstemRCS:TheRCSiscomprised ofthereactorvesselshell,vesselhead,CRDhousings, vesselnozzlesandpenetrations andallprimarysystemsdirectlyconnected totheRPVuptotheoutermost primarycontainment isolation valve.imarContainment PC:Theprimarycontainment iscomprised ofthedrywell,suppression chamber,theinterconnections betweenthetwo,andallisolation valvesrequiredtomaintainprimarycontainment integrity underaccidentconditions.

Althoughthesecondary containment (reactorbuilding) servesasaneffective fissionproductbarrierbyminimizing groundlevelreleases, itisnotconsidered asafissionproductbarrierforthepurposeofemergency classification.

Thefollowing criteriaservesasthebasisforeventclassification relatedtofissionproductbarrierloss:UnusualEvent:Anylossorpotential lossofcontainment Alert:Anylossoranypotential lossofeitherfuelcladorRCSSiteAreaEmerenc:AnylossofbothfuelcladandRCSorAnypotential lossofbothfuelcladandRCSorAnypotential lossofeitherfuelcladorRCSwithalossofanyadditional barrierMay1994Page4EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

DISCUSSION (Cont)ATTACHHENT I(Cont).GeneralEmerenc:Lossofanytwobarrierswithlossorpotential lossofathirdThoseEALswhichreference oneormoreofthefissionproductbarrierInitiating Condition (IC)designators (FC,RCSandPC)inthePEGReference sectionofthetechnical basisarederivedfromtheFissionProductBarrierAnalysis.

Theanalysisentailedanevaluation ofeverycombination oftheplantspecificbarrierloss/potential lossindicators appliedtotheabovecriteria.

Wherepossible, theEALshavebeenmadeconsistent withandutilizetheconditions definedintheNHP-2symptombasedEmergency Operating Procedures (EOPs).Whilethesymptomsthatdriveoperatoractionsspecified intheEOPsarenotindicative ofallpossibleconditions whichwarrantemergency classification, theydodefinethesymptoms, independent ofinitiating events,forwhichreactorplantsafetyand/orfissionproductbarrierintegrity arethreatened.

Wherethesesymptomsareclearlyrepresentative ofoneofthePEGInitiating Conditions, theyhavebeenutilizedasanEAL.Thisallowsforrapidclassification ofemergency situations basedonplantconditions withouttheneedforadditional evaluation oreventdiagnosis.

AlthoughsomeoftheEALspresented herearebasedonconditions definedintheEOPs,classification ofemergencies usingtheseEALsisnotdependent uponEOPentryorexecution.

TheEALscanbeutilizedindependently orinconjunction withtheEOPs.Totheextentpossible, theEALsaresymptombased.Thatis,theactionlevelisdefinedbyvaluesofkeyplantoperating parameters whichidentifyemergency orpotential emergency conditions.

Thisapproachisappropriate becauseitallowsthefullscopeofvariations inthetypesofeventstobeclassified asemergencies.

But,apurelysymptombasedapproachisnotsufficient toaddressalleventsforwhichemergency classification isappropriate.

Particular eventstowhichnopredetermined symptomscanbeascribedhavealsobeenutilizedasEALssincetheymaybeindicative ofpotentially moreseriousconditions notyetfullyrealized.

TheEALsaregroupedintoninecategories tosimplifytheirpresentation andtopromotearapidunderstanding bytheirusers.Thesecategories are:1.ReactorFuel2.ReactorPressureVessel3.PrimaryContainment 4.Secondary Containment 5.Radioactivity Release6.Electrical FailuresHay1994Page5EPHP-EPP-0102 Rev00

DISCUSSION (Cont)7.Equipment Failures8.Hazards9.OtherATTACHMENT I(Ct)Categories 1through5areprimarily symptombased.Thesymptomsareindicative ofactualorpotential degradation ofeitherfissionproductbarriersorpersonnel safety.Categories 6,7and8areeventbased.Electrical Failuresarethoseeventsassociated withlossesofeitherACorvitalDCelectrical power.Equipment Failuresareabnormalandemergency eventsassociated withvitalplantsystemfailures, whileHazardsarethosenon-plant systemrelatedeventswhichhaveaffectedormayaffectplantsafety.Category9providestheEmergency Directorthelatitudetoclassifyanddeclareemergencies basedonplantsymptomsoreventswhichinhisjudgmentwarrantclassification.

Thisjudgmentincludesevaluation oflossorpotential ofoneormorefissionproductbarrierswarranting emergency classification consistent withtheNUMARCbarrierlosscriteria.

Categories arefurtherdividedintooneormoresubcategories depending onthetypesandnumberofplantconditions thatdictateemergency classifications.

Forexample,theReactorFuelcategoryhasfivesubcategories whosevaluescan,beindicative offueldamage:coolantactivity, off-gasactivity, containment radiation, otherradiation monitorsandrefueling accidents.

AnEALmayormaynotexistforeachsubcategoryatallfourclassification levels.Similarly, morethanoneEALmayexistforasubcategoryinagivenemergency classification whenappropriate (i.e.,noEALattheGeneralEmergency levelbutthreeEALsattheUnusualEventlevel).ForeachEAL,thefollowing information isprovided:

Classification:

UnusualEvent,Alert,SiteAreaEmergency, orGeneralEmergency Operating NodeApplicability:

Oneormoreofthefollowing plantoperating conditions arelisted:PowerOperation, Startup/Hot Standby,HotShutdown, ColdShutdown, RefuelandDefueledEAL:Description ofthecondition orsetofconditions whichcomprisetheEALBasis:Description oftherationale fortheEALPEGReference(s):

PEGIC(s)andexampleEAL(s)fromwhichtheEALisderived~BasisReference(s):

Sourcedocumentation fromwhichtheEALisderivedNay1994Page6EPNP-EPP-0102 Rev00

dtdtddtltd tttlATTACHMENT 1(Cont)Theidentified operating modesaredefinedasfollows:Power0eratiosReactoriscriticalandthemodeswitchisinRUN.StartuHotStandbReactoriscriticalandthemodeswitchisinSTARTUP/HOT STANDBY.~tdttdNodeswitchisusuallyinSHUTDOWNandreactorcoolanttemperature is>200'F.ColdShutdownModeswitchusuallyinSHUTDOWNandreactorcoolanttemperature is<200'F.RefuelModeswitchinREFUEL(withvesselheadclosureboltslessthanfullytensioned orwithheadremoved)ORModeswitchinSHUTDOWNandreactorcoolanttemperature is8140'F.~efcledRPVcontainsnoirradiated fuel.May1994Page7EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

1.0 REACTORFUELATTACHMENT

1(Cont)Thereactorfuelcladdingservesastheprimaryfissionproductbarrier.Overtheusefullifeofafuelbundle,theintegrity ofthisbarriershouldremainintactaslongasfuelcladdingintegrity limitsarenotexceeded.

Shouldfueldamageoccur(breachofthefuelcladdingintegrity) radioactive fissionproductsarereleasedtothereactorcoolant.Themagnitude ofsuchareleaseisdependent upontheextentofthedamageaswellasthemechanism bywhichthedamageoccurred.

Oncereleasedintothereactorcoolant,thehighlyradioactive fissionproductscanposesignificant radiological hazardsinplantfromreactorcoolantprocessstreams.Ifotherfissionproductbarriersweretofail,theseradioactive fissionproductscanposesignificant offsiteradiological consequences.

Thefollowing parameters/indicators areindicative ofpossiblefuelfailures:

CoolantActivit:Duringnormaloperation, reactorcoolantfissionproductactivityisverylow.Smallconcentrations offissionproductsinthecoolantareprimarily fromeitherthefissionoftrampuraniuminthefuelcladdingorminorperforations inthecladdingitself.Anysignificant increasefromthesebase-line levelsisindicative offuelfailures.

~pf-AIt:A~ith1ttitty,yf1fi1willreleasefissionproductstothereactorcoolant.Thoseproductswhicharegaseousorvolatileinnaturewillbecarriedoverwiththesteamandeventually bedetectedbytheairejectoroff-gasradiation monitors.

Containment Radiation Monitors:

Althoughnotadirectindication ormeasurement offueldamage,exceeding predetermined limitsoncontainment highrangeradiation monitorsunderLOCAconditions isindicative possiblefuelfailures.

Inaddition, thisindicator isutilizedasanindicator ofRCSlossandpotential containment loss.OtherRadiation Monitors:

Otherprocessandarearadiation monitoring systemsarespecifically designedtoprovideindication ofpossiblefueldamagesuchasAreaRadiation Monitoring Systems.RefuelinAccidets:Bothareaandprocessradiation monitoring systemsdesignedtodetectfissionproductsduringrefueling conditions aswellasvisualobservation canbeutilizedtoindicatelossorpotential lossofspentfuelcladdingintegrity.

May1994Page8EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

CoolantActivitl.l.lE~EATTACHMENT 1(Cont)Coolantactivity>0.2pCi/gmI-131equivalent or>100/Ebar pCi/gmNodeApplicability:

AllBasis:Elevatedreactorcoolantactivityrepresents apotential degradation inthelevelofsafetyoftheplantandapotential precursor ofmoreseriousproblems.

ThisEALaddresses reactorcoolantsamplesexceeding coolanttechnical specifications foriodinespiking.PEGReference(s):

SU4.2BasisReference(s):

1.NUREG-1253 Technical Specifications NineMilePointNuclearStations, UnitNo..2,DocketNo.50-410,Article3.4.5.aandbMay1994Page9EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

1.1.2~1ertATTACHMENT 1(Cont)Coolantactivity>300pCi/gm1-131equivalent NodeApplicability:

Poweroperation, startup/hot standby,hotshutdownBasis:Elevatedreactorcoolantactivityrepresents apotential degradation inthelevelofsafetyoftheplantandapotential precursor ofmoreseriousproblems.

Thisamountofcoolantactivityiswellabovethatexpectedforiodinespikesandcorresponds toabout2Xto5Xfuelcladdamage.Whenreactorcoolantactivityreachesthislevel,significant cladheatinghasoccurredandthusthefuelcladbarrierisconsidered lost.Therefore, declaration ofanAlertiswarranted.

PEGReference(s):

FC1.1BasisReference(s):

1.GeneralElectricNED0-22215, Procedures fortheDetermination oftheExtentofCoreDamageUnderAccidentConditions May1994Page10EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

1.2Off-asActivitSTTAIINENT1(Ct)1.2.1UnusualEventValidoffgasradiation highalarm(atDRMSred).NodeApplicability:

AllBasis:Elevatedoffgasradiation activityrepresents apotential degradation inthelevelofsafetyoftheplantandapotential precursor ofmoreseriousproblems.

TheTechnical Specification allowable limitisanoffgaslevelnottoexceed350,000pCi/sec.TheORMSalarmsetpointhasbeenconservatively selectedbecauseitisoperationally significant andisreadilyrecognizable byControlRoomoperating staff.15minutesisallottedforoperatoractiontoreducedtheoffgasradiation levelsandexcludetransient conditions.

Thehioffgasradiation alarmissetusingmethodology outlinedintheODCM.PEGReference(s):

SU4.1BasisReference(s):

1.NUREG-1253 Technical Specifications NineMilePointNuclearStations, UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Article3.11.2.72.NUREG-1253 Technical Specifications NineMilePointNuclearStations, UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Table3.3.7.10-1 3.NUREG-1253 Technical Specifications NineMilePointNuclearStations, UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Article3.4.5.aandb4.NUREG-1253 Technical Specifications NineMilePointNuclearStations, UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Article3.4.5c.2and35.N2-0P-42, annunciator 851253,pg.115May1994PagellEPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

1.3Containment Radiation ETTAIIIIENT1(C1.3.1alertDrywellarearadiation

~41R/hrNodeApplicability:

Poweroperation, startup/hot standby,hotshutdownBasis:Thedrywellradiation readingisavaluewhichindicates thereleaseofreactorcoolanttothedrywell.Thereadingiscalculated assumingtheinstantaneous releaseanddispersal ofthereactorcoolantnoblegasandiodineinventory associated withnormaloperating concentrations (i.e.,withinTechnical Specifications) intothedrywellatmosphere.

Thereadingislessthanthatspecified forEAL1.3.2becausenodamagetothefuelcladisassumed.OnlyleakagefromtheRCSisassumedinthisEAL.Itisimportant torecognize thattheradiation monitormaybesensitive toshinefromtheRPVorRCSpiping.DrywellHighRangeRadiation Monitorsareinstalled inthefollowing locations:

2CEC*Pnl880D:

DRHS2RHS*RElB/D RHS*RUZ1B RHS*RUZ1D 2CEC*Pnl880B:

DRMS2RMS*REIA/C RMS*RUZIA RMS*RUZlC PEGReference(s):

RCS3.1BasisReference(s):

1.NUREG-1253 Technical Specifications NineMilePointNuclearStations, UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Table3.3.7.5-1 2.Calculation PR-C-24-0 Hay1994Page12EPHP-EPP-0102 Rev00

1.3.2SiteAreaEmerencATTACHMENT 1(Cont)Drywellarearadiation

>3100R/hrNodeApplicability:

Poweroperation, startup/hot standby,hotshutdownBasis:Thedrywellradiation readingisavaluewhichindicates thereleaseofreactorcoolant,withelevatedactivityindicative offueldamage,intothedrywell.Thereadingiscalculated assumingtheinstantaneous releaseanddispersal ofthereactorcoolantnoblegasandiodineinventory associated withaconcentration of300pCi/gmdoseequivalent I-131intothedrywellatmosphere.

Reactorcoolantconcentrations ofthismagnitude areseveraltimeslargerthanthemaximumconcentrations allowedwithinTechnical Specifications (including iodinespiking)andaretherefore indicative offueldamage(approximately 2X-5Xcladfailuredepending oncoreinventory andRCSvolume).Thereadingishigherthanthatspecified forEAL1.3.1and,thus,thisEALindicates alossofboththefuelcladbarrierandtheRCSbarrier.Itisimportant torecognize thattheradiation monitormaybesensitive toshinefromtheRPVorRCSpiping.DrywellHighRangeRadiation Monitorsareinstalled inthefollowing locations:

2CEC*Pnl880D:

DRHS2RHS*RE1B/D RMS*RUZ1B RMS*RUZ1D 2CEC*Pnl880B:

DRMS2RMS*RElA/C RMS*RUZ1A RMS*RUZlC PEGReference(s):

FC3.1BasisReference(s):

1.NUREG-1253 Technical Specifications NineMilePointNuclearStations, UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Table3.3.7.5-1 2.Calculation PR-C-24-0 May1994Page13EPHP-EPP-0102 Rev00

1.3.3GeneralEmerencATTACHMENT 1(Cont)Drywellarearadiation

>5.2E6R/hrNodeApplicability:

Poweroperation, startup/hot standby,hotshutdownBasis:Thedrywellradiation readingisavaluewhichindicates significant fueldamagewellinexcessofthatrequiredforlossoftheRCSbarrierandthefuelcladbarrier.NUREG-1228 "SourceEstimations DuringIncidentResponsetoSevereNuclearPowerPlantAccidents" statesthatsuchreadingsdonotexistwhentheamountofcladdamageislessthan20X.Amajorreleaseofradioactivity requiring offsiteprotective actionsfromcoredamageisnotpossibleunlessamajorfailureintothereactorcoolanthasoccurred.

Regardless ofwhethertheprimarycontainment barrieritselfischallenged,'his amountofactivityincontainment couldhavesevereconsequences ifreleased.

Itis,therefore, prudenttotreatthisasapotential lossofthecontainment barrierandupgradetheemergency classification toaGeneralEmergency.

Itisimportant torecognize thattheradiation monitormaybesensitive toshinefromtheRPVorRCSpiping.DrywellHighRangeRadiation Monitorsareinstalled inthefollowing locations:

2CEC*Pnl880D:

DRHS2RHS*RE1B/D RHS*RUZ1B RHS*RUZ1D 2CEC*Pnl880B:

ORMS2RMS*RE1A/C RMS*RUZ1A RHS*RUZlC PEGReference(s):

PC3.1BasisReference(s):

1.NUREG-1253 Technical Specifications NineMilePointNuclearStations, UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Table3.3.7.5-1 2.Calculation PR-C-24-0, Rev.4Hay1994Page14EPHP-EPP-0102 Rev00

1.4OtherRadiation MonitorsCTTNCIINENT IECtt1.4.1UnusualEventAnysustained ARHreading>100xDRMShighradiation alarm(red)oroffscalehigh(DETECTOR SATURATION) resulting fromanuncontrolled processModeApplicabi1ity:AllBasis:Validelevatedarearadiation levelsusuallyhavelongleadtimesrelativetothepotential forradiological releasebeyondthesiteboundary, thusimpacttopublichealthandsafetyisverylow.'ThisEALaddresses unplanned increases inradiation levelsinsidetheplant.Theseradiation levelsrepresent adegradation inthecontrolofradioactive materialandapotential degradation inthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.Arearadiation levelsabove100timesthehighradiation alarmsetpointhavebeenselectedbecausetheyarereadilyidentifiable onARHinstrumentation.

TheARHalarmsetpointisconsidered tobeaboundingvalueabovethemaximumnormalradiation levelinanarea.SinceARHsetpoints arenominally setonedecadeovernormallevels,100timesthealarmsetpointprovidesanappropriate threshold foremergency classification.

ForthoseARMSwhoseupperrangelimitsarelessthan100timesthehighradiation alarmsetpoint, avalueofoffscalehighisused.ThisEALescalates toanAlert,iftheincreases impairthelevelofsafeplantoperation.

PEGReference(s):

AU2.4BasisReference(s):

1.N2-0P-79, Radiation Monitoring System2.EPIP-EPP-13, pg.843.Calculation PR-C-25-1 Hay1994Page15EPHP-EPP-0102 Rev00

1.4.2A1ertATTACHMENT 1(Cont)ValidRxBldg.aboveRefueling FloorRadiation Monitor2HVR*RE14A orB,GaseousRadiation Monitors(channel1)isolation ORAnysustained refuelfloorradmonitor>8.0R/hrTable1.1Table1.1Reeoordon'torsARMRMSlll,RB354'estofSpentFuelPoolARMRHS112,RB354'astofSpentFuelPoolNodeApplicability:

AllBasis:ThisEALisdefinedbythespecificareaswhereirradiated fuelislocatedsuchasreactorcavity,reactorvessel,,or spentfuelpool.Sufficient timeexiststotakecorrective actionsfortheseconditions andthereislittlepotential forsubstantial fueldamage.NUREG/CR-4982"SevereAccidentinSpentFuelPoolsinSupportofGenericSafety;Issue82"indicates thatevenifcorrective actionsarenottaken,no-promptfatalities arepredicted andtheriskofinjuryislow.Inaddition, NRCInformation NoticeNo.90-08,"KR-85HazardsfromDecayedFuel"presentsthefollowing initsdiscussion:

"Intheeventofaseriousaccidentinvolving decayedspentfuel,protective actionswouldbeneededforpersonnel onsite,whileoffsitedoses(assuming anexclusion arearadiusofonemilefromtheplantsite)wouldbewellbelowtheEnvironmental Protection Agency'sProtective ActionGuides.Accordingly, itisimportant tobeabletoproperlysurveyandmonitorforKr-85intheeventofanaccidentwithdecayedspentfuel."Thus,anAlertClassification forthiseventisappropriate.

Escalation, ifappropriate; wouldoccurviaEmergency DirectorjudgmentinEALCategory9.0.Thebasisforthereactorbuildingventilation monitorsetpointisaspentfuelhandlingaccident(isolation setpoint) andis,therefore,appropriate forthisEAL.Technical Specification requiresisolation at<2.36E-3pCi/cc).Hay1994Page16EPHP-EPP-0102 Rev00

1.4.2(Cont)ATTACHMENT 1(Cont)Arearadiation levelsontherefuelflooratorabovetheMaximumSafeOperating value(8.0R/hr)areindicative ofradiation fieldswhichmaylimitpersonnel access.Accesstotherefuelfloorisrequiredinordertovisuallyobservewaterlevelinthespentfuelpool.Withoutaccesstotherefuelfloor,itwouldnotbepossibletodetermine theapplicability ofEAL1.5.2.Arearadiation levelsontherefuelflooratorabovetheMaximumSafeOperating valuecouldalsoadversely affectequipment whoseoperation maybeneededtoassureadequatecorecoolingorshutdownthereactor.PEGReference(s):

AA2.1BasisReference(s):

.1.'NUREG-0818, Emergency ActionLevelsforLightWaterReactors2.NUREG/CR-4982, SevereAccidentinSpentFuelPoolsinSupportofGenericSafetyIssue82,July19873.NRCInformation NoticeNo.90-08,KR-85HazardsfromDecayedFuel4.N2-0P-79, Radiation Monitoring System=5.NUREG-1253 Technical Specifications NineMilePointNuclearStations, UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Table3.3.2-26.N2-0P-61B, StandbyGasTreatment Hay1994Page17EPHP-EPP-0102 Rev00

1.4.3AlertNTTACIIIIENT IECt)Sustained arearadiation levels>15mR/hrineither:ControlRoomORCentralAlarmStation(CAS)andSecondary AlarmStation(SAS)NodeApplicability:

AllBasis:ThisEALaddresses increased radiation levelsthatimpedenecessary accesstooperating stationsrequiring continuous occupancy tomaintainsafeplantoperation orperformasafeplantshutdown.

Areasrequiring continuous occupancy includetheControlRoom,thecentralalarmstation(CAS)andthesecondary securityalarmstation(SAS).Thesecurityalarmstations-areincludedinthisEALbecauseoftheirimportance topermitting accesstoareasrequiredtoassuresafeplantoperations.

Thevalueof15mR/hrisderivedfromtheGDC19valueof5remin30dayswithadjustment forexpectedoccupancy times.AlthoughSectionIII.D.3ofNUREG-0737, "Clarification ofTHIActionPlanRequirements",

providesthatthe15mR/hrvaluecanbeaveragedoverthe30days,thevalueisusedherewithoutaveraging.

A30daydurationimpliesaneventpotentially moresignificant thananAlelt.Itistheimpairedabilitytooperatetheplantthatresultsintheactualorpotential degradation ofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.Thecauseormagnitude oftheincreaseinradiation levelsisnotaconcernofthisEAL.TheEmergency Directormustconsiderthesourceorcauseoftheincreased radiation levelsanddetermine ifanyotherEALsmaybeinvolved.

Forexample,adoserateof15mR/hrintheControlRoommaybeaprobleminitself.However,theincreasemayalsobeindicative ofhighdoseratesinthecontainment duetoaLOCA.Inthislattercase,aSiteAreaEmergency oraGeneralEmergency maybeindicated byotherEALcategories.

ThisEALcouldresultindeclaration ofanAlertatNHP-2duetoaradioactivity releaseorradiation shineresulting fromamajoraccidentattheNHP-1orJAFNPP.Suchadeclaration wouldbeappropriate iftheincreaseimpairssafeplantoperation.

ThisEALisnotintendedtoapplytoanticipated temporary radiation increases duetoplannedevents(e.g.,radwastecontainer

movement, depletedresintransfers, etc.).Hay1994Page18EPHP-EPP-0102 Rev00

1.4.3(Cont)PEGReference(s):

AA3.1ATTACHMENT 1(Cont)~BasisReference(s):

1.GDC191.4.42.NUREG-0737, "Clarification ofTHIActionPlanRequirements",

SectionIII.D.3AlertSustained arearadiation levels>8R/hrinanyareas,Table1.2ANDAccessisrequiredforsafeoperation orshutdownTable1.2PlantSaetFuctionAreasControlBuildingNormalSwitchgear BuildingSouthAux.BayNorthAux.BayRadWasteBuildingReactorBuildingTurbineBuildingDieselGenerator BuildingScreenwell Building/

ServiceWaterPumpBaysCondensate StorageTanksBuildingStandbyGasTreatment BuildingNodeApplicability:

AllBasis:ThisEALaddresses increased radiation levelsinareasrequiring infrequent accessinordertomaintainsafeplantoperation orperformasafeplantshutdown.

Arearadiation levelsatorabove8R/hrareindicative ofradiation fieldswhichmaylimitpersonnel accessoradversely affectequipment whoseoperation maybeneededtoassureadequatecorecoolingorshutdownthereactor.Thisbasisofthevalueisdescribed inNMPCmemoFileCodeNHP31027"Exposure Guidelines ForUnusual/Accident Conditions".

Theareasselectedareconsistent withthoselistedinotherEALsandrepresent thosestructures whichhousesystemsandequipment necessary forthesafeoperation andshutdownoftheplant.Hay1994Page19EPHP-EPP-0102 Rev00

1.4.4(Cont)ATTACHMENT 1(Cont)IItistheimpairedabilitytooperatetheplantthatresultsintheactualorpotential degradation ofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.Thecauseormagnitude oftheincreaseinradiation levelsisnotaconcernofthisEAL.TheEmergency Directormustconsiderthesourceorcauseoftheincreased radiation levelsanddetermine ifanyotherEALmaybeinvolved.

Forexample,adoserateof8R/hrmaybeaprobleminitself.However,theincreasemayalsobeindicative ofhighdoseratesinthecontainment duetoaLOCA.Inthislattercase,aSiteAreaEmergency oraGeneralEmergency maybeindicated byotherEALcategories.

ThisEALcouldresultindeclaration ofanAlertatNHP-2duetoaradioactivity releaseorradiation shineresulting fromamajoraccidentattheNHP-1orJAFNPP.Suchadeclaration wouldbeappropriate iftheincreaseimpairssafeplantoperation.

ThisEALisnotmeanttoapplytoincreases inthecontainment radiation monitorsastheseareeventswhichareaddressed inotherEALs.Norisitintendedtoapplytoanticipated temporary radiation increases duetoplannedevents(e.g.,radwastecontainer

movement, depleteresintransfers, etc.).PEGReference(s):

AA3.21.5BasisReference(s):

1.NiagaraMohawkPowerCorporation memo'ileCodeNHP31027"Exposure Guidelines ForUnusual/Accident Conditions",

Revision1,3/18/93RefueinAccidents 1.5.1UnusualEventSpentfuelpool/reactor cavitywaterlevelcannotberestoredandmaintained abovethespentfuelpoollowwaterlevelalarmNodeApplicability:

AllHay1994Page20EPHP-EPP-0102 Rev00

1.5.1(Cont)Basis:ATTACHMENT 1(Cont)Theaboveeventhasalongleadtimerelativetothepotential forradiological releaseoutsidethesiteboundary, thusimpacttopublichealthandsafetyisverylow.However,inlightofrecentindustryevents,'classification asanUnusualEventiswarranted asaprecursor toamoreseriousevent.Thespentfuelpoollowwaterlevelisindicated byannunciators 873317and875117whichalarmatEl352'".Thedefinition of"...cannotberestoredandmaintained above..."allowstheoperatortovisuallyobservethelowwaterlevelcondition, ifpossible, andtoattemptwaterlevelrestoration instructions aslongaswaterlevelremainsabovethetopofirradiated fuel.Waterlevelrestoration instructions areperformed inaccordance withN2-0P-38.

Whenthefueltransfercanalisdirectlyconnected tothespentfuelpoolandreactorcavity,therecouldexistthepossibility ofuncovering irradiated fuelinthefueltransfercanal.Therefore, thisEALisapplicable forconditions inwhichirradiated fuelisbeingtransferred toandfromtheRPVandspentfuelpool.PEGReference(s):

AU2.1BasisReference(s):

1.N2-0P-38, SpentFuelPoolCoolingandCleanupSystem1.5.2AlertImminentorreportofactualobservation oftheuncovering ofirradiated fuel.NodeApplicability:

AllMay1994Page21EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

ATTACHMENT t(Ct)1.5.2(Cont)Basis:ThisEALisdefinedbythespecificareaswhereirradiated fuelislocatedsuchasreactorcavity,reactorvessel,orspentfuelpool.Sufficient timeexiststotakecorrective actionsfortheseconditions andthereislittlepotential forsubstantial fueldamage.NUREG/CR-4982"SevereAccidentinSpentFuelPoolsinSupportofGenericSafetyIssue82"indicates thatevenifcorrective actionsarenottaken,nopromptfatalities arepredicted andtheriskofinjuryislow.Inaddition, NRCInformation NoticeNo.90-08,KR-85HazardsfromDecayedFuel"presentsthefollowing ititsdiscussion:

"Intheeventofaseriousaccidentinvolving decayedspentfuel,protective actionswouldbeneededforpersonnel onsite,whileoffsitedoses(assuming anexclusion arearadiusofonemilefromtheplantsite)wouldbewellbelowtheEnvironmental Protection Agency'sProtective Action.Guides.Accordingly, itisimportant tobeabletoproperlysurveyandmonitorforKr-85intheeventofanaccidentwithdecayedspentfuel."Thus,anAlertClassification forthiseventisappropriate.

Escalation, ifappropriate, wouldoccurbyEmergency DirectorjudgmentinEALCategory9.0.Thereisnoindication thatwaterlevelinthespentfuelpoolhasdroppedtothelevelofthefuelotherthanbyvisualobservation by.personnel ontherefueling floor.Whenthefueltransfercanalisdirectlyconnected tothespentfuelpoolandreactorcavity,therecouldexistthe-possibility ofuncovering irradiated fuelinthefueltransfercanal.Therefore, thisEALisapplicable forconditions inwhichirradiated fuelisbeingtransferred toandfromtheRPVandspentfuelpool.ThisEALappliestospentfuelrequiring watercoverageandisnotintendedtoaddressspentfuelwhichislicensedfordrystorage.PEGReference(s):

AA2.2BasisReference(s):

1.NUREG-0818, Emergency ActionLevelsforLightWaterReactors2.NUREG/CR-4982, SevereAccidentinSpentFuelPoolsinSupportofGenericSafetyIssue82,July19873.NRCInformation NoticeNo.90-08,KR-85HazardsfromDecayedFuelMay1994Page22EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

2.0NTTANNTNTIICttREACTORPRESSUREVESSELRPV2.1N.l.lThereactorpressurevesselprovidesavolumeforthecoolantwhichcoversthereactorcore.TheRPVandassociated pressurepiping(reactorcoolantsystem)togetherprovideabarriertolimitthereleaseofradioactive materialshouldthereactorfuelcladdingintegrity fail.TherearetwoRPVparameters whichareindicative ofconditions whichmayposeathreattoRPVorfuelcladdingintegrity:

APPWII:NPIII11dttlyItdtttstatusofadequatecorecooling,andtherefore fuelcladdingintegrity.

Excessive

(>Tech.Spec.)reactorcoolanttodrywellleakageindications areutilizedtoindicatepotential pipecrackswhichmaypropagate toanextentthreatening fuelclad,RPVandprimarycontainment integrity.

Conditions underwhichallattemptsatestablishing adequatecorecoolinghavefailedrequireprimarycontainment flooding.

eactorPowerReact'vit Contro:Theinability tocontrolreactorpowerbelowcertainlevelscanposeadirectthreattoreactorfuel,RPVandprimarycontainment integrity.

PVWaterLevelUnidentified drywellleakage>10gpmORReactorcoolanttodrywellidentified leakage>25gpmNodeApplicability:

Poweroperation, startup/hot standby,hotshutdownBasis:Theconditions ofthisEALmaybeaprecursor ofmoreseriousconditions and,asaresult,isconsidered tobeapotential degradation ofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.The10gpmvaluefortheunidentified drywellleakagewasselectedbecauseitisobservable withnormalControlRoomindications.

Smallervaluesmustbedetermined throughtime-consuming surveillance tests(e.g.,massbalances).

The25gpmvalueforidentified reactorcoolanttodrywellleakageissetatahighervaluebecauseofthesignificance ofidentified leakageincomparison tounidentified orpressureboundaryleakage.Hay1994Page23EPHP-EPP-0102 Rev00

STTACHNENT 1lCtl2.1.1(Cont)Onlyoperating modesinwhichthereisfuelinthereactorcoolantsystemandthesystemispressurized arespecified.

PEGReference(s):

SU5.1BasisReference(s):

None2.1.2SiteAreaEmerencRPVwaterlevelcannotberestoredandmaintained

>-14in.(TAF)NodeApplicability:

PowerOperation, Startup/Hot Standby,HotShutdown, ColdShutdown, RefuelBasis:TheRPVwaterlevelused,in"thisEAListhetopofactivefuel(TAF).Thisvaluecorresponds tothelevelwhichisusedinEOPstoindicatechallenge tocorecoolingandlossofthefuelcladbarrier.Thisistheminimumwater'leveltoassurecorecoolingwithoutfurtherdegradation oftheclad.Severecoredamagecanoccurandreactorcoolantsystempressureboundaryintegrity maynotbeassuredifRPVwaterlevelisnotmaintained

>TAF.Uncoveryofthefuelirrespective oftheeventthatcausesfueluncoveryisjustification alonefordeclaring aSiteAreaEmergency.

Thisincludese'ventsthatcouldleadtofueluncoveryinanyplantoperating modeincluding coldshutdownandrefuel.Escalation toaGeneralEmergency occursthroughradiological effluence addressed inEAL1.3.3fordrywellradiation andintheEALsdefinedforCategory5.0,Radioactivity Release.PEGReference(s):

SS5.1FC2.1Nay1994Page24EPHP-EPP-0102 Rev00

2.1.2(Cont)STTACIINEIIT 1(Ct)BasisReference(s):

1.N2-EOP-RPV, RPVControl2.1.3GeneralEmerencPrimaryContainment FloodingrequiredNodeApplicability:

Poweroperation, startup/hot standby,hotshutdownBasis:Thecondition inthisEALrepresents imminentmeltsequences which,ifnotcorrected, couldleadtoRPVfailureandincreased potential forprimarycontainment failure.IftheEOPsareineffective inrestoring

-RPVwaterlevelabovethetopofactivefuel,lossofthefuelcladbarrierisimminent.

Therefore, declaration ofaGeneralEmergency isappropriate whenentrytothePrimaryContainment FloodingEOPisrequired.

PEGReference(s):

PC4.12.2BasisReference(s):

1.N2-EOP-RPV, RPVControlReactorPowerReactivit Control2.2.1AlertAllimmediate manualscramsfailtoshutdownthereactorNodeApplicability:

Poweroperation, startup/hot standbyMay1994Page25EPHP-EPP-0102 Rev00

2.2.1(Cont)Basis:A~TTACAAIA ITCttThiscondition indicates failureoftheautomatic and/ormanualprotection systemtoscramthereactortotheextentwhichprecludes thereactorbeingmadesub-critical.

Itisthecontinued criticality underconditions requiring areactorscramwhichposesthepotential threattoRCSorfuelcladintegrity.

Thiscondition ismorethanapotential degradation ofasafetysystem.Afrontlineautomatic protection systemdidnotfunctioninresponsetoaplanttransient, andthusplantsafetyhasbeencompromised anddesignlimitsofthefuelmaybeexceeded.

AnAlertisindicated becauseconditions existthatleadtoapotential lossofthefuelcladbarrierortheRCSbarrier.Animmediate manualscramisanysetofactionsbythereactoroperators atthereactorcontrolconsolewhichcausescontrolrodstoberapidlyinsertedintothecoreandbringsthereactorsubcritical including manualscrampushbuttons,ARIandmodeswitch.PEGReference(s):

SA2.12.2.2BasisReference(s):

,1.N2-EOP-RPV, RPVControl,SectionRLSiteAreaEmerencAllimmediate manualscramsfailtoshutdownthereactorANDBoroninjection isrequiredNodeApplicability:

Poweroperation, startup/hot standbyBasis:Thiscondition indicates failureoftheautomatic and/ormanualprotection systemtoscramthereactortotheextentwhichprecludes

,thereactorbeingmadesubcritical.

Undertheseconditions, thereactorisproducing moreheatthanthemaximumdecayheatloadforwhichthesafetysystemsaredesigned.

ASiteAreaEmergency isindicated becauseconditions existthatleadtoimminentlossorpotential lossofbothfuelcladandprimarycontainment.

Nay1994Page26EPHP-EPP-0102 Rev00

2.2.2(Cont)ATTACHMENT 1(Cont)Thefailureofautomatic initiation ofareactorscramfollowedbyunsuccessful manualinitiation actionswhichcanberapidlytakenatthereactorcontrolconsoledoesnot,byitself,leadtoimminentlossofeitherfuelcladorprimarycontainment barriers.

Itisthecontinued criticality underconditions requiring areactorscramalongwiththecontinued additionofheattocontainment whichposestheimminentthreattoprimarycontainment orfuelcladbarriers.

Inaccordance withtheEOPs,SLCisinitiated basedonheatadditiontocontainment inexcessofsafetysystemcapability underfailuretoscramconditions.

Animmediate manualscramisanysetofactionsbythereactoroperatoratthereactorcontrolconsolewhichcausescontrolrodstoberapidlyinsertedintothecoreandbringsthereactorsubcritical including manualscrampushbuttons,ARIandmodeswitch.PEGReference(s):

SS2.1BasisReference(s):

1.N2-EOP-RPV, RPVControl,SectionRL2.2.3GeneralEmerencAllimmediate manualscramsfailtoshutdownthereactorANDRPVwaterlevelcannotberestoredandmaintained

>-39in.NodeApplicability:

Poweroperation, startup/hot standbyBasis:Undertheconditions ofthisEAL,theeffortstobringthereactorsubcritical havebeenunsuccessful and,asaresult,thereactorisproducing moreheatthanthemaximumdecayheatloadforwhichthesafetysystemsweredesigned.

Hay1994Page27EPHP-EPP-0102 Rev00

2.2.3(Cont)ATTACHMENT I(Cont)Anextremechallenge totheabilitytocoolthecoreisindicated whenRPVwaterlevelcannotberestoredandmaintained abovetheMinimumSteamCoolingRPVWaterLevel(-39in.).ThisRPVwaterlevelisusedintheEOPstodefinethelowestRPVwaterlevelinafailure-to-scram eventabovewhichadequatecorecoolingcanbemaintained.

Thissituation couldbeprecursor foracoremeltsequence.

Inthissituation, coredegradation canoccurrapidlyForthisreason,theGeneralEmergency declaration isintendedtobeanticipatory ofthelossoftwofissionproductbarriersandapotential lossofathirdthuspermitting themaximumoffsiteintervention time.Animmediate manualscramisanysetofactionsbythereactoroperatoratthereactorcontrolconsolewhichcausescontrolrodstoberapidlyinsertedintothecoreandbringsthereactorsubcritical including manualscrampushbuttons,ARIandmodeswitch.PEGReference(s):

SG2.12.2.4BasisReference(s):

1.N2-EOP-C5, Level/Power ControlGeneaEmerencAllimmediate manualscramsfailtoshutdownthereactorANDSuppression pooltemperature andRPVpressurecannotbemaintained

<HCTLNodeApplicability:

Poweroperation, startup/hot standbyBasis:Undertheconditions ofthisEAL,theeffortstobringthereactorsubcritical havebeenunsuccessful and,asaresult,thereactorisproducing moreheatthanthemaximumdecayheatloadforwhichthesafetysystemsweredesigned.

May1994Page28EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

2.2.4(Cont)ATTACHMENT 1(Cont)Anextremechallenge totheprimarycontainment isindicated whentheinability toremoveheatduringtheearlystagesofthissequenceresultsinheatupofthecontainment.

TheHeatCapacityTemperature Limit(HCTL)isameasureofthemaximumheatloadwhichtheprimarycontainment canwithstand.

Thissituation couldbeprecursor foracoremeltsequence.

Inthissituation, coredegradation canoccurrapidlyForthisreason,theGeneralEmergency declaration isintendedtobeanticipatory ofthelossoftwofissionproductbarriersandapotential lossofathirdthuspermitting themaximumoffsiteintervention time.Animmediate manualscramisanysetofactionsbythereactoroperatoratthereactorcontrolconsolewhichcausescontrolrodstoberapidlyinsertedintothecoreandbringsthereactorsubcritical including manualscrampushbuttons,ARIandmodeswitch.PEGReference(s):

SG2.1BasisReference(s):

1.N2-EOP-C5, Level/Power Control.2.N2-EOP-PC, PrimaryContainment Control3.0PRINARYCONTAINMENT PCTheprimarycontainment structure isapressuresuppression system.Itformsafissionproductbarrierdesignedtolimitthereleaseofradioactive fissionproductsgenerated fromanypostulated accidentsoastoprecludeexceeding offsiteexposurelimits.Theprimarycontainment structure isalowleakagepressuresuppression systemhousingthereactorpressurevessel(RPV),thereactorcoolantrecirculation pipingandotherbranchconnections ofthereactorprimarysystem.Theprimarycontainment isequippedwithisolation valvesformostsystemswhichpenetrate thecontainment boundary.

Thesevalvesautomatically actuatetoisolatesystemsunderemergency conditions.

May1994Page29EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

3.0(Cont)ATTACHNENT 1(Cont)Therearefourprimarycontainment parameters whichareindicative ofconditions whichmayposeathreattoprimarycontainment integrity orindicatedegradation ofRPVorreactorfuelintegrity.

~rimarContainment Pressure:

Excessive primarycontainment pressureisalsoindicative ofeitherprimarysystemleaksintocontainment orlossofcontainment coolingfunction.

Primarycontainment pressures atorabovespecified limitsposeadirectthreattoprimarycontainment integrity andthepressuresuppression function.

~SuressionPoolTemerature:Excessive suppression poolwatertemperatures canresultinalossofthepressuresuppression capability ofcontainment andthusbeindicative ofseverelydegradedRPVandcontainment conditions.

~Combustible GasConcentrations:

Theexistence ofcombustible gasconcentrations incontainment poseaseverethreattocontainment integrity andareindicative ofseverelydegradedreactorcoreand/orRPVconditions.

CotinmetIsolatoStatus:Theexistence ofanunisolable steamlinebreakoutsidecontainment constitutes alossofcontainment integrity aswellasalossofRCSboundary.

Shouldalossoffuelcladdingintegrity occur,thepotential forreleaseoflargeamountsofradioactive materials totheenvironment exists.3.1Containment Pressure3.1.1AlertPrimarycontainment pressure'cannot bemaintained

<1.68psigduetocoolantleakageNodeApplicability:

Poweroperation, startup/hot standby,hotshutdownBasis:Thedrywellpressurevalueisthedrywellhighpressurescramsetpointandisindicative ofaLOCAevent.Theterm"cannotbemaintained below"isintendedtobeconsistent withtheconditions specified inthePrimaryContainment ControlEOPindicative ofahighenergyreleaseintocontainment for.whichnormalcontainment coolingsystemsareinsufficient.

Nay1994Page30EPHP-EPP-0102 Rev00

3.1.1(Cont)PEGReference(s):

RCS2.1ATTACHMENT 1(Cont)3.1.2BasisReference(s):

1.N2-0P-97, annunciator 603401SiteAreaEmerencPrimarycontainment pressurecannotbemaintained

<1.68psigANDCoolantactivity>300pCi/gmNodeApplicability:

Poweroperation, startup/hot standby,hotshutdownBasis:Thedrywellpressurevalueisthedrywellhighpressurescramsetpointandisindicative ofaLOCAevent.Thetermcannotbemaintained below"isintendedtobeconsistent withtheconditions specified inthePrimaryContainment ControlEOPindicative ofahighenergyreleaseintocontainment forwhichnormalcontainment coolingsystemsareinsufficient.

Elevatedreactorcoolantactivityrepresents apotential degradation inthelevelofsafetyoftheplantandapotential precursor ofmoreseriousproblems.

Thisamountofcoolantactivityiswellabovethatexpectedforiodinespikesandcorresponds toabout2Xto5Xfuelcladdamage.Whenreactorcoolantactivityreachesthislevel,significant cladheatinghasoccurredandthusthefuelcladbarrierisconsidered lost.Thecombination oftheseconditions represents alossoftwofissionproductbarriersand,therefore, declaration ofaSiteAreaEmergency iswarranted.

PEGReference(s):

FC1.1RCS2.1May1994Page31EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

3.1.2(Cont)BasisReference(s):

ATTACHMENT 1(Cont)1.N2-0P-97, annunciator 6034012.GeneralElectricNED0-22215, Procedures fortheDetermination oftheExtentofCoreDamageUnderAccidentConditions 3.1.3GeeralEmerencPrimarycontainment ventingisrequiredduetoPCPLNodeApplicability:

Poweroperation, startup/hot standby,hotshutdownBasis:Lossofprimarycontainment isindicated whenproximity tothePrimaryContainment PressureLimit(PCPL)requiresventingirrespective oftheoffsiteradioactivity releaserate.ToreachthePCPL,primarycontainment pressuremustexceedthatpredicted inanyplantdesignbasisaccidentanalysis.

AlossoftheRCSbarriermusthaveoccurredwithapotential lossofthefuelcladbarrier.PEGReference(s):

PC1.3PC2.23.2BasisReference(s):

1.N2-EOP-PC, PrimaryContainment ControlSuressionPoolTemerature3.2.1StereaEmerencRPVpressureandsuppression pooltemperature cannotbemaintained (HCTL(non-ATWS)

NodeApplicability:Poweroperation, startup/hot standby,hotshutdownNay1994Page32EPHP-EPP-0102 Rev00

3.2.1(Cont)Basis:ATTACHMENT 1(Cont).ThisEALaddresses completelossoffunctions, including ultimateheatsink,requiredforhotshutdownwiththereactoratpressureandtemperature.

Undertheseconditions, thereisanactualmajorfailureofasystemintendedforprotection ofthepublic.Thus,declaration ofaSiteAreaEmergency iswarranted.

Functions requiredforhotshutdownconsistoftheabilitytoachievereactorshutdownandtodischarge decayheatenergyfromthereactortotheultimateheatsink.Inability toremovedecayheatenergyisreflected inanincrease.insuppression pooltemperature.

Elevatedsuppression pooltemperature isaddressed bytheHeatCapacityTemperature Limit(HCTL).TheHCTLisafunctionofRPVpressureandsuppression pooltemperature.

IfRPVpressureandsuppression pooltemperature cannotbemaintained belowtheHCTL,theultimateheatsinkisthreatened anddeclaration ofaSiteAreaEmergency iswarranted.

PEGReference(s):

SS4.13.3BasisReference(s):

'-.l.USAR,Revision2,Section9B.22.'SAR,Revision2,Section9B.4.33.N2-EOP-PC, PrimaryContainment ControlCombustible GasConcentration 3.3.1SiteAreaEmerenc>4AHzexistsinDMorsuppression chamberNodeApplicability:

AllMay1994Page33EPHP-EPP-0102 Rev00

3.3.1(Cont)Basis:ATTACHHENT 1(Cont)4Xhydrogenconcentration isthelowesthydrogenconcentration which,inthepresenceofsufficient oxygen,cansupportupwardflamepropagation.

Thishydrogenconcentration isgenerally considered thelowerboundaryoftherangeinwhichlocalized deflagrations mayoccur.Togeneratesuchaconcentration ofcombustible gas,lossofboththefuelcladandRCSbarriersmusthaveoccurred.

Therefore, declaration ofaSiteAreaEmergency iswarranted.

Ifhydrogenconcentrations increaseinconjunction withthepresenceofoxygentoglobaldeflagration levels(i.e.~6Xhydrogenandh5Xoxygen),ventingofthecontainment irrespective oftheoffsiteradioactive releaseratewouldberequiredbyEOPsanddeclaration ofaGeneralEmergency required.

PEGReference(s):

SS5.23.3."2BasisReference(s):

1.N2-EOP-PC, PrimaryContainment Control,Revision5GeneraEmerencPrimarycontainment ventingisrequiredduetocombustible gasconcentrations NodeApplicability:

AllBasis:6Xhydrogenconcentration inthepresenceof5Xoxygenconcentration isthelowestconcentration atwhichadeflagration insideoftheprimarycontainment couldoccur.Whenhydrogenandoxygenconcentrationsreachorexceedcombustible limits,imminentlossofthecontainment barrierexists.Togeneratesuchlevelsofcombustible gas,lossofthefuelcladandRCSbarriersmusthaveoccurred.

Ventingofthecontainment irrespective oftheoffsiteradioactive releaserateisrequiredbyEOPsforthiscondition.

Hay1994Page34EPHP-EPP-0102 Rev00

3.3.2(Cont)PEGReference(s):

PC1.4PC2.2ATTACHMENT 1(Cont)3.4BasisReference(s):

1.N2-EOP-PC, PrimaryContainment ControlContainment IsolatioStatus3.4.1SiteAreaEmerencMainSteamLine,RCICsteamlineorReactorWaterClean-upisolation failureresulting inareleasepathwayoutsideprimarycontainment.

NodeApplicability:

Poweroperation, startup/hot standby,hotshutdownBasis:Theconditions ofthisEALincluderequiredcontainment isolation failuresallowingaflowpathtotheenvironment.

Areleasepathwayoutsideprimarycontainment existswhensteamflowisnotprevented bydownstream isolations.

Inthecaseofafailureofbothisolation valvestoclosebutinwhichnodownstream flowpathexists,declaration underthisEALwouldnotberequired.

Theconditions ofthisEALrepresent thelossofboththeRCSbarrierandtheprimarycontainment barrierandthusjustifies declaration ofaSiteAreaEmergency.

PEGReference(s):

PC2.1BasisReference(s):

NoneMay1994Page35EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

3.4.2ATTACHMENT 1(Cont)GenealEmerencHainSteamLine,RCICsteamlineorReactorMaterClean-upisolation failureresulting inareleasepathwayoutsideprimarycontainment ANDany:~Coolantactivity>300pCi/gmI-131equivalent

~RPVwaterlevel<-14in.(TAF)~DWradiation

>3100R/hrNodeApplicability:

Poweroperation, startup/hot standby,hotshutdownBasis:Theconditions ofthisEALincluderequiredcontainment isolation failuresallowingaflowpathtotheenvironment.

Areleasepathwayoutsideprimarycontainment existswhensteamflowisnotprevented bydownstream isolations.

Inthecaseofafailureofbothisolation valvestoclosebutinwhichnodownstream flowpathexists,declaration underthisEALwouldnotberequired.

Containment isolation failureswhichresultinareleasepathwayoutsideprimarycontainment arethebasisfordeclaration ofSiteAreaEmergency inEAL3.4.1.Whenisolation failuresareaccompanied byelevatedcoolantactivity, RPVwaterlevelbelowTAF,orhighdrywellradiation, declaration ofaGeneralEmergency isappropriate duetolossoftheprimarycontainment barrier,RCSbarrier,andlossorpotential lossofthefuelcladbarrier.Elevatedreactorcoolantactivityrepresents apotential degradation inthelevelofsafetyoftheplantandapotential precursor ofmoreseriousproblems.

Thisamountofcoolantactivityiswellabovethatexpectedforiodinespikesandcorresponds toabout2XtoSXfuelcladdamage.Whenreactorcoolantactivityreachesthislevel,significant cladheatinghasoccurredandthusthefuelcladbarrierisconsidered lost.TheRPVwaterlevelusedinthisEAListhetopofactivefuel(TAF).Thisvaluecorresponds tothelevelwhichisusedinEOPstoindicatechallenge tocorecoolingandlossofthefuelcladbarrier.Thisistheminimumwaterleveltoassurecorecoolingwithoutfurtherdegradation oftheclad.Severecoredamagecanoccurandreactorcoolantsystempressureboundaryintegrity maynotbeassuredifRPVwaterlevelisnotmaintained aboveTAF.Hay1994Page36EPHP-EPP-0102 Rev00

3.4.2(Cont)ATTACHMENT 1(Cont)Thedrywellradiation readingisavaluewhichindicates thereleaseofreactorcoolant,withelevatedactivityindicative offueldamage,intothedrywell.Thereadingiscalculated assumingtheinstantaneous releaseanddispersal ofthereactorcoolantnoblegasandiodineinventory associated withaconcentration of300pCi/gmdoseequivalent I-131intothedrywellatmosphere.

Reactorcoolantconcentrations ofthismagnitude areseveral.timeslargerthanthemaximumconcentrations allowedwithinTechnical Specifications (including iodinespiking)andaretherefore indicative offueldamage(approximately 2X-5Xcladfailuredepending oncoreinventory andRCSvolume).Itisimportant torecognize thattheradiation monitormaybesensitive toshinefromtheRPVorRCSpiping.DrywellHighRangeRadiation Monito}sareinstalled inthefollowing locations:

2CEC*Pnl880D:

DRHS2RHS*RE1B/D RHS*RUZ1B RHS*RUZ1D 2CEC*pnl880B:

ORMS2RHS*RElA/C RHS*RUZlA RHS*RUZ1C PEGReference(s):

PC2.1andFCl.lPC2.1andFC2.1PC2.1andFC3.1BasisReference(s):

1.GeneralElectricNED0-22215, Procedures fortheDetermination oftheExtentofCoreDamageUnderAccidentConditions 2.N2-EOP-RPV, RPVControl3.NUREG-1253 Technical Specifications NineMilePointNuclearStations, UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Table3.3.7.5-1 4.Calculation PR-C-24-0, Rev.4May1994Page37EPHP-EPP-0102 Rev00

4.0 NTIACNIIENT

I(CI)SECONDRYCONTAINNENT SCThesecondary containment iscomprised ofthereactorbuildingandassociated ventilation, isolation andeffluentsystems.Thesecondary containment servesasaneffective fissionproductbarrierandisdesignedtominimizeanygroundlevelreleaseofradioactive materials whichmightresultfromaseriousaccident.

Thereactorbuildingprovidessecondary containment duringreactoroperation andservesasprimarycontainment whenthereactorisshutdownandthedrywellisopen,asduringrefueling.

Becausethesecondary containment isanintegralpartofthecompletecontainment system,conditions whichposeathreattovitalequipment locatedinthesecondary containment areclassifiable asemergencies.

Therearetwosecondary containment parameters whichareindicative ofconditions whichmayposeathreattosecondary containment integrity orequipment locatedinsecondary containment orareindicative ofadirectreleasebyaprimarysystemintosecondary containment:

SecondarContanmentTemeratures:

Abnormally highsecondary containment areatemperatures canalsoposeathreattotheoperability ofvitalequipment locatedinsidesecondary containment including RPVwaterlevelinstrumentation.

Highareatemperatures maylimitpersonnel accessibility tovitalareas.Highareatemperatures mayalsobeindicative ofeitherprimarysystemdischarges intosecondary containment orfires.~SecondarContainment AreaRadiatioLevels:Abnormally higharearadiation levelsinsecondary containment, althoughnotnecessarily posingathreattoequipment operability, mayposeathreattopersonnel safetyandtheabilitytooperatevitalequipment duetoalackofaccessibility.

Abnormally higharearadiation levelsmayalsobetheresultofaprimarysystemdischarging intothesecondary containment andbeindicative ofprecursors tosignificant radioactivity releasetotheenvironment.

4.1ReactorBuildinTemerature4.1.1SiteAreaEmerencPrimarysystemisdischarging outsidePCANDRBareatemperatures are>maximumsafeoperating levelsintwoormoreareas,N2-EOP-SC NodeApplicability:

.Poweroperation, startup/hot standby,hotshutdownMay1994Page38EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

4.1.1(Cont)Basis:CTTACIIMIMT ITCttThepresenceofelevatedareatemperatures inthesecondary containment maybeindicative ofanunisolable primarysystemleakageoutsidetheprimarycontainment.

Theseconditions represent alossofthecontainment barrierandapotential lossoftheRCSbarrier.PEGReference(s):

PC2.3RCS1.3BasisReference(s):

1.N2-EOP-SC, Secondary Containment Control2.N2-EOP-SC 4.1.2GeneralEmerencPrimarysystemisdischarging outsidePCANDRBareatemperatures are>maximumsafeoperating levelsintwoormoreareas,N2-EOP-SC ANDany:~Coolantactivity>300pCi/gmI-131equivalent

~RPVwaterlevel<-14in.(TAF)~DWradiation

>3100R/hrNodeApplicability:

Poweroperation, startup/hot standby,hotshutdownBasis:Thepresenceofelevatedareatemperatures inthesecondary containment maybeindicative ofanunisolable primarysystemleakageoutsidetheprimarycontainment.

Theseconditions represent alossofthecontainment barrierandapotential lossoftheRCSbarrier.Whensecondary containment areatemperatures areaccompanied byelevatedcoolantactivity, RPVwaterlevelbelowTAF,orhighdrywellradiation, declaration ofaGeneralEmergency isappropriate duetolossoftheprimarycontainment barrier,RCSbarrier,andlossorpotential lossofthefuelcladbarrier.May1994Page39EPHP-EPP-0102 Rev00

4.1.2(Cont)ATTACHMENT 1(Cont)Elevatedreactorcoolantactivityrepresents apotential degradation inthelevelofsafetyoftheplantandapotential precursor ofmoreseriousproblems.

Thisamountofcoolantactivityiswellabovethatexpectedforiodinespikesandcorresponds toabout2Xto5Xfuelcladdamage.Whenreactorcoolantactivityreachesthislevel,significant cladheatinghasoccurredandthusthefuelcladbarrierisconsidered lost.TheRPVwaterlevelusedinthisEAListhetopofactivefuel(TAF).Thisvaluecorresponds tothelevelwhichisusedinEOPstoindicatechallenge tocorecoolingandlossofthefuelcladbarrier.Thisistheminimumwaterleveltoassurecorecoolingwithoutfurtherdegradation oftheclad.Severecoredamagecanoccurandreactorcoolantsystempressureboundaryintegrity maynotbeassuredifRPVwaterlevelisnotmaintained aboveTAF.Thedrywellradiation readingisavaluewhichindicates thereleaseofreactorcoolant,withelevatedactivityindicative offueldamage,-intothedrywell.Thereadingiscalculated assumingtheinstantaneous releaseanddispersal ofthereactorcoolantnoblegasandiodineinventory associated withaconcentration of300pCi/gmdoseequivalent I-131intothedrywellatmosphere.

Reactorcoolantconcentrations ofthismagnitude areseveraltimeslargerthanthemaximumconcentrations allowedwithinTechnical Specifications (including iodinespiking)andaretherefore indicative offueldamage(approximately 2X-5Xcladfailuredepending oncoreinventory andRCSvolume).Itisimportant torecognize thattheradiation monitormaybesensitive toshine-fromtheRPVorRCSpiping.DrywellHighRangeRadiation Monitorsareinstalled inthefollowing locations:

2CEC*Pnl880D:

DRHS2RMS*RE1B/D RHS*RUZ1B RHS*RUZ1D 2CEC*Pnl880B:

DRMS2RMS*RElA/C RHS*RUZlA RHS*RUZ1C PEGReference(s):

PC2.3andFCl.lPC2.3andFC2.1PC2.3andFC3.1May1994Page40EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

4.1.2(Cont)ATTACHMENT 1(Cont)BasisReference(s):

1.N2-EOP-SC, Secondary Containment Control2.N2-EOP-RPV, RPVControl3.GeneralElectricNED0-22215, Procedures fortheDetermination oftheExtentofCoreDamageUnderAccidentConditions 4.NUREG-1253 Technical Specifications NineMilePointNuclearStations, UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Table3.3.7.5-1 5.Calculation PR-C-24-0, Rev.44.2ReactoBuidinadationLeve4.2.1SitereaEmerencPrimarysystemisdischarging outsidePCANDRBarearadiation levelsare>maximumsafeoperating levelsintwoormoreareas,N2-EOP-SC NodeApplicability:

Poweroperation, startup/hot standby,hotshutdownBasis:Thepresenceofelevatedarearadiation levelsinthesecondary containment maybeindicative ofanunisolable primarysystemleakageoutsidetheprimarycontainment.

Theseconditions represent alossofthecontainment barrierandapotential lossoftheRCSbarrier.PEGReference(s):

PC2.3RCS1.3May1994Page41EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

4.2.1(Cont)ATTACHMENT 1(Cont)BasisReference(s):

N2-EOP-SC, Secondary Containment Control4.2.2GeeaerecPrimarysystemisdischarging outsidePCANDRBarearadiation levelsare>maximumsafeoperating levelsintwoor'oreareas,N2-EOP-SC ANDany:~Coolantactivity>300pCi/gmI-131equivalent

~RPVwaterlevel<-14in.(TAF)~DWradiation

>3100R/hrNodeApplicability:

Poweroperation, startup/hot standby,hotshutdownBasis:Thepresenceofelevatedarearadiation levelsinthesecondary containment maybeindicative ofanunisolable primarysystemleakageoutsidetheprimarycontainment.

Theseconditions represent alossofthecontainment barrierandapotential lossoftheRCSbarrier.Whensecondary containment radiation levelsareaccompanied byelevatedcoolantactivity, RPVwaterlevelbelowTAF,orhighdrywellradiation, declaration ofaGeneralEmergency isappropriate duetolossoftheprimarycontainment barrier,RCSbarrier,andlossorpotential lossofthefuelcladbarrier.Elevatedreactorcoolantactivityrepresents apotential degradation inthelevelofsafetyoftheplantandapotential precursor ofmoreseriousproblems.

Thisamountofcoolantactivityiswellabovethatexpectedforiodinespikesandcorresponds toabout2Xto5Xfuelcladdamage.Whenreactorcoolantactivityreachesthislevel,significant cladheatinghasoccurredandthusthefuelcladbarrierisconsidered lost.May1994Page42EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

4.2.2(Cont)ATTACHMENT 1(Cont)TheRPVwaterlevelusedinthisEAListhetopofactivefuel(TAF).Thisvaluecorresponds tothelevelwhichisusedinEOPstoindicatechallenge tocorecoolingandlossofthefuelcladbarrier.Thisistheminimumwaterleveltoassurecorecoolingwithoutfurtherdegradation oftheclad.Severecoredamagecanoccurandreactorcoolantsystempressureboundaryintegrity maynotbeassuredifRPVwaterlevelisnotmaintained aboveTAF.Thedrywellradiation readingisavaluewhichindicates thereleaseofreactorcoolant,withelevatedactivityindicative offueldamage,intothedrywell.Thereadingiscalculated assumingtheinstantaneous releaseanddispersal ofthereactorcoolantnoblegasandiodineinventory associated withaconcentration of300pCi/gmdoseequivalent I-131intothedrywellatmosphere.

Reactorcoolant.concentrations ofthismagnitude areseveraltimeslargerthanthemaximumconcentrations allowedwithinTechnical Specifications (including iodinespiking)andaretherefore indicative offueldamage(approximately 2X-5Xcladfailuredepending oncoreinventory andRCSvolume).Itisimportant torecognize thattheradiation monitormaybesensitive toshinefromtheRPVorRCSpiping.DrywellHighRangeRadiation Monitorsareinstalled inthefollowing locations:

2CEC*Pnl880D:

DRMS2RMS*RElB/D RHS*RUZlB RHS*RUZ1D 2CEC*Pnl880B:

DRHS2RHS*RE1A/C RHS*RUZIA RMS*RUZ1C PEGReference(s):

PC2.3andFC1.1PC2.3andFC2.1PC2.3andFC3.1May1994Page43EPHP-EPP-0102 Rev00

4.2.2(Cont)ATTACHMENT 1(Cont)BasisReference(s):

1.N2-EOP-SC, Secondary Containment Control2.N2-EOP-RPV, RPVControl3.GeneralElectricNED0-22215, Procedures fortheDetermination oftheExtentofCoreDamageUnderAccidentConditions 4.NUREG-1253 Technical Specifications NineMilePointNuclearStations, UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Table3.3.7.5-1 5.Calculation PR-C-24-0, Rev.46.N2-EOP-SC

5.0 RADIOACTIVITY

RELEASEManyEALsarebasedonactualorpotential degradation offissionproductbarriersbecauseoftheincreased potential foroffsiteradioactivity release.Degradation offissionproductbarriersthough,isnotalwaysapparentvianon-radiological symptoms.

Therefore, directindication ofincreased radiological effluents areappropriate symptomsforemergency classification.

.Atlowerlevels,abnormalradioactivity releasesmaybeindicative ofafailureofcontainment systemsorprecursorstomoresignificant releases.

Athigherreleaserates,offsiteradiological conditions mayresultwhichrequireoffsiteprotective actions.Therearetwobasicindications ofradioactivity releaserateswhichwarrantemergency classifications.

EfluentMonitors:

Directindication ofeffluentradiation monitoring systemsprovidesarapidassessment mechanism todetermine releasesinexcessofclassifiable limits.DosePro'ectionandorEnvironmental Measurements:

Projected offsitedoses(basedoneffluentmonitorreadings) oractualoffsitefieldmeasurements indicating dosesordoseratesaboveclassifiable limits.May1994Page44EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

5.1EffluentMonitorsE.l.l~EEETTCMMEETITCttAvalidreadingonanymonitorsTable5.1column"UE"for>60min.Table5.1EffluentMonitorClassification Thresholds MonitorUEAlertSAEGERadwaste/Reactor Bldg.VentEffluentMainStackEffluentServiceWaterEffluentLiquidRadWasteEffluentCoolingTowerBlowdown2xGEMSalarm2xGEMSalarm2xDRMSHigh(red)2xDRMSHigh(red)2xDRMSHigh(red)200xGEMSalarm200xGEMSalarm200xDRMSHigh(red)200xDRMSHigh(red)200xDRMSHigh(red)~5.5E6pCi/sN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/ANodeApplicability:

AllBasis:Validmeansthataradiation monitorreadinghasbeenconfirmed bytheoperators tobecorrect.Unplanned releasesinexcessoftwotimesthesitetechnical specifications thatcontinuefor60minutesorlongerrepresent anuncontrolled situation andhence,apotential degradation inthelevelofsafety.Thefinalintegrated dose(whichisverylowintheUnusualEventemergency class)isnottheprimaryconcern;itisthedegradation inplantcontrolimpliedbythefactthatthereleasewasnotisolatedwithin60minutes.Therefore, itisnotintendedthatthereleasebeaveragedover60minutes.Forexample,areleaseof4timesT/Sfor30minutesdoesnotexceedthisinitiating condition.

Further,theEmergency Directorshouldnotwaituntil60minuteshaselapsed,butshoulddeclaretheeventassoonasitisdetermined thatthereleasedurationhasorwilllikelyexceed60minutes.May1994Page45EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

5.1.1(Cont)ATTACHMENT 1(Cont)Thealarmsetpoints forthelistedmonitorsareconservatively settoensureTechnical Specification radioactivity releaselimitsarenotexceeded.

ThevalueshownforeachmonitoristwotimesthehighalarmsetpointfortheDigitalRadiation Monitoring System(DRHS).Instrumentation thatmaybeusedtoassessthisEALislistedbelow:Radwaste/Reactor BuildingVentEffluentMonitoring Systemmonitor:2RMS-CAB180 recorder:

2RHS-RR170/180 annunciator:

851248MainStackEffluentMonitoring Systemmonitor:2RHS-CAB170 recorder:

2RHS-RR170/180 annunciator:

851256ServiceWaterEffluentLoopA/BRadiation monitor:2SWP*RE146A/B recorder:

2SWP*RR146A/B annunciator:

851258LiquidEffluentLinemonitor:LWS-RE206 annunciator:

851258CoolingTowerBlowdownLinemonitor:CWS-RE157annunciator:851258PEGReference(s):

AU1.1BasisReference(s):

1.N2-0P-79, Radiation Monitoring System2.NUREG-1253 Technical Specifications NineMilePointNuclearStations, UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Table3.3.7.10-1 3.NUREG-1253 Technical Specifications NineMilePointNuclearStations, UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Table3.3.7.1-1 May1994Page46EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

5.1.2alertCTTACIIIITIIT ICCtlAvalidreadingonanymonitorsTable5.1column"Alert"for>15min.Table5.1EffluentMonitorClassification Thresholds MonitorUEAlertSAEGERadwaste/Reactor Bldg.VentEffluent2xGEMSalarmHainStackEffluent2xGENSalarmServiceWaterEffluent2xDRHSHigh(red)LiquidRadWasteEffluent2xDRHSHigh(red)CoolingTowerBlowdown2xORMSHigh(red)200xGEMSalarm200xGEMSalarm200xDRMSHigh(red)200xDRHSHigh(red)200xDRHSHigh(red)~5.5E6pCi/sN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AModeApplicability:

AllBasis:Validmeansthataradiation monitorreadinghasbeenconfirmed bytheoperators tobecorrect.Thiseventescalates fromtheUnusualEventbyincreasing themagnitude ofthereleasebyafactorof100overtheUnusualEventlevel(i.e.,200timesTechnical Specifications).

.Prorating the500mR/yrbasisofthe10CFR20non-occupational DAClimitsforbothtime(8766hr/yr)andthe200multiplier, theassociated siteboundarydoseratewouldbe10mR/hr.Therequiredreleasedurationwasreducedto15minutesinrecognition oftheincreased severity.

Thevaluesforthegaseouseffluentradiation monitorsarebaseduponnotexceeding 10mR/hratthesiteboundaryasaresultoftherelease.Instrumentation thatmaybeusedtoassessthisEALislistedbelow:Radwaste/Reactor BuildingVentEffluentMonitoring Systemmonitor:2RMS-CAB180 recorder:

2RHS-RR170/180 annunciator:

851248Hay1994Page47EPHP-EPP-0102 Rev00

5.1.2(Cont)ATTACHMENT 1(Cont)MainStackEffluentMonitoring Systemmonitor:2RMS-CAB170 recorder:

2RMS-RR170/180 annunciator:

851256ServiceWaterEffluentLoopA/BRadiation monitor:2SWP*RE146A/B recorder:

2SWP*RR146A/B annunciator:

851258LiquidRadWasteEffluentLinemonitor:LWS-RE206 annunciator:

851258CoolingTowerBlowdownLinemonitor:CWS-RE157annunciator:

851258PEGReference(s):

AA1.1BasisReference(s):

1.N2-0P-79, Radiation Monitoring System2.NUREG-1253 Technical Specifications NineMilePointNuclearStations, UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Table3.3.7.10-1 3.NUREG-1253 Technical Specifications NineMilePointNuclearStations, UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Table3.3.7.1-1 May1994Page48EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

5.1.3SiteAreaEmerencATTACHMENT 1(Cont)AvalidreadingonanymonitorsTable5.1column"SAE"for>15min.Table5.1EffluentMonitorClassification Thresholds MonitorUEAlertSAEGERadwaste/Reactor Bldg.VentEffluent2xGEMSalarmMainStackEffluent2xGEMSalarmServiceWaterEffluent2xDRMSHigh(red)LiquidRadWasteEffluent2xDRMSHigh(red)CoolingTowerBlowdown2xORMSHigh(red)200xGEMSalarm200xGEMSalarm200xDRMSHigh(red)200xDRMSHigh(red)200xORMSHigh(red)~5.5E6pCi/sN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/ANodeApplicability:

AllBasis:Validmeansthataradiation monitorreadinghasbeenconfirmed bytheoperators tobecorrect.TheSAEvaluesofTable5.1arebasedontheboundarydoseresulting fromanactualorimminentreleaseofgaseousradioactivity thatexceeds100mRwholebodyor500mRchildthyroidfortheactualorprojected durationoftherelease.The100mRintegrated doseisbasedontheproposed10CFR20annualaveragepopulation exposure.

The500mRintegrated childthyroiddosewasestablished inconsideration ofthe1:5ratiooftheEPAProtective ActionGuidelines forwholebodythyroid.Thesevaluesprovideadesirable gradient(oneorderofmagnitude) betweentheAlert,SiteAreaEmergency, andGeneralEmergency classifications.

Itisdeemedthatexposures lessthanthislimitarenotconsistent withtheSiteAreaEmergency classdescription.

Integrated dosesaregenerally notmonitored inreal-time.

Inestablishing thisemergency actionlevel,adurationofonehourisassumedbasedonsiteboundarydosesforeitherwholebodyorchildthyroid,whichever ismorelimiting(dependsonsourcetermassumptions).

TheFSARsourcetermsapplicable toeachmonitored pathwayareusedindetermining indications forthemonitorsonthatpathway.ThevaluesarederivedfromCalculation PR-C-24-X, Rev.2.May1994Page49EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

5.1.3(Cont)PEGReference(s):

AS1.1ATTACHMENT 1(Cont)5.2'asisReference(s):

1.N2-0P-79, Radiation Monitoring System2.NUREG-1253 Technical Specifications NineMilePointNuclearStations, UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Table3.3.7.10-1 3.NUREG-1253 Technical Specifications NineMilePointNuclearStations, UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Table3.3.7.1-14.Calculation PR-C-24-X, Rev.2DosePoectionsEnvironmenta easuremets5:2:1~UlEConfirmed sampleanalyses'forgaseousorliquidreleaserates>2xtechnical specifications limitsfor>60min.NodeApplicability:

AllBasis:Confirmed sampleanalysesinexcessoftwotimesthesitetechnical specifications thatcontinuefor60minutesorlongerrepresent anuncontrolled situation andhence,apotential degradation inthelevelofsafety.Thefinalintegrated dose(whichisverylowintheUnusualEventemergency class)isnottheprimaryconcern;itisthedegradation inplantcontrolimpliedbythefactthatthereleasewasnotisolatedwithin60minutes.Therefore, itisnotintendedthatthereleasebeaveragedover60minutes.Forexample,areleaseof4timesT/Sfor30minutesdoesnotexceedthisinitiating condition.

Further,theEmergency Directorshouldnotwaituntil60minuteshaselapsed,butshoulddeclaretheeventassoonasitisdetermined thatthereleasedurationhasorwilllikelyexceed60minutes.May1994Page50EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

5.2.1(Cont)PEGReference(s):

AU1.2ATTACHMENT 1(Cont)BasisReference(s):

1.N2-0P-79, Radiation Monitoring System2.NUREG-1253 Technical Specifications NineMilePointNuclearStations, UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Table3.3.7.10-1 3.NUREG-1253 Technical Specifications NineMilePointNuclearStations, UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Table3.3.7.1-1 5.2.2AlertConfirmed sampleanalysesforgaseousorliquidreleaserates>200xtechnical specifications limitsfor>15min.NodeApplicability:

All'Basis:Confirmed sampleanalysesinexcessoftwohundredtimesthesitetechnical specifications thatcontinuefor15minutesorlongerrepresent anuncontrolled situation andhence,apotential degradation inthelevelofsafety.'This'eventescalates fromtheUnusualEventbyincreasing themagnitude ofthereleasebyafactorof100overtheUnusualEventlevel(i.e.,200timesTechnical Specifications).

Prorating the500mR/yrbasisofthe10CFR20non-occupational HPClimitsforbothtime(8766hr/yr)andthe200multiplier, theassociated siteboundarydoseratewouldbe10mR/hr.Therequiredreleasedurationwasreducedto15minutesinrecognition oftheincreased severity.

PEGReference(s):

AA1.2Hay1994Page51EPHP-EPP-0102 Rev00

5.2.2(Cont)ATTACHMENT 1(Cont)BasisReference(s):

1.N2-0P-79, Radiation Monitoring System2.NUREG-1253 Technical Specifications NineMilePointNuclearStations, UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Table3.3.7.10-1 3.NUREG-1253 Technical Specifications NineMilePointNuclearStations, UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Table3.3.7.1-1 5.2.3AlertDoseprojections orfieldsurveyswhichindicatedoses/doserates>Table5.2column"Alert"atthesiteboundaryorbeyondTable5.2DosePro'ectionEnv.Measurement Classification Thresholds AlertSAEGETEDECDEThyroidTEDErateCDEThyroidrate10mR100mRN/A500mR10mR/hr100mR/hrN/A500mR/hr1000mR5000mR1000mR/hr5000mR/hrNodeApplicability:

AllBasis:Offsiteintegrated dosesinexcessof10mRTEDEordoseratesinexcessof10mR/hrTEDErepresent anuncontrolled situation andhence,apotential degradation inthelevelofsafety.Thiseventescalates fromtheUnusualEventbyincreasing themagnitude ofthereleasebyafactorof100overtheUnusualEventlevel(i.e.,200timesTechnical Specifications).

Prorating the500mR/yrbasisof10CFR20forbothtime(8766hr/yr)andthe200multiplier, theassociated siteboundarydoseratewouldbe10mR/hr.hAspreviously stated,the10mR/hrvalueisbasedonaproration of200timesthe500mR/yrbasisof10CFR20,roundeddownto10mR/hr.May1994Page52EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

5.2.3(Cont)PEGReference(s):

AA1.2BITACHIIENT I(Ct)BasisReference(s):

1.N2-0P-79, Radiation Monitoring System2.NUREG-1253 Technical Specifications NineMilePointNuclearStations, UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Table3.3.7.10-1 3.NUREG-1253 Technical Specifications NineMilePointNuclearStations, UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Table3.3.7.1-1 5.2.4SiteAreaEmerencDoseprojections or-fieldsurveyswhichindicatedoses/doserates>Table5.2columnSAE"atthesiteboundaryorbeyondTable5.2DosePro'ectionEnv.Measurement Classification Thresholds AlertSAEGE'TEDECDEThyroidTEDErate10mR100mRN/A500mR10mR/hr100mR/hrCDEThyroidrateN/A500mR/hrNodeApplicability:

All1000mR5000mR1000mR/hr5000mR/hrMay1994Page53EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

5.'2.4(Cont)Basis:ATTACHMENT 1(Cont)The100mRintegrated TEDEdoseinthisEALisbasedontheproposed10CFR20annualaveragepopulation exposure.

Thisvaluealsoprovidesadesirable gradient(oneorderofmagnitude) betweentheAlert,SiteAreaEmergency, andGeneralEmergency classes.Itisdeemedthatexposures lessthanthislimitarenotconsistent withtheSiteAreaEmergency classdescription.

The500mRintegrated CDEthyroiddosewasestablished inconsideration ofthe1:5ratiooftheEPAProtective ActionGuidelines forwholebodythyroid.Inestablishing thedoserateemergency actionlevels,adurationofonehourisassumed.Therefore, thedoserateEALsarebasedonasiteboundarydoserateof100mR/hrTEDEor500mR/hrCDEthyroid,whichever ismorelimiting.

PEGReference(s):

AS1.3AS1.4BasisReference(s):

1.N2-0P-79, Radiation Monitoring System2.NUREG-1253 Technical Specifications NineMilePointNuclearStations, UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Table3.3.7.10-1 3.NUREG-1253 Technical Specifications NineMilePointNuclearStations, UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Table3.3.7.1-1 5.2.5GeneralEmerencDoseprojections orfieldsurveyswhichindicatedoses/doseratesinexcessofTable5.2column"GE"atthesiteboundaryorbeyondTable5.2Dosero'ectionEnv.Measurement Classification Thresholds TEDECDEThyroidTEDErateAlert10mRN/A10mR/hrCDEThyroidrateN/ASAE100mR500mR100mR/hr500mR/hrGE1000mR5000mR1000mR/hr5000mR/hrHay1994NodeApplicability:

AllPage54EPHP-EPP-0102 Rev00

5.2.5(Cont)Basis:ATTACHMENT 1(Cont)TheGeneralEmergency valuesofTable5.2arebasedontheboundarydoseresulting fromanactualorimminentreleaseofgaseousradioactivity thatexceeds1000mRTEDEor5000mRCDEthyroidfortheactualorprojected durationoftherelease.The1000mRTEDEandthe5000mRCDEthyroidintegrated dosearebasedontheEPAprotective actionguidancewhichindicates thatpublicprotective actionsareindicated ifthedoseexceeds1remTEDEor5remCDEthyroid.Thisisconsistent withtheemergency classdescription foraGeneralEmergency.

Thislevelconstitutes theupperlevelofthedesirable gradientfortheSiteAreaEmergency.

Actualmeteorology isspecifically identified sinceitgivesthemostaccuratedoseassessment.

Actualmeteorology (including forecasts) shouldbeusedwheneverpossible.

Inestablishing thedoserateemergency actionlevels,adurationofonehourisassumed.Therefore, thedoserateEALsarebasedonasiteboundarydoserateof1000mR/hrTEDEor5000mR/hrCDEthyroid,whichever ismorelimiting.

PEGReference(s):

AG1.3AG1.4BasisReference(s):

1.N2-0P-79, Radiation Monitoring System2.NUREG-1253 Technical Specifications NineMilePointNuclearStations, UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Table3.3.7.10-1 3.NUREG-1253 Technical Specifications NineMilePointNuclearStations, UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Table3.3.7.1-1 May1994Page55EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

6.0 ELECTRICLFAILURESATTACHMENT

ItCtjLossofvitalplantelectrical powercancompromise plantsafetysystemoperability including decayheatremovalandemergency corecoolingsystemswhichmaybenecessary toensurefissionproductbarrierintegrity.

Theeventsofthiscategoryhavebeengroupedintothefollowing twolossofelectrical powertypes:~LossofACPowerSources:Thiscategoryincludeslossesofonsiteand/oroffsiteACpowersourcesincluding stationblackoutevents.6.1~LossofDCPowerSources:Thiscategoryinvolvestotallossesofvitalplant125vdcpowersources.LossofACPowerSources6.1.1UnusualEventLossofpowerfor>15min.toall:~ReserveTransformer A~ReserveTransformer B~AuxBoilerTransformer NodeApplicability:

AllBasis:Prolonged lossofalloffsiteACpowerreducesrequiredredundancy andpotentially degradesthelevelofsafetyoftheplantbyrendering theplantmorevulnerable toacompletelossofACpower(stationblackout).

Fifteenminuteswasselectedasathreshold toexcludetransient ormomentary powerlosses.Nay1994Page56EPHP-EPP-0102 Rev00

6.1.1(Cont)PEGReference(s):

SU1.1ATTACHHENT 1(Cont)BasisReference(s):

1.N2-0P-70, StationElectrical Feedand115kvSwitchyard 2.N2-0P-100A, StandbyDieselGenerators 3.N2-0P-100B, HPCSDieselGenerator 6.1.2AlertLossofallemergency busACpowerfor>15min.NodeApplicability:

Coldshutdown, refuel,defuelBasis:LossofallACpowercompromises allplantsafetysystemsrequiring electricpower.ThisEALisindicated by:Lossofpowerfor>15min.toall:~ReserveTransformer A~ReserveTransformer B~AuxBoilerTransformer Whenincoldshutdown, refueling, ordefueledmodethiseventisclassified asanAlert.Thisisbecauseofthesignificantly reduceddecayheat,lowertemperature andpressure, thusincreasing thetimetorestoreoneoftheemergency busses,relativetothatspecified fortheSiteAreaEmergency EAL.Escalating totheSiteAreaEmergency, ifappropriate, isbyAbnormalRadLevels/Radiological

Effluent, orEmergency DirectorJudgmentICs.Fifteenminuteswasselectedasathreshold toexcludetransient ormomentary powerlosses.Hay1994Page57EPHP-EPP-0102 Rev00

6.1.2(Cont)PEGReference(s):

SA1.1STIAIINENT1(Ct)BasisReference(s):

1.N2-0P-70, StationElectrical Feedand115kvSwitchyard 2.N2-0P-100A, StandbyDieselGenerators 3.N2-0P-100B, HPCSDieselGenerator 6.1.3AlertAvailable emergency busACpowerreducedtoonlyoneofthefollowing sourcesfor>15min.:ReserveTransformer AReserve'Transformer BAuxBoilerTransformer 2EGS*EG12EGS*EG22EGS*EG3NodeApplicability:

'Poweroperation, startup/hot standby,hotshutdownBasis:Thecondition indicated bythisEAListhedegradation oftheoffsitepowerwithaconcurrent failureofoneemergency generator tosupplypowertoitsemergency busses.Anotherrelatedcondition couldbethelossofonsiteemergency dieselswithonlyonetrainofemergency bussesbeingfedfromoffsitepower.Thesubsequent lossofthissinglepowersourcewouldescalatetheeventtoaSiteAreaEmergency.

Hay1994Page58EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

6.1.3(Cont)PEGReference(s):

SA5.1ATTACHMENT 1(Cont)BasisReference(s):

1.N2-0P-70, StationElectrical Feedand115kvSwitchyard 2.N2-0P-100A, StandbyDieselGenerators 3.N2-0P-100B, HPCSDieselGenerator 6.1.4SiteAreaEmerencLossofallemergency busACpowerfor>15min..NodeApplicability:

Poweroperation, startup/hot standby,hotshutdownBasis:LossofallACpowercompromises allplantsafetysystemsrequiring electricpower.ThisEALisindicated by:LossofpowertoReserveTransformer A,ReserveTransformer B,andAuxBoilerTransformer ANDfailureofallDGstopoweranyemergency busANDfailuretorestorepowerto2ENS*SWG101, 2ENS*SWG102 or2ENS*SWG103 in~15min.Prolonged lossofallACpowercancausecoreuncoveryandlossofcontainment integrity, thusthiseventcanescalatetoaGeneralEmergency.

Thetimedurationselected, 15minutes,excludestransient ormomentary powerlosses.PEGReference(s):

SS1.1May1994Page59EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

6.1.4(Cont)ATTACHMENT 1(Cont)BasisReference(s):

1.N2-0P-100A, StandbyDieselGenerators 2.N2-0P-100B, HPCSDieselGenerator 3.N2-0P-70, StationElectrical Feedand115kvSwitchyard 4.N2-0P-72, StandbyandEmergency ACDistribution System6.1.5GenealEmereLossofallemergency busACpowerANDeither:Powercannotberestoredtoanyemergency busin<2hrsORRPVwaterlevelcannotberestoredandmaintained

)-14in.(TAF)NodeApplicability:

Poweroperation, startup/hot standby,hotshutdownBasis:LossofallACpowercompromises allplantsafetysystemsrequiring electricpower.Prolonged lossofallACpowerwillleadtolossoffuelclad,RCS,andcontainment.

AlthoughthisEALmaybeviewedasredundant totheRPVWaterLevelEALs,itsinclusion isnecessary tobetterassuretimelyrecognition andemergency response.

ThisEALisspecified toassurethatintheunlikelyeventofprolonged stationblackout, timelyrecognition oftheseriousness oftheeventoccursandthatdeclaration ofaGeneralEmergency occursasearlyasisappropriate, basedonareasonable assessment oftheeventtrajectory.

Thelikelihood ofrestoring atleastoneemergency busshouldbebasedonarealistic appraisal ofthesituation sinceadelayinanupgradedecisionbasedononlyachanceofmitigating theeventcouldresultinalossofvaluabletimeinpreparing andimplementing publicprotective actions.Inaddition, undertheseconditions, fissionproductbarriermonitoring capability maybedegraded.

Althoughitmaybedifficult topredictwhenpowercanberestored, theEmergency DirectorshoulddeclareaGeneralEmergency basedontwomajorconsiderations:

May1994Page60EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

6.1.5(Cont)ATTACHHENT 1(Cont)1.Arethereanypresentindications thatcorecoolingisalreadydegradedtothepointthatLossorPotential Lossoffissionproductbarriersisimminent7 2.Iftherearenopresentindications ofsuchcorecoolingdegradation, howlikelyisitthatpowercanberestoredintime.toassurethatalossoftwobarrierswithapotential lossofthethirdbarriercanbeprevented?

Thus,indication ofcontinuing corecoolingdegradation mustbebasedonfissionproductbarriermonitoring withparticular emphasisonEmergency Directorjudgmentasitrelatestoimminentlossorpotential lossoffissionproductbarriersanddegradedabilitytomonitorfissionproductbarriers.

ThetimetorestoreACpowerisbasedonsiteblackoutcopinganalysisperformed inconformance with10CFR50.63 andRegulatory Guide1.155,StationBlackout",

withappropriate allowance foroffsiteemergency response.

PEGReference(s):

SG1.16.2BasisReference(s):

1.N2-0P-74A, Emergency DCDistribution 2.N2-0P-74B, HPCS125vdcSystem3.N2-0P-70, StationElectrical Feedand115kvSwitchyard 4.N2-EOP-RPV, RPVControlLossofDCPowerSources6.2.1UnusualEvent<105vdcon2BYS*BAT2A andBfor>15min.NodeApplicability:

Coldshutdown, RefuelHay1994Page61EPHP-EPP-0102 Rev00

6.2.1(Cont)Basis:ATTACHMENT 1(Cont)ThepurposeofthisEAListorecognize alossofDCpowercompromising theabilitytomonitorandcontroltheremovalofdecayheatduringcoldshutdownorrefueling operations.

ThisEALisintendedtobeanticipatory inasmuchastheoperating crewmaynothavenecessary indication andcontrolofequipment neededtorespondtotheloss.Thebusvoltageisbasedontheminimumbusvoltagenecessary fortheoperation ofsafetyrelatedequipment.

Thisvoltagevalueincorporates amarginofatleast15minutesofoperationbeforetheonsetofinability tooperateloads.PEGReference(s):

SU7.1BasisReference(s):

1.NUREG-1253 Technical Specifications NineMilePointNuclearStations, UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,Amendment 5,Article4.8.2.1.d.2 2.NUREG-1253 Technical Specifications NineMilePointNuclearStations, UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,Basis3/4.8.1-3, pg.B3/48-23.Operations Technology BYS/BWS,PlantDCElectrical Distribution System6.2.2SiteAreaEmerenc<105vdcon2BYS*BAT2A andBfor>15min.NodeApplicability:

Poweroperation, startup/hot standby,hotshutdownMay1994Page62EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

6.2.2(Cont)Basis:ATTACHMENT 1(Cont)LossofallDCpowercompromises abilitytomonitorandcontrolplantsafetyfunctions.

Prolonged lossofallDC.powerwillcausecoreuncovering andlossofcontainment integrity whenthereissignificant decayheatandsensibleheatinthereactorsystem.Escalation toaGeneralEmergency wouldoccurbyotherEALcategories.

Fifteenminuteswasselectedasathreshold toexcludetransient ormomentary powerlosses.Thebusvoltageisbasedontheminimumbusvoltagenecessary fortheoperation ofsafetyrelatedequipment.

Thisvoltagevalueincorporates amarginofatleast15minutesofoperation beforetheonsetofinability tooperateloads.PEGReference(s):

SS3.'1BasisReference(s):

1.NUREG-1253 Technical Specifications NineMilePointNuclearStations, UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,Amendment 5,Article4.8.2.l.d.2 2.NUREG-1253 Technical Specifications NineMilePointNuclearStations, UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Basis3/4.8.1-3, pg.B3/48-23.Operations Technology BYS/BWS,PlantDCElectrical Distribution System7.0EUIPMENTFAILURESNumerousplantsystemrelatedequipment failureeventswhichwarrantemergency classification, basedupontheirpotential toposeactualorpotential threatstoplantsafety,havebeenidentified inthiscategory.

Theeventsofthiscategoryhavebeengroupedintothefollowing eventtypes:~Technical Secifications:

OnlyoneEALfallsunderthiseventtyperelatedtothefailureoftheplanttobebroughttotherequiredplantoperating condition requiredbytechnical specifications.

May1994Page63EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

7.0(Cont)ATTACHMENT I(Cont)7.1~SstemFailuresorControlRoomEvacuation:

Thiscategoryincludeseventswhichareindicative oflossesofoperability ofsafetysystemssuchasECCS,isolation functions, ControlRoomhabitability orcoldandhotshutdowncapabilities.

~LossofIndication AlarmorCommunication Caabilit:Certaineventswhichdegradetheplantoperators abilitytoeffectively assessplantconditions orcommunicate withessential personnel withinorexternaltotheplantwarrantemergency classification.

Underthiseventtypearelossesofannunciators and/orcommunication equipment.

TecncaSecifications 7.1.1UnusualEventPlantisnotbroughttorequiredoperating modewithinTechnical Specifications LCOActionStatement TimeNodeApplicability:

Poweroperation, startup/hot standby,hotshutdownBasis:'-Limiting Conditions ofOperation (LCOs)requiretheplanttobebroughttoarequiredshutdownmodewhentheTechnical Specification requiredconfiguration cannotberestored.

Depending onthecircumstances, thismayormaynotbeanemergency orprecursor toamoreseverecondition.

Inanycase,theinitiation ofplantshutdownrequiredbythesiteTechnical Specification requiresaonehourreportunder10CFR50.72 (b)non-emergency events.Theplantiswithinitssafetyenvelopewhenbeingshutdownwithintheallowable actionstatement timeintheTechnical Specifications.

Animmediate Notification ofanUnusualEventisrequiredwhentheplantisnotbroughttotherequiredoperating modewithintheallowable actionstatement timeintheTechnical Specifications.

Declaration ofanUnusualEventisbasedonthetimeatwhichtheLCO-specified actionstatement timeperiodelapsesunderthesiteTechnical Specifications andisnotrelatedtohowlongacondition mayhaveexisted.OtherrequiredTechnical Specification shutdowns thatinvolveprecursors tomoreseriouseventsareaddressed byotherEALs.PEGReference(s):

SU2.1May1994Page64EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

'.1.1(Cont)~~BasisReference(s):

ATTACHMENT 1(Cont)7.21.NUREG-1253 Technical Specifications NineMilePointNuclearStations, UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,article3.0.3SstemFailuresorControlRoomEvacuation 7.2.1UnusualEventReportofmainturbinefailureresulting incasingpenetration ordamagetoturbinesealsorgenerator sealsNodeApplicability:

Poweroperation, startup/hot standby,hotshutdownBasis:ThisEALisintendedtoaddressmainturbinerotatingcomponent failuresofsufficient magnitude tocauseobservable damagetotheturbinecasingortothesealsoftheturbinegenerator.

Ofmajorconcernisthepotential forleakageofcombustible fluids(lubricating oils)andgases(hydrogen cooling)totheplantenvirons.

Actualfiresandflammable gasbuildupareappropriately classified throughotherEALs.ThisEALisconsistent withthedefinition ofanUnusualEventwhilemaintaining theanticipatory naturedesiredandrecognizing therisktonon-safety relatedequipment.

PEGReference(s):

HU1.6BasisReference(s):

None7.2.2alertControlRoomevacuation NodeApplicability:

AllMay1994Page65EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

7.2.2(Cont)Basis:ATTACHMENT 1(Cont)WiththeControlRoomevacuated, additional support,monitoring anddirection throughtheTechnical SupportCenterand/orotherEmergency Operations Centerisnecessary.

Inability toestablish plantcontrolfromoutsidetheControlRoomwillescalatethiseventtoaSiteAreaEmergency.

PEGReference(s):

HAS.1BasisReference(s):

1.N2-0P-78, RemoteShutdownSystem,SectionH.2.07.2.3AlertReactorcoolanttemperature cannotbemaintained

<200'FNodeApplicability:

Coldshutdown, refuelBasis:ThisEALaddresses completelossoffunctions requiredforcorecoolingduringrefueling andcoldshutdownmodes.Escalation toSiteAreaEmergency orGeneralEmergency wouldbethroughotherEALs.Areactorcoolanttemperature increasethatapproaches orexceedsthecoldshutdowntechnical specification limitwarrantsdeclaration ofanAlertirrespective oftheavailability oftechnical specification requiredfunctions tomaintaincoldshutdown.

TheconcernofthisEAListhelossofabilitytomaintaintheplantincoldshutdownwhichisdefinedbyreactorcoolanttemperature andnottheoperability ofequipment whichsupportsremovalofheatfromthereactor.ThisEALdoesnotapplyduringhydrostatic testing.PEGReference(s):

SA3.1May1994Page66EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

7.2.3(Cont)BasisReference(s):

ATTACHMENT 1(Cont).1.NUREG-1253 Technical Specifications NineMilePointNuclearStations, UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Amendment 26,Article3.4.9.22.NUREG-1253 Technical Specifications NineMilePointNuclearStations, UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,Table1.27.2.4SiteAreaEmerencControlRoomevacuation ANDControlofcorecoolingsystemscannotbeestablished ing15min.NodeApplicability:

AllBasis:ThisEALindicates thatexpeditious transferofcontrolofsafetysystemshasnotoccurred.

Thetimeintervalfortransferisbasedonanalysisorassessments astohowquicklycontrolmustbereestablished withoutcoreuncovering and/orcoredamage.Incoldshutdownandrefueling modes,operatorconcernisdirectedtowardmaintaining corecoolingsuchasisdiscussed inGenericLetter88-17,"LossofDecayHeatRemoval."

Inpoweroperation

,hotstandby,andhotshutdownmodes,operatorconcernisprimarily directedtowardmonitoring andcontrolling plantparameters dictatedbytheEOPsandtherebyassuringfissionproductbarrierintegrity.

PEGReference(s):

HS2.1BasisReference(s):

1.GenericLette}88-17,"LossofDecayHeatRemoval"2.N2-0P-78, RemoteShutdownSystem,SectionH.2.03.NMP-2FSARSection9B.8.2.2, SafeShutdownScenario, pg.9B.8-5a,May1994Page67EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

7.3ATTACHMENT 1(Cont)LossofIndications AlarmCommunication Caabilit7.3.1~UEUnplanned lossofannunciators orindicators onanyofthefollowing panelsfor>15min.:2CEC*PNL601 2CEC*PNL602 2CEC*PNL603 2CEC*PNL852 2CEC*PNL851 ANDIncreased surveillance isrequiredforsafeplantoperation NodeApplicability:

Poweroperation, startup/hot standby,hotshutdownBasis:ThisEALrecognizes thedifficulty associated withmonitoring changingplantconditions withouttheuseofamajorportionoftheannunciation orindication equipment.

Recognition oftheavailability ofcomputerbasedindication equipment isconsidered (SPDS,plantcomputer, etc.)."Unplanned" lossofannunciators orindicators excludesscheduled maintenance andtestingactivities.

Itis,notintendedthatplantpersonnel performadetailedcountofinstrumentation lostbuttheuseofjudgmentbytheShiftSupervisor asthethreshold fordetermining theseverityoftheplantconditions.

Thisjudgmentissupported bythespecificopinionoftheShiftSupervisor thatadditional operating personnel willberequiredtoprovideincreased monitoring ofsystemoperation tosafelyoperatetheplant.May1994Page68EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

7.3.1(Cont)ATTACHMENT 1(Cont)Itisfurtherrecognized thatmostplantdesignsprovideredundant safetysystemindication poweredfromseparateuninterruptable powersupplies.

Whilefailureofalargeportionofannunciators ismorelikelythanafailureofalargeportionofindications, theconcernisincludedinthisEALduetodifficulty associated withassessment ofplantconditions.

Thelossofspecific, orseveral,safetysystemindicators shouldremainafunctionofthatspecificsystemorcomponent operability status.Thiswillbeaddressed bytheirspecificTechnical Specification.

Theinitiation ofaTechnical Specification imposedplantshutdownrelatedtotheinstrument losswillbereportedvia10CFR50.72.

Iftheshutdownisnotincompliance withtheTechnical Specification action,theUnusualEventisbasedonEAL7.1.1,Inability toReachRequiredShutdownWithinTechnical Specification Limits.Annunciators orindicators forthisEALmustincludethoseidentified intheAbnormalOperating procedures, intheEmergency Operating Procedures, andinotherEALs(e.g.,area,process,and/oreffluentradmonitors, etc.).Fifteenminuteswasselectedasathreshold toexcludetransient ormomentary powerlosses.Duetothelimitednumberofsafetysystemsinoperation duringcoldshutdown, refueling, anddefueledmodes,thisEALisnotapplicable duringthesemodesofoperation.

ThisUnusualEventwillbeescalated toanAlertifatransient isinprogressduringthelossofannunciation orindication.

PEGReference(s):

SU3.1BasisReference(s):

1.USARFigure1.2-15,ControlRoomlayout2.N2-0P-91A, ProcessComputer3.N2-0P-91B, SafetyParameter DisplaySystem(SPDS)May1994Page69EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

7.3.2U~1ATTACHHENT 1(Cont)Lossofallcommunications capability affecting theabilitytoeither:Performroutineonsiteoperations ORNotifyoffsiteagenciesorpersonnel NodeApplicability:

Al1Basis:ThepurposeofthisEAListorecognize alossofcommunications capability thateitherdefeatstheplantoperations staffabilitytoperformroutinetasksnecessary forplantoperations ortheabilitytocommunicate problemswithoffsiteauthorities.

Thelossofoffsitecommunications abilityisexpectedtobesignificantly morecomprehensive thanthecondition addressed by10CFR50.72.

Theonsitecommunications lossmustencompass thelossofallmeansofroutinecommunications, Table7.1.Table7.1Communications Sstems~SstemOnsiteOffsiteDialtelephones SPCsystemM/CCsystemPP/PAsystemHand-Held PortableradioRedphonetoUSNRC-Bethesda BlackphonetoUSNRC-King ofPrussiaBlackphonedirecttoJAFNPPPBXREGSHealthphysicsnetworkandFTS2000UHFradiosTheoffsitecommunications lossmustencompass thelossofallmeansofcommunications withoffsiteauthorities, Table7.1.ThisEALisintendedtobeusedonlywhenextraordinary meansarebeingutilizedtomakecommunications possible(relaying ofinformation fromradiotransmissions, individuals beingsenttooffsitelocations, etc.).Hay1994Page70EPHP-EPP-0102 Rev00

7.3.2(Cont)PEGReference(s):

SU6.1ATTACHMENT 1(Cont)BasisReference(s):

1.N2-0P-76, PlantCommunications 7.3.3AlertUnplanned lossofannunciators orindicators onanyofthefollowing panelsfor>15min.:~2CEC*PNL601

~2CEC*PNL602

~2CEC*PNL603

~2CEC*PNL852

-~2CEC*PNL851 ANDincreased surveillance isrequiredforsafeplantoperation ANDeither:Planttransient inprogressORplantcomputerandSPDSareunavailable ModeApplicability:

Poweroperation, startup/hot standby,hotshutdownBasis:ThisEALrecognizes thedifficulty associated withmonitoring changingplantconditions withouttheuseofamajorportionoftheannunciation orindication equipment duringatransient.

Recognition oftheavailability ofcomputerbasedindication equipment isconsidered (SPDS,plantcomputer, etc.)."Unplanned" lossofannunciators orindicators doesnotincludescheduled maintenance andtestingactivities.

Itisnotintendedthatplantpersonnel performadetailedcountoftheinstrumentation lostbuttheuseofthevalueasajudgmentbytheshiftsupervisor asthethreshold fordetermining theseverityoftheplantconditions.

Thisjudgmentissupported bythespecificopinionoftheShiftSupervisor thatadditional operating personnel willberequiredtoprovideincreased monitoring ofsystemoperation tosafelyoperatetheplant.Hay1994Page71EPHP-EPP-0102 Rev00

7.3.3(Cont)ATTACHMENT 1(Cont)Itisfurtherrecognized thatmostplantdesignsprovideredundant safetysystemindication poweredfromseparateuninterruptable powersupplies.

Whilefailureofalargeportionofannunciators ismorelikelythanafailureofalargeportionofindications, theconcernisincludedinthisEALduetodifficulty associated withassessment ofplantconditions.

Thelossofspecific, orseveral,safetysystemindicators shouldremainafunctionofthatspecificsystemorcomponent operability status.Thiswillbeaddressed bythespecificTechnical Specification.

Theinitiation ofaTechnical Specification imposedplantshutdownrelatedtotheinstrument losswillbereportedvia10CFR50.72.

Annunciators orindicators forthisEALincludesthoseidentified intheAbnormalOperating Procedures, intheEmergency Operating Procedures, andinotherEALs(e.g.,area,process,and/oreffluentradmonitors, etc.)."Significant transient" includesresponsetoautomatic ormanuallyinitiated functions suchasscrams,runbacksinvolving greaterthan25Xthermalpowerchange,ECCSinjections, orthermalpoweroscillations of10Xorgreater.Ifbothamajorportionoftheannunciation systemandallcomputermonitoring areunavailable totheextentthattheadditional operating personnel arerequiredtomonitorindications, theAlertisrequired.

Duetothelimitednumberofsafetysystemsinoperation duringcoldshutdown, refueling anddefueledmodes,noEALisindicated duringthesemodesofoperation.

ThisAlertwillbeescalated toaSiteAreaEmergency iftheoperating crewcannotmonitorthetransient inprogress.

PEGReference(s):

SA4.1BasisReference(s):

1.USARFigure1.2-15,ControlRoomlayout2.N2-0P-91A, ProcessComputer3.N2-0P-91B, SafetyParameter DisplaySystem(SPDS)May1994Page72EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

7.3.4SiteAreaEmerencATTACHMENT 1(Cont)Lossofannunciators orindicators onanyofthefollowing panels:~2CEC*PNL601

~2CEC*PNL602

~2CEC*PNL603

~2CEC*PNL852

~2CEC*PNL851 ANDplantcomputerandSPDSareunavailable ANDindications tomonitorallRPVandprimarycontainment EOPparameters arelostANDplanttransient isinprogressNodeApplicability:

Poweroperation,

-startup/hot standby,hotshutdownBasis:ThisEALrecognizes theinability oftheControlRoomstafftomonitortheplantresponsetoatransient.

ASiteAreaEmergency isconsidered toexistiftheControlRoomstaffcannotmonitorsafety.functions neededforprotection ofthepublic.Annunciators forthisEALshouldbelimitedtoincludethoseidentified intheAbnormalOperating Procedures, intheEmergency Operating Procedures, andinotherEALs(e.g.,radmonitors, etc.)."Significant transient" includesresponsetoautomatic ormanuallyinitiated functions suchasscrams,runbacksinvolving greaterthan25Xthermalpowerchange,ECCSinjections, orthermalpoweroscillations of10Xorgreater.Indications neededtomonitorsafetyfunctions necessary forprotection ofthepublicmustincludeControlRoomindications, computergenerated indications anddedicated annunciation capability.

Thespecificindications shouldbethoseusedtodetermine suchfunctions astheabilitytoshutdownthereactor,maintainthecorecooledandinaeoolablegeometry, toremoveheatfromthecore,tomaintainthereactorcoolantsystemintact,andtomaintaincontainment intact."Planned" actionsareexcludedfromtheisEALsincethelossofinstrumentation ofthismagnitude isofsuchsignificance duringatransient thatthecauseofthelossisnotanameliorating factor.May1994Page73EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

7.3.4(Cont)PEGReference(s):

SS6.1ATTACHMENT 1(Cont).IBasisReference(s):

1.N2-EOP-PC, PrimaryContainment Control2.N2-EOP-RPV, RPVControl3.N2-0P-91A, ProcessComputer4.N2-0P-91B, SafetyParameter DisplaySystem(SPDS)5.USARFigure1.2-15,ControlRoomlayout8.0HAZARDSPHazardsarethosenon-plant systemrelatedeventswhichcandirectlyorindirectly impactplantoperation orreactorplantandpersonnel safety.Theeventsofthiscategoryhavebeengroupedintothefollowing types:SecuritThreats:Thiscategoryincludesunauthorized entryattemptsintotheProtected Areaaswellasbombthreatsandsabotageattempts.

Alsoaddressed areactualsecuritycompromises threatening lossofphysicalcontroloftheplant.FireorExlosion:Firescanposesignificant hazardstopersonnel andreactorsafety.Appropriate forclassification arefireswithinthesiteProtected Areaorwhichmayaffectoperability ofvitalequipment.

Man-madeEvents:Han-madeeventsarethosenon-naturally occurring eventswhichcancausedamagetoplantfacilities suchasaircraftcrashes,missileimpacts,toxicorflammable gasleaksorexplosions fromwhateversource.NaturalEvents:Eventssuchashurricanes, earthquakes ortornadoes whichhavepotential tocausedamagetoplantstructures orequipment significant enoughtothreatenpersonnel orplantsafety.Hay1994Page74EPHP-EPP-0102 Rev00

8.1SecuritThreatsETIACAIIENT IECI)8.1.1UnusualEventBombdeviceorotherindication ofattempted sabotagediscovered withinplantProtected AreaNodeApplicability:

AllBasis:ThisEALisbasedontheNineMilePointNuclearStationPhysicalSecurityandSafeguards Contingency Plans.Securityeventswhichdonotrepresent atleastapotential degradation inthelevelofsafetyoftheplant,arereportedunder10CFR73.71 orinsomecasesunder10CFR50.72.

TheplantProtected Areaboundaryiswithinthesecurityisolation zoneandisdefinedinthesecurityplan.PEGReference(s):

HU4.1HU4.2BasisReference(s):

1.NineMilePointNuclearStationPhysicalSecurityandSafeguards Contingency Plans.8.1.2AlertIntrusion intoplantProtected Areabyanadversary NodeApplicability:

AllMay1994Page75EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

8.1.2(Cont)Basis:ATTACHMENT 1(Cont)Thisclassofsecurityeventsrepresents anescalated threattoplantsafetyabovethatcontained intheUnusualEvent.ForthepurposesofthisEAL,theintrusion byanadversary insidetheProtected Areaboundarycanbeconsidered asignificant securitythreat.Intrusion intoavitalareabyanadversary willescalatethiseventtoaSiteAreaEmergency.

NMP-1andNMP-2Protected Areaboundaries areillustrated inUSARFigure1.2-1.AlsoseeSEWDrawingNo.12187-SK-032483-25, IssueNo.1,SiteFacilities LayoutStatusasof8/1/89.PEGReference(s):

HA4.1HA4.2BasisReference(s):

1.NineMilePointNuclearStationPhysicalSecurityandSafeguards Contingency Plans2.SNDrawingNo.12187-SK-032483-25, IssueNo.1,SiteFacilities LayoutStatusasof8/1/898.1.3SiteAreaEmerencIntrusion intoaplantsecurityvitalareabyanadversary NodeApplicability:

AllBasis:Thisclassofsecurityeventsrepresents anescalated threattoplantsafetyabovethatcontained intheAlertinthatanadversary hasprogressed fromtheProtected Areatothevitalarea.May1994Page76EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

8.1.3(Cont)PEGReference(s):

HS1.1HS1.2ATTACHMENT 1(Cont)BasisReference(s):

1.NineMilePointNuclearStationPhysicalSecurityandSafeguards Contingency Plans8.1.4GeneralEmerencSecurityeventwhichresultsin:LossofplantcontrolfromtheControlRoomANDLossofremoteshutdowncapability NodeApplicability:

AllBasis:ThisEALencompasses conditions underwhichunauthorized personnel havetakenphysicalcontrolofvitalareasrequiredtoreachandmaintainsafeshutdown.

PEGReference(s):

HGl.1HG1.2BasisReference(s):

NoneMay1994Page77EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

8.2FireorExlosionATTACHHENT 1(Cont)8.2.1UnusualEventConfirmed fireinanyplantarea,Table8.2orTable8.3,notextinguished ing15min.ofControlRoomnotification Table8.2PlantAreasServiceBuilding115KVSwitchyard 345KVSwitchyard NodeApplicability:

AllTable8.3PlantVitaAreasSouthAux.BayNorthAug.BayRadWasteBuildingReactorBuildingTurbineBuilding'DieselGenerator BuildingScreenwell Building/Service WaterPumpBaysCondensate StorageTanksBuildingStandbyGasTreatment BuildingControlBuildingUnit2SecurityBuildingBasis:ThepurposeofthisEAListoaddressthemagnitude andextentoffiresthatmaybepotentially significant precursors todamagetosafetysystems.Thisexcludessuchitemsasfireswithinadministration buildings, waste-basket fires,andothersmallfiresofnosafetyconsequence.

PEGReference(s):

HU2.1Hay1994Page78EPHP-EPP-0102 Rev00

8.2.1(Cont)BasisReference(s):

ATTACHMENT 1(Cont)1.NineMilePointNuclearStationPhysicalSecurityandSafeguards Contingency Plans2.NUREG0737,SectionII.B.2-28.2.2alertFireorexplosion inanyplantarea,Table8.2orTable8.3,whichresultsindamagetoplantequipment orstructures neededforsafeplantoperation Table8.2PlantAreasServiceBuilding115KVSwitchyard 345KVSwitchyard NodeApplicability:

AllTable8.3lantVitalAreasSouthAux.BayNorthAux.BayRadWasteBuildingReactorBuildingTurbineBuildingDieselGenerator BuildingScreenwell Building/Service WaterPumpBaysCondensate StorageTanksBuildingStandbyGasTreatment BuildingControlBuildingUnit2SecurityBuildingBasis:Thelistedareascontainfunctions andsystemsrequiredforthesafeshutdownoftheplant.TheNMP-2safeshutdownanalysiswasconsulted forequipment andplantareasrequiredfortheapplicable mode.May1994Page79EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

8.2.2(Cont)ATTACHHENT 1(Cont)Withregardtoexplosions, onlythoseexplosions ofsufficient forcetodamagepermanent structures orequipment requiredforsafeoperation withintheidentified plantareasshouldbeconsidered.

Asusedhere,anexplosion isarapid,violent;unconfined'combustion, oracatastrophic failureofpressurized equipment, thatpotentially impartssignificant energytonearbystructures andmaterials.

NoattemptismadeinthisEALtoassesstheactualmagnitude ofthedamage.Thedeclaration ofanAlertandtheactivation oftheTSCwillprovidetheEmergency Directorwiththeresources neededtoperformdamageassessments.

TheEmergency Directoralsoneedstoconsideranysecurityaspectsoftheexplosions.

PEGReference(s):

HA2.18.38.3.1.BasisReference(s):

1.N2-0P-47, FireDetection 2.USAR,Figure9B.6-13.USAR,Section9B4.NUREG0737,SectionII.B.2-2-lidEUnusualEventVehiclecrashintoorprojectile whichimpactsplantstructures orsystemswithinProtected AreaboundaryNodeApplicability:

AllBasis:TheProtected Areaboundaryiswithinthesecurityisolation zoneandisdefinedinthesitesecurityplan.NHP-1andNHP-2Protected Areaboundaries areillustrated inUSARFigure1.2-1.Also,refertoS8WDrawingNo.12187-SK-032483-25; IssueNo.1,SiteFacilities LayoutStatusasof8/1/89.Hay1994Page80EPHP-EPP-0102 Rev00

8.3.1(Cont)ATTACHMENT 1(Cont)ThisEALaddresses suchitemsasplane,helicopter, train,car,truck,orbargecrash,orimpactofotherprojectiles thatmaypotentially damageplantstructures containing functions andsystemsrequiredforsafeshutdownoftheplant.Ifthecrashisconfirmed toaffectaplantvitalarea,theeventmaybeescalated toAlert.ForthepurposeofthisEAL,aplantstructure isanypermanent buildingorstructure whichhousesplantprocess/supportsystemsandequipment.

Administrative buildings, supportbuildings/trailers orothernonplantoperations relatedstructures arenotintendedtobeincludedhere.PEGReference(s):

HU1.4S.3.2BasisReference(s):

l.USARFigure1.2-2StationArrangement 2.SEWDrawingNo.12187-SK-032483-25, IssueNo.1,SiteFacilities LayoutStatusasof8/1/89.Reportbyplantpersonnel ofanexplosion withinProtected Areaboundaryresulting invisibledamagetopermanent structures orequipment NodeApplicability:

AllBasis:TheProtected Areaboundaryiswithinthesecurityisolation zoneandisdefinedinthesitesecurityplan.NMP-1andNMP-2Protected Areaboundaries areillustrated inUSARFigure1.2-1.Also,refertoSEWDrawingNo.12187-SK-032483-25, IssueNo.1,SiteFacilities LayoutStatusasof8/1/89.May1994Page81EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

8.3.2(Cont)ATTACHMENT 1(Cont)ForthisEAL,onlythoseexplosions ofsufficient forcetodamagepermanent structures orequipment withintheProtected Areashouldbeconsidered.

Asusedhere,anexplosion isarapid,violent,unconfined combustion, oracatastrophic failureofpressurized equipment, thatpotentially impartssignificant energytonearbystructures andmaterials.

NoattemptismadeinthisEALtoassesstheactualmagnitude ofthedamage.Theoccurrence oftheexplosion withreportsofevidenceofdamage(e.g.,deformation, scorching) issufficient fordeclaration.

TheEmergency Directoralsoneedstoconsideranysecurit'y aspectsoftheexplosion.

PEGReference(s):

HU1.58.3.3BasisReference(s):

l.USARFigure1.2-2StationArrangement 2.SLWDrawingNo.12187-SK-032483-25, IssueNo.1,SiteFacilities LayoutStatusasof8/1/89UnusualEventReportordetection ofareleaseoftoxicorflammable gasesthatcouldenterorhaveenteredwithintheProtected Areaboundaryinamountsthatcouldaffectthehealthofplantpersonnel orsafeplantoperationORreportbylocal,countyorstateofficials forpotential evacuation ofsitepersonnel basedonoffsiteeventModeApplicability:

AllBasis:ThisEALisbasedonreleasesinconcentrations withinthesiteboundarythatwillaffectthehealthofplantpersonnel oraffecting thesafeoperation oftheplantwiththeplantbeingwithintheevacuation areaofanoffsiteevent(i.e.,tankertruckaccidentreleasing toxicgases,etc.).Theevacuation areaisasdetermined fromtheDOTEvacuation TablesforSelectedHazardous Materials, intheDOTEmergency ResponseGuideforHazardous Materials.

May1994Page82EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

8.3.3(Cont)ATTACHMENT 1(Cont)NMP-1andNMP-2sharenocommonsafetysystems,buttheirrespective Protected Areaboundaries sharecommonbordersinsomeplaces.Therefore itispossiblethatatoxicorflammable gasincidenthappening ononesitecouldaffecttheothersite.Shouldanexplosion occurwithinaspecified plantarea,anAlertwouldbedeclaredbasedonEAL8.2.2PEGReference(s):

HU3.1HU3.2BasisReference(s):

None8.3.4alertVehiclecrashorprojectile impactwhichprecludes personnel accesstoordamagesequipment inplantvitalareas,Table8.3Table8.3PlantVitalAreasNodeApplicability:

AllSouthAux.BayNorthAux.BayRadWasteBuildingReactorBuildingTurbineBuildingDieselGenerator BuildingScreenwell Building/Service WaterPumpBaysCondensate StorageTanksBuildingStandbyGasTreatment BuildingControlBuildingUnit2SecurityBuildingMay1994Page83EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

8.3.4(Cont)Basis:ATTACHMENT 1(Cont)ThisEALaddresses eventsthatmayhaveresultedinaplantvitalareabeingsubjected toforcesbeyonddesignlimits,andthusdamagemaybeassumedtohaveoccurredtoplantsafetysystems.Theinitialreportshouldnotbeinterpreted asmandating alengthydamageassessment priortoclassification.

NoattemptismadeinthisEALtoassesstheactualmagnitude ofthedamage.NMP-1andNMP-2Protected Areaboundaries areillustrated inUSARFigure1.2-1.AlsoseeSSWDrawingNo.12187-SK-032483-25, IssueNo.1,SiteFacilities LayoutStatusasof8/1/89.ThisEALaddresses suchitemsasplane,helicopter, train,car,truck,orbargecrash,orimpactofotherprojectiles intoaplantvitalarea.PEGReference(s):

HA1.5BasisReference(s):

1.USARFigure1.2-2StationArrangement 2.SKWDrawingNo.12187-SK-032483-25, IssueNo.1,SiteFacilities LayoutStatusasof8/1/893.NUREG0737,SectionII.B.2-28.3.5AlertConfirmed reportordetection oftoxicorflammable gaseswithinaplantvitalarea,Table8.3,inconcentrations thatwillbelifethreatening toplantpersonnel orprecludeaccesstoequipment neededforsafeplantoperation Table8.3PlantVitalAreasSouthAux.BayNorthAux.BayRadWasteBuildingReactorBuildingTurbineBuildingDieselGenerator BuildingScreenwell Building/Service WaterPumpBaysCondensate StorageTanksBuildingStandbyGasTreatment BuildingControlBuildingUnit2SecurityBuildingMay1994Page84EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

8.3.5(Cont)ATTACHNENT 1(Cont)RodeApplicability:

AllBasis:ThisEALisbasedongasesthathaveenteredaplantstructureprecluding accesstoequipment necessary forthesafeoperation oftheplant.ThisEALappliestobuildings andareascontiguous toplantvitalareasorothersignificant buildings orareas.TheintentofthisEALisnottoincludebuildings (i.e.,warehouses) orotherareasthatarenotcontiguous orimmediately adjacenttoplantvitalareas.Itisappropriate thatincreased monitoring bedonetoascertain whetherconsequential damagehasoccurred.

8.4PEGReference(s):

HA3.1HA3.2BasisReference(s):

1.USARFigure1.2-2StationArrangement 2.NUREG0737,SectionII.B.2-2NaturalEvents8.4.1UnusualEventEarthquake feltinplantbyanyoperatorANDeither:NNP-2seismicinstrumentation actuatedORconfirmation ofearthquake receivedonNHP-IorJAFNPPseismicinstrumentation Hay1994Page85EPHP-EPP-0102 Rev00

ATTACNIIENT IECtt8.4.1(Cont)NodeApplicability:

AllBasis:NHP-2seismicinstrumentation actuatesat0.01gcausing:Powertoremoteacceleration sensorunitsActivation ofMRSlrecorders EVENTalarmlightonPWRSltolightAnnunciator 842121onpanel2CEC-PNL842 tobereceivedEVENTINDICATOR onPWRSltoturnfromblacktowhiteDamagetosomeportionsofthesitemayoccurbutitshouldnotaffectabilityofsafetyfunctions tooperate.Methodsofdetection canbebasedoninstrumentation validated byareliablesource,operatorassessment, orindication receivedfromNMP-1orJAFNPPinstrumentation.

AsdefinedintheEPRI-sponsored "Guidelines forNuclearPlantResponsetoanEarthquake",

datedOctober1989,a"feltearthquake" is:"Anearthquake ofsufficient intensity suchthat:(a)theinventory groundmotionisfeltatthenuclearplantsiteandrecognized asanearthquake basedonaconsensus ofControlRoomoperators ondutyatthetime,and(b)-forplantswithoperableseismicinstrumentation, theseismicswitchesoftheplantareactivated.

Formostplantswithseismicinstrumentation

,theseismicswitchesaresetatanacceleration ofabout0.01g."PEGReference(s):

HU1.1BasisReference(s):

1.N2-0P-90, SeismicMonitoring 2.NUREG-1253 Technical Speci-fications NineMilePointNuclearStations, UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,article3.3.7.23.EPRIdocument, "Guidelines forNuclearPlantResponsetoanEarthquake",

datedOctober1989Hay1994Page86EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

8.4.2UnusualEventATTACHHENT 1(Cont)Reportbyplantpersonnel oftornadostrikingwithinplantProtected AreaboundaryNodeApplicability:

AllBasis:ThisEALisbasedontheassumption thatatornadostriking(touching down)withintheProtected Areaboundarymayhavepotentially damagedplantstructures containing functions orsystemsrequiredforsafeshutdownoftheplant.Ifsuchdamageisconfirmed visuallyorbyotherin-plantindications, theeventmaybeescalated toAlert.NHP-1andNHP-2Protected Areaboundaries areillustrated inUSARFigure1.2-1.AlsoseeSEWDrawingNo.12187-SK-032483-25, IssueNo.1,SiteFacilities LayoutStatusasof8/1/89.PEGReference(s):

HU1.2BasisReference(s):

1.USARFigure1.2-12.S&WDrawingNo.12187-SK-032483-25, IssueNo.1,SiteFacilities LayoutStatusasof8/1/89Hay1994Page87EPHP-EPP-0102 Rev00

8.4.3UnusualEventATTACHHENT 1(Cont)Assessment byControlRoompersonnel thatanaturaleventhasoccurredprecluding accesstoaplant.vitalarea,Table8.4Table8.4PlantVitalAreasSouthAux.BayNorthAux.BayRadWasteBuildingReactorBuildingTurbineBuildingDieselGenerator BuildingScreenwell Building/Service WaterPumpBaysCondensate StorageTanksBuildingStandbyGasTreatment BuildingControlBuildingUnit2SecurityBuildingNodeApplicabi1ity:AllBasis:ThisEALallowsfortheControlRoomtodetermine thataneventhasoccurredandtakeappropriate actionbasedonpersonalassessment asopposedtoverification (i.e.,anearthquake isfeltbutdoesnotregisteronanyplant-specific instrumentation, etc.).NHP-1andNHP-2Protected Areaboundaries areillustrated inUSARFigure1.2-1.AlsoseeS&WDrawingNo.12187-SK-032483-25, IssueNo.1,SiteFacilities LayoutStatusasof8/1/89.PEGReference(s):

HU1.3Hay1994Page88EPHP-EPP-0102 Rev00

8.4.3(Cont)BasisReference(s):

1.USARFigure1.2-1ATTACHMENT 1(Cont)2.SKWDrawingNo.12187-SK-032483-25, IssueNo.1,SiteFacilities LayoutStatusasof8/1/893.NUREG0737,SectionII.B.2-28.4.4UnusualEventLakewaterlevel>248ftORintakewaterlevel<237ftNodeApplicability:

AllBasis:Thiscovershighandlowlakewaterlevelconditions thatcouldbeprecursors ofmoreseriousevents.Thehighlakelevelisbaseduponthemaximumattainable uncontrolled lakewaterlevelasspecified intheFSAR.Thelowlevelisbasedonintakewaterlevelandcorresponds tothedesignminimumlakelevel.PEGReference(s):

HU1.7BasisReference(s):

1.FSARSection2.4.1.2and2.4.11.28.4.8AlertEarthquake feltinplantbyanyoperatorANDNMP-2seismicinstrumentation indicates

>0.075gNodeApplicability:

AllMay1994Page89EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

8.4.5(Cont)Basis:ATTACHHENT 1(Cont)ThisEALaddresses eventsthatmayhaveresultedinaplantvitalareabeingsubjected toforcesbeyonddesignlimits,andthusdamagemaybeassumedtohaveoccurredtoplantsafetysystems.Theinitialreportshouldnotbeinterpreted asmandating alengthydamageassessment priortoclassification.

NoattemptismadeinthisEALtoassesstheactualmagnitude ofthedamage.ThisEALisbasedontheFSARdesignoperating basisearthquake of0.075g.Seismiceventsofthismagnitude cancausedamagetoplantsafetyfunctions.

PEGReference(s):

HAl.1BasisReference(s):

1.'2-0P-90, SeismicHonitoring 2.NUREG-1253 Technical Specifications NineHilePointNuclearStations, UnitNo.2,DocketNo.50-410,7/87,article3.3.7.2Hay1994Page90EPHP-EPP-0102 Rev00

8.4.6Alert)TTACHNENT

))Ct)Sustained winds>90mphORTornadostrikesaplantvitalarea,Table8.4Table8.4PlantVitalAreasSouthAux.BayNorthAux.BayRadWasteBuildingReactorBuildingTurbineBuildingDieselGenerator BuildingScreenwell Building/Service WaterPumpBaysCondensate StorageTanksBuildingStandbyGasTreatment BuildingControlBuildingUnit2SecurityBuildingNodeApplicability:

AllBasis:ThisEALaddresses eventsthatmayhaveresultedinaplantvitalareabeingsubjected toforcesbeyonddesignlimits,andthusdamagemaybeassumedtohaveoccurredtoplantsafetysystems.Theinitialreportshouldnotbeinterpreted asmandating alengthydamageassessment priortoclassification.

.NoattemptismadeinthisEALtoassesstheactualmagnitude ofthedamage.ThisEALisbasedontheFSARdesignbasisof90mph.Windloadsofthismagnitude cancausedamagetosafetyfunctions.

NHP-1andNHP-2Protected Areaboundaries areillustrated inUSARFigure1.2-1.AlsoseeSEWDrawingNo.12187-SK-032483-25, IssueNo.1,SiteFacilities LayoutStatusasof8/1/89.PEGReference(s):

HA1.2Hay1994Page91EPHP-EPP-0102 Rev00

8.4.6(Cont)ATTACHMENT 1(Cont)BasisReference(s):

1.FSAR3.3,WindandTornadoLoadings, Amendment 262.FSARTable1.3-7,Amendment 43.NUREG0737,SectionII.B.2-28.4.7AlertAssessment bytheControlRoompersonnel thatanaturaleventhasresultedindamagetoequipment neededforsafeplantoperation, Table8.4Table8.4PlantVitalAreasSouthAux.BayNorthAux.Bay'RadWaste BuildingReactorBuildingTurbineBuildingDieselGenerator BuildingScreenwell Building/Service WaterPumpBaysCondensate StorageTanksBuildingStandbyGasTreatment BuildingControlBuildingUnit2SecurityBuildingNodeApplicability:

AllBasis:ThisEALaddresses eventsthatmayhaveresultedinaplantvitalareabeingsubjected toforcesbeyonddesignlimits,andthusdamagemaybeassumedtohaveoccurred'toplantsafetysystems.Theinitialreportshouldnotbeinterpreted asmandating alengthydamageassessment priortoclassification.

NoattemptismadeinthisEALtoassesstheactualmagnitude ofthedamage.ThisEALspecifies areasinwhichstructures containing systemsandfunctions requiredforsafeshutdownoftheplantarelocated.May1994Page92EPHP-EPP-0102 Rev00

8.4.7(Cont)PEGReference(s):

HA1.3ATTACHMENT 1(Cont)BasisReference(s):

1.USARFigure1.2-2StationArrangement 2.NUREG0737,SectionII.B.2-28.4.8AlertLakewaterlevel>254ftORIntakewaterlevel<233ftNodeApplicability:

AllBasis:ThisEALaddresses eventsthatmayhaveresultedinaplantvitalareabeingsubjected tolevelsbeyonddesignlimits,andthusdamagemaybeassumedtohaveoccurredtoplantsafetysystems.Theinitialreportshouldnotbeinterpreted asmandating alengthydamageassessment

,priortoclassification.

NoattemptismadeinthisEALtoassesstheactualmagnitude ofthedamage.ThisEALcovershighandlowlakewaterlevelconditions thatexceedlevelswhichthreatenvitalequipment.

Thehighlakelevelisbaseduponthemaximumprobablefloodlevel.Thelowforebaywaterlevelcorresponds totheminimumintakebaywaterlevelwhichprovidesadequatesubmergence totheservicewaterpumps.PEGReference(s):

HA1.7BasisReference(s):

1.FSARSection2.4.5.22.FSARSection2.4.1.13.FSARSection9.2.5.3.1 May1994Page93EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

9.0 OTHERATTACHMENT

1(Cont)TheEALsdefinedincategories 1.0through8.0specifythepredetermined symptomsoreventswhichareindicative ofemergency orpotential emergency conditions, andwhichwarrantclassification.

WhiletheseEALshavebeendeveloped toaddressthefullspectrumofpossibleemergency conditions whichmaywarrantclassification andsubsequent implementation oftheEmergency Plan,aprovision forclassification ofemergencies basedonoperator/management experience andjudgmentisstillnecessary.

TheEALsofthiscategoryprovidetheShiftSupervisor orSiteEmergency Directorthelatitudetoclassifyemergency conditions consistent withtheestablished classification

criteria, basedupontheirjudgment.

E.l.l~ll11Anyevent,asdetermined bytheShiftSupervisor orSiteEmergency

Director, thatcouldleadtoorhasledtoapotential degradation ofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.NodeApplicability:

AllBasis:ThisEAL.addresses unanticipated conditions notaddressed explicitly elsewhere butthatwarrantdeclaration ofanemergency becauseconditions existwhicharebelievedbytheSiteEmergency DirectortofallundertheUnusualEventemergency class.Fromabroadperspective, oneareathatmaywarrantSiteEmergency Directorjudgmentisrelatedtolikelyoractualbreakdown ofsitespecificeventmitigating actions.Examplestoconsiderincludeinadequate emergency responseprocedures, transient responseeitherunexpected ornotunderstood, failureorunavailability ofemergency systemsduringanaccidentinexcessofthatassumedinaccidentanalysis, orinsufficient availability ofequipment and/orsupportpersonnel.

Anotherexampletoconsiderwouldbeexceeding aplantsafetylimitasdefinedinTechnical Specifications.

PEGReference(s):

HU5.1BasisReference(s):

NoneMay1994Page94EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

9.1.2VusualEventATTACHMENT 1(Cont)~Anyevent,asdetermined bytheShiftSupervisor orSiteEmergency

Director, thatcouldleadtoorhasledtoalossorpotential lossofcontainment.

NodeApplicability:

Poweroperations, Startup/Hot standby,HotShutdownBasis:ThisEALaddresses anyotherfactorsthataretobeusedbytheSiteEmergency Directorindetermining whetherthecontainment barrierislostorpotentially lost.Inaddition, theinability tomonitorthebarriershouldalsobeincorporated inthisEALasafactorinEmergency Directorjudgmentthatthebarriermaybeconsidered lostorpotentially lost.PEGReference(s):PC6.1BasisReference(s):

None9.1.3AlertAnyevent,asdetermined bytheShiftSupervisor orSiteEmergency

Director, thatcouldcauseorhascausedactualsubstantial degradation ofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.NodeApplicability:

AllBasis:ThisEALaddresses unanticipated conditions notaddressed explicitly elsewhere butthatwarrantdeclaration ofanemergency becauseconditions existwhicharebelievedbytheSiteEmergency DirectortofallundertheAlertemergency class.May1994Page95EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

9.1.3(Cont)PEGReference(s):

HA6.1ATTACHMENT 1(Cont)BasisReference(s):

None9.1.4AlertAnyevent,asdetermined bytheShiftSupervisor orSiteEmergency

Director, thatcouldleadorhasledtoalossorpotential lossofeitherfuelcladorRCSbarrier.NodeApplicability:

Poweroperations, Startup/Hot standby,HotShutdownBasis:ThisEALaddresses anyotherfactorsthataretobeusedbytheSiteEmergency Directorindetermining whetherthefuelcladorRCSbarriersarelostorpotentially lost.Inaddition, theinability tomonitorthebarriersshouldalsobeconsidered inthisEALasafactorinEmergency Directorjudgmentthat'thebarriersmaybeconsidered lostorpotentially lost.PEGReference(s):

FC5,1RCS6.1BasisReference(s):

NoneHay1994Page96EPHP-EPP-0102 Rev00

9.1.5SiteAreaEmerencATTACHMENT 1(Cont)Asdetermined bytheShiftSupervisor orSiteEmergency

Director, eventsareinprogresswhichindicateactualorlikelyfailuresofplantsystemsneededtoprotectthepublic.Anyreleasesarenotexpectedtoresultinexposures whichexceedEPAPAGs.RodeApplicability:

AllBasis:ThisEALaddresses unanticipated conditions notaddressed explicitly elsewhere butthatwarrantdeclaration ofanemergency becauseconditions existwhicharebelievedbytheSiteEmergency Directortofallundertheemergency classdescription forSiteAreaEmergency.

PEGReference(s):

HS3.1BasisReference(s):

None9.1.6SitereaEmerencAnyevent,asdetermined bytheShiftSupervisor orSiteEmergency

Director, thatcouldleadorhasledtoeither:Lossorpotential lossofbothfuelcladandRCSbarrierORLossorpotential lossofeitherfuelcladorRCSbarrierinconjunction withalossofcontainment Lossofcontainment indicators mayinclude:~Inconsistent orunexpected LOCAresponse~Rapidunexplained decreasefollowing initialincreaseincontainment pressureNodeApplicability:

Poweroperations, Startup/Hot standby,HotShutdownHay1994Page97EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

9.1.6(Cont)Basis:ATTACHMENT 1(Cont)ThisEALaddresses unanticipated conditions affecting fissionproductbarrierswhicharenotaddressed explicitly

.elsewhere.

Declaration ofanemergency iswarranted becauseconditions existwhicharebelievedbytheSiteEmergency Directortofallundertheemergency classdescription forSiteAreaEmergency.

Rapidunexplained lossofpressure(i.e.,notattributable todrywellsprayorcondensation effects)following aninitialpressureincreaseindicates alossofcontainment integrity.

Drywellpressureshouldincreaseasaresultofmassandenergyreleaseintocontainment fromaLOCA.Thus,drywellpressurenotincreasing undertheseconditions indicates alossofcontainment integrity.

PEGReference(s):

FC5.1RCS6.1PC6.1PC1.1PC1.29.1.7BasisReference(s):

NoneGeneralEmerencAsdetermined bytheShiftSupervisor orSiteEmergency

Director, eventsareinprogresswhichindicateactualorimminentcoredamageandthepotential foralargereleaseofradioactive materialinexcessofEPAPAGsoutsidethesiteboundary.

NodeApplicability:

AllBasis:ThisEALaddresses unanticipated conditions notaddressed explicitly elsewhere butthatwarrantdeclaration ofanemergency becauseconditions existwhicharebelievedbytheSiteEmergency Directortobeconsistent withtheGeneralEmergency classification description.

Releasescanreasonably beexpectedtoexceedEPAPAGplumeexposurelevelsoutsidethesiteboundary.

May1994Page98EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

9.1.7(Cont)PEGReference(s):

HG2.1STIACIINENT 1(Ct)BasisReference(s):

None9.1.8GeneralEmerencAnyevent,asdetermined bytheShiftSupervisor orSiteEmergency

Director, thatcouldleadorhasledtoalossofanytwofissionproductbarriersandlossorpotential lossofthethird.Lossofcontainment indicators mayinclude:~Inconsistent orunexpected LOCAresponseRapidunexplained decreasefollowing initialincreaseincontainment pressureNodeApplicability:

Poweroperations, Startup/Hot standby,HotShutdownBasis:ThisEALaddresses unanticipated conditions affecting fissionproductbarrierswhicharenotaddressed explicitly elsewhere.

Declaration ofanemergency iswarranted becauseconditions existwhicharebelievedbytheSiteEmergency Directortofallundertheemergency classdescription fortheGeneralEmergency class.Rapidunexplained lossofpressure(i.e.,notattributable todrywellsprayorcondensation effects)following aninitialpressureincreaseindicates alossofcontainment integrity.

Drywellpressureshouldincreaseasaresultofmassandenergyreleaseintocontainment fromaLOCA.Thus,drywellpressurenotincreasing undertheseconditions indicates alossofcontainment integrity.

PEGReference(s):

FC5.1RCS6.1PC6.1PC1.1PC1.2May1994Page99EPHP-EPP-0102 Rev00

9.1.8(Cont)BasisReference(s):

NoneATTACHMENT 1(Cont)May1994Page100EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

TTACHMENT 2WORDLIST/DEFINITIONS May1994Page101EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

ctuateATTACHMENT 2(Cont)~Toputintooperation; tomovetoaction;commonlyusedtorefertoautomated, multi-faceted operations.

"ActuateECCS".~dversarAsappliedtosecurityEALs,anindividual whoseintentistocommitsabotage, disruptStationoperations orotherwise commitacrimeonstationproperty.

deuateCoreCoolinHeatremovalfromthereactorsufficient topreventrupturing thefuelclad.alertEventsareinprocessorhaveoccurredwhichinvolveanactualorpotential substantial degradation ofthe'levelofsafetyoftheplant.Anyreleasesareexpectedtobelimitedtosmallfractions oftheEPAProtective ActionGuideline exposurelevels.~vailabieThestateorcondition ofbeingreadyandabletobeused(placedintooperation) toaccomplish thestated(orimplied)actionorfunction.

Asappliedtoasystem,thisrequirestheoperability ofnecessary supportsystems(electrical powersupplies, coolingwater,lubrication, etc.).CanCannotbedetermined Thecurrentvalueorstatusofanidentified parameter relativetothatspecified can/cannot beascertained usingallavailable indications (directandindirect, singlyorincombination).

CanCannotbemaintained abovebelowThevalueoftheidentified parameter(s) is/isnotabletobekeptabove/belowspecified limits.Thisdetermination includesmakinganevaluation thatconsiders bothcurrentandfuturesystemperformance inrelationtothecurrentvalueandtrendoftheparameter(s).

Neitherimpliesthattheparameter mustactuallyexceedthelimitbeforetheactionistakennorthattheactionmustbetakenbeforethelimitisreached.May1994Page102EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

ATTACHNENT 2(Cont)CanCannotberestoredabovebelowThevalueoftheidentified parameter(s) is/isnotabletobereturnedtoabove/below specified limitsafterhavingpassedthoselimits.Thisdetermination includesmakinganevaluation thatconsiders bothcurrentandfuturesystemsperformances inrelationtothecurrentvalueandtrendoftheparameter(s).

Doesnotimplyanyspecifictimeintervalbutdoesnotpermitprolonged operation beyondalimitwithouttakingthespecified action.Asappliedtolossofelectrical powersources(ex.:Powercannotberestoredtoanyvitalbusin~4hrs)thespecified powersourcecannotbereturnedtoservicewithinthespecified time.Thisdetermination includesmaki,nganevaluation thatconsiders bothcurrentandfuturerestoration capabilities.

Impliesthatthedeclaration shouldbemadeassoonasthedetermination ismadethatthepowersourcecannotberestoredwithinthespecified time.CloseTopositionavalveordampersoastopreventflowoftheprocessfluid.Tomakeanelectrical connection tosupplypower.ConfirmConfirmatio Tovalidate, throughvisualobservation orphysicalinspection, thatanassumedcondition isasexpectedorrequired, withouttakingactiontoalterthe"asfound"configuration.

ControlTakeaction,asnecessary, tomaintainthevalueofaspecified parameter withinapplicable limits;tofixoradjustthetime,amount,orrateof;toregulateorrestrict.

DecreaseTobecomeprogressively lessinsize,amount,number,orintensity.

~0fschareRemovalofafluid/gas fromavolumeorsystem.May1994Page103EPHP-EPP-0102 Rev00

~0rel1STTACHNENT (Ct)Thatcomponent oftheBWRprimarycontainment whichhousestheRPVandassociated piping.EnterTogointo.Establish Toperformactionsnecessary tomeetastatedcondition.

Establish communication withtheControlRoom."EvacuateToremovethecontentsof;toremovepersonnel fromanarea.ExceedsTogoorbebeyondastatedorimpliedlimit,measure,ordegree.EstTo"havebeingwithrespecttounderstood limitations orconditions.

FailureAstateofinability toperformanormalfunction.

GeneralEmerencEventsareinprocessorhaveoccurredwhichinvolveactualorimminentsubstantial coredegradation ormeltingwithpotential forlossofcontainment integrity.

Releasescanbereasonably expectedtoexceedEPAProtective ActionGuideline exposurelevelsoffsiteformorethantheimmediate sitearea.Hay1994Page104EPHP-EPP-0102 Rev00

STTACIIMENT 2(Ct)Logictermwhichindicates thattakingtheactionprescribed iscontingent uponthecurrentexistence ofthestatedcondition(s).

Iftheidentified conditions donotexist,theprescribed actionisnottobetakenandexecution ofoperatoractionsmustproceedpromptlyinaccordance withsubsequent instructions.

IncreaseTobecomeprogressively greaterinsize,amount,numberorintensity.

IndicateTopointoutorpointto;todisplaythevalueofaprocessvariable; tobeasignorsymbol.~IitiateTheactofplacingequipment orasystemintoservice,eithermanuallyorautomatically.

Activation ofafunctionorprotective feature(i.e.initiateamanualscram).InectionTheactofforcingaTluidintoavolumeorvessel.Intrusion Theactofenteringwithoutauthorization LossFailureofoperability orlackofaccessto.NaintainTakeaction,asnecessary, tokeepthevalueofthespecified parameter withintheapplicable limits.Nay1994Page105EPHP-EPP-0102 Rev00

STTACIIMfNT 2(CtiNaximumSafe0eratinarameterThehighestvalueoftheidentified operating parameter beyondwhich,requiredpersonnel accessorcontinued operation ofequipment important tosafetycannotbeassured.NonitorObserveandevaluateatafrequency sufficient toremainapprisedofthevalue,trend,andrateofchangeofthespecified parameter.

got~ifTogivenoticeoforreporttheoccurrence of;tomakeknownto;toinformspecified personnel; toadvise;tocommunicate; tocontact;torelay.~0enTopositionavalveordampersoastoallowflowoftheprocessfluid.Tobreakanelectrical connection whichremovesapowersupplyfromanelectrical device.Tomakeavailable forentryorpassagebyturningback,removing, orclearingaway.~eeeableAbletoperformit'sintendedfunctionPerformTocarryoutanaction;toaccomplish; toaffect;toreachanobjective.

PrimarContainment Theairtightvolumeimmediately adjacenttoandsurrounding theRPV,consisting ofthedrywellandwetwellinaBWRplant.PrimarSsteThepipes,valves,andotherequipment whichconnectdirectlytotheRPVorreactorcoolantsystemsuchthatareduction inRPVpressurewilleffectadecreaseinthesteamorwaterbeingdischarged throughanunisolated breakinthesystem.Nay1994Page106EPHP-EPP-0102 Rev00

RemoveATTACHMENT 2(Cont)Tochangethelocationorpositionof.eortTodescribeasbeinginaspecificstate.lLeeufreTodemandasnecessary oressential.

RestoreTaketheappropriate actionrequirestoreturnthevalueofanidentified parameter towithinapplicable limits.RiseDescribes anincreaseinaparameter astheresultofanoperatororautomatic action.~SamleToperformananalysisonaspecified mediatodetermine itsproperties.

ScramTotakeactiontocauseshutdownofthereactorbyrapidlyinserting acontrolrodorcontrolrods(BWR).SecondarContainment Theairtightvolumeimmediately adjacenttoorsurrounding theprimarycontainment inaBWRplant.ShutdownToperformoperations necessary tocauseequipment toceaseorsuspendoperation; tostop."Shutdownunnecessary equipment."

May1994Page107EPMP-EPP-0102 Rev00

ShutdownATTACHHENT 2(Cont)AsappliedtotheBWRreactor,subcritical withreactorpowerbelowtheheatingrange.SiteAreaEmerencEventsareinprocessorhaveoccurredwhichinvolveactualorlikelymajorfailuresofplantfunctions neededforprotection ofthepublic.AnyreleasesarenotexpectedtoresultinexposurelevelswhichexceedEPAProtective ActionGuideline exposurelevelsexceptnearthesiteboundary.

SuressonoolThevolumeofwaterinaBWRplantintendedtocondensesteamdischarged fromaprimarysystembreakinsidethedrywell.Sustained Prolonged.

Notintermittent oroftransitory natureTode-energize apumporfanmotor;topositionabreakersoastointerrupt orpreventtheflowofcurrentintheassociated circuit;tomanuallyactivateasemi-automatic feature.Unavailable Notabletoperformit'sintendedfunctionUcontrolled Anevolution lackingcontrolbutisnottheresultofoperatoraction.~U1anedNotasanexpectedresultofdeliberate action.UntilIndicates thattheassociated prescribed actionistoproceedonlysolongastheidentified condition doesnotexist.Hay1994Page108EPHP-EPP-0102 Rev00

UnusualEvetATTACHHENT 2(Cont).Eventsareinprocessorhaveoccurredwhichindicateapotential degradation ofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.Noreleasesofradioactive materialrequiring offsiteresponseormonitoring areexpectedunlessfurtherdegradation ofsafetysystemsoccurs.ValidSupported orcorroborated onasoundbasis.entToopenaneffluent(exhaust) flowpathfromanenclosedvolume;toreducepressureinanenclosedvolume.~VerifToconfirmacondition and-takeactiontoestablish thatcondition ifrequired.

Verifyreactortrip."Iti11Anyplantareawhichcontainsvitalequipment.

Hay1994Page109EPHP-EPP-0102 Rev00

IL~'I0-,NIKP-2Emergency ActionLevelsCategory1.0ReactorFuelCategory2.0ReactorPressureVesselCategory3.0PrimaryContainment Category4.0Secondary Containment Category5.0Radioactivity ReleaseCategory6.0Elecrtical FailuresCategory7.0Equipment FailuresCategory8.0HazardsCategory9.0Other6/20/94

1.0ReactorFuel1.1CoolantActivity1.1.1UnusualEventCategory1.0ReactorFuel1.0ReactorFuel12Off-gasActivity1.2.1UnusualEventCoolantactivity>0.2pCi/gmI-131equivalent or>100EbarpCi/gmValidofFgasradiation highalarm(at>DRMSred)for>15min.1.1.2AlertCoolantactivity>800pCi/gmI-131equivalent Poweroperation, startup/hot standby,hotshutdown1-2 e

Category1.0ReactorFuel1.0ReactorFuel18Contaimnent Radiation 1.3.1AlertDrywellarearadiation

>41R/hrPoweroperation, startup/hot standby,hotshutdown1.8.2SiteAreaEmergency Drywellarearadiation 28100R/hrPoweroperation, startup/hot standby,hotshutdown1.8.8GeneralEmergency Drywellarearadiation t5.2E6R/hrPoweroperation, startup/hot standby,hotshutdown1.0ReactorFuel1.4OtherRadiation Monitors1.4.1UnusualEventAnysustained ARMreading>100xDRMShighradiation alarm(red)oroffscalehigh(DETECTOR SATURATION) resulting fromanuncontrolled processALL1.4.2AlertValidreadingonRxBldg.aboveRefueling FloorRadiation Monitor2HVR*HE14A orB,GaseousRadiation Monitors(Channel1)isolation ORAnysustained refuelQoorradmonitor>8.0R/hr,Table1.11.4.8AlertSustained arearadiation levels)15mR/hrineither:ControlRoomORCentralAlarmStationandSecondary AlarmStation1-3

Category1.0ReactorFuel1.0ReactorFuel1.4OtherRadiation Monitors1.4.4Alert1.0ReactorFuel1.6Refueling Accidents 1.6.1UnusualEventSustained arearadiation levels>8R/hrinanyareas,Table1.2ANDAccessisrequiredforsafeoperation orshutdownSpentfuelpooVreactorcavitywaterlevelcannotberestoredandmaintained abovethespentfuelpoollowwaterlevelalarmTable1.1RefuelFloorRadMonitorsARMRMS111,RB354'estSpentFuelPoolARMRMS112,RB354'astofSpentFuelPool1.6.2AlertImminentorreportofactualobservation ofirradiated fueluncovered Table1.2PlantSafetFunctionAreasControlBuildingNormalSwitchgear BuildingSouthAux.BayNorthAux.BayRadWasteBuildingReactorBuildingTurbineBuildingDieselGenerator BuildingScreenwell Building/

ServiceWaterPumpBayCondensate StorageTanksBuildingStandbyGasTreatment Building

Category2.0ReactorPressureVessel2.0ReactorPressureVessel2.1RPVWaterLevel2.1.1UnusualEvent2.0ReactorPressureVessel2.2ReactorPower/Reactivity Control2%1AlertUnidentified drywellleakage>10gpmORReactorcoolanttodrywellidentified leakage>25gpmPoweroperation, startup/hot standby,hotshutdown2.1.2SiteAreaEmergency RPVwaterlevelcannotberestoredandmaintained

>-14in.(TAF)PowerOperation, Startup/Hot Standby,HotShutdown, ColdShutdown, RefuelAllimmediate manualscramsfailtoshutdownthereactorPoweroperation, startup/hot standby2.2.2SiteAreaEmergency Allimmediate manualscramsfailtoshutdownthereactorANDBoroninjection isrequiredPoweroperation, startup/hot standby2.1.8GeneralEmergency PrimaryContainment FloodingrequiredPoweroperation, startup/hot standby,hotshutdown2.2.8GeneralEmergency Allimmediate manualscramsfailtoshutdownthereactorANDRPVwaterlevelcannotberestoredandmaintained

>-89in.Poweroperat'ion, startup/hot standby

Category2.0ReactorPressureVessel2.0ReactorPressureVessel2.2ReactorPower/Reactivity Control2.2.4GeneralEmergency Allimmediate manualscramsfailtoshutdownthereactorANDSuppression pooltemperature andRPVpressurecannotbemaintained cHCTLPoujeroperation, startup)hotstandby

Category8.0PrimaryContainment

3.0 PrimaryContainment

3.1Containment Pressure3.1.1AlertPrimarycontainment pressurecannotbemaintained

<1.68psigduetocoolantleakagePoweroperation, startup/hot standby,hotshutdown8.0PrimaryContainment 3.2Suppression PoolTemperature 3.2.1SiteAreaEmergency RPVpressureandsuppression pooltemperature cannotbemaintained

<HCTL(non-ASS)

Poweroperation, startup/hot standby,hotshutdown8.1.2SiteAreaEmergency Primarycontainment pressurecannotbemaintained

<1.68psigANDCoolantactivity>800pCi/gmPoweroperation, startup/hot standby,hotshutdown8.1.8GeneralEmergency Primarycontainment ventingisrequiredduetoPCPLPoweroperation, startup/hot standby,hotshutdown3-1

Category8.0PrimaryContainment

8.0 PrimaryContainment

3.8Combustible GasConcentration 3.8.1SiteAreaEmergency

>4%H2existsinDWorsuppression chamber8.0PrimaryContainment 8.4Containment Isolation Status8.4.1SiteAreaEmergency MainSteamLine,RCICsteamlineorRWCUisolation failureresulting inareleasepathwayoutsideprimarycontainment.

8.8.2GeneralEmergency Primarycontainment ventingisrequiredduetocombustible gasconcentrations Poweroperation, startup/hot standby,hotshutdown3.4.2GeneralEmergency MainSteamLine,RCICsteamlineorRWCUisolation failureresulting inareleasepathwayoutsideprimarycontainment ANDany:~Coolantactivity>800p,Ci/gmI-131equivalent

~RPVwaterlevel<-14in.(TAF)~DWradiation

)8100R/hrPoweroperation, startup/hot standby,hotshutdown3-2

Category4.0Secondary Containment

4.0 Secondary

Containment 4.1ReactorBuildingTemperature 4.1.1SiteAreaEmergency

4.0 Secondary

Containment 4.2ReactorBuildingRadiation Level4.2.1SiteAreaEmergency Primarysystemisdischarging outsidePCANDRBareatemperatures are>maximumsafeoperating levelsintwoormoreareas,N2-EOP-SC,RR Poweroperation, startuplhot standby,hotshutdownPrimarysystemisdischarging outsidePCANDRBarearadiation levelsare>maximumsafeoperating levelsintwoormoreareas,N2-EOP-SC,RR Poweroperation, startup/hot standby,hotshutdown4.12GeneralEmergency Primarysystemisdischarging outsidePCANDRBareatemperatures are>maximumsafeoperating levelsintwoormoreareas,N2-EOP-SC,RR ANDany:~Coolantactivity>800pCi/gmI-131equivalent

~RPVwaterlevel(-14in.(TAF)~DWradiation

>8100R/hr4.2.2GeneralEmergency Primarysystemisdischarging outsidePCANDRBarearadiation levelsare>maximumsafeoperating levelsintwoormoreareas,N2-EOP-SC,RR ANDany:~Coolantactivity>800pCi/gmI-131equivalent

~RPVwaterlevel(-14in.(TAF)~DWradiation

>8100R/hrPoweroperation, startup/hot standby,hotshutdownPoweroperation, startup/hot standby,hotshutdown

Category6.0Radioactivity Release/AreaRadiation

6.0 Radioactivity

Release/AreaRadiation 5.1EQluentMonitors6.1.1UnusualEventAvalidreadingonanymonitorsTable5.1column"UE"for>60min.6.0Radioactivity Release/AreaRadiation 6.2DoseProjections/

Environmental Measurements/

ReleaseRates6.2.1UnusualEventConfirmed sampleanalysesforgaseousorliquidreleaserates>2xtechnical specifications limitsfor>60min.6.1.2AlertAvalidreadingonanymonitorsTable5.1column"Alert"for>15min.5.2.2AlertConfirmed sampleanalysesforgaseousorliquidreleaserates>200xtechnical specifications limitsfor>15min.5.1.3SiteAreaEmergency AvalidreadingonanymonitorsTable5.1column"SAE"for>15min.6.2.3AlertDoseprojections orfieldsurveyswhichindicatedoses/doserates>Table5.2column"Alert"atthesiteboundaryorbeyond.5-1

Category6.0Radioactivity Release/AreaRadiation

5.0 Radioactivity

Release/AreaRadiation 6.2DoseProjections/

Environmental Measurements/

ReleaseRates6.2.4SiteAreaEmergency Doseprojections orfieldsurveyswhichindicatedoses/doserates>Table5.2column"SAE"atthesiteboundaryorbeyond.6.2.6GeneralEmergency Doseprojections orfieldsurveyswhichindicatedoses/doserates>Table5.2column"GE"atthesiteboundaryorbeyond.

e Category6.0Radioactivity Release/AreaRadiation MonitorTable5.1EffluentMonitorClassification Thresholds RadWaste/Reactor Bldg.VentEffluent2xGEMSalarmMainStackEffluent2xGEMSalarm200xGEMSalarm200xGEMSalarm%.5E6p,Ci/sN/AN/AN/AServiceWaterEffluentLiquidRadWasteEffluentCoolingTowerBlowdown2xDRMSHigh(red)200xDRMSHigh(red)N/A2xDRMSHigh(red) 200xDRMSHigh(red)

N/A2xDRMSHigh(red)200xDRMSHigh(red)N/AN/AN/AN/ATable5.2DoseProection/Env.Measurement Classification Thresholds GETEDECDEThyroidTEDErateCDEThoidrate10mRN/A10mR/hrN/A100mR500mR100mR/hr500mR/hr1000mR5000mR1000mR/hr5000mR/hr5-3

Electrical Failures6.0Electrical Failures6.1LossofACPowerSources6.1.1UnusualEventLossofpowerfor>15min.toall:~ReserveTransformer A~ReserveTransformer B~Auxiliary BoilerTransformer

6.0 Electrical

Failures6.1LossofACPowerSources6.1.4SiteAreaEmergency Lossofallemergency busACpowerfor>15min.Poweroperation, startup/hot standby,hotshutdown6.1.5GeneralEmergency 6.1.2AlertLossofallemergency busACpowerfor>15min.Coldshutdown, refuel6.1.8AlertAvailable emergency busACpowerreducedtoonly'neofthefollowing sourcesfor>15min.:~ReserveTransformer A~ReserveTransformer B~Auxiliary BoilerTransformer

~2EGS*EG1~2EGS*EG2~2EGS*EG3Lossofallemergency busACpowerANDeither:Powercannotberestoredtoanyemergency busin<2hrsORRPVwaterlevelcannotberestoredandmaintained

>-14in.(TAF)Poweroperation, startupIhot standby,hotshutdownPoweroperation, st'artup(hotstandby,hotshutdown

Category6.0Electrical Failures6.0Electrical Failures6.2LossofDCPowerSources6.2.1UnusualEvent<105vdcon2BYS*BAT2A andBfor>15min.Coldshutdown, Refuel6.2,2SiteAreaEmergency

<105vdcon2BYS*BAT2A andBfor>15min.Poweroperation, startuplhot standby,hotshutdown

Equipment Failures7.0Equipment FailuresV.1Technical Speci6cationXRequirements 7.1.1UnusualEventPlantisnotbroughttorequiredoperating modewithinTechnical Specifications LCOActionStatement Time.Poweroperation, startup(hotstandby,hotshutdown7.0Equipment FailuresV.2SystemFailuresorControlRoomEvacuation V.2.1UnusualEventReportofmainturbinefailureresulting incasingpenetration ordamagetoturbinesealsorgenerator seals.Poweroperation, startup)hotstandby,hotshutdown7.2.2AlertControlRoomevacuation 7.2.3AlertReactorcoolanttemperature cannotbemaintained (200'FColdshutdown, refuel7-1

7.0 Equipment

Failures7.2SystemFailuresorControlRoomEvacuation 7.2.4SiteAreaEmergency CategoryV.OEquipment FailuresV.OEquipment Failures7.8LossofIndications/Alarm/Communication Capability V.8.1UnusualEventControlRoomevacuation ANDControlofcorecoolingsystemscannotbeestablished in515min.Unplanned lossofannunciators orindicators onanyofthefollowing panelsfor>15min.:~2CEC*PNL601

~2CEC*PNL602

~2CEC*PNL603

~2CEC*PNL852

~2CEC*PNL851 Poweroperation, startup/hot standby,hotshutdown7.8.2UnusualEventLossofallcommunications capability affecting theabilitytoeither:Performroutineonsiteoperations ORNotifyoQsiteagenciesorpersonnel 7-2

Category7.0Equipment Failures7.0Equipment FailuresV.8LossofIndications/Alarm/Communication Capability V.8.8AlertUnplanned lossofannunciators orindicators onanyofthefollowing panelsfor>15min.:~2CEC*PNL601

~2CEC*PNL602

~2CEC*PNL603

~2CEC*PNL852

~2CEC*PNL851 ANDIncreased surveillance isrequiredforsafeplantoperation ANDeither:Planttransient inprogressORPlantcomputerandSPDSareunavailable Poweroperation, startup/hot standby,hotshutdown7.0Equipment Failures7.8LossofIndications/Alarm/Communication Capability 7.8.4SiteAreaEmergency Lossofannunciators orindicators onanyofthefollowing panels:~2CEC*PNL601

~2CEC*PNL602 2CEC*PNL603

~2CEC*PNL852

~2CEC*PNL851 ANDPlantcomputerandSPDSareunavailable ANDIndications tomonitorallRPVandprimarycontainment EOPparameters arelostANDPlanttransient isinprogressPoweroperation, startup/hot standby,hotshutdown7-3

Category8.0Hazards8.0Hazards8.1SecurityThreats8.1.1UnusualEvent8.0Hazards8.2FireorExylosion 8.2.1UnusualEventBombdeviceorotherindication ofattempted sabotagediscovered withinplantProtected AreaConfirmed fireinanyplantarea,Table8.2orTable8.3,notextinguished in<15min.ofControlRoomnotification 8.12AlertIntrusion intoplantProtected Areabyanadversary 8.2.2AlertFireorexplosion inanyplantarea,Table8.2orTable8.3,whichresultsindamagetoplantequipment orstructures neededforsafeplantoperation 8.1.3SiteAreaEmergency Intrusion intoaplantsecurityvitalareabyanadversary 8.1.4GeneralEmergency Securityeventwhichresultsin:LossofplantcontrolfromtheControlRoomANDLossofremoteshutdowncapability 8-1

Category8.0Hazards8.0Hazards8.8Man-MadeEvents8.3.1UnusualEvent8.0Hazards8.3Man-MadeEvents8.8.4AlertVehiclecrashintoorprojectile whichimpactsplantstructures orsystemswithinProtected AreaboundaryVehiclecrashorprojectile impactwhichprecludes personnel accesstoordamagesequipment inplantvitalareas,Table8.38.3.2UnusualEventReportbyplantpersonnel ofanexplosion withinProtected Areaboundaryresulting invisibledamagetopermanent structures orequipment 8.3.5AlertReportordetection oftoxicorflammable gaseswithinaplantvitalarea,Table8.3,inconcentrations thatwillbelifethreatening toplantpersonnel orprecludeaccesstoequipment neededforsafeplantoperation 8.3.3UnusualEventReportordetection ofareleaseoftoxicorflammable gasesthatcouldenterorhaveenteredwithintheProtected Areaboundaryinamountsthatcouldaffectthehealthofplantpersonnel orsafeplantoperation ORReportbylocal,countyorstateofBcialsforpotential evacuation ofsitepersonnel basedonoffsiteevent8-2

Category8.0Hazards8.0Hazards8.4NaturalEvents8.4.1UnusualEvent8.0Hazards8.4NaturalEvents8.4.4UnusualEventEarthquake feltinplantbyanyoperatorANDeither:NMP-2seismicinstrumentation actuatedORConarmation ofearthquake receivedonNMP-1orJAFNPPseismicinstrumentation Lakewaterlevel>248ftORIntakewaterlevel<237ft8.4.5Alert8.4.2UnusualEventReportbyplantpersonnel oftornadostrikingwithinplantProtected AreaboundaryEarthquake feltinplantbyanyoperatorANDNMP-2seismicinstrumentation indicates

)0.075gAll8.4.6Alert8.4.3UnusualEventAssessment byControlRoompersonnel thatanaturaleventhasoccurredprecluding accesstoaplantvitalarea,Table8.3Sustained winds)90mphORTornadostrikesaplantvitalarea,Table8.38-3

Category8.0Hazards8.0Hazards8.4NaturalEvents8.4.7AlertAssessment bytheControlRoompersonnel thatanaturaleventhasresultedindamagetoequipment neededforsafeplantoperation, Table8.38.4.8AlertLakewaterlevel)264ftORIntakewaterlevelc288ft8-4

HazardsTable8.2PlantAreas~ServiceBuilding~115KVSwitchyard

~345KVSwitchyard Table8.3PlantVitalAreas~SouthAux.Bay~NorthAux.Bay~RadWasteBuilding~ReactorBuilding~TurbineBuilding~DieselGenerator Building~Screenwell Building/Service WaterPumpBays~Condensate StorageTanksBuilding~StandbyGasTreatment Building~ControlBuilding~Unit2SecurityBuilding8-5

Category9.0Other9.0Other9.1.1UnusualEvent9.0Other9.1.4AlertAnyevent,asdetermined bytheShiftSupervisor orSiteEmergency

Director, thatcouldleadtoorhasledtoapotential degradation ofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.Anyevent,asdetermined bytheShiftSupervisor orSiteEmergency

Director, thatcouldleadorhasledtoalossorpotential lossofeitherfuelcladorRCSbarrier.Poweroperation, startuplhot standby,hotshutdown9.1dUnusualEvent9.1.6SiteAreaEmergency Anyevent,asdetermined bytheShiftSupervisor orSiteEmergency

Director, thatcouldleadtoorhasledtoalossorpotential lossofcontainment.

Poweroperation, startupIhotstandby,hotshutdownAsdetermined bytheShiftSupervisor orSiteEmergency

Director, eventsareinprogresswhichindicateactualorlikelyfailuresofplantsystemsneededtoprotectthepublic.Anyreleasesarenotexpectedtoresultinexposures whichexceedEPAPAGs.9.1.3AlertAnyevent,asdetermined bytheShiRSupervisor orSiteEmergency

Director, thatcouldcauseorhascausedactualsubstantial degradation ofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.

Category9.0Other9.0Other9.1.6SiteAreaEmergency Anyevent,asdetermined bytheShiRSupervisor orSiteEmergency

Director, thatcouldleadorhasledtoeither:Lossorpotential lossofbothfuelcladandRCSbarrierORLossorpotential lossofeitherfuelcladorRCSbarrierinconjunction withalossofcontainment Lossofcontainment indicators mayinclude:~Inconsistent orunexpected LOCAresponse~Rapidunexplained decreasefollowing initialincreaseincontainment pressurePoweroperation, startup/hot standby,hotshutdown9.0Other9.1.8GeheralEmergency Anyevent,asdetermined bytheShiftSupervisor orSiteEmergency

Director, thatcouldleadorhasledtoalossofanytwofissionproductbarriersandlossorpotential lossofthethird.Lossofcontaizunent indicators mayinclude:Inconsistent orunexpected LOCAresponse~Rapidunexplained decreasefollowing initialincreaseincontainment pressurePoweroperation, startupfhot standby,hotshutdown9.1.VGeneralEmergency Asdetermined bytheShiRSupervisor orSiteEmergency

Director, eventsareinprogresswhichindicateactualorimminentcoredamageandthepotential foralargereleaseofradioactive materialinexcessofEPAPAGsoutsidethesiteboundary.

OSSI93-402A-10-NMP2 NMP-2EALVeriQcatton

&Validation Report,Rev.0ErnerencActionLevelV==-'cation RValidation ReortRevision0NewYorkPowerAuthoriJ.A,Fitzpatrick NuclearPowerPlantIndianPointNuclearPowerPlantUnit3NiaraMohawkPowerCoorationNineMilePointUnit1NineMilePointUnit2Consolidated EdisonComanIndianPointStationUnit2Rochester GasandElectricComanR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerStationOperations SupportServices, Inc.233WaterStreet2r.dFloorPlymouth, MA02360 eI OSSI93-402A-10-N MP2NMP-2EALVeriQcatfon

&Validation Report,Rev.0TableofContentsSection~Pae1Introduction

...................,....,......,.....

~~~t~~otto~~otooooeootoesososooooo

~o~o~oooottotoottoto 12.Preparations

~~o~oo~~~~~~~~~o~~s~o~~~~eoo~~~~~eoo~~~oooo~~~~etto~~et~e~e~~s~oooto~~ettoo~otoo~e~ootoooottooteoo

~13.Process~oooeoooosoooooooooooooooeoooooo 43.1Verification Activities,.......,........,.................................,.........,............,...4 3~2ValidationActivities

~.....~..~..,....,........,...

~.,.......,..................,.............

54CommentResolution

....,......,......,........,...................................................................9 5References

...~~~~o~ooooeotooo

~eeoooooeo

~ooooosoooooo 9Attachment 1EALVerlfjcat;o sChecklists 11Attachment 2EALVerification CommentDatabase..~~~~~~~o~~~o~o~~o~o~~~~~o~o~~~o~o~~o~~~to~Attachment 3Ef.in~~<n~-curios ALValidaiio~n>arios31Attachment 4EALpQ.~own~ni~rC4csi-c.VamationS,pia~rSh4-Attachment 5EALValidation L.-.c:ciseChecklists...........................................................................5-1 Attachment 6EALnA1s1131AValidatict

..0:...",:cnt Database.................................,.........................................6-1

OSSI93-402A-'.*

-'",!."NMP-2EALVerificatio

&Validation Report,Rev.01.Introduc'n Theverificat'~:".

processwasperformed toensuretheNMP-2Emergency ActionLevel."-'L';)andclassification procedures arewrittencorrectly andaretechnica!i,.:.:

...'cct.TheNMP-2EALverification wasconducted priortotheEALvalic';:-;"..'onexercises.

Verification activities werecompleted according toRc"c:.ence l.Thevalidation piocesswasperformed toensurethattheNMP-2EALsandclassification procedures areusableandoperationally correct,andtoensurethatresponse!,'i en.ei.gency responseorganization personnel areabletoarriveatco:-.'.-.=!,ct t.'Lerpretations ofEALsundervaryingconditions.

TheNMP-2EAL...:..;...;;,.;

exercises wereconducted onOctober7,1993attheNineMilePoi'".:..;.'.ining CenterNMP-2controlroomsimulator.

Validation activities wcioi..:piet.ed according toReference 2.TheNMP-2E!4.vc..ification/validation wasoneofsixverification/validations conducted byCSS!ateachofthesixparticipating plantsintheNYPAEALUpgradePre)".".~.

2.P~reareal"",.s Mr.C,K,W.".",":("SR?)wasassignedEALverification andvalidation teamleader.For..'.'.,~-;,;;.ication, hewasresponsible for:~Det.'"-'.:-".;-;.g theextenttowhichtheEALdocumentation isverii::*...

~Scl".,".:.:..:g

'.=.".,mmemberstoconductEALverification reviews.

OSSI93-402A-"':NMP-2EALVerification

&Validation Report,Rev.0~Providing appropriate sourcedocuments soteammemberscancon;!::ct vciification reviews.~Coo:.;..'.-.nt;.-:<

resolutions toanyverification reviewcomments.

~Coor".:--",.!:.:g updateofEALprogramdocumentation consistent with!.i.::r=solution ofverification reviewcomments.

~Deter:~iining theextenttowhicheachselectedEALisvalidated.

ForEALvalid.:o>>,

Mr'.Walkerwasresponsible for:~Selec"..~,<<'c:-.mmemberstoparticipate asvalidation exerciseob"-e.",.:.s;handasemergency responseorganization personnel duin;",EA!.validation exercises.

~Prepar::;<

..validation exercisetestplanandschedule.

(EALsselectdI;:rvalidation aredocumented ontheValidation SummarySheetwhichservedasthevalidation testplan.)~Ob'..":,;...'.g appropriate scenarios totestemergency responseorg:;r.=:;t.i.",

classification activities whileusingtheEALs.~Coor;i::-~at.:;ig resolutions tovalidation exercisecomments.

~Coorlnat,ingupdateofEALprogramdocumentation consistent wi'..'..!,".crsoIiition ofvalidation exercisecomments.

Mr.J.P.St.-"...:,2=::.-"i) wasassignedtotheverification teamandwasresponsible

.~;~Beco:>,."g

'anliliar withappropriate verification sourcedocuments andthcNMP-2EALstobeverified.

~Pe:.'"..r....::."

assignedEALverification reviews.

OSSI93-402P.-:

NMP-2EALVer1Qcatton

&Valfdation Report,Rev.0~Complcf.ing verification checklists fortechnical accuracyandwr!.'.".:".

c,.rrcctness reviews.~As.".'<nthcpreparation ofresolutions toverification reviewcori!ie!!ts.Mr.M.C.D,.:.;(<<.";:S.')

andMr.J.Toothaker (NMPC)wereassignedEALvalidation exe!ciseobservers, Theywereresponsible for:~Beco'..ing familiarwithappropriate NMP-2EALdevelopment do.,:..-..;

..'.sandtheEALstobevalidated.

~OL.-..:emergency responseorganization participants usingthe.EAl.."..v.'ii.c responding tosimulated emergency events.Comp.'.i:".g thevalidation exercisechecklists

~Ass.',',r!ginthepreparation ofresolutions tovalidation exercisecoaa~isSeveralme:"...'.::".

l.h"NMP-2operations trainingstaffwerealsoassignedtothevalid...:!;.t.oplaytheroleofemergency responseorganization positions.

Th:".':n,.mcsandtitlesarelistedontheEALValidation Summarysheets(Atta"..l.:.'.c:.t 4).Theywereresponsible for:~Bcc".:..',:pfa!:..iliar withtheEALstobevalidated.

~Us.:'.'.'"<<PLswhileresponding tosimulated emergency events.~Con':.'.e~ing thevalidation exercisechecklists.

OSSI93-402h-!

"-"':i.-?

NMP-2EAI.VeriQcation

&Validation Report,Rev.03.Proces~3.1Verificaf1on Activities Thetechnic",1:.;.""...:..","..y andwrittencorrectness oftheupgradedEALswereverifiedthrc;-.'.f.'..-i-'opreviewswhichaddressed thefollowing EALattributes:

WritenCorrectness Hum"ncn<inccring factorsoftheEALWriter'sGuideFo.-..'...,..:.":::.ance andterminology consistent, totheextentpos..ihlc.

a...on<BWRandPWRplantsinvolvedintheNYPAEALUp~-..-;cfc.:ojectEALc:f:-ii'AL terminology isclearandwelldefinedTechnical AccuracTc.".!.:;:::;

.".,o:".-l',;leteness andappropriateness foreachclassification lcv".'o'...'"":

.'.:"';nssification upgradeonlywhenthereisanincreased th1'::::;-...!-.:.c healthandsafetyLog",al=.r)<:ession inclassification forcombinations ofmultipleeventsCon".~tcncy of'ALs,totheextentpossible, amongBWRandPWR1nyp1le(~iI~iabTheEALsv;.'.:.",."::.".*.

cdintermsoftheevaluation criteriaembodiedinthechecklists f:.'c"h:::cal accuracyandwrittencorrectness (Attachments 1and2ofRc"..-..:"..'1.KALverification reviewsfortechnical accuracyandwrittencorr:;:!.."."..a~ereaccomplished byacomparative Table-Top evaluation c:';,h('";:Giving:

OSSI93-402A-'MP-2EALVeriAcation

&Validation Report,Rev.0~Wri!'cn,'.cctnessoftheEALsincluding humanfactorsguidanceof'.;.'...>>.rater's guide.~Tec!~nical accuracyoftheEALscomparedtotheEALTechnical Bas..1'.=,:-isionProductBarrierEvaluation, Plant-Specific EALGu-i'..;:.F.h.LBinningDocument, andNUMARCNESP-007, Rev.'.'"=

'..'.".c!uding NUMARC/NRC Questions andAnswers).

~Co...pat.i!

..!yoftheEALswiththeplant.~Nu:.;"ri:,".':

v'.1pcs,quantitative andcalculated information.

TheWalk-th.'"

n.c'.!'.od ofverification wasperformed duringEALvalidation wherenece."":",::.'.

fcrencestoequipment, indications andinstrument"

'-.nw";"checkedagainstcontrolroomhardwareasrepresented; t'.;;..':>...i1ator controlroom.Verification rvic>>,"swereperformed usingtheapplicable sectionsoftheEALverifical.:.".n c1"..".cklists (Attachment 1).Alldiscrepancies weredocumented

'n':".',Co::ament FormsintheEALVerification CommentDatabase.

A'i~.'o.:to!thisdatabaseisprovidedinAttachment 2.3.2Valid~".D'.;.'.'i:i."s Theusabilit~

andc-"rational correctness oftheupgradedEALswerevalidated t!."u~>'...:".,c;.>>ation ofemergency responseorganization personnel respondin<:,

=..'....;

',=":..emergency eventsusingthe$UiLs.ThegroupofEALsselect:..

'.'......:;".:".ion weresufficiently representative totestthattheEALsposse'.;"

~h~,;",.:

n<attributes:

Usabili'~ai f'ii"'1'iqpqsEca'-"oi.)~"e'deriding

OSSI93-402P-':-.'iNMP-2EALVeriAcation

&Validation Report,Rev.0~Easeofplace-keeping

~Ea.";;of;:".,:.:!-:ng anddeclassifying

~Oerati",

-'...',-.:-,c"

~,.sessPol..':"..;

=classification upgradeonlywhenthereisanincreased thre.".i:

t.o".::blichealthandsafetyTeel:;;i"::.

"o:...pleteness andappropriateness foreachclassification ieqpnlP.i':"."';'-~,:".ssion inclassification forcombinations ofmultipleev...EALsnotsei'.".;;.".::.;.;-.!idation werecomparedtothevalidation checklist criteriaatL>;.eco..".lisionofthevalidation exercises.

TheEALsw..:."~;~.:..'.!ated intermsoftheevaluation criteriaembodiedinthechecklist for".,A!.;.'.,

Iuation.EALvalidation exercises wereconducted usingtheTable-T-"".

!..".'.!~ad andtheSimulator method.Scenarios weredeveloped

"....:.:.".

t:".cperformance oftheTable-Top andSimulator methodsof'-.::...;.::(h.t.tachment 3).Thescenarios providedthemeansforvalidatic"

':...:-.observers toviewemergency responseorganization personnel c"...'.8'.i.".g theEALsforproperemergency classification.

Intheclas.;.;".

>>"..::.":..hers oftheEALvalidation teamwereintroduced totheupgrac!,,

• I.eteamleader.Classification categories andsubcatego..:

',:.scussed aswerethetechnical basisforindividual EALconditions.

'..-..I'.ofamiliarize allvalidation teamparticipants withtheconten'.'...;:..".Ls andtheirrelationship totheexistingclassificai.i;

".::.".s.Membersofthevalidation teamwerealsobriefedonthevali;i'.;.:..:cess described inReference 2.CopiesoftheupgradedEALsweren:.;!ci.!l.bletoteammembersduringthevalidation exercises.

TheEALv"-."inAttach:.wereperf.':lanisgivenontheEALValidation SummarySheets...hEALvalidation

scenario, thefollowing activities

OSSI93402sNMP-2EALVerillcation

&Validation Report,Rev.01.Tl..vali.!..'.Ionteammembersassumedtheemergency responseo:.,."..'.;les theywereexpectedtofulfillduringanactual2.Tl'".'.'":.,'crdescribed theinitialplantconditions.

3.Wl~:-.;i'..c:.gcncy responseorganization personnel werefamiliarw".r::-..::!.i.;.!

~"lentconditions, theteamleaderannounced thestartoft1-."..:..a:.;c:;crcise anddescribed changesinkeyplantp",."-:-':-!!'".rtheTable-Top method)orheinstructed thes'...,.'.."..i instructor toplacethesimulator inRUN(fortheS"."!".:.cr i're'.bod).

4.Th~".c'<.-.'.cy responseorganization personnel described theac'...;..s Lheywouldperform(fortheTable-Top method)ortheyn.=--.-'.'"..'-.".>>roprlate plantcontrolsinthesimulator asneededto.:<..'""...".anging plantconditions (fortheSimulator 5,Tl"...,.;.,;,"."responseorganization personnel consulted theup:.:.'.!'...~'.I'.s according toEmergency Planprocedures andmadea;"...';..siiications.

6.T.'--".".:.""-rversoccasionaly askedquestions oftheemergency rc,.'.-..'::stion personnel duringtheexercise.

7P7~"..".tconditions werereached,thevalidation team:theexerciseandheldapostscenariobriefing~~~"".:;i.-...":.ibers jointlydiscussed problemsandcomments!:"...<

theexercise.

OSSI93-402"-'MP-2 EALVeriilcation

&Validation Report,Rev.0~".'".".:n n~c>>bcrsjointlycompleted theEALValidation Exercise~"""..1.'-'-t~

(h.ttachment 5)..:.sonsfornotedproblemsandcommentswere')i;."cases,portionsoralloftheexercisewere..."...:"=!togainabetterperspective ofnotedproblemsc~n'.CC':lnlellts.

Thevalidatic

"'."">>>",".dciensuredthefollowing information wasrecordedoneachV,",.':....:".eChecldist:

tVa"."..n".ammembernamesandtitlesEA'.!:.-".!ionnumberofEALsvalidated Sce:"":sc'...-~ripe,ion Vai-',.'.,:

n,.'.hadFollowing e"'....-'",.::::;.rio

briefing, teammemberscomparedobservatio.",

';..'..cd ifanyproblemsandcommentsnotedthusfarrequiredn"".:"!'.~e testplantoachievevalidation objectives.

Whenallv-"'".'.,"r".scswerecompleted, theteamleader,withtheassistance

~'t..;nicnbers,consolidated allexerciseproblemsandcomments'p~.yproblemandcommentrecordedontheEAL-'hecklists.

~R-.'!"msandcommentsintheEALValidation Comment"';-.!:out ofthisdatabaseisprovidedinAttachment 6.~R-C1~...;.;mment numbersontheEALValidation Exercise

OSSI93-402A-l

~-.'P2NMP-2EALVeriQcation

&Validation Report,Rev.04.Commen',T'...~~Dition Mr.WalkerandMr.Dausevaluated eachverification andvalidation commentrecordedintheEALcommentdatabases.

Theyreviewedthecommentdiscrepancies anddetermined theaccuracyofthediscrepancy.

Reference materials inEP.'c~e1opnient wereusedtoidentifythescopeofthediscrepancy andtoprepareappropriate solutions.

Theypreparedreso!utions tothediscrepancies, determined theimpactthefinalresolutio..".

i:"ieonEALProgramdocumentation, determined theimpactthefinalicsolutions haveontheplant,andidentified anyrequiredfollow-up act.'."...,.

Resultsofthever.*ication andvalidation commentresolution processweredocumented inUie!.ALVerification CommentDatabase(Attachment 2)andtheEALValida'.ion C'om:..ent Database(Attachment 6),respectively.

5.Refere~'..""l.OSSI92-~,-,".",-".,".:;;ergency ActionLevelVerifcation,Revision02.OSSI92-4"".-..H:..ergency ActionLevelValidation, Revision0

OSSI93-402A-10-N YP2NMP-2EALVerification

&Validation Report,Rev.0Attachment 1T';.KLVeri6cation Chechlists

OSSI92-402A-6-NMP2 EAI,Verification Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 1-Technical AccuracyPlant:NineMlePoint2Date:92093Verifier:

J.P.StalnameEALUadeProectEn'nertitleYesNoNA1.Plant-specific EALGuideline (PEG)comparison toNESP-007, Revision2,including NRCreviewedquestions andanswers:1.1DoeseachNESP-007initiating condition haveacorresponding PEGinitiating condition thatreflectsthemeaningoftheNESP-007IC'?~QQ1.2Doestheoperating modeapplicability ofeachPEGinitiating condition agreewiththeNESP-007operating modeapplicabilityV Q~Q1.3IseachPEGEALderivedfromacorresponding NESP-007exampleEALapplicable toplantspeciflcdesign'~QQ1.4DoPEGEALsreflecttheintentoftheNESP-007exampleEALs'?Q~Q1.5DoesthePEGEALbasesreflecttheintentoftheNESP-007EALbaseswhichareapplicable toplantspecificdesign'Q~Q

OSSI92-402A-6-NMP2 EAI.Verification Procedure, Rev.0Attachment I-Technical AccuracyYesNoNA1.6ArethePEGEALscompleteandappropriate (i.e.,isadditional information needed,shouldanyinformation bedeleted)'

Q~Q1.7Iseachapplicable PEGfissionproductbarrierEALproperlyconsidered intheQssionproductbarrierevaluation forthisplant'~QQ1-2

OSSI92-402A-6-NMP2 EALVerificatio Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 1-Technical AccuracyYesNoNA2.EALTechnical Basis(TB)comparison tothePlant-Specific EALGuideline (PEG),FissionProductBarrierEvaluation (FPBE)andEALBinningDocument:

2.1DoesthesetofTBcategories andsubcategories satisfactorily reflectthesetofPEGinitiating conditions asdefinedintheEALBinningDocument'

~002.2IseachTBEALderivedfromoneormorecorresponding PEGEALsasdefinedbytheFPBEandEALBinningDocument' 0r02.3DoTBEALsreflecttheintentofthePEGEALsfromwhichtheyarederived'0~02.4Doestheoperating modeapplicability ofeachTBEALagreewiththecorresponding PEGEALoperating modeapplicabilityV 0~02.5DoestheTBEALbasesreflecttheintentofthePEGEALbasesandFPBE'?~002.6Arethereferences listedforeachTBEALappropriate andconsistent withthePEG:~PEGReference(s)'?

~BasisReference(s)'?

0r0~001-3

OSSI92-402A-6-NMP2 EALVeriQcation Procedure.

Rev.0Attachment 1-Technical AccuracyYesNoNA2.7AretheTBEALscompleteandappropriate (i.e.,isadditional information needed,shouldanyinformation bedeleted)V 2.7Doeseach"Remark"inTablesAthroughDofthefissionproductbarrierevaluation forthisplantsatisfactorily explainthereasonaPEGEALorcombination ofPEGEALsisnotneededforeventclassification'?

~002.8Aretheresultant fissionproductbarrierevaluation EALsforthisplantproperlyaddressed intheTBattheappropriate classification level:~UnusualEvent'~Alert'~SiteAreaEmergency'

~GeneralEmergency'?

~00~00~000~02.9Doesthepotential existforclassification upgradeonlywhenthereisanincreased threattopublichealthandsafety'002.10Istherealogicalprogression inclassiQcation forcombinations ofmultipleeventswithinacategory'

~001-4 0

OSSI92-402A-6-NMP2 EALVerification Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 1-Technical AccuracyYesNoNA3.EALcomparison totheEALTechnical Basis(TB):3.1DoesthesetofEALcategories andsubcategories agreewiththeTBcategories andsubcategories, respectivelyV

~QQ3.2IseachEALcondition derivedfromacorresponding TBEALcondition'

~QQ3.3Doestheoperating modeapplicability ofeachEALagreewiththecorresponding TBEALoperating modeapplicabilityV SQQ4.EALcomparison totheplantControlRoom(Simulator):

4.1Areas-labeled designations usedtoidentifyspecificcomponents, alarms,controls, andinstruments totheextentpracticable'

~QQ4.2IseachEALadequately supported byplantinstruments, approvedinstructions, orotherappropriate sourcesofinformation'

~QQ1-5

OSSIS2-402A-6-NMP2 EAI.Verification Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 1-Technical AccuracyYesNoNA4.3WhereEALconditions specifynumerical values,aretheunitsofmeasurement thesameasthosepresented ontherespective plantpanelinstruments, approvedinstructions, orothersourcesofinformation' 50Q4.4WhereEALconditions specifynumerical values,arethevaluesexpressed toaprecision consistent withtheaccuracyandprecision oftherespective instrumentation' a~aAlldiscrepancies havebeenrecordedonEALCommentFormsandforwarded totheVerification TeamLeader.Signature:

Date:920931-6

OSSI92-402A-6-NMP2 EALVeriQcation Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 2-WrittenCorrectness Plant:NineMilePoint2Date:92093VeriQer:J.P.StalnameEALUradeProectEnineertitleYesNoNAl.EALOrganization:

1.1IseachEALassignedtooneofninecategories'?

~aa1.2Iseachsubcategory clearlyassociated withitscategory' SCIC32.EALIdentification:

2.1IseachEALidentified withauniquethreedigitnumberwhosefirstdigitcorresponds tothecategorynumber,seconddigitthesubcategory number,andthirddigittheEALsequencenumbers~ao2.2DoEALsequencenumbersincreaseinmagnitude asclassifications changefromUnusualEvent,toAlert,toSiteAreaEmergency, andtoGeneralEmergency'

~0Cl2-1

OSSI92-402A-6-NMP2 EAI.Verification Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 2-WrittenCorrectness YesNoNA2.3WhereanEALcondition doesnotexistinacategory/subcategory foragivenemergency classification, has"NA"beenenteredinplaceoftheEALidentification number'~QQ3.EALLengthandContent:3.1IseachEALclearandconcise'Q~Q3.2HaveverbsandarticlesbeendeletedfromEALswheretechnical accuracyandreadingclaritypermit'3.3AreEALsconsisting ofmultipleconditions formatted suchthateachcondition anditsrelationship tootherconditions areeasilyunderstood' 5QQ3.4Iswordingandabbreviations/

acronymsusedintheEALsconsistent withthedeQnitions providedinAttachments 1and2oftheEALWriter'sGuide'~QQ3.5AreEALconditions expressed quantifiably wherepossible?

~QQ3.6Whereused,dolimitmodiQers(<,>,s,>)simplifypresentation ofEALconditions' SQQ2-2

OSSI92-402A-6-NMP2 EALVerification Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 2-WrittenCorrectness YesNoNA3.7Areannunciator setpoints notgiveninEALswhenthesetpointiscommonoperatorknowledge orthesetpointissubjecttofrequentadjustment (e.g.,arearadiation monitoralarmsetpoints, offgasradiation monitoralarms,etc.)'?5QQ4.UseofLogicTerms:4.1WhenanEALmustexpressacombination oftwoconditions, aretheconditions joinedbythelogictermAND'?5QQ4.2WhenanEALmustexpressanalternate combination oftwoconditions, aretheconditions joinedbythelogictermOR'~QQ4.3IstheuseofANDandORwithinthesameEALavoidedwherepossible'?

4.4IseachEALcondition clearandconcise'~QQ~QQ2-3

OSSI92-402A-6-NMP2 EALVerification Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 2-WrittenCorrectness Yes~NNA5.Presentation ofinformation intables:5.1Iseachtablepresented inarectangular enclosure withatablenumberandtitleprintedabovethetableentries'8005.2Arecolumnheadingswithapplicable engineering unitsprovidedfortableswithmultiplecolumnsofinformation' S005.3Whereverticallinesseparatecolumnsofinformation, isreadability improved' 5.4Ifanentryisnotrequiredinatablecell,istheabbreviation "N/A"used'~006.Mechanics ofstyle:6.1Istheuseofhyphensminimized, and~nousedtobreakwordsbetweenlines'~006.2Ispunctuation usedonlyasnecessary toaidreadingandpreventmisunderstandingV

~006.3Areparentheses usedtoencloselocationinformation inEALsandtovisuallyseparatesupplemental/qualifying information fromtheprimaryinformation beingstated'~002-4

OSSI92-402A-6-NMP2 EALVerification Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 2-WrittenCorrectness YesNoNA6.4Iswordusageconsistent amongtheEALs'?~QQ6.5ArenumbersintheEALsprintedinArabicnumerals'

~QQ6.6.AreEALlimitsspecified insuchawaythatadditionandsubtraction bytheuseris.avoided' 8QQ6.7AreEALlimitsexpressed toaprecision consistent withtheintentoftheEALasspecified intheTBandPEG'?aQQ7.EALformat:7.lArethreeormoremultipleitems(systems, plantconditions, etc.)forwhichthereisnopreference orpriorityarrangedinalistformatwitheachitemprefacedbyabullets~QQ7.2AreEALlimitvalues,valuemodiQersandvalueengineering unitsprintedinboldprint'Q~QAlldiscrepancies havebeenrecordedonEALCommentFormsandforwarded totheVerification TeamLeader.Signature Dt:9//20932-5

OSSI92-402A-6-NMP2 EALVerification Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-Inter-Plant EALComparison Plants:J.A.FitzPatrlck NineMile1Date:92093NineMile2VeriQer:J.P.StalenameEALProectEnineertitleYesNoNA1.Withintheconstraints ofBWRandPWRplantdesign,iseachplanttypeEALscomposedofthesamecategories'

~QQ2.Withintheconstraints ofBWRandPWRplantdesign,iseachplanttypeEALscategorycomposedofthesamesubcategories'?

~QQ3.Withintheconstraints ofBWRandPWRplantdesign,doestheoperating modeapplicability ofeachEALthesameforeachplant'SQQ4,Whereindividual plantdesignpermits,arethecondition(s) ofeachEALthesameforeachplant?Q~Q3-1

OSSI92-402A-6-NMP2 EALVerification Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-Inter-Plant EALComparison YesNoNA5.Whereindividual plantdesignpermits,arethelimitvalue(s)ofeachEALcondition thesameforeachplant'0~06.Withintheconstraints ofBWRandPWRplantdesign,isEALwordusagethesameforeachplant'S00Alldiscrepancies havebeenrecordedonEALCommentFormsandforwarded totheVeriQcation TeamLeader.Signature:

Date:~920933-2 0

OSSI93-402A-10-NMP2 NMP-2EALVerIAcatlon

&Validation Report,Rev.0Attachment 2EA."V"Hfication CommentDatabase2-1

a~~a~~.~~~~RecordNo.5Orlglnatlng SiteJAFNMP-1NMP-2Date9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteAppllcablllty OJAFOIP-3ONMP-2OGenericBWR8GeneralOIP-2ONMP-1OGinnaOGenericPWRImpactONUMARC-007 OProcedure OVerification OTrainingOHardwaregEALElTechnical BasesOValidation ODeviation ONoneCat.PCIc¹2No.2Emer.Class.LOSSComment(verification question2.3):EAL3.4.2isdeclaredwhenH2/02exceedcombustible limits.PEGEALPC2.2requiresdeclaration whentheycannotbedetermined tobebelowcomubustible limits.ItisnotclearifEAL3.4.2addresses thelattercondition.

Consider"Primarycontainment ventingisrequiredduetoH2and02concentrations tcombustible limits".C!nncirfor ovnlanatinn inthohacicthatinrlinatoc thatthoovictinnuinrdinnonrnmnaccociashonResolution ExplaininTBwhatismeantbycombustible gasconcentrations.

PEGsareok.ChangedEALtostate"Primarycontainment ventingisrequiredduetocombustible gasconcentrations".

status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition QeClosedRecordNo.7Orlglnatlng SiteJAFNMP-1NMP-2Date9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteAppllcablllty OJAFOIP-3ONMP-2OGenericBWR8GeneralOIP-2ONMP-1OGinnaOGenericPWRImpactONUMARC-007 OProcedure OVerification OTrainingOHardwareIHIEALOTechnical BasesOValidation ODeviation ONonecat.SystemMalf.No.1Emer.Class.UnuSualEVentComment(verification question3.2):EALmatrixandTB7.3.1ismissingcondition thatEPICisavailable.

.Resolution Addedjustification inPEGforthereasonthiscondition isnotrequired.

SeePWRverification commentsforspecificresolution.

status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition OIClosed

RecordNo.8Originating SiteJAFNMP-1NMP-2Date9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicability ClJAFC3IP-3QNMP-2PGenericBWR8GeneralCIIP-20NMP-1CIGinnaC3GenericPWRImpactCINUMARC-007 0Procedure 0Verification ClTraining0HardwaregEALrHITechnical BasesCIValidation QDeviation 0NoneNo.1Emer.Class.UnuSualEventIc¹3cat.HazardsComment(verification question2.3):PEGHU3.1referstoprotecting safeoperation oftheplant.EAL8.3.3onlyaddresses personnel protection.

Resolution Theconcernforsafeplantoperation hasbeenaddedtotheEALs.status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition OeClosedRecordNo.10rlglnatlng SiteJAFNMP-1NMP-2DateImpactQNUMARC-007 gEAL9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicability PJAFQIP-3PNMP-2ClGenericBWR8GeneralQIP-2PNMP-1ClGinnaPGenericPWRC3Procedure C3Verification ClTrainingPHardwareHTechnical BasesQValidation 0Deviation 0Nonecat.BarrierIC¹**No.**Emer.Class.**Comment(verification question1):9.0categoryreferstolossandpotential lossofbarriers.

NESP-007providescleardefinition oftheseconditions intheFPBtables,buttheEALmatrixnevermakesadistinction betweenalossorpotential loss.Thiscouldpresentaproblemregarding interpretation oflossandpotential barrierlosses.Resolution Checkforthisinvalidation.

10/22/93Thiswascheckedduringvalidation andwasnotobservedtobeaproblemstatus0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition OeClosed

RecordNo.11orlglnatlng SitelJAFNMP-1NMP-2Date9/2Q/93NameM.C.DausSiteAppllcablllty PJAFQIP-3QNMP-2QGenericBWREGeneral0IP-20NMP-10Ginna0GenericPWRImpact0NUMARC-007 0Procedure 0Verification 0TrainingCJHardwaregEALC3Technical Bases0Validation 0Deviation QNonecat~N/Alc¹****Emer.Class.**Comment(verification question7.2):EALmatrix5.2.3,6.1.4,6.2.2,theEALnumbersshouldbeinboldprint.Resolution EALnumbershavebeenproperlyembolded.

status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition OIClosedRecordNo.13orlglnatlng SiteJAFNMP-1NMP-2Date9/2Q/93NameM.C.DauSSiteAppllcablllty QJAFQIP-3PNMP-28GenericBWRQGeneralQIP-2PNMP-1PGinnaPGenericPWRImpactClNUMARC-007 0Procedure 0Verification PTraining0HardwaregEALQTechnical BasesQValidation QDeviation QNonecat~HazardsIc¹1No.**Emer.Class.UnuSualEVentComment(verification question2.4):PEGICHU1,HA3operating modeisunchecked.

Itshouldbe"All".Resolution Checked"All"forHU1,HA3operating modeapplicability inthePEG.status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition OIClosed

RecordNo.15Originating SiteJAFNMP-1NMP-2Date9/2Q/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicability 0JAFPIP-3QNMP-2mjGenericBWRPGeneral0IP-20NMP-1QGinnaC]GenericPWRImpactQNUMARC-007 CIProcedure 0Verification 0TrainingCIHardwareIHIEAL0Technical Bases0Validation 0Deviation 0NoneNo.**Emer.Class.UnusualEventIcg2cat.SystemMalf.Comment(verification question2.4):PEGICHU2operating modeincludeshotshutdownbuttheTBEAL7.1.1onlyincludespoweroperations andhotstandby.Isthisintentional orshouldtheTBincludehotshutdown?

Resolution EAL7.1.1shouldincludehotshutdown.

ChangedTBstoincludehotshutdown.

10/9needtochangematrices.

MntothatthicicalenaRWRFAIualirlatinn nnmmontstatus0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition 0+ClosedRecordNo.16rlglnatlng SiteJAFNMP-1NMP-2Date9/2Q/93NameM.C.DauSSiteAppllcablllty 0JAFQIP-3C]NMP-2[3GenericBWREGeneralClIP-2QNMP-1QGinnaCJGenericPWRImpactQNUMARC-007 DProcedure DVerification 0TrainingQHardwareglEALQTechnical BasesQValidation QDeviation C3NoneNo.**Emer.Class.AlertIct1cat.SystemMalf.Comment(verification question2.4):PEGICSA1operating modeincludesdefuelbuttheTBEAL6.1.2onlyincludescoldshutdownandrefuel.Isthisintentional orshouldtheTBincludedefuel?Resolution TheICspecifically statesthatthelossofpowerisapplicable tocoldshutdownandrefueling modes.Therefore, NESP-007operating modeapplicability shouldnotlistdefueled.

ChangedPEGSA1toexcludedefueledmode.Addedstatement toPEGbasis:"NotethatDefuelmnrfoicnntannlinahlo tnthicIt.honaiicothoIC'.iccnonifirallu writtonfnrnnlAchi>trlnwn anrlrohiolstatus0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition OiClosed

RecordNo.17Orlglnatlng SiteJAFNMP-1NMP-2Date9/2Q/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicability OJAFOIP-3ONMP-2EGenericBWROGeneralOIP-2ONMP-1OGinnaOGenericPWRImpact0NUMARC-QQ7 0Procedure 0Verification 0Training0HardwareHEALOTechnical BasesOValidation ODeviation ONoneNo.**Emer.Class.SiteAl'eaIc¹2cat.SystemMalf.Comment(verification question2.4):PEGICSS2operating modeispoweroperations only,buttheTBEAL2.2.2includesstartup/hot standby.Isthisintentional?

Resolution ThisEALisconcerned withATWSconditions inaBWR.Poweroperation modedoesnotencompass alloftheplantconditions whereanATWSwouldbeofconcerninaBWR,therefore, itisappropriate toexpandthisEALtoincludestartup/hot standbymode.C'.honnorl RWRPFAIC'.c'c'9tninningcarloctort>>n/hnt ctonrlhvmnrtoonrlorlrlorlohnvoovnbntotinn tnstatusOOpenOResolved/Awaiting Disposition 0+ClosedRecordNo.18rlglnatlng SiteJAFNMP-1NMP-2Date9/2Q/93NameM.C.DausSiteAppllcabIlltyOJAFOIP-3ONMP-2ILGeneric BWROGeneral0IP-20NMP-1OGinna0GenericPWRImpactONUMARC-QQ7 0Procedure OVerification OTraining 0HardwareHEAL0Technical Bases0Validation 0Deviation 0NoneNo.**Emer.Class.Generallc¹2cat.SystemMalf.Comment(verification question2.4):PEGICSG2operating modeispoweroperations only,buttheTBEAL2.2.3includesstartup/hot standby.Isthisintentional?

Resolution ThisEALisconcerned withATWSconditions inaBWR.Poweroperation modedoesnotencompass alloftheplantconditions whereanATWSwouldbeofconcerninaBWR,therefore, itisappropriate toexpandthisEALtoincludestartup/hot standbymode.l.honnorlRWRPC(~IC'.c'C~Ptninningcarloctorti>n/hntctonrlhvmnrloonrlorlrtorlohnvoovnbntotinn tnstatus0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition 0Closed

RecordNo.22Orlglnatlng SiteNMP-2NMP-1Date9/2Q/93NameM.C.DauSSiteApplicability QJAF0IP-30NMP-20GenericBWR8GeneralHIP-2QNMP-1QGinnaCIGeneric PWRImpact0NUMARC-007 QProcedure 0Verification QTraining0HardwaregEAL8Technical BasesI]Validation 0Deviation 0Nonecat.Abnorm.Rad.Ic¹**No.**Emer.Glass.**Comment(verification)

NMP-1,AU-1bases:Whynoreference listedtoNMP-1TechSpecs?SameforAA-1,AS-1,AG-1,andmanyothers.Resolution FacilityOperating LicenseNo.DPR-63,AppendixA,Radiological Technical Specifications isreferenced ineachoftheabovePEGEALbasisdiscussions.

status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition 0ClosedRecordNo.23riginatlngSiteNMP-1NMP-2Date9/2Q/93NameM.C.DauSSiteApplicability OJAFOIP-3ENMP-2PGenericBWRPGeneral0IP-2gNMP-10Ginna0GenericPWRImpactQNUMARC-007 QProcedure QVerification QTrainingC3HardwarelaIEALIHITechnical BasesOValidation ODeviation ONonecat.Abnorm.Rad.Ic¹1No.**Emer.Class.SiteAreaComment(verification)

AS1:Note"laters"here,bothunits.Resolution StillwaitingfornumbersfromNMP.sta~usOOpenOResolved/Awaiting Disposition OClosed

RecordNo.27Originating SiteNMP-1NMP-2Date9/2Q/93NameM.C.DauSSiteApplicability OJAFOIP-38NMP-2OGenericBWROGeneralOIP-2HNMP-1OGinnaOGenericPWRImpactONUMARC-007 OProcedure OVerification C3Training OHardwaregEALHTechnical BasesOValidation ODeviation ONoneNo.1Emer.Glass.UnuSualEventIc¹7cat.SystemMalf.Comment(verification)

NMP-1,NMP-2SU-7.1(alsoappliestoSS3):Itwouldseemthatthesetwoplantsmightagreeonwhich-105 voltsor106volts-constitutes lossofDCpoweriResolution Agree,butthat'swhatwehavefromtheirdatasources.statusOOpenOResolved/Awaiting Disposition OeClosedRecordNo.28rlglnatlng SiteNMP-1NMP-2Date9/2Q/93NameM.C.DauSSiteApplicability C3JAFC3IP-3gNMP-2C3Generic BWROGeneralC3IP-28NMP-1OGinnaOGenericPWRImpactC3NUMARC-007 C3Procedure C3Verification C3Training OHardwaregEALHTechnical BasesC3Validation ODeviation C3Nonelc¹2cat.SystemMalf.No.**Emer.Class.AlertComment(verification)

NMP-1,NMP-2SA2bases:"Existence" ismisspelled insecondparagraph.

Resolution Corrected typoinNMP1,2.JAFok.senatus0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition 0+Closed

RecordNo.29Originating SiteNMP-2Date9/20/93NameM.C.DauSSiteApplicability OJAFHIP-3ENMP-2QGenencBWR OGeneralHIP-2ONMP-1CIGinnaOGenericPWRImpactC3NUMARC-007 0Procedure QVerification 0TrainingClHardwaregEALISLTechnical Bases0Validation CIDeviation C3Nonecat.SystemMalf.Ic¹4No.**Emer.Glass.AlertComment(verification)

NMP-2,SA4:"COLDSHUTDOWN" ischeckedasapplicable, butshouldn't be.Resolution Corrected NMP2;NMP1andJAFareok.statusOOpen0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition 0>ClosedRecordNo.31Originating SiteNMP-1NMP-2Date9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicability 0JAFQIP-38NMP-2QIP-2isiNMP-1PGinnaImpact0NUMARC-007 0Procedure 0Verification gEALHTechnical Bases0Validation QGenericBWRQGeneral0GenericPWR0TrainingC3Hardware0Deviation 0NoneNo.**Emer.Class.SiteAreaIc¹2cat.SystemMalf.Comment(verification)

NMP-1,NMP-2SS2:NUMARCsaysthisEALisapplicable inPowerOperation, butPEGsaysPowerOperation andHotStandby.Resolution Deselected hotstandbyinNMP1,2.JAFok.statusOOpenOResolved/Awaiting Disposition OeClosed

RecordNo.32orlglnatlng SiteNMP-1NMP-2JAFDate9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicability QJAFQIP-3QNMP-2gGenericBWRQGeneralQIP-2QNMP-1QGinnaQGenericPWRImpactQNUMARC-007 QProcedure QVerification QTrainingQHardwaregEAL8Technical BasesQValidation QDeviation QNoneNo.**Emer.Class.SiteAf'eaIc¹2cat.SystemMalf.Comment(verification)

NMP-1,NMP-2SS2bases:Thestatement that"thegenericguidancewouldrequireclassification ofaSAEforconditions inwhichthereactorisinfactshutdownasaresultofthescramsignal..."

iswrong.Apparently thissentencewascopiedoverfromthecorresponding Alert.Resolution Deletedsentencecontaining theabovestatement fromNMP1,2andJAF.status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition 0ClosedRecordNo.33rlglnatlng SiteNMP-1NMP-2JAFDate9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicability QJAFQIP-3QNMP-28GenericBWRQGeneralQIP-2QNMP-1QGinnaQGenericPWRImpactQNUMARC-007 QProcedure QVerification QTrainingQHardwaregEALHTechnical BasesQValidation QDeviation QNoneNo.**Emer.Class.SiteAl'ealc¹5cat.SystemMalf.Comment(verification)

NMP-1,NMP-2SS5:Wouldprimarycontainment Hydrogenconcentration above4%bebettertreatedasacontainment barrierpotential breach?Also,lossofwaterlevelinthepoweroperation, HSBandHSDconditions istreatedasafuelcladbarrierealformodes1,2,3,4&5.Soisitappropriate ornecessary toexpandSS2fromcolds/dandrefueling toallmodes?Resolution Itcouldbetreatedasapotential containment breach,buthydrogengeneration ismostdirectlyanindication ofprolonged inadequate corecooling.Expanding SS2modeapplicability isnotnecessary.

status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition 0+Closed

RecordNo.35Orlglnatlng SiteNMP-1NMP-2JAFDate9/20/93NameM.C.DauSSiteAppllcablllty C3JAFPIP-3PNMP-2PGenericBWREGeneralCIIP-2QNMP-10GinnaQGenericPWRImpact0NUMARC-007 0Procedure CIVerification ETraining0HardwaregEALHTechnical BasesC]Validation 0Deviation C1NoneNo.**Emer.Class.SiteAreaIc¹5cat.SystemMalf.Comment(verification)

NMP-1,NMP-2SS6:ShouldtheEALstatethatALLoftheindications neededtomonitorplantparameters havetobeunavailable?

Whynothalf,ormost?Resolution NESP-007specifies "mostorall"indications where"most"isstatedtobeapproximately 75'/o.But,NESP-007alsostatesthattheydonotexpecttheoperatortallyupthenumberoflostindicators.

ThisEALispoorlywordedinNESP-007.

Theemphasisneedstobeontheneedforincreased surveillance resulting fromwhatevernumberislost.ThisisatrainingissueuntilNUMARCchoosestnhottorrlofinothinI=AIstatus0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition 0ClosedRecordNo.36rlglnatlng SiteNMP-1NMP-2Date9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteAppllcablllty 0JAF0IP-30NMP-2C3GenericBWR8GeneralC3IP-2C]NMP-10Ginna0GenericPWRImpactQNUMARC-007 0Procedure C3Verification gTrainingQHardwaregEAL8Technical Bases0Validation QDeviation QNoneNo.**Emer.Class.SiteAI'eaIC¹5cat.SystemMalf.Comment(verification)

NMP-1,NMP-2SG1:Shouldastatement beaddedtothebasesjustifying useofonlyoneparameter, i.e.RPVwatercan'tbemaintained aboveTAF,insteadofbroaderfissionproductbarriermonitoring?

Resolution Ifthecoreiscovered,adequatecorecoolingexistsnomatterwhatthestatusofotherfissionproductbarriers.

status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition OeClosed

RecordNo.37Originating SiteNMP-1NMP-2JAFDate9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicability OJAFOIP-3ONMP-2EGenericBWR DGeneral0IP-20NMP-1QGinna0GenericPWRImpact0NUMARC-007 CIProcedure 0Verification ElTrainingCIHardwareILEALETechnical BasesQValidation DDeviation CINonecat.SystemMalf.Ic¹5No.**Emer.Glass.SiteAreaComment(verification)

NMP-1,NMP-2FC2.1:PartofbasisfromNUMARCismissing.Resolution AddedtoNMP1,2andJAFFC2.1basis:The"Potential Loss"EAListhesameastheRCSbarrier"Loss"EAL4belowandcorresponds tothe(site-specific) waterlevelatthetopoftheactivefuel.Thus,thisEALindicates a"Loss"ofRCSbarrieranda"Potential Loss"oftheFuelCladBarrier.ThisEALappropriately escalates theemergency classtoaSiteAreaEmergency.

statusOOpen0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition 0ClosedRecordNo.38'originating SiteNMP-1NMP-2Date9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicability OJAFOIP-3HNMP-2I)Generic BWRC3General OIP-2gNMP-1OGinnaQGenericPWR ImpactQNUMARC-007 PProcedure QVerification QTrainingQHardwarelaLEALEITechnical BasesQValidation QDeviation ClNonecat.BarrierIc¹**No.**Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)

NMP-1,NMP-2FC3.1,RC3,PC3.1:Note"later"¹sstillneeded.Resolution StillwaitingfornumbersfromNMP.statusOIOpen0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition 0Closed

RecordNo.39Originating SiteNMP-1NMP-2DateImpact0NUMARC-007 gEAL9/2Q/93NameM.C.DauSSiteApplicability OJAFCIIP-3DNMP-2HGenericBWROGeneral0IP-2CINMP-1PGinnaCIGeneric PWR0Procedure ClVerification ClTrainingClHardwareETechnical BasesC3Validation CjDeviation ClNonecat.Barrierlc¹**No.**Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)

NMP-1,NMP-2PC1.1,1.2basisstatement:

IwonderiftheNRCwillquestionthisadditiontothebases...Resolution Thiscommentreferstothelineoutoftheprimarycontainment pressuredecreasefollowing rapidincrease.

PerhapstheNRCwillquestionthis,buttheyshouldbemoreconcerned withtheBWREOPsthantheEALsbecausethestatement inthebasisisthereasontheoperatorisnotkeyedtorespondbasedonthetypesofconditions suggested byNUMARC.ChangedthePEGtoincludethorornnriitinnc Ilnriorthoiitrtnomont FAIPC'.R1status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition 0+ClosedRecordNo.40Originating SiteNMP-1NMP-2JAFDate9/2Q/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicability C3JAFCIIP-3ONMP-2HGenericBWRCJGeneral HIP-2QNMP-1PGinnaQGenericPWRImpactC3NUMARC-007 I3Procedure QVerification 0TrainingQHardwareggEALHTechnical BasesC3Validation CIDeviation ONoneNo.**Emer.Class.**Ic¹**cat~BarrierComment(verification)

NMP-1,NMP-2PC4.1:Iwouldsuggestmoreexplanation shouldbeaddedtothebasesastowhyweareusingprimarycontainment floodingasthecriterion insteadoftheNUMARCcriteria.

Resolution Addedthefollowing totheendofthesecondparagraph ofNMP1,2,JAFPEGPC4.1:Therequirement forprimarycontainmnent floodingaddresses allplantconditions forwhichadequatecorecoolingisorisabouttobelost.ThisincludesRPVwaterlevelcannotberestoredandmaintained aboveTAFandRPVfloodingconditions cannotbeestablished andmaintained.

Thus,thoPI=Arnnrlitinn onnnmnoccoc thoNlIMAAC'.nnnrtitinn rnnnorninn I=IPVwotorlovolonrIthos~a~us00pen0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition 0Closed 0

RecordNo.41Originating SiteNMP-1NMP-2JAFDate9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicability ClJAFOIP-3C3NMP-2gGenericBWRQGeneralHIP-2QNMP-1QGinnaCIGeneric PWRImpactCJNUMARC-007 0Procedure C3Verification QTraining0HardwaregEAL8Technical Bases0Validation 0Deviation CINonecat.BarrierIC¹****Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)

NMP-1,NMP-2:Generalcomment:Thebarrierloss/potential losstableonpage3oftheevaluation isconfusingly laidout;itwouldbebettertoassignauniqueidentifier toeachlossorpotential losscondition.

Resolution Agree,shouldidentifyinparentheses aftereach"Yes"thespecificPEGEALnumber.statusOOpenOResolved/Awaiting Disposition 0+ClosedRecordNo.42rlglnatlng SiteNMP-2DateImpact0NUMARC-007 gEAL9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicability OJAFHIP-3ONMP-2HGenericBWRCIGeneral C3IP-20NMP-1QGinnaC3Generic PWRC3Procedure QVerification 0TrainingQHardwaregTechnical BasesOValidation ODeviation 0NoneNo.**IC¹**Emer.Class.**cat.BarrierComment(verification)

NMP-2,remarkf21:Whyisn'tfailureofasteamline toisolatewithadirectpathtotheenvironment alossofRCSratherthanapotential lossasstatedintheremark?Resolution Afterreviewoftheremark,Idon'tknowwhyitisnotalossofRCSasopposedtoapotential loss.ChangedremarktostatelossofRCS.sta~usOOpenOResolved/Awaiting Disposition OClosed

RecordNo.43orlglnatlng SiteNMP-2DateImpact0NUMARC-007 gEAL9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteAppllcablllty C3JAF0IP-3QNMP-2IIGenericBWRQGeneral0IP-2C7NMP-10GinnaC3GenericPWR0Procedure C3Verification ClTraining0HardwarelalTechnical BasesPValidation CJDeviation CJNonecat~BarrierIC¹****Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)

NMP-2UnusualEventtable:PC1aPot.lossshouldn't reference remark¹24,andPC1bPot.lossshouldreference

¹25.Resolution Agree,changedtoremark25.status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition ClosedRecordNo.44rlglnatlng SiteNMP-2DateImpactQNUMARC-007 IHIEAL9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteAppllcabllity 0JAF0IP-30NMP-28GenericBWRQGeneralCIIP-2C3NMP-10Ginna0GenericPWRC3Procedure 0Verification C3Training0HardwareIHITechnical BasesC3Validation QDeviation 0Nonecat.Barrierlc¹*No.**Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)

NMP-2UnusualEventtable:Remark¹25doesn'tapplytoPC3-pot.loss.Shouldref.26.Resolution Agree,changedtoremark26.status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition OeClosed

RecordNo.45Originating SiteNMP-2Date9/20/93NameM.C.DauSSiteAppllcablllty OJAFOIP-3ONMP-28GenericBWROGeneralOIP-20NMP-1OGinnaOGenericPWRImpactONUMARC-007 OProcedure OVerification OTrainingOHardwaregEAL8Technical BasesOValidation ODeviation ONonecat.BarrierIC¹****Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)

NMP-2UnusualEventtable:PC-4potential lossshouldreference remark¹27vs.26.Resolution Agree,changedtoremark27.status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition 0ClosedRecordNo.46rlglnatlng SiteNMP-1NMP-2Date9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteAppllcablllty OJAFOIP-3ONMP-28GenericBWROGeneralOIP-2ONMP-1OGinnaOGenericPWRImpactONUMARC-007 OProcedure OVerification OTrainingOHardwaregEALHTechnical BasesOValidation ODeviation ONonecat~BarrierIc¹****Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)

Remark¹15:Inmostofthecontainments I'mfamiliarwith,50GPMofRCSleakageisnotverymuchandwouldtakeaverylongtimetoresultinapressureincreaseto1.68psig,ifever.Suggestthisremarkbereexamined.

Resolution Remark¹15appliestoRCS1a-pot loss(RCS1.2leakageintothedlywell>50gpm).TheNESP-007basisforthisEALstatesinpart"ManyBWRsmaybeunabletomeasureanRCSleakofthissizebecausetheleakwouldlikelyincreasedrywellpressureabovethedrywellisolation setpoint".

Measurement ofleakageintothedrywellforNMP1isverylimited.Itjustdoesnotseemwnrthittnirlontifu onFAIhocorlnnouoruorhitroru nnmhorSnnnmlwhononuciihctontiol omnnntstatus0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition OeClosed

RecordNo.47Originating SiteNMP-2DateImpact0NUMARC-007 ILEAL9/2Q/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicability 0JAFQIP-3QNMP-2HGenericBWR0General0IP-20NMP-10Ginna0GenericPWR0Procedure 0Verification CJTrainingQHardware8Technical Bases0Validation 0Deviation 0Nonecat.BarrierIC¹**No.**Emer.Class.'*Comment(verification)

NMP2SAEtable:Firstline(FC1loss+RCS1aloss):Idon'tunderstand howremark16appliestothis.IfyouhavehighcoolantactivityandasteamlinebreakinsideORoutsidethedrywell,itdoesn'tmeanthatyouwillhaveadoseatthesiteboundaryof100mr/hr(AS1.1).Ifthiswasactuallysupposedtoberemark17,itstilldoesn'tseemtowork.FC3.1ishighdrywellradiation indicating aLOCAwithfueldamage.RCS1acouldbeamainsteamlinebreakinsideORoutsidennntolnrnnnt Resolution Iftheleakisoutsidetheprimarycontainment, thiscombination wouldrequiredeclaration ofaGeneralEmergency iftheleakwasnotisolated.

Iftheleakwereisolated, theresulting puffreleasewouldrequireescalation totheSAEonlyiftheexposureatthesiteboundaryreachedthelevelgiveninAS1.1.Otherwise, thereleaseonlyjustifies anAlertcondition.

Remark¹16hasbeennhonnoritnroflontthoohnuoctotornontc status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition 0>>ClosedRecordNo.48rlglnatlng SiteNMP-2DateImpactQNUMARC-007 gEAL9/2Q/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicability QJAF0IP-30NMP-28GenericBWRClGeneralClIP-20NMP-10Ginna0GenericPWR0Procedure 0Verification C3TrainingC3HardwaregTechnical BasesQValidation QDeviation C3NoneEmer.Class.**No.*Ic¹**cat.BarrierComment(verification)

NMP2SAEtable:Secondline(FC1loss+RCS2loss):Remark¹17statesthatthiscondition isadequately coveredbyFC3.1.FC3.1isbasedonallofthecoolantactivityofFC1.1beingdumpedintoprimarycontainment.

CanwereallybesurethatALLthecoolantactivityisinthedrywellifdrywellpressureis>3.5psig?Resolution RevisedFPBEstomakeRemark¹17N/AmakingFC1loss+RCS2lossanEAL.AddednewEALtoBinningdocumentandEALTB.AddedEALtomatrices.

status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition 0>>Closed

RecordNo.49Orlglnatlng SiteNMP-2DateImpact0NUMARC-007 gEAL9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicability 0JAF0IP-3DNMP-28GenericBWRQGeneralGIP-20NMP-10GinnaQGenericPWR0Procedure 0Verification 0Training0HardwareIHLTechnical Bases0Validation DDeviation I3None**Emer.Class.**IC¹**cat.BarrierComment(verification)

NMP2SAEtable:FC2loss+RCS1alossisshownasaSAE,whilereferencing remark¹8.Butremark¹8saysthisEALisunnecessary becauseit'scoveredbySS5.1.Sowhyisthiscombination shownasaSAE?Resolution Remark¹8shouldstatethat"...thisportionoftheEALisunnecessary andcanbedeleted".

"thisportion"referstoRCS1aloss.ChangedJAF,NMP1,2FPBEstostate"...theRCS1alossportionoftheEALisunnecessary andcanbedeleted".

status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition OIClosedRecordNo.50riglnatlng SiteNMP-2Date9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteAppllcablllty 0JAF0IP-3QNMP-2gGenericBWRClGeneral0IP-2PNMP-1QGinnaQGenericPWRImpact0NUMARC-007 0Procedure C3Verification QTrainingPHardwaregEALlalTechnical Bases0Validation ClDeviation C]NoneEmer.Class.****IC¹*cat.BarrierComment(verification)

NMP2SAEtable:FC4loss+RCS1aloss:Withrespecttoremark¹24,Idon'understand whythesystemandprocessmonitorswouldnotbeinoperation justbecausethereisamainsteamlinebreak,especially ifthebreakisoutsidetheD/W.Iwouldsuggestmorejustification isneededhere.Resolution Remark¹24presumesthatavalidgp1isolation signalinRCS1alosswouldresultinisolation ofthesteamlines.Withnoflowthroughoffgas,theoffgasmonitorsarenotagoodindication offuelfailure.status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition OIClosed

RecordNo.51originating SiteNMP-2Date9/2Q/93NameM.C.DauSSiteApplicability PJAFClIP-3PNMP-2IHIGenencBWRPGeneralC]IP-20NMP-10GinnaClGenericPWRImpact0NUMARC-007 0Procedure 0Verification 0Training0HardwaregEAL8Technical Bases0Validation QDeviation 0Nonecat.BarrierIC¹**N**Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)

NMP2SAEpage13:Thecondition FC4-pot.loss+RCS1apot.lossisrepeatedfivetimesinarow.Resolution Corrected BWRFPBEsbylistingcorrectRCSpotential losseswithFC4-pot.loss.status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition OoClosedRecordNo.52rlginatlng SiteNMP-2Date9/2Q/93NameM.C.DauSSiteApplicability CIJAFClIP-3QNMP-28GenericBWR0GeneralCIIP-20NMP-10Ginna0GenericPWRImpactQNUMARC-007 CIProcedure 0Verification 0TrainingQHardwaregEALHTechnical BasesQValidation 0Deviation I7Nonecat.Bal'I'lel' C¹**No.**Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)

NMP2SAEpage14:ForRCS1apot.loss+FC4loss:See¹27above.Resolution Thissetofconditions isdeletedbecauseofRemark¹20.Remark¹20hasbeenclarified asfollows:"RCS1apot.lossis>50gpminthedrywell.FC4lossisveryhighoffgasactivity.

Highoffgasactivityunderconditions inwhichsteamflowtothemaincondenser isongoing(i.e.,highoffgasreadingsvalid)aloneisindicative ofaMSLfailuretoisolatewithdownstream pathwaytotheonvirnnmont Thicrnnditinn roniiiroc rlorhrotinn nfoRitoArool=mornonrv>>nidor I=AIc<<cinnstatus0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition OIClosed

RecordNo.53Originating SiteNMP-2Date9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicability 0JAF0IP-3PNMP-2IIGenericBWRQGeneralQIP-20NMP-1[3Ginna0GenericPWRImpact0NUMARC-007 0Procedure CJVerification C3TrainingC3HardwareIjEAL8Technical Bases0Validation 0Deviation C3Nonecat.BarrierIc¹****Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)

NMP2SAEpage14:ForRCS1b-pot.loss

+FC4-loss:

See¹31above.Resolution Expandeddiscussion inRemark¹24whichjustifies thedeletionoftheseconditions.

"Offgasmonitorsarenotareliableindicator offuelfailureunderseverelydegradedconditions inthatthesystemwouldbeisolatedandtheprocessmonitorswouldnotbemonitoring anunisolated processstream.Highoffgasactivityunderconditions inwhichsteamflowtothemaincondenser isongoingliohinhnHnocrooriinnc Moliribolnnoicinriirotiuo nfomoinctoom linofoil>>rotnicnlotowithstatus0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition OeClosedRecordNo.54Originating SiteNMP-2DateimpactQNUMARC-007 gEAL9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicability C3JAFQIP-3ClNMP-2HGenericBWR0GeneralPIP-20NMP-1CIGinnaPGenencPWR0Procedure 0Verification C3TrainingQHardwareIITechnical BasesCIValidation QDeviation 0Nonecat.BarrierIc¹****Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)

NMP2SAEpage15:RCS6-pot.

loss+FC1lossshouldsay:"Subsumed in'Judgement EAL.'"Resolution ChangedJAFFPBERemarksonpage15forthiscombination ofEALsto"Subsumed in'Judgement'AL".

status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition OeClosed

RecordNo.55Originating SiteNMP-2Date9/2p/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicability 0JAFC3IP-3QNMP-2HGenencBWR0General0IP-20NMP-10Ginna0GenericPWRImpact0NUMARC-007 0Procedure 0Verification ClTraining0Hardware8EAL8Technical Bases0Validation 0Deviation PNonecat.BarrierIc¹**No.**Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)

NMP2SAEpage15:Thecombination ofRCS1a-pot.

loss+PC2b-loss references remark¹22.Whynotsimplystate"Notsupported inPEG?"Resolution "Condition notsupported inPEG"isnotappropriate becausetheseconditions aresupported inthePEGs...statusOOpenOResolved/Awaiting Disposition OeClosedRecordNo.56Originating SiteNMP-2Date9/2P/93NameM.C.DauSSiteApplicability CjJAFQIP-3QNMP-2HGenericBWRC]GeneralClIP-20NMP-1QGinna0GenericPWRImpact0NUMARC-007 QProcedure QVerification 0Training0HardwaregEAL8Technical Bases0Validation ClDeviation 0Nonecat.BarrierIC¹****Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)

NMP2GEpage17:ForFC2-Loss+RCS4-Loss

+PC1b-loss, remark¹25wouldbemoreappropriate than14,sinceitstatesthatPC1b-loss byitselfconstitutes aGE.Similarly, remarks26and27wouldbebetterforthetwocombinations thatfollowthisone.Resolution Page17onlyreferstoPC1b-potloss,notPC1b-loss.

ChangedJAFFPBEfromRemark¹14to¹25;Remark¹26and¹27areappliedtothetwocombinations thatfollowthisone.SinceRemark¹14isnolongerinuse,N/AhasbeenenteredforthisremarkintheFPBE.statusOOpenOResolved/Awaiting Disposition OeClosed

RecordNo.57Originating SiteNMP-2DateImpactC3NUMARC-007 gEAL9/20/93NameM.C.DauSSiteApplicability 0JAFC3IP-3PNMP-2gGenericBWRQGeneralHIP-2QNMP-1PGinnaPGenericPWRClProcedure 0Verification 0TrainingC3Hardware8Technical Bases0Validation QDeviation 0Nonecat.BarrierIc¹No.'*Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)

NMP2GEtable:Throughout theGEtable,onlyonecombination ofRCS3-loss isshowninconjunction withlossofFCandPC,thatwhereitiscombinedwithPC-1apotential loss.Idon'tunderstand why.WhathappenedtoPC-1b,PC-3,4,5,6pot.loss?Resolution Don'tknowwhathappenedappeartoalsobemissingFC1-loss+

RCS4-loss+

PC1a-pot.

losseachplacetheRCS4-loss followstheRCS2-loss.

Addedmissinggeneralemergency conditions including lossofallthreebarrierstotheBWRFPBEs.Evaluation oftheaddedconditions indicated thatallwerepreviously identified asaGeneralEmergency, subsumedintheJudgement EALs,orthonnnriitinn wocnntc<<nnnrtori inthoPI=(cstatus0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition 0ClosedRecordNo.58rlginatlng SiteNMP-2DateImpactQNUMARC-007 IHIEAL9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicability OJAFCIIP-3QNMP-2HGenericBWRQGeneraiC3IP-20NMP-10Ginna0GenericPWRCIProcedure QVerification 0Training0HardwareHTechnical Bases0Validation QDeviation QNoneEmer.Class.**N**Ic¹**cat.BarrierComment(verification)

NMP2GEtable:Forcombinations ofLOSSOFRCS,LOSSOFPC,POT.LOSSOFFConlyFC2,4and5arelistedinthecombinations.

WhynotFC1andFC3,bothofwhichareadmittedly notsupported inthePEG?Resolution FC1andFC3potential lossesarenotincludedintheTablebecausetheyarenotsupported inNESP-007.

Thisfactisidentified intheTableonpage3oftheFPBEs.status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition OeClosed

RecordNo.59Originating SiteNMP-2DateImpact0NUMARC-007 gEAL9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicability 0JAF0IP-30NMP-2IJGenericBWRCJGeneral0IP-2QNMP-1CJGinna0GenericPWR0Procedure 0Verification 0TrainingQHardware8Technical BasesQValidation DDeviation QNonecat.BarrierIC¹**No.**Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)

NMP2GE:Remark¹28hasatypo,shouldbeEAL¹FC1.1,notEAL1.1.Resolution ChangedtoEAL¹FC1.1inFPBE.status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition OeClosedRecordNo.60riginatlng SiteNMP-2Date9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicability 0JAF0IP-3QNMP-2HGenericBWR0GeneralC3IP-2C3NMP-10GinnaQGenericPWRImpact0NUMARC-007 0Procedure C]Verification QTrainingQHardwaregEALgTechnical BasesClValidation QDeviation 0Nonecat.BarrierIc¹**No.**Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)

NMP2GEtable,page25:Remark¹28doesnotapplytothecombination ofPC2alossandFC2loss.Anewremarkshouldmakereference toRPVWL<TAFasalossoffuelclad.Asimilarcommentsappliesforthecombination ofPC2alossandFC3loss.Resolution RevisedRemark¹28tostatethatFC2-lossandFC3-lossareeachlossesofthefuelclad.status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition OeClosed

RecordNo.61Originating SiteNMP-2Date9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicability 0JAFC3IP-30NMP-2HGenericBWRQGeneralPIP-2QNMP-1PGinnaQGenencPWRImpact0NUMARC-007 0Procedure CIVerification 0TrainingQHardware8EALIHLTechnical BasesC3Validation 0Deviation C3None**IC¹**Emer.Class.**cat.BarrierComment(verification)

NMP2GEtable,page25:Remark28doesnotappeartoapplytothecombinations ofPC2aloss+FC4loss+RCS1a/bpot.loss.Resolution RevisedRemarks¹24and¹28toexplaintheconditions inwhichuseoftheoffgasairejectorsetpointwouldnotbevalidforemergency declaration.

status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition OeClosedRecordNo.62Originating SiteNMP-1NMP-2DateImpact0NUMARC-007 gEAL9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteAppllcabillty QJAFQIP-3QNMP-2mjGenericBWRQGeneralQIP-2PNMP-1PGinnaQGenericPWRQProcedure CIVerification QTraining0HardwareElTechnical Bases0Validation QDeviation 0NoneIc¹****Emer.Class.**cat.BarrierComment(verification)

Throughout thetableofLOSSOFPC+LOSSOFFC+POT.LOSSOFRCS,RCS2,3,and4conditions arenotlisted.Admittedly theyarenotsupported inthePEG.Resolution Thesepotential lossesarenotincludedintheTablebecausetheyarenotsupported inNESP-007.

Thisfactisidentified intheTableonpage3oftheFPBEs.status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition 0Closed

RecordNo.63Orlglnatlng SiteNMP-2cat.BarrierDateImpactQNUMARC-007 ILEALIc¹**9/2Q/93NameM.C.DauSSiteAppllcablllty QJAFQIP-3QNMP-2gGenericBWRQGeneralQIP-2QNMP-1QGinnaQGenericPWRQProcedure QVerification QTrainingQHardwaregTechnical BasesQValidation QDeviation QNoneNo.**Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)

NMP2GEtable,page20andlater:Remark¹8appliestoSAEsanditwouldseemshouldnotbereferenced intheGEtable.Theseshouldbereevaluated.

Resolution Agree.WherePC2a-loss orPC2c-loss isusedintheGEtable,Remark¹28isapplied.WherePC2c-loss isusedintheGEtable,Remark¹25isapplied.status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition OeClosedRecordNo.64rlglnating SiteNMP-2DateImpactQNUMARC-007 gEAL9/2Q/93NameM.C.DausSiteAppllcabilltyQJAFQIP-3QNMP-2gGenericBWRQGeneralQIP-2QNMP-1QGinnaQGenericPWRQProcedure QVerification QTrainingQHardwaregTechnical BasesQValidation QDeviation QNoneIC¹**No.**Emer.Class.**cat.BarrierComment(verification)

NMP2GEtable,page25:Remark¹22statesthatPC2b-loss shouldbeaGEallbyitself.Sowhyisn'titlistedasone.Resolution PC2b-loss appearsintheEALsunderventingforPCPLandH2/02atorabovecombustible limits.status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition OeClosed

RecordNo.65Originating SiteNMP-2DateImpact0NUMARC-007 SEAL9/2Q/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicability QJAFtlIP-3QNMP-2HGenericBWRQGeneralC]IP-2ONMP-1OGinnaDGenericPWRC3Procedure 0Verification CITrainingCJHardware8Technical Bases0Validation 0Deviation 0Nonecat.Barrierlc¹**No.**Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)

NMP2GEtable,page25and26:Remarks¹25,26and27arereferenced inalotofcombinations theydon'tapplyto.Resolution DeletedRemarks¹25,¹26,and¹27fromcombinations withEALPC2b-loss becauseintentional ventingaloneisreasontodeclareaGeneralEmergency.

statusOOpenOResolved/Awaiting Disposition OiClosed**Emer.Class.**lc¹**cat~BarrierComment(verification)

WithrespecttoAU2.4,listedinthe"ReactorFuel"category, otherthingsthanfueldegradation couldcauseahundredfold increaseinarearadiation monitors.

SameforAA3.1andAA3.2.SuggestthesethreeEALsbelonginthe"Equipment Failures" category...?

RecordNo.66Date9/2Q/93NameM.C.DauSOriginating SiteSiteApplicability NMP-1QJAFHIP-3PNMP-2EGenericBWR QGeneralNMP-20IP-2QNMP-1PGinnaC3GenericPWRImpact,C3NUMARC-007 C3Procedure QVerification 0Training0HardwaregEAL8Technical BasesClValidation 0Deviation 0NoneResolution AlmostallEALscouldbegroupedunder"Equipment Failures" sinceequipment failuresgenerally contribute totheseriousness ofaneventandleadtoemergency classifications..Validation evaluation ofEALsshouldindicateifthesePEGEALsareproperlycategorized.

senatusOOpenOResolved/Awaiting Disposition O>Closed

RecordNo.67Originating SiteNMP-1NMP-2JAFDate9/2Q/93NameM.C.DauSSiteApplicability PJAFC3IP-3QNMP-2HGenericBWRPGeneral0IP-2CINMP-1C3GinnaOGenericPWRImpact0NUMARC-007 CJProcedure CIVerification C3TrainingC3Hardware8EALHTechnical Bases0Validation PDeviation I]Nonecat.BarrierIC¹****Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)

AA2.1isduplicated, in1.4and1.5.Resolution DeletedAA2.1fromsubcategory 1.5.status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition 0+ClosedRecordNo.68Date9/2Q/93NameM.C.DausOriginating SiteSiteApplicability NMP-20JAF0IP-3GNMP-2gGenericBWRC3General HIP-2QNMP-1QGinnaPGenericPWRImpact:0NUMARC-007 QProcedure 0Verification 0TrainingPHardwaregEAL8Technical BasesOValidation 0Deviation ONonecat.BarrierIC¹****Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)

NMP-2PEG,EALAS1.3:

Says1000mr/hr, shouldsay100mr/hr.

NMP1PEGisOK.Resolution ChangedNMP-2PEGEALAS1.3to100mr/hr.senatusOOpenOResolved/Awaiting Disposition OClosed

RecordNo.69Orlglnatlng SiteNMP-1NMP-2JAFDate9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicability CIJAFOIP-3ONMP-28GenericBWROGeneral0IP-2QNMP-1PGinnaPGenericPWRImpact0NUMARC-007 0Procedure 0Verification CITrainingpHardwareIIIEALIHITechnical Bases0Validation QDeviation 0Nonecat.BarrierIC¹****Emer.Class.*'omment(verification)

Considering thatsometimes theemergency Coordinator maynotbeabletodistinguish betweenfireandexplosion, andconsidering thecloseassociation ofHU1.5andHU2.1,considercombining the"fire"and"Man-made events"intoonecategory.

Resolution Firecategorywillbeexpandedtobefire/explosions andnotcombinedwithman-madeevents.status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition 0ClosedRecordNo.70Originating SiteNMP-1NMP-2JAFDate9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicability QJAFOIP-3ONMP-2SGenericBWRClGeneral 0IP-2C3NMP-1OGinnaOGenericPWRImpactQNUMARC-007 PProcedure QVerification QTrainingQHardware5gEALgTechnical BasesQValidation C]Deviation 0Nonecat.BarrierIC¹****Emer.Class.*Comment(verification)

Insection2.0,ReactorVessel,SS5.1andFC2.1areredundant EALs(bothareRPVWL(TAF)..

Resolution ItispossibleforFissionProductBarrierEALstoberedundant witheventbasedEALs.status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition 0Closed

RecordNo.71Orlglnatlng SIteNMP-1NMP-2JAFDate9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteAppllcablllty QJAFPIP-3PNMP-28GenericBWRQGeneralCJIP-2CINMP-1CIGinna0GenericPWRImpactQNUMARC-007 CJProcedure 0Verification 0TrainingC3HardwareSEAL8Technical BasesC]Validation CIDeviation 0Nonecat.BarrierIc¹**No.**Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)

RCS3.1isindicative ofanRCSleakonly,i.e.nofueldamage.SoIsuggestthattheReactorFuelbinisnottheappropriate placeforthisEAL.Maybethe"ReactorPressureVessel"categoryshouldbemadeinto"ReactorPressureVesselandSteamSystems."

Resolution DespitethefactthatNUMARCsaysthisradlevelisindicative ofreactorcoolantinthedrywellwithtechspeclevelofactivity, thesourceofactivityisduetoexposuretoirradiated fuelintheRPV.Assuch,thisEALisindicative ofthestatusofReactorFuel.status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition 0+ClosedRecordNo.rlglnatlng NMP-1NMP-272SiteDateImpact0NUMARC-007 ggEAL9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicabillty0JAF0IP-30NMP-28GenericBWR0GeneralQIP-20NMP-10Ginna0GenericPWR0Procedure 0Verification QTrainingQHardwaregTechnical BasesC]Validation QDeviation QNonecat.BarrierIC¹**No.*Emer.Class.*'omment(verification)

NMP-1,2,NUE1.1~1:Thestatedbasisforthisdoesn'treadmuchlikethePEG,althoughitseemsOK...ResoluttonAgree.status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition 0Closed

RecordNo.73Orlglnatlng SiteNMP-2cat.BarrierDateImpact0NUMARC-007 HEALIc¹**9/2Q/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicability 0JAFQIP-3HNMP-2QGenericBWRC3GeneralI7IP-2HNMP-10Ginna[3GenericPWROProcedure OVerification C3Training CIHardware HTechnical BasesC3Validation 0Deviation QNoneNo.*Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)

NMP-2,NUE1.2.1:TheEALstates15minutes,butthere'snomentionof15minutesinthePEG.Resolution NMP-2PEGEALisbasedontheoffgasradiation alarmsetpoint.

ThesetpointforNMP-2,unlikeNMP-1,includesa15minutetimedelay.statusQOpenQResolved/Awaiting Disposition QeClosedRecordNo.74riglnatlng SiteNMP-1NMP-2Date9/2Q/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicability 0JAFPIP-3HNMP-2PGenericBWRC3General0IP-2HNMP-1CJGinna0GenericPWRImpactC3NUMARC-007 QProcedure QVerification QTrainingC3HardwareHEALHTechnical Bases0Validation C3Deviation QNonelc¹****Emer.Class.**cat.BarrierComment(verification)

NMP-1,2,NUE1.2.2:Idon'tseewhereitsaysinthePEGthat10timestheDRMSalarmsetpointisequivalent to300pCi/CCl-131.Resolution Addeddiscussion inEALTBbasistoPEGEALbasisforNMP1,2.JAFisok.statusQOpenQResolved/Awaiting Disposition QeClosed

RecordNo.75OriglnatlngSiteNMP-1NMP-2Date9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicability QJAFQIP-3QNMP-2gGenencBWRQGeneralQIP-2QNMP-1QGinnaQGenericPWRImpactQNUMARC-007 QProcedure QVerification QTrainingQHardwareSEALHTechnical BasesQValidation QDeviation QNonecat.BarrierIc¹****Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)

NMP-1,2,ALERT1.4.4:Thesecondparagraph ofthebasisisredundant withthefirst.Asuggestion:

Sincethereferenced NMPCmemomaynotbeimmediately available toanyonereadingtheTechBasis,abriefexplanation mightbeappropriate.

Resolution Deletedsecondparagraph ofEALTBbasisforNMP1,2andJAF.status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition 0+ClosedRecordNo.76rlginatlng SiteNMP-1NMP-2Date9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteAppllcablllty QJAFQIP-38NMP-2QGenericBWRQGeneralQIP-28NMP-1QGinnaQGenericPWRImpactQNUMARC-007 QProcedure QVerification QTrainingQHardware8EALgTechnical BasesQValidation QDeviation QNonecat.BarrierIC¹**No.**Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)

NMP-1,2,ALERT1.5.2:PEGreference ofAU2.2iscited.ShouldbeAA2.2.Resolution ChangedNMP1,2EALTB1.5.2reference toAA2.2,JAFok.status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition OeClosed

RecordNo.77Orlglnatlng SiteNMP-1NMP-2Date9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteAppllcabllity 0JAF0IP-30NMP-2gGenericBWR0General0IP-20NMP-10Ginna0GenericPWRImpact0NUMARC-007 0Procedure 0Verification 0Training0HardwaregEAL8Technical Bases0Validation 0Deviation 0Nonecat.BarrierIc¹'*No.'*Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)

NMP-1,2,EALs2.2.1,2.2.2,2.2.3,2.2.4:TheseEALsstate,"anymanualscramwhichfailstoshutdownthereactor."

ButthePEGstates,"Anymanualscramorautomatic scramfollowedbyamanualscramwhichfails.~."Resolution Theseareoneinthesamesinceoperating procedures requirethatanyautomatic scrambefollowedbyoneormoremanualscramattempts.

statusOOpenOResolved/Awaiting Disposition OeClosedRecordNo.78Orlglnatlng SiteNMP-1NMP-2DateImpact0NUMARC-007 5gEAL9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteAppllcablllty 0JAF0IP-30NMP-28GenericBWR0General0IP-20NMP-10Ginna0GenericPWR0Procedure 0Verification 0Training0Hardware8Technical Bases0Validation 0Deviation 0Nonecat.Barrierlc¹**No.**Emer.Class.Comment(verification)

NMP-1,2:NotedthatPC2.2isreferenced forGEs3.2.2and3.4.2.Resolution Itshouldbebecausetheseareconditions requiring intentional ventingperEOPs.statusOOpen0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition 0Closed

RecordNo.79Orlginatlng SiteNMP-1NMP-2DateImpactQNUMARC-007 gEAL9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteAppllcablllty QJAFQIP-3QNMP-28GenencBWRQGeneralQIP-2QNMP-1QGinnaQGenericPWRQProcedure QVerification QTrainingOHardwareHTechnical BasesQValidation QDeviation QNonecat.BarrierIC¹***Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)

NMP-1,2:PEGsectionRCS1.3isnotreferenced forEAL4.1.1inthebinningdocument, butisreferenced intheTechBasisfor4.1.1.Resolution Changedbinningdocument4.1fromPC2.3(SAE)to"PC2.3orRCS1.3(Temp)(SAE)".Changedbinningdocument4.2fromPC2.3(SAE)to"PC2.3orRCS1.3(Rad)(SAE)".status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition 0ClosedRecordNo.80rlginatlng SiteNMP-1NMP-2Date9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteAppllcablllty QJAFQIP-38NMP-2QGenericBWRQGeneralImpactQIP-2QNMP-1QGinnaQGenericPWRQNUMARC-007 QProcedure QVerification QTrainingQHardware5gEALgTechnical BasesQValidation QDeviation QNonecat.BarrierIC¹**N**Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)

NMP-2,EAL4.1.2:Theword"temperature" ismisspelled inthedescription oftheEAL.Resolution Corrected spellinginNMP2.NMP1andJAFok.status0OpenCIResolved/Awaiting Disposition OeClosed

RecordNo.81Originating SiteNMP-2Date9/20/93NameM.C.DauSSiteApplicability CIJAFOIP-3HNMP-2QGenericBWR OGeneralOIP-2ONMP-1QGinnaOGenericPWRImpactQNUMARC-007 0Procedure 0Verification QTrainingC1HardwaregEALIHITechnical Bases0Validation C3Deviation QNonecat.BarrierIc¹**N**Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)

NMP2:FortheEffluentMonitorClassification Threshold TableofEAL5.1.1:AttheAlertlevel,thePEGcallsfor200xDRMSsetpointforRW/RxBldg VentEffl.Mon.andthemainstackeffluentmonitor.ButEAL5.1.1says"lateV'or both.Resolution StillwaitingfornumbersfromNMP.statusOeOpen0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition 0ClosedRecordNo.82rlginating SiteNMP-1NMP-2DateImpactC3NUMARC-007 gEAL9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicability ClJAFHIP-3PNMP-2PGenericBWRgGeneralQIP-2PNMP-1PGinnaQGenericPWR0Procedure 0Verification C3TrainingQHardwareHTechnical Bases0Validation QDeviation ClNonecat~BarrierIC¹**N**Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)

NMP1,2:ForEAL6.1.1,thereisnomentionofthePEGstatement thatatleasttwoemergency generators aresupplying powertoemergency buses.Resolution Availability ofDGsisunnecessary inthisEALbecause,iftheyareunavailable, ahigheremergency classification wouldbedeclaredduetoEAL6.1.2.senatus0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition OeClosed

RecordNo.83Originating SiteNMP-2Date9/20/93NameM.C.DauSSiteApplicability C3JAFCJIP-3HNMP-2OGenericBWRC3General 0IP-2DNMP-1C3GinnaOGenericPWRImpact0NUMARC-007 0Procedure ClVerification CITrainingC3HardwaregEAL8Technical BasesC3Validation 0Deviation C3NoneIc¹**Emer.Class.**cat.BarrierComment(verification)

NMP2:ForEAL6.2.1,the EALspecifies<112.5VDCon 2BYS*BAT2C.

Thereisnomentionof112.5VDCinthePEG.Resolution NMP-2PEGEALSU7.1states"<105vdcbusvoltageindications on125vdcbatteries 2BYS*BAT2A andB,and<112.5vdcon125vdcbattery2BYS*BAT2C".

.statusOOpenOResolved/Awaiting Disposition OIClosedRecordNo.84rlglnatlng SiteNMP-1NMP-2DateImpactC3NUMARC-007 gEAL9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicability OJAFCJIP-3ONMP-2OGenericBWRHGeneralC3IP-2PNMP-1QGinnaOGenericPWR0Procedure 0Verification 0TrainingCIHardwareIHITechnical BasesC3Validation ClDeviation C3Nonecat.BarrierIc¹****Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)

NMP1,2:ForEAL7.3.4,seecomment¹13above.Resolution NESP-007specifies "mostorall"indications where"most"isstatedtobeapproximately 75%.But,NESP-007alsostatesthattheydonotexpecttheoperatortallyupthenumberoflostindicators.

ThisEALispoorlywordedinNESP-007.

Theemphasisneedstobeontheneedforincreased surveillance resulting fromwhatevernumberislost.ThisisatrainingissueuntilNUMARCchoosestnhottorrlofinothicFAIstatus0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition OIClosed

RecordNo.85Orlglnatlng SiteNMP-1NMP-2DateImpact0NUMARC-007 gEAL9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteAppllcablllty 0JAFC3IP-3C3NMP-2QGenericBWRgGeneral0IP-2CINMP-1CJGinnaQGenericPWR0Procedure 0Verification 0TrainingClHardwareIHLTechnical Bases0Validation QDeviation C1Nonecat.BarrierIc¹**No.**Emer.Class.**Comment(verification)

NMP1,2:EAL8.1.2references PEGHA4.2,butthereisnomentionintheEALof"other"securityevents.SimilarcommentforEAL8.1.3.Resolution Sincethereisnodefined"other"securityeventforthisexampleEAL,thiscondition isaddressed undertheJudgement EALs.status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition OeClosedRecordNo.86rlglnatlng SiteNMP-2Date9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteAppllcablllty 0JAFQIP-3QNMP-2QGenericBWR8GeneralImpactPIP-2QNMP-1QGinnaPGenericPWRPNUMARC-007 QProcedure C3Verification 0TrainingQHardware5gEALIHITechnical BasesC]Validation ClDeviation 0NoneEmer.Class.**No.**Ic¹**cat.BarrierComment(verification)

NMP2:InEAL8.2.2,thelistofaffectedareasdoesnotmatchthatinthePEG.Resolution UpdatedPEGtouselistofareasinHUinHA2.1.status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition OiClosed

RecordNo.87Originating SiteNMP-1NMP-2DateImpactC3NUMARC-007 gEAL9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicability ClJAF0IP-3C]NMP-.20GenericBWR8GeneralC3IP-20NMP-1PGinnaCIGenericPWR0Procedure CIVerification 0TrainingClHardware8Technical BasesQValidation 0Deviation ClNoneic¹**Emer.Class.**No.cat.BarrierComment(verification)

NMP1,2:EAL8.3.5references PEGHA3.2,butmakesnoreference toflammable gas.Resolution Addedreference toflammable gasesinwordingofEAL.status.0Open,OResolved/Awaiting Disposition OiClosedRecordNo.88riginatlngSiteNMP-2Date9/20/93NameM.C.DausSiteApplicability 0JAF0IP-3C3NMP-2C3GenericBWRIIIGeneralC3IP-20NMP-1ClGinnaQGenericPWRImpact0NUMARC-007 C3Procedure C3Verification QTrainingCJHardwaregEALIHLTechnical BasesC1Validation CIDeviation QNoneIC¹*No.**cat.BarrierComment(verification)

NMP2:ForEAL8.4.3,theReactorBuildingisnotincludedinthelistofPlantVitalAreas.Samefor8.4.6,8.4.7.Resolution ReactorBuildingisincludedinTable8.4.status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition OeClosed

OSSI93-402A-10-NMP2 NMP-2EALVerlQcatlon

&Valldatlon Report,Rev.0Attachment 3L<'ALVaMationScenarios 3-1

OSSI92-402A-7A-NMP2 EAIValidation Scenarios, Rev.0Attachment 2-VaHdation ExerciseScenarioChecklist No.:Plant:NMP-2Simulator:

~Table-Top:

ClScenario¹1ScenarioDescription(s):

InitialConditions:

Reactorpower100%;HPCSDGOOSinsevendayLCO.Withtheplantat100%power,mainturbinepressurecontrollers faillowinitiating aturbinetripandreactorscramsignal.Allrodsfullyinsert.Reserveandauxboilerstationtransformers failtoenergizewhenthegenerator trips(UE6.1.1).DGsstartandenergizeemergency busses.RCICsteamlinerupturesduetopressurespikeandRCICisolation valvesfaQtoisolate.Emergency RPVdepressurization duetosecondary containment maximumsafeoperating temp"=.ature values(SAE4.1.1).Bombexplosions intheswitchyard andthetwoDGs(UE8.1.1,Alert8.2.2)causelossofRPVinjection sources,(105vdconallbatteries (SAE6.2.2),andlossofoffsit~~~ve:(UE6.1.1);lossofannunciators andindicators andincreased survei!!",:-::..

withtransient inprogress(Alert7.3.3).[ifexplosion weretohaveoccu'..-~

v:hileincoldshutdown/refuel, batterylossperUE6.2.1andlossof'":!'.~'.=per6.1.2.]RPVwaterdecreases

<TAI(SAE2,1.1);withprimarysystemdischarging outsideprimaryco;".'.".'.;".-;.cnt andRBtemperatures aboveMSOlevelsintwoormoreareas(GK4.'.",'.Somefueldamagecc"'..swithcoreuncovery.

RBARMsincreaseaboveMSOvaluesinmoretK-;;..'oareas;withprimarysystemdischarging outsideprimarycontain:.......

("-,~.T:4.2.1,SAE7.3.4,GE4.2.2).2-1

OSSI92-402A-7A-N.""~2 EALValidation Scenarios, Rev.0A;."-.:.=.c"..t2-VaIMation ExerciseScenarioChecklist No.:Plant.NMP-'?Simulator:

~Table-Top:

0Scenario¹2ScenarioDescri".".

'.-'".,'.:InitialConditions:

Reactorpower100%forpast3months,smallsteamleakfromoneturbi","'.!".rottle valve,planttoshutdowntomorrowWiththeplantatI"0%powerandasmallsteamleakonturbinethrottlevalve,adroppedco.-.":o.'-.

-odresultsinfuelcladfailure.Reactorscrams;~~.'.IsnarHCUsexceed100timesalarmsetpoint(UE1.4.1).Offgasactivityi~.";-e,".(UE1.2.1).OneMSLfailstoc(3Z3.5.1).Offsiteradioactivi',;

r"1caseincreases totheGeneralEmergency level(UE5.1.1,Alert1.2.2"';;:=.l.2,SAE5.1.3,GE5.1.4).Drywellradiation

="..-!i.gsincrease(Alert1.3.1).Coolantsampler..:..'.',-300pCi/gm)supporthighoffsiteradiactivity readings(UEl.l.......'<-

i.1.2,GE3.5.2).Emergency RPV'..;"-..":..i;.ation isrequired.

2-2

OSSI92-402A-7A-NMP2 EAI.Validatfon Scenarios, Rev.0A:".::='.="."-t2-VaHdation ExerciseScenarioChecklist No.:PlantNMP->>,Simulator:

~Table-Top:

ClScenario03ScenarioDescris..".:.=

-.'.-,,'nitial Condition.::;.

":."torpower60%,returntopowerdelayedwithfeedwater heate"~.";..s.HPCSoutofservicewithbearingreplacement; duebackin4hc.."Earthquake cause".;.

's";.icactivityalarmsatJAFNPPandNMP-1/2(UE8.4.1).Smalllocaintodg~>>~'!,unidentiQed leakage>10gpm(UE3.1.1).Drywellpressure>"".r'.setpoint(Alert3.2.1).Multiplefailuresc"'..-~.~lection systemsRPVwaterleveld"."...:-;.:-."s

<TAF(SAE2.1.1)2-3

OSSI92-402A-7A-NMP'-?

EALValfdaUon Scenarios, Rev.0P..t."-.-..h=;."..".

t2-Validation ExerciseScenarioChecklist No.:Plant:NMP--.Simulator:

STable-Top:

ClScenario¹4ScenarioDescrip':;..","):

InitialCondition..:

..""..!orpower100%,noequipment OOS.Condensate head"=';.-..sresulting inalossoffeed.Whenthereactors".:".-,n;s onlowRPVwaterlevel,severalcontrolrodsfailtoinsert(Alert2.2.1).'reactorpowerremainsabove5%.RCICandHPCSdo:"..".-t rmainoperable.

Variousotherfail~r";s!~a.ic onelowpressureECCSpumpforRPVmakeup.Boroninjection i,::..=::"-.,(.".-.AE2.2.2).SRVoperation h='=.";;:-".:cssion poolandleakfromsuppression poolcauseswaterlev..!'".-:..e~.".e.RPVpressureandsuppression pooltemperature can.".'..=."..;:aintained belowtheHCTL(SAE3.3.1,GE2.2.3);RPVwaterlevelc":".;.':>emaintained belowMSCRWL(GE2.2.4).Hydrogenconcen:Ž"...'"..

int'esuppression chamberreaches4%(SAE3.4.1).2-4

OSSI92-402A-7A-NMP2 EALValfdation Scenarios, Rev.0J'tt".':....e.t2-Validation ExerciseScenarioChecklist No.:Plant:NMP-2Simulator:

STable-Top:

ClScenario85ScenarioDescript'"..".!~):

InitialConditions:

'."..ctorpower75%,ashutdownisinprogressforadrywellentrytoicc:;";.:;"-.

c!"-ritified leakage,wetwellisdeinerted, drywelldeinertion inpr<;,;..."!'.;!g~ell oxygenconcentration 10%.Noequipment OOS.Lossofoffsitepow..-..o.."u-s(UE6.1.1).Reactorfailstoscr".-'..."-0rodsout(Alert2.2.1).WhenRPSfusesp~"':!.allrodsfullyinsert.AllbutoneDG<a!.":-.::I-."

',-"Jert6.1.3).Remaining DGtxil;.".',.=~"r'.1.4).MajorLOCAoccurs,"'.>Vwaterlevelcannotberestoredandmaintained aboveTAF-(GE6.1.",'.After20minutes,c:".eŽ-returnedtooperation; available injection cannotrestoreRPVwaterl"=-.;.',~eve TAF.Drywellhydrol::-

.~r'.'"..".K3.4.1).PrimaryConta.'."..;.*

...'..."..'

isrequired(GE3.1.2).Hydrogenindrywell>6%(GE3.4.2).Primarycontain';:c:-:.t

.'svent"..dduetoPCPL(GE3.2.2).2-5

OSSI92-402A-7A-N.'.~P2 EALValidation Scenarios, Rev.0Att".:".~:.=nt2-Validation ExerciseScenarioChecklist No.:Plant:Simulator:

ClTable-Top:

~Scenario86ScenarioDescrip'...-.

-',-',:Afterelevatedof:"p-.-,

."'.,'sanoted,reactorcoolantsamplesindicatecoolantactivity>,":,<,',-

g,'-131eq.(UE1.1.1)Following react","."'".,'..:.-.:-,..d depressurization, coolantsamplesaretakenindicating 390pCiy-:mi-131cq.(Alert1.1.2)2-6

OSSI92-402A-7A-NMP2 EAT.Validation Scenarios, Rev.0At*"=-.'.;

cnt2-Validation ExerciseScenarioChecklist No.:Plant:M<P-2Simulator:

0Table-Top:

~Scenario¹7ScenarioDescr'r"..-'."):

Reactorscramson!.'.xd:g~vellpressure.

Drywellradiation levelsindicate[Later]R/hr.(PJer..".

).Following emerge";."..."..".'V c!@pressurization, drywellradiation levelsof[Later]R/hrareindicated (ShE1.3.2).Atwhatlevelwou!d;oudcc!areaGeneralEmergency basedondrywellradiation levels?(GT1.3.3)2-7

OSSI92-402A-7A-i"'~.".

~"EALValidation Scenarios.

Rev.0Attachxnent 2-Validation ExerciseScenarioChecklist No.:Plant:renp-."Simulator:

QTable-Top:

~Scenario88ScenarioDescrip".o".

f"-):AHPTechnician pc.farmingroutinesurveysmeasuresControlRoomarearadiation levelsoi".:..":.2 j!'r(Alert1.4.3).Itisreportedthat.".n".~shielded radiography sourceisintheRelayRoom.Generalareared~.tion'eve!s intherelayroomareapproximately 20R/hr(Alert1.4.4)2-8

OSSI92-402A-7A-Nl<>2 EAI.Validation Scenarios, Rev.0At".".".'....."".t 2-Validation ExerciseScenarioChecklist No.:Plant:Simulator:

ClTable-Top:

~Scenario89ScenarioDescria"."."!"'efueling operations areinprogressandamainsteamlineplugbeginstoleakcausingther"f':"!"..<ca.".tyandspentfuelpoolleveltodrop.TheSFPlowlevelalarmisr".."ic;cd (UE1.5.1).Afuelbund!.i.=.c'.'"e<r~pp'eandinthecattleshutewhentherefuelfloorisevacuated

',.'.:;.;

'..:Therefuelfloorradiation monitorsgooffscalehigh(Alert1.4.2)2-9

OSSI92-402A-7A-NMP2 EALValfdatfon Scenarios, Rev.08t..-..l..-...."..".t

"-Validation ExerciseScenarioChecklist No.:Plant.NMP-2Simulator; ClTable-Top:

~Scenario¹10ScenarioDescrii."io

"<"'.Chemistry reportsstackeffluentanalysisindicates thateffluents havebeenapproximately 3'.i::.".s;"ech.

S~ec.allowedlimitsforthelast2hours(UE5.2.1).300timesTec.'s.Spec.forthelast20minutes(Alert5.2.2)2-10

OSSI92-402A-74-F

>.",".P2EALValidation Scenarios.

Rev.0Att,.b...cnt2-Validation ExerciseScenarioChecklist No.:Plant:NynP2Simulator:

ClTable-Top:

~'cenario¹11ScenarioDescr'-:c.-',".):

Fieldsurveyteamsrcportivholebodydoseratesatthesiteboundaryof20mR/hr(Alert5.";,.3,'.

200mR/h(8,':.'..;"

""Doseprojection"

.':".".jcate childthyroiddosesof7200mR(GE5.2.5)2-11

OSSI92-402A-7A-."I;"..?

EAI.Validation Scenarios, Rev.0"'.:"."-,"-.,"..".t".-VA~'dation ExerciseScenarioChecklist No.:Plant:Ni'IP-2Simulator:

QTable-Top:

0Scenario812ScenarioDescTheplanthasentere..l a24LCOactionstatement at0700duetoEGoperability.

At1800ap!",ntshutdownisinitiated.

At0700thefollowing day,coolanttemple:.ate,'e isstill220'Fwhileattempting toinitiateshutdowncooling{:.'=..'.'=)Shutdowncoo':::<cannotbcestablished duetoafailureofSDCsuctionvalve.Reactortemper:-..".;:"cannotvc'educedto212F(Alert7.2.3)2-12

OSSI92-402A-7A-i9l;

~?EALValidation Scenarios, Rev.0..-VMdationExerciseScenarioChecklist No.:Plant:Nvi.p-)Simulator:

QTable-Top:

~Scenario813ScenarioDescr'".i"..Ž.'"-"

Atankercarry.'.~<

~,:.=>>.,i~.iagasoverturns ontheaccessroadreleasing ammoniagas.Th".lu;.~ecaressesontothesite,incapacitating numeroussitepersonnel (UI;8....!Thegasthene:"!.,".rs thecontrolroomrequiring thecontrolroomtobeevacuated (Ale't".3.38:7.2.2).ControlofRPViniection isnotacheivedafter30minutes(SAR7.2.4).2-13

OSSI92-402A-7A-Ni~!

P2EALValidation Scenarios, Rev.0~"".-'".-.""..'

-VMdationExerciseScenarioChecklist No.:Plant:NA".P-,'?

Simulator:

ClTable-Top:

~Scenario814ScenarioDescr':":.'"-':

Aseverestormcau,".""alossofalltelephone systemsoffsite.Noradiosrespondtoatt.e::pL'stoc.,!1cffsite(UE7.3.2).Meteorologic" I,t"""Ž".;ipchart indicatesustained windspeedsof95mph(Alert8.4.O.Theroofisrir.a."~o.'foithesecuritybuilding(Alert8.4.7).2-14

OSSI92-402A-7h-I'i".

-2EALValfdatfon ScenarloS, Rev.0."-.-Validation ExerciseScenarioChecklist No.:Plant:NynP2Simulator:

QTable-Top:

8Scenario¹15ScenarioDescr'vt'.on(s):

Abombthreatisr""".".d.Asearchrevealsabombinthereactorbuildingataremoteshu!.-..'."...

~~'..-."!(!.'.-.8.1.1).Anunauthor"ec':".c vi:!ualisrcco<nized tohavescaledtheProtected Areafence(Alert8.!..'.Theindividu.".!

i~'..";.".'.;..d intothereactorbuilding(SAE8.1.3).Thebombexp!odsdestroying theremoteshutdownpanel(GE8.1.4orAlert8.2.2).Insteadoft!-.:"."-'-.;

'-..'Id'ng,abombexplodesintheAdministative Building(U2-15

OSSI92-402A-7A-N VP2EALValidation Scenarios, Rev.0f.';"."-.

-..".;.=+:?-Validation ExerciseScenarioChecklist No.:Plant:Simulator:

C3Table-Top:

SScenario816ScenarioDesc'""."!~!.):

Asecuritytru"':":",".ti",ed;sc!fuelstoragetank(UE8.3.1).Thecollisinn

'n~'".~'",".'"intheoiltank(Alert8.3.4).Thespilledci!c"-"."..hes

~:.reandburnsoutofcontrolfor30minutes(UE8.2.1).2-16

OSSI92-402A-7,'.

EALValtdatfon Scenarios, Rev.0..-=."-.:."-Validation ExerciseScenarioChecklist No.:Plant:Simulator:

QTable-Top:

~Scenario817ScenarioDesc'hecontrolroomoperators noticegroundmotionandthattheseismicactivityala".i~.'.";."".",'",'.J."..i!PPcallsandconfirmstheearthquake (UE8.4.1).JAFNPPlaterce'.!~andsaystheearthquake wasofmagnitude O.lg(Alert8.4.5).Asaresultoftheearthquake thescreenwell buildingisdestroyed (Alert8.4.7).2-17 0

OSSI92-402h.-7A-

~2EALValidation Scenarios, Rev.0Attachment

-Validation ExerciseScenarioChecklist No.:Plant:N)"t~-2Simulator:

0Table-Top:

0Gcenario¹18ScenarioDescry".:",;=',):Areporttotheccntrclroomstatesthatatornadohasbeensightedinsidethesecur'tyf'e:..ce',i'+.4.2).Anoperate'".-."."'"

-'="-.'";.

c,".:".not gettothescreenwell becauseofwindanddebris',"..:.',"=..:.

2-18

OSSI92-402~='?.~-"'~~?EALValidation Scenarios, Rev.0Attach'nt2-Validation ExerciseScenarioChecklist No.:Plant:Simulator; C3Table-Top:

~Scenario¹19ScenarioDescry:,".lo.;.(

..':Lakefloodinghas:e,.u'-'..cd inmeasuredlakelevelsof248ft.(UE8.4.4).Frizzleicef".."..:.".'~n

!."-scausedt.heintakewaterleveltodropto[Later]ft.(Alert8.4.B;.2-19

OSSI93-402A-10-NMP2 NMP-2EALVerIAcatfon

&Validation Report,Rev.0Attachment 4EALValidation SSheets4-1

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValidaUon Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 1-VaHdation SunlmaxySheetiiI4,,').!~Plant+~2-IIRIIlCValidation TeamMembers:ICa(6tA.W5Jck~WrstPIecch(.('1~~~Checklist No.:~EALRev.No.:~EALNscrimnrlN8Ql~g.IBgiValid.performed andcommentsrecorded; Q.(ot>(ZXValidatiTeamLeaderDateEALRev.No.:~jChecklist No.:~1I~lliII1tii~~NJim~TiFi,s~~'tiiiIliValidation amLeaderDate~IIiI.oet~l.~,zg.Q82-QRQValida.performed andcommentsrecorded:

~&I.~~CheckhstNo.:tEALRev.No.:IsIzIUass'7~BQS.IIQQValid.performed andcommentsrecorded:

e.-Validatio TeamLeaderDateChcklistNo.:~e(EALRev.No.:~~@QgQQQQValida.performed andcommentsrecorded:

Validation earnLeaderDateI~*l~~IContinuation SheetsAttached:

~'Il~~I

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValidation Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 1-VaHdation SuxnmsrySheetPlant:XLGI1KValidation TeamMembers:5~~e~4~)t'Il3tI'IChecldtst No.:~EALRev.No.:ILtegl,'?r<3lEValid.performed andcommentsrecorded:

LobJaZValidatio earn.Leader DateChecklist No.:~EALRev.No.:tValida.performed andcommentsrecorded:

~sf(VValtdation earnLeaderDate'l;3li'Il3RItChecklist No.:~EALRev.No.:M~lAL~N~i~TCheckhstNo.:MBa.Rm.XZEALRev.No.:Q5gaIi9.asoValid.performed andcommentsrecorded:

gofv(qValidation earnLeaderDatestII~3'106Valida.performed andcommentsrecorded:

Lb()(tedValidation earnLeaderDate.3iContinuation SheetsAttached:

1-2

OSSI92-402A-7A-NMP2 EALValidation Scenarios, Rev.0,Attachment 1-VaHdation SummaxySheetPlant:Validation TeamMembers:Checklist No.:v(tI!tEALRev.No.:CChecklist No.:~II'ALRev.No.:s-.QQ.'.cQQ7-I~7.~.39.>.5QRl/CIXI~IQlipQKIValid.performed andcommentsrecorded:

i,t>i~~Validation earnLeaderDateValida.performed andcommentsrecorded:

r.L,itsVaBdation TeamLeaderDateChecklist No.:IEALRev.No.:~SS=I!Checklist No.:AREALRev.No.:/ALLANJimT-TL)QQtoQN/0ocloQQ/7-rL.I!~QQQQrQQQQValid.performed andcommentsrecorded:

C..dtit'((g~Valida.performed andcommentsrecorded:

lo!(/ygValidation earnLeaderDateValidation TmLeaderDateContinuation SheetsAttached:

1-3

OSSI92-402A-7A-NMP2 EALValidation Scenarios, Rev.0Attachment 1-VaHdation SmnmaxySheettc)o)<<t>Plant:Validation TeamMembers:Checklist No.:~/6EALRev.No.:IL=eChecklist No.:~EALRev.No.:~~M;I'\IL=e.(~oelQQQCIff!/QQcetClliPQQQtlII)Valid.performed andcommentsrecorded:

JokL'c2.Validation earnLeaderDateIValidaUon earnLeaderDateValida.performed andcommentsrecorded:

(l.c'~3Checklist No.:EALRev.No.:~I""sChecldist No.:EALRev.No.:~L~NQmT-T8'39f.z..I.9sQglQg3elQ8Continuation SheetsAttached:

Valid.performed andcommentsrecorded:

I~~~f'tZValidation earnLeaderDateQQQQQQQQValida.performed andcommentsrecorded:

UaBdation TeamLeaderDateI!lfi$~tj)ifjII~I1-4

OSSI93-402A-10-NMP2 NMP-2EALVerification

&Validation Report,Rev.0Attachment 5F.~.TValidation ExerciseChecklists 5-1

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValidation Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-ValMation ExerciseChechlist Date:10793Checklist No.:1YesNo~NA1.WhentheneedforclassiQcation wasinitially recognized, weretheEALseasilyaccessible totheuser'~QQComments:

None.2.Whereplantconditions requiredemergency classification, didtheformatandlayoutoftheEALssupporteasyandrapidclassification recognition' Q~QComments:

ItwouldbeheifultolaminateEALmatrixanduseerasablemarkerssoEDcanmarkEALsreachandthoseabouttbdelared.3.Wasclassification ofanyconditions notrequiring emergency classification avoided'~QQComments:

None.4.Didtypeandarrangement ofEALcategories andsubcategories adequately supportemergency classification efforts'~QComments:

EAL3.1.1leakratesmabebetterlocatedunderRPV.That'swherethe'relocatedinTechnical Secifications.

ConsidermovinEAL3.1.2tounderRPValso.3-1

OSSIS2-402A-7 EALValidation Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-VaHdation ExerciseChechlist Date:10793Checklist No.:1YesNo~NA5.Whereplantconditions requiredemergency classification, wastheoperating modeapplicability oftheEALsclearlyrecognized?

aooComments:

None.6.DidtheEALsandrequiredEmergency Planprocedures interface properly' Cl0~Comments:

None.7.Afterinitialclassification, didsubsequent classification escalation followalogicalprogression intheEM@whenappropriate?

~0CIComments:

None.8.DidtheEALssupportescalation ofemergency classification whenplantconditions indicated thatescalation wasappropriate'

~ooComments:

None.3-2

OSSI92-402A-7 EAI.ValidatIon Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-VaHdation ExerciseChecMistDate:10793Checklist No.:19Whereplantconditions permitted reduction inthelevelofemergency'response, wasdowngradingofclassifications easilyrecognized usingtheEALs'?YesNo~NA5QQComments:

None.10.AretheEALsdevoidofanymisleading orincorrect information'

~QQComments:

None.11.DidtheEALsadequately specifycontrols, instrumentation, operatoraides,procedures.

etc,necessary toeffectively evaluatetheEALs'?~QQComments:

None.12.DidtheEALshaveadequatedetailtobeeffectively evaluated' Q~QComments:

EAL1.4.2:secichannel1with1413.AretheEALsdevoidofexcessive detail'?~QQComments:

EAL6.1.1:aredesinatorsfortransformers readilunderstandable'?

Iscommonterminolo used'?3-3

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValidation Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-VaHdation ExerciseChechHstDate:10793Checklist No.:1YesNo~NA14.DidtheEALidentification schemeadequately supportlocationoftheEALcondition withintheclassification procedure'P

~0CIComments:

None..15.Additional Comments:

None.3-4

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValfdatfon Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-VaHdation ExerciseChecRHstDate:10793Checklist No.:2Yes~N~NA1.Whentheneedforclassification wasinitially recognized, weretheEALseasilyaccessible totheuser'~aoComments:

None.2.Whereplantconditions requiredemergency classiQcation, didtheformatandlayoutoftheEALssupporteasyandrapidclassification recognition'?

50C3Comments:

None.,3.WasclassiQcation ofanyconditions

~norequiring emergency classification avoided'~0ClComments:

None.4.Didtypeandarrangement ofEALcategories andsubcategories adequately supportemergency classification efforts'~00Comments:

None.3-1

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValidation Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-VaHdation ExerciseChechHstDate:10793Checklist No.:25.Whereplantconditions requiredemergency classiQcation, wastheoperating modeapplicability oftheEALsclearlyrecognized' YesNo~NASQ0Comments:

None.6.DidtheEALsandrequiredEmergency Planprocedures interface properly' a~Comments:

None.7.Afterinitialclassification, didsubsequent classification escalation followalogicalprogression intheEALswhenappropriate'

~0C3Comments:

None.8.DidtheEALssupportescalation ofemergency classification whenplantconditions indicated thatescalation wasappropriate'

~ooComments:

None.9.Whereplantconditions permitted reduction inthelevelofemergency

response, wasdowngradingofclassifications easilyrecognized usingtheF~?500Comments:

None.3-2

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValidation Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-VaHdation ExerciseChecMistDate:10793Checklist No.:2YesNo~NA10.AretheEALsdevoidofanymisleading orincorrect information'

~ooComments:

None.11.DidtheEALsadequately specifycontrols, instrumentation, operatoraides,procedures, etc.necessary toeffectively evaluatetheEMs'?oruComments:

EAL13.11.3.21.3.3:whenvaluesarereceivedfromNMPshouldlisttheminTablesas2decimallacesscientioc notatione.1.76E5.12.DidtheEALshaveadequatedetailtobeeffectively evaluated' 0~0Comments:

EAL3.5.1:Pathwatotheenvironment isnsideredtoexistonceasoutbdPCisolaionbecausedownstream valvsarenotleaktested.Wouldwanttoconsiderotherindications intheturbinebuildinsuchasvisualobservation ofsteamleakARMsCAMstc.3-3

OSSI92-402A-7 EAI.ValfdatIon Procedure, Rer.0Attachment 3-VaHdation ExerciseChechHstDate:10793Checklist No.:213.AretheEALsdevoidofexcessive detailVYesNo~NA0~CIComments:

EAL1.2.1shouldreadreaterthanoreualtoDRMSred.14.DidtheEALidentification schemeadequately supportlocationoftheEALcondition withintheclassification procedure'P

~aoComments:

None.15.Additional Comments:

None.3-4

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValidation Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-Validation ExerciseChecMistDate;10793Checklist No.:~YesNo~NA1.Whentheneedforclassification wasinitially recognized, weretheEALseasilyaccessible totheuser'Comments:

None.Whereplantconditions requiredemergency classification, didtheformatandlayoutoftheEALssupporteasyandrapidclassification recognition' rooComments:

None.3.Wasclassification ofanyconditions notrequiring emergency classification avoided'o~oComments:

EAL3.2.1:If1.68siisreacheduetolossofdellcoolinisAlertdeclared' AearssobutNESP-007clearlfocusesonlossofRCSandleakintoPC.Considerusinwordinforrestoreandmaintaininsteadofustmaintain.

Restoreandmaintainwouldallowtheoeratortotoreduceressure.Butouhttodeclareifreduction isduetodellsraoeration.annotbemaintained

<1.68siduetocoolan~leakse.3-1

OSSI92-402A-7 EAI.Validation Procedure.

Rev.0Attachment 3-Validation ExerciseChechHstDate:10793Checldist No.:~YesNo~NA4.Didtypeandarrangement ofEALcategories andsubcategories adequately supportemergency classiAcation efforts'~QQComments:

None.5.Whereplantconditions requiredemergency classification, wastheoperating modeapplicability oftheEALsclearlyrecognized?

rQQComments:

None.6.DidtheEALsandrequiredEmergency Planprocedures interface properly' QQ~Comments:

None.7.Afterinitialclassification, didsubsequent classification escalation followalogicalprogression intheEALswhenappropriate'

~QQComments:

None.8.DidtheEALssupportescalation ofemergency classification whenplantconditions indicated thatescalation wasappropriate?

~QQComments:

None.3-2

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValidation Procedure.

Rev.0Attachment 3-ValMation ExerciseChechHstDate:10793'hecklist No.:3YesNo~NA9.Whereplantconditions permitted reduction inthelevelofemergency

response, wasdowngradingofclassifications easilyrecognized usingtheEALs'?~QQComments:

None.10.AretheEALsdevoidofanymisleading orincorrect information'

~QQComments:

None.11.Didthe$MLsadequately specifycontrols.

instrumentation, operatoraides,procedures, etc,necessary toeffectively evaluatetheEALs'?~QQComments:

None.12.DidtheEALshaveadequatedetailtobeeffectively evaluated'

~QQComments:

None.13.AretheEALsdevoidofexcessive detail'~QQComments:

None.3-3

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValidation Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-VaHdation ExerciseChecMistDate10793Checklist No.:314.DidtheEALidentification schemeadequately supportlocationoftheEALcondition withintheclassification procedure'P YesNo~NA50ClComments:

None.15.Additional Comments:

None.3-4

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValidation Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-VaHdation ExerciseChechHstDate10793CheckBstNo.:4Y~s~N~NA1.Whentheneedforclassification wasinitially recognized, weretheEALseasilyaccessible totheuser'?~00Comments:

None.2.Whereplantconditions requiredemergency classiQcation, didtheformatandlayoutoftheEALssupporteasyandrapidclassification recognition'?

r00Comments:

None.3.Wasclassification ofanyconditions

~nrequiring emergency classification avoided'500Comments:

None.4.Didtypeandarrangement ofEALcategories andsubcategories adequately supportemergency classification efforts'?

~00Comments:

None.3-1

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValidation Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-Validation ExerciseChechHstDate:10793Cimcldist No.:45.Whereplantconditions requiredemergency classiAcation, wastheoperating modeapplicability oftheEALsclearlyrecognized' YesNo~NA5QQComments:

None.6.DidtheEALsandrequiredEmergency Planprocedures interface properly' QQ~Comments:

None.7.Afterinitialclassification, didsubsequent classification escalation followalogicalprogression intheEALswhenappropriate' 0QQComments:

None.8.DidtheEALssupportescalation ofemergency classification whenplantconditions indicated thatescalation wasappropriate'?

~QQComments:

None.9.Whereplantconditions permitted reduction inthelevelofemergency

response, wasdowngradingofclassifications easilyrecognized usingtheEALs'?~QQComments:

None.3-2

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValfdation Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-Validation ExerciseChechlist Date10793Checklist No.:4YesNo~NA10.AretheEALsdevoidofanymisleading orincorrect information' rQQComments:

None.11.DidtheEALsadequately specifycontrols, instrumentation, operatoraides,procedures, etc.necessary toeffectively evaluatetheEALs'?rQQComments:

None.12.DidtheEALshaveadequatedetailtobeeffectively evaluated' 8QQComments:

None.13.AretheEALsdevoidofexcessive detail'~QQComments:

None.14.DidtheEALidentification schemeadequately supportlocationoftheEALcondition withintheclassification procedure'

~QQComments:

None.15.Additional Comments:

None.3-3

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValidation Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-Validation ExerciseChechHstDate:10793Checklist No.:~YesNo~NAl.WhentheneedforclassiQcation wasinitially recognized, weretheEALseasilyaccessible totheusers~QQComments:

None.2.Whereplantconditions requiredemergency classiQcation, didtheformatandlayoutofthe'EALssupporteasyandrapidclassification recognition'?

~QQComments:

None.3.WasclassiAcation ofanyconditions

~norequiring emergency classification avoidedV8QQComments:

None.4.Didtypeandarrangement ofEALcategories andsubcategories adequately supportemergency classification efforts'aQQComments:

None.3-1

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValidation Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-Validation ExerciseChechHstDate:10793Checklist No.:5Yes~N~NA5.Whereplantconditions requiredemergency classification, wastheoperating modeapplicability oftheEALsclearlyrecognizedV

~ooComments:

None.6.DidtheEALsandrequiredEmergency Planprocedures interface properly'?

aorComments:

None.7.Afterinitialclassification, didsubsequent classiQcation escalation followalogicalprogression intheEALswhenappropriate'

~ClClComments:

None.8.DidtheEALssupportescalation ofemergency classification whenplantconditions indicated thatescalation wasappropriate'

~00Comments:

None.9.Whereplantconditions permitted reduction inthelevelofemergency

response, wasdowngradingofclassifications easilyrecognized usingtheEALs'?W00Comments:

None.3-2

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValidation Procedure.

Rev.0Attachment 3-Validation ExerciseChecRHstDate:10793CheckBstNo.:~YesNo~NA10.AretheEALsdevoidofanymisleading orincorrect information'?

rooComments:

None.ll.DidtheEALsadequately specifycontrols, instrumentation, operatoraides,procedures, etc..necessary toeffectively evaluatetheEALs'?~00Comments:

None.12.DidtheEALshaveadequatedetailtobeeffectively evaluated' roaComments:

~Non.13.AretheEALsdevoidofexcessive detail'0~0Comments:

EAL6.1.3shouldnotinclude2XTS-XSNlbecauseitcannotbeoweredfromanoA'siteowersources.14.DidtheEALidentification schemeadequately supportlocationoftheEALcondition withintheclassification procedure'

~C30Comments:

None.3-3

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValidation Procedure.

Rev.0Attachment 3-VaHdation ExerciseChechHstDate:10793Checklist No.:515.Additional Comments:

None.YesNo~NA3-4

OSSIS2-402A-7 EALValidation Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-ValMation ExerciseChechlist Date:10793Checklist No.:~Yes~N~NA1.WhentheneedforclassiQcation wasinitially recognized, weretheEALseasilyaccessible totheuser?~Q0Comments:

None.2.Whereplantconditions requiredemergency classiQcation, didtheformatandlayoutoftheEALssupporteasyandrapidclassiQcation recognition'

~00Comments:

None.3.'-Wasclassification ofanyconditions notrequiring emergency classification avoided'roaComments:

None.4.Didtypeandarrangement ofEALcategories andsubcategories adequately supportemergency classification efforts?0~0Comments:

Cateo6title"Sstem"doesnotreallAttheEALscontained intheCateoe.turbinefailurecontrolroomevacuation

.3-1

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValidation Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-VaHdation ExerciseChecMist10793Checklist No.:65.Whereplantconditions requiredemergency classification, wastheoperating modeapplicability oftheEALsclearlyrecognized' Y~sNo~NAS00Comments:

None.6.DidtheEALsandrequiredEmergency Planprocedures interface properly' oo~Comments:

None.7.Afterinitialclassification, didsubsequent classification escalation followalogicalprogression intheEALswhenappropriate?

~0QComments:

None.8.DidtheEALssupportescalation ofemergency classification whenplantconditions indicated thatescalation wasappropriate' E00Comments:

None.9.Whereplantconditions permitted reduction inthelevelofemergency

response, wasdowngradingofclassifications easilyrecognized usingtheEALs'?~Cl03-2

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValidation Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-VaIMation ExerciseChecRIist Date10793CheekBstNo.:6YesNo~NAComments:

Modealicabili:

isitnecessatodownradewhenthemodeshiftsfromowerostocoldshutdown'?

No.Thisisaolicissue.Thechaneinmodeisnotamehanismtoescalateordescalate.

NRCwillromlateinasoontobeissuedNUREGthataformaldeclaration neednotbemadeifoneAndsthatintheastacondition reuirinescalation xistedbutsubseuentlassed.10.AretheEALsdevoidofanymisleading orincorrect informationV rooComments:

None.11.DidtheEALsadequately specifycontrols, instrumentation, operatoraides,procedures, etc.necessary toeffectively evaluatetheEALsVrooComments:

None.12.DidtheEALshaveadequatedetailtobeeffectively evaluated' oroComments:

Definitions ofclassiAcations areneededonEALmatrixatleasttoheiinteretationofCateo9.13.AretheEALsdevoidofexcessive detail'~oo3-3

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValidation Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-VaHdation ExerciseChechHstDate:10793Checklist No.:6YesNo~NAComments:

None.14.DidtheEALidentification schemeadequately supportlocationoftheEALcondition withintheclassification procedure'

~oaComments:

None.15.Additional Comments:

SuestchaneEbarto-E.3-4

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValidation Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-Validation ExerciseChechlist 10793ChecMtetNo.:7Y~eNo~NA1.Whentheneedforclassification wasinitially recognized, weretheEALseasilyaccessible totheuser'?aoaComments:

None.2.Whereplantconditions requiredemergency

,.classification, didtheformatandlayoutoftheEALssupporteasyandrapidclassification recognition'

~Cl0Comments:

None.3.Wasclassification ofanyconditions

~norequiring emergency classification avoided'0~CIComments:

Ifsraandressurecomedownandcantherefore maintainlessthanscramseointdoesAlerthaveobedeclared'?

BelieveshouldhavedeclaredAlertassoonasEOPsteasedthatermitteduseofsrasontrolerr,~ur..4.Didtypeandarrangement ofEALcategories andsubcategories adequately supportemergency classification efforts'?

~00Comments:

None.3-1

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValtdation Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-Validation ExerciseChecklist Date;10793Checklist No.:7YesNo~NA5.Whereplantconditions requiredemergency classification, wastheoperating modeapplicability oftheEALsclearlyrecognized'

~QQComments:

None.6.DidtheEALsandrequiredEmergency Planprocedures interface properly' QQ~Comments:

None.7.Afterinitialclassification, didsubsequent classification escalation followalogicalprogression intheEALswhenappropriate' rQQComments:

None.8.DidtheEALssupportescalation ofemergency classification whenplantconditions indicated thatescalation wasappropriate'

~QQComments:

None.3-2

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValidation Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-VaHdation ExerciseChecMistDatir10793Checklist No.:7YesNo~NA9.Whereplantconditions permitted reduction inthelevelofemergency

response, wasdowngradingofclassifications easilyrecognized usingtheEALs'?~QQComments:

None.10.AretheEALsdevoidofanymisleading orincorrect information'

~QQComments; None.11.DidtheEALsadequately specifycontrols, instrumentation, operatoraides,procedures, etc.necessary toeffectively evaluatetheEALs'?Q~QComments:

EALsasdellressurebutEOPsasrimacontainment ressure.12.DidtheEALshaveadequatedetailtobeeffectively evaluated?

Q~QComments:

Perhasusedellarearadiation andutRMScomonentnumbersinEAL1.1.11.1.21.1.3.Doesradmonitornumberneedobesecified'?

Possibl.3-3

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValtdatfon Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-VaHdation ExerciseChechHstDate1079Checklist No.:713.AretheEALsdevoidofexcessive detail'YesNo~NAraComments:

Takesstemdesinator43outofTable1.1.14.DidtheEALidentification schemeadequately supportlocationoftheEALcondition withintheclassification procedure'

~0ClComments:

None.15.Additional Comments:

None.34

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValfdatfon Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-VaHdation ExerciseChechHstDate10793Checldist No.:~YesNo~NA1.Whentheneedforclassification wasinitially recognized, weretheEALseasilyaccessible totheuser?rooComments:

None.2.Whereplantconditions requiredemergency classification, didtheformatandlayoutoftheEALssupporteasyandrapidclassification recognition?

rQQComments:

None.3.Wasclassification ofanyconditions notrequiring emergency classification avoided?rooComments:

None.4.Didtypeandarrangement ofEALcategories andsubcategories adequately supportemergency classification efforts?rQQrComments:

None.3-1

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValidation Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-Validation ExerciseChechHstDate:10793Checklist No.:85.Whereplantconditions requiredemergency classification, wastheoperating modeapplicability oftheEALsclearlyrecognized?

YesNo~NA5QQComments; None.6.DidtheEALsandrequiredEmergency Planprocedures interface properly?

QQ~Comments:

None.7.Afterinitialclassification, didsubsequent classification escalation followalogicalprogression intheEALswhenappropriate?

Comments:

None.8.DidtheEALssupportescalation ofemergency classification whenplantconditions indicated thatescalation wasappropriate?

5QQComments:

None.9.Whereplantconditions permitted reduction inthelevelofemergency

response, wasdowngradingofclassifications easilyrecognized usingtheEALs?~QQComments:

None.3-2

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValidation Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-Validation ExerciseChecMistDate:10793Checklist No.:8YesNo~NA10.AretheEALsdevoidofanymisleading orincorrect information'

~QQComments:

None.ll.DidtheEALsadequately specifycontrols, instrumentation, operatoraides,procedures, etc.necessary toeffectively evaluatetheEALsVQSQComments:

EAL1.4.4:Wouldnothavearriveddeclaration of>8Rhrunlessaccesstoareawasreuired.That'scorrect.12.DidtheEALshaveadequatedetailtobeeffectively evaluated?

~QQComments:

None.13.AretheEALsdevoidofexcessive detail'SQQComments:None.14.DidtheEALidentification schemeadequately supportlocationoftheEALcondition withintheclassification pro'cedure'?

~QQComments:

None.3-3

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValidation Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-Validation ExerciseChecklist Date10793Checklist No.:815.Additional Comments:

None.YesNo~NA'-4

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValidation Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-Validation ExerciseChecklist Date:10793Checldist No.:9YesNo~NA1.Whentheneedforclassification wasinitially recognized, weretheEALseasilyaccessible totheuser'?SQQComments:

None.2.Whereplantconditions requiredemergency classification, didtheformatandlayoutoftheEALssupporteasyandrapidclassification recognition?

5QQComments:

None.3.Wasclassilication ofanyconditions

~norequiring emergency classification avoided?rQQComments:None.4.Didtypeandarrangement ofEALcategories andsubcategories adequately supportemergency classification efforts?~QQComments:None.3-1

OSSI92-402A-7 EAI.Valldatfon Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-Validation ExerciseChecMistDate:10793Checldist No.:~YesNo~NA5.Whereplantconditions requiredemergency classification, wastheoperating modeapplicability oftheEALsclearlyrecognized' rQQComments:None.6.DidtheEALsandrequiredEmergency Planprocedures interface properly?

Commcnts:None.7.Afterinitialclassification, didsubsequent classificai.ion escalation followalogicalprogression intheEALswhenappropriate' SQQComments:

None.8.DidtheE.'ii.ssupportescalation ofemergency classificai.ion whenplantconditions indicated thatescal:~t.ion wasappropriate' SQQCommcnt,s:None.9.Whereplantconditions permitted reduction inthelevelofemergency

response, wasdowngradingofclassifications easilyrecognized usingtheEAI.sY~QQCommcnts:None.3-2

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValidation Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-Validation ExerciseChecklist DM:~laIC!Checklist No.:9YesNo~NA10.AretheEAI.sdevoidofanymisleading orincorrect information?

rQoComments:

EAL1.5.2:oneSROwouldhavecalledAlertwovisualreortotherwouldhavewaitedforvisual.11.Did-theEALsadequately specifycontrols, instrumentation, operatoraides,procedures, etc.necessary toeffectively evaluatetheEALs?rooCommcnis:

None.12.DidtheEALshaveadequatedetailtobeeffectively evaluated?

oroCommcnIs:ARMs>100timessetointwhich~setointnlcrtalarm

,orhialarm'PShouldbe"hi".ThisisalsoaroblemwithotherEALse..5.0~etc..J!.:stcut"red"or"ellow"noteveningarenUic,"-~'~,

13.AretheI.:KLsdevoidofexcessive detail?rooComments:

None.3-3

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValidation Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-VaHdation ExerciseChecMistDate:~107(93Checklist No.:914.DidtheI;Al.identification schemeadequately supportloc;!.ion oftheEALcondition withintheclassificaL:on procedures Yes~N~NA~0ClCommcn!.s:

None.15.Additional Comments:

None.3-4

OSSI92-402A-7 EAI.Validatfon Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-VaHdation ExerciseChechHstDate:10793Checklist No.:10Y~sNo~NA1.Whentheneedforclassification wasinitially recognized, weretheEALseasilyaccessible totheuser'?~ouComments:

None.2.Whereplantconditions requiredemergency classification, didtheformatandlayoutoftheEALssupporteasyandrapidclassification recognition' rooComments:

None.3.Wasclassification ofanyconditions notrequiring emergency classification avoided'~aoComments:

None.4.Didtypeandarrangement ofEALcategories andsubcategories adequately supportemergency classification efforts'~00Comments:

None.3-1

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValldaUon Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-VaHdation ExerciseChecklist Date:10793Checklist No.:10YesNo~NA5.Whereplantconditions requiredemergency classification, wastheoperating modeapplicability oftheEALsclearlyrecognizedV rQQComments:

None.6.DidtheEALsandrequiredEmergency Planprocedures interface properl+QQ~Comments:

None.7.Afterinitialclassification, didsubsequent classification escalation followalogicalprogression intheEALswhenappropriate' rQQComments:

None.8.DidtheEALssupportescalation ofemergency classification whenplantconditions indicated thatescalation wasappropriate' rQaComments:

None.9.Whereplantconditions permitted reduction inthelevelofemergency

response, wasdowngradingofclassifications easilyrecognized usingtheEALs'?~QQComments:

None.3-2

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValidation Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-VaHdation ExerciseChechHstDate:10793Checklist No.:10YesNo~NA10.AretheEALsdevoidofanymisleading orincorrect information'

~QQComments:

None.11.DidtheEALsadequately specifycontrols, instrumentation, operatoraides,procedures, etc.necessary toeffectively evaluatetheEALs'?QSQComments:

StackandRBRWyeneffluentmonitordoesnototoDRMS.Table5.1.1thefirstinstruments willrobablnotreadlownuhoindiateUEandshouldrobablbelistedNAintheUEcolumn.12.DidtheEALshaveadequatedetailtobeeffectively evaluated' QQComments:

None.13.AretheEALsdevoidofexcessive detail'~QQComments:

None.3-3

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValidation Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-Validation ExerciseChecMistDate:10793Checklist No.:11YesNo~NA1.Whentheneedforclassification wasinitially recognized, weretheEALseasilyaccessible totheuser'?~QQComments:

None.2.Whereplantconditions requiredemergency classification, didtheformatandlayoutoftheFRLssupporteasyandrapidclassiQcation recognition' QQComments:

None.3.Wasclassification ofanyconditions

~nrequiring emergency classification avoided'Comments:

None.4.Didtypeandarrangement ofEALcategories andsubcategories adequately supportemergency classification efforts'~QQComments:

None,3-1

OSSI92-402A-7 EAI.Valfdatlon Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-VaHdation ExerciseChechHstDate10793Checklist No.:115.Whereplantconditions requiredemergency classiQcation, wastheoperating modeapplicability oftheEALsclearlyrecognized' YesNo~NA~QQComments:

None.6.DidtheEALsandrequiredEmergency Planprocedures interface properly' Comments:

None.7.Afterinitialclassification, didsubsequent classification escalation followalogicalprogression intheEALswhenappropriate'

~QQComments:

None.8,DidtheEALssupportescalation ofemergency classification whenplantconditions indicated thatescalation wasappropriate' QSQComments:

Table5.1.1use2xand200xalarmsetointforUEandAlertresectivel.3-2

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValidatfon Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-VaHdation ExerciseChechHstDate:10793Checklist No.:119.Whereplantconditions permitted reduction inthelevelofemergency

response, wasdowngradingofclassifications easilyrecognized usingtheEALs'?YesNo~NA~ooComments:

None.10.AretheEALsdevoidofanymisleading orincorrect information' Comments:

EAL1.4.2is10RhrEAL1.4.4is8Rhr.Shoulduseonevalueandbasisforit.11.DidtheEALsadequately specifycontrols, instrumentation, operatoraides,procedures, etc.necessary toeffectively evaluatetheEALs'?~ooComments:

~Nne.12.DidtheEALshaveadequatedetailtobeeffectively evaluated' rooComments:

None.13.AretheEALsdevoidofexcessive detail'oroComments:

EAL1.4.4relaceoneormorewithan.Checktheuseofoneormorethrouhoutthematrix.3-3

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValidation Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-VaHdation ExerciseChechlist Date;10793Checklist No.:11Y~No~NA14.DidtheEALidentification schemeadequately supportlocationoftheEALcondition withintheclassification procedure'

~ooComments:

None.15.Additional Comments:

None.3-4

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValidation Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-VaHdation ExerciseChecMistDate:10793Checklist No.:12YesNo~NA1.WhentheneedforclassiAcation wasinitially recognized, weretheEALseasilyaccessible totheuser'?~QQComments:

None.2.Whereplantconditions requiredemergency classiQcation, didtheformatandlayoutoftheEALssupporteasyandrapidclassification recognition'?

~QQComments:

None.3.Wasclassification ofanyconditions notrequiring emergency classification avoided?rQQComments:

None.4.Didtypeandarrangement ofEALcategories andsubcategories adequately supportemergency classification efforts?~QQComments:

None.3-1

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValidation Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-VaHdation ExerciseChecRHstDate:10793Checklist No,:125.Whereplantconditions requiredemergency classification, wastheoperating modeapplicability oftheEALsclearlyrecognized' Y~sNo~NAo~oComments:

EAL7.1.1:Mode3isblockedoutandthisEALisnotreuiredinthismode.Becauseofanevent'that evolvesintimeleftmode1mode2andwhentheLCOtimerunsoutourinmode3wherEALdoesnoal.PrNESP-007shoulincludemode3.6.DidtheEALsandrequiredEmergency Planprocedures interface properly' oo~Comments:

None.7.Afterinitialclassification, didsubsequent classification escalation followalogicalprogression intheEALswhenappropriate' rooComments:

None.8.DidtheEALssupportescalation ofemergency classification whenplantconditions indicated thatescalation wasappropriate?

~ooComments:

None.3-2

OSSI92-402A-7 EAI.Validation Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-VaHdation ExerciseChechHstDate:10793Checklist No.:129.Whereplantconditions permitted reduction inthelevelofemergency

response, wasdowngradingofclassifications easilyrecognized usingtheEALs'?Yes~N~NAroQComments:

None.10.AretheEALsdevoidofanymisleading orincorrect information QrQComments:

EAL7.2.3:Issueofbeininhothutdownandan'ttobelow212'F.ShouldonlbeaUE.Ifincoldshutdownbutcan'tstatherethenit'sanAlert.ShouldincludthisreasonininTrainin.EAL7.2.3:Shouldbeusin200'Finsteadof212'F.11.DidtheEALsadequately specifycontrols, instrumentation, operatoraides,procedures, etc.necessary toeffectively evaluatetheEALs'?~QQComments:

None.12.DidtheEALshaveadequatedetailtobeeffectively evaluated'

~QQComments:

None.3-3 0

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValidation Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-VaHdation ExerciseChechlist Date:10793Checklist No.:1213.AretheEALsdevoidofexcessive detail?YesNo~NA~aoComments:

None.14.DidtheEALidentiQcation schemeadequately supportlocationoftheEALcondition withintheclassification procedure'

~aaComments:

None.15.Additional Comments:

None.3-4

,

OSSI92-402A-7 EAI.Valfdation Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-VaHdation ExerciseChecRHstDate;10793Checklist No.:13YesNo~NA1.WhentheneedforclassiAcation wasinitially recognized, weretheEALseasilyaccessible totheuser?~aoComments:

None.2.Whereplantconditions requiredemergency classiQcation, didtheformatandlayoutoftheEALssupporteasyandrapidclassiAcation recognition' ooComments:

None.3.Wasclassification ofanyconditions notrequiring emergency classification avoided'~aoComments:

None.4.Didtypeandarrangement ofEALcategories andsubcategories adequately supportemergency classification efforts'?

~aaComments:

None.3-1

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValidation Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-VaHdation ExerciseChechHstDate:1079Checklist No.:135.Whereplantconditions requiredemergency classiQcation, wastheoperating modeapplicability oftheEALsclearlyrecognized' YesNo~NA~aaComments:

None.6.DidtheEALsandrequiredEmergency Planprocedures interface properl+Comments:

None.7.Afterinitialclassification, didsubsequent classification escalation followalogicalprogression intheEALswhenappropriate'

~0ClComments:

None.8.DidtheEALssupportescalation ofemergency classification whenplantconditions indicated thatescalation wasappropriateV rooComments:

None.9.Whereplantconditions permitted reduction inthelevelofemergency

response, wasdowngradingofclassifications easilyrecognized usingtheEALs'?~ooComments:

None.3-2

OSSI92-402A-7 EAI.Valfdation Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-VaHdation ExerciseChechHstDate:10793Checklist No.:13Y~sNo~NA10.AretheEALsdevoidofanymisleading orincorrect information?

Q~QComments:

Table8.2and8.3shouldinclude"ControlBuildin".Table8.2shouldnotinclude"CoolinTower"and"OilStorae",TakeTable8.3areasoutofTable8.2tavoidconfusion overiffrninlitdareas.NthnhaneEALsreferencin Table8.2sothatitnowreferences bothTable8.2andTable8.3.EAL7.2.4shouldstatecannotbemaintained inaofstablished.

"Within15minuteaftercontrolroomevacuation adeuatecorecoolincannotbemaintained".

No.UsewordinfromexistinEAL.ll.DidtheEALsadequately specifycontrols, instrumentation, operatoraides,procedures, etc.necessary toeffectively evaluatetheEALs?~QQComments:

None.12.DidtheEALshaveadequatedetailtobeeffectively evaluated?

Q~QComments:

EAL8.3.5shouldreference "vital"table.3-3

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValfdatlon Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-VaHdation ExerciseChechHstDate10793Checklist No.:13Y~~N~NA13.AretheEALsdevoidofexcessive detail'~0ClComments:

None.14.DidtheEALidentification schemeadequately supportlocationoftheEALcondition withintheclassification procedure?

800Comments:

None.15.Additional Comments:

None.3-4

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValidation Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-VaHdation ExerciseChechHstDate:10793Checklist No.:14YesNo~NA1.Whentheneedforclassification wasinitially recognized, weretheEALseasilyaccessible totheuser?~QQComments:

None.2.Whereplantconditions requiredemergency classiQcation, didtheformatandlayoutofthelessupporteasyandrapidclassification recognition'?

~QQComments:

None.3.WasclassiQcation ofanyconditions

~norequiring emergency classification avoided'~QQComments:

None.4.Didtypeandarrangement ofEALcategories andsubcategories adequately supportemergency classification efforts?0QQComments:

None.3-1

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValfdatfon Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-VaHdation ExerciseChechlist Date:10793Checklist No.:14YesNo~NA5.Whereplantconditions requiredemergency classification, wastheoperating modeapplicability oftheEALsclearlyrecognized' SCl0Comments:

None.6.DidtheEALsandrequiredEmergency Planprocedures interface properly' C30~Comments:

None.7.Afterinitialclassification, didsubsequent classification escalation followalogicalprogression intheEALswhenappropriate' SC30Comments:

None.8.DidtheEALssupportescalation ofemergency classification whenplantconditions indicated thatescalation wasappropriate'?

~ooComments:

None.9.Whereplantconditions permitted reduction inthelevelofemergency

response, wasdowngradingofclassifications easilyrecognized usingtheEALs'?raoComments:

None.3-2

OSSI92-402A-7 EAI.Validation Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-ValMation ExerciseChecMistDate:10793Checklist No.:14YesNo~NA10.AretheEALsdevoidofanymisleading orincorrect information' Q8QComments:

EAL8.4.6shouldincludeword"sustained" toavoidtransient sike.Don'includeatimelimit.Metcomuterrvides1minuteaveraerins.11.DidtheEALsadequately specifycontrols, instrumentation, operatoraides,procedures, etc.necessary toeffectively evaluatetheEALs'?~QQComments:

~Nne.12.DidtheEALshaveadequatedetailtobeeffectively evaluated' Q~QComments:

Table8.3needstohave"SecuriBuildin".13.AretheEALsdevoidofexcessive detail'rQQComments:

None.3-3

,

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValidation Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-Validation ExerciseChecklist Date:107Checklist No.:14YesNo~NA14.DidtheEALidentification schemeadequately supportlocationoftheEALcondition withintheclassification procedure' SQQComments:

None.15.Additional Comments:

None.3-4

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValidation Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-Validation ExerciseChecRHstDate10793Checklist No.:~lY~sNo~NA1.Whentheneedforclassification wasinitially recognized, weretheEALseasilyaccessible totheuser'rQQComments:

~Non.2.Whereplantconditions requiredemergency classification, didtheformatandlayoutoftheEALssupporteasyandrapidclassification recognition' Comments:

None.3.Wasclassification ofanyconditions notrequiring emergency classification avoided'0QQComments:

None.4.Didtypeandarrangement ofEALcategories andsubcategories adequately supportemergency classification efforts'SQQComments:

None.3-1

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValidation Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-VaHdation ExerciseChecMistDate10793Checklist No.:155.Whereplantconditions requiredemergency classiQcation, wastheoperating modeapplicability oftheEALsclearlyrecognized' Y~eNo~NA~ooComments:

None.6.DidtheEALsandrequiredEmergency Planprocedures interface properly' Comments:

None.7.Afterinitialclassification, didsubsequent classiQcation escalation followalogicalprogression intheEALswhenappropriate' Comments:

~Nne.8.DidtheEALssupportescalation ofemergency classification whenplantconditions indicated thatescalation wasappropriate' rooComments:

None.9Whereplantconditions permitted reduction inthelevelofemergency

response, wasdowngradingofclassifications easilyrecognized usingtheEALs'?~ooComments:

None.3-2

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValfdation Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-VaHdation ExerciseChecklist Date:10793Checklist No.:15Yes~N~NA10.AretheEALsdevoidofanymisleading orincorrect information' a~oComments:

EAL8.1.3needstostatethattheareasofconcernarethosedefinedbSecuriSeemsthattheseareaswouldallreuirkecardtoaccess.NeedtomakeitclearatSAElevelthatitisSecuri'scall.IsSecuriersonnelknowledcableenouhtoknowthatitertainstoanintrusion.

NMP2willcontactSecuritoensuretheirwordsaresamemeaninasEALs.11.DidtheEALsadequately specifycontrols, instrumentation, operatoraides,procedures, etc.necessary toeffectively evaluatetheEALs'?Comments:

None.12.DidtheEALshaveadequatedetailtobeeffectively evaluated'?

0~0Comments:

EAL8.1.4:ShouldbeanANDnoOR.Chanet"LossoflantcontrIfromthecontrolroom"becauseanRSPtakeovercouldtransferthecontrolroomcaabilitocontrolthelant.3-3

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValidation Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-VaHdation ExerciseChechHstDate:10793Checklist No.:1513.AretheEALsdevoidofexcessive detail'Yes~N~NA80ClComments:

~Non.14.DidtheEALidentification schemeadequately supportlocationoftheEALcondition withintheclassification procedure'

~00Comments:

None.15.Additional Comments:

None.3-4

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValidation Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-VaHdation ExerciseChechHstDate;10793Checklist No.:16YesNo~NA1.WhentheneedforclassiQcation wasinitially recognized, werethe&MLseasilyaccessible totheuser'5QQComments:

None.2.Whereplantconditions requiredemergency classification, didtheformatandlayoutoftheEALssupporteasyandrapidclassiQcation recognition'

~QQComments:

None.3.Wasclassification ofanyconditions

~norequiring emergency classification avoided'SQQComments:

None.4.Didtypeandarrangement ofEALcategories andsubcategories adequately supportemergency classification efforts'~QQComments:

None.3-1

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValidation Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-VaHdation ExerciseChechlist Date;10793Checklist No.:16Y~~N~NA5.Whereplantconditions requiredemergency classification, wastheoperating modeapplicability oftheEALsclearlyrecognized'

~QQComments:

None.6.DidtheEALsandrequiredEmergency Planprocedures interface properly' QQ~Comments:

None.7.Afterinitialclassification, didsubsequent classification escalation followalogicalprogression intheEALswhenappropriate'

~QQComments:

None.8.DidtheEALssupportescalation ofemergency classification whenplantconditions indicated thatescalation wasappropriate'

~QQComments:

None.9.Whereplantconditions permitted reduction inthelevelofemergency

response, wasdowngradingofclassifications easilyrecognized usingtheEALs'?~QQComments:

None.3-2

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValidatfon Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-VaHdation ExerciseChecklist Date:10793Checklist No.:16~YeNo~NA10.AretheEALsdevoidofanymisleading orincorrect information'

~oaComments:

~Nne.11.DidtheEALsadequately specifycontrols, instrumentation, operatoraides,procedures, etc.necessary toeffectively evaluatetheEALs'?~aoComments:

None.12.DidtheEALshaveadequatedetailtobeeffectively evaluated'

~oaComments:

None.13.AretheEALsdevoidofexcessive detail'~oaComments:

None.14.DidtheEALidentification schemeadequately supportlocationoftheEALcondition withintheclassification procedure' aoaComments:

ToAdesksidebsidewuldbebased.Makethemortable.shouldbeoneboard.15.Additional Comments:

None.3-3

(

OSSI92-402A-7 EAI.VaBdation Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-Validation ExerciseChechHstDate:10793Checklist No.:17Yes~N~NA1.Whentheneedforclassification wasinitially recognized, weretheEALseasilyaccessible totheuser'?~ooComments:

None.2.Whereplantconditions requiredemergency classification, didtheformatandlayoutoftheEALssupporteasyandrapidclassification recognition' SClC3Comments:

None.3.Wasclassification ofanyconditions notrequiring emergency classification avoided'50ClComments:

None.4.Didtypeandarrangement ofEALcategories andsubcategories adequately supportemergency classification efforts'~aaComments:

None.5.Whereplantconditions requiredemergency classification, wastheoperating modeapplicability oftheEALsclearlyrecognized' 500Comments:

None.3-1

(

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValfdation Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-Validation ExerciseChechHstDate:10793Checklist No.:17YesNo~NA6.DidtheEALsandrequiredEmergency Planprocedures interface properly?

Comments:

~Non.7.Afterinitialclassification, didsubsequent classiQcation escalation followalogicalprogression intheEALswhenappropriate?

~CI0Comments:

None.8.DidtheEALssupportescalation ofemergency classification whenplantconditions indicated thatescalation wasappropriate?

SCI0Comments:

None.9.Whereplantconditions permitted reduction inthelevelofemergency

response, wasdowngradingofclassifications easilyrecognized usingtheEALs?roaComments:

None.10,AretheEALsdevoidofanymisleading orincorrect information?

50ClComments:

None.3-2

,

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValldatlon Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-VaHdation ExerciseChecldist Date:10793Checklist No.:1711.DidtheEALsadequately specifycontrols, instrumentation, operatoraides,procedures, etc.necessary toeffectively evaluatetheEALs'?Yes~N~NASCI0Comments:

None.12.DidtheEALshaveadequatedetailtobeeffectively evaluated'

~00Comments:

None.13.AretheEALsdevoidofexcessive detail'?S00Comments:

None.14.DidtheEALidentiQcation schemeadequately supportlocationoftheEALcondition withintheclassification procedure'

~oaComments:

None.15.Additional Comments:

None.3-3

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValidatfon Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-Va1Mation ExerciseChechHstDate:10793Checklist No.:~lYes~N~NA1.Whentheneedforclassification wasinitially recognized, weretheEALseasilyaccessible totheuser'?Comments:

None.2.Whereplantconditions requiredemergency classification, didtheformatandlayoutoftheEALssupporteasyandrapidclassification recognition'?

~QQComments:

None.3.Wasclassification ofanyconditions notrequiring emergency classification avoided?~QQComments:

~Non.4.Didtypeandarrangement ofEALcategories andsubcategories adequately supportemergency classification efforts'?

~QQComments:

None.5.Whereplantconditions requiredemergency classification, wastheoperating modeapplicability oftheEALsclearlyrecognized?

rQQComments:

None.3-1 L

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValldatfon Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-VaHdation ExerciseChechHstDate:10793Checklist No.:18YesNo~NA6.DidtheEALsandrequiredEmergency Planprocedures interface properly' Q5Comments:

None.7.Afterinitialclassification, didsubsequent classification escalation followalogicalprogression intheEALswhenappropriateV rQQComments:

None.8.DidtheEALssupportescalation ofemergency classification whenplantconditions indicated thatescalation wasappropriate'

~QQComments:

None.9.Whereplantconditions permitted reduction inthelevelofemergency

response, wasdowngradingofclassifications easilyrecognized usingtheEALs'?rQQComments:

None.10.AretheEALsdevoidofanymisleading orincorrect information?

~QQComments:

None.3-2

,

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValidation Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-VaHdation ExerciseChechHstDate:10793Checklist No.:1811.DidtheEALsadequately specifycontrols, instrumentation, operatoraides,procedures, etc.necessary toeffectively evaluatetheEALs'?YesNo~NA~QQComments:

None.12.DidtheEALshaveadequatedetailtobeeffectively evaluated?

~QQComments:

None.13.AretheEALsdevoidofexcessive detail?~QQComments:

None.14.DidtheEALidentification schemeadequately supportlocationoftheEALcondition withintheclassification procedure'

~QQComments:

None.15.Additional Comments:

None.3-3

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValidation Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-Validation ExerciseChecRHstDate:10793Checklist No.:19YesNo~NA1~Whentheneedforclassification wasinitially recognized, weretheEALseasilyaccessible totheuser'rooComments:

None.2.Whereplantconditions requiredemergency classiQcation, didtheformatandlayoutoftheEALssupporteasyandrapidclassification recognition' rooComments:

None.3.WasclassiQcation ofanyconditions notrequiring emergency classification avoided'rooComments:

None.4.Didtypeandarrangement ofEALcategories andsubcategories adequately supportemergency classification efforts'~ooComments:

None.3-1

OSSI92-402A-7 EAI.Valfdation Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-Validation ExerciseChechHstDate:10793Checklist No.:195.Whereplantconditions requiredemergency classification, wastheoperating modeapplicability oftheEALsclearlyrecognized' Y~sNo~NA~aaComments:

None.6.DidtheEALsandrequiredEmergency Planprocedures interface properly' 00~Comments:

None.7.Afterinitialclassification, didsubsequent classiQcation escalation followalogicalprogression intheEALswhenappropriate'

~ooComments:

None.8.DidtheEALssupportescalation ofemergency classification whenplantconditions indicated thatescalation wasappropriate' Comments:

None.9.Whereplantconditions permitted reduction inthelevelofemergency

response, wasdowngradingofclassifications easilyrecognized usingtheEALs'?rooComments:

None.3-2

,

OSSI92-402A-7 EALValfdatlon Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-VaHdation ExerciseChechHstDate:10793Checklist No.:'19YesNo~NA10.AretheEALsdevoidofanymisleading orincorrect information'?

Q~0Comments:

Lowlakelevelis233.1ftforservicewaterumoerabilitbasedonUSARlevelforintake.USARminimumlakelevelreventseverreachinminimumintakelevel.Therefore couldotolaklevelinsteadoflowintakelevel'?No.couldhaveanintakeroblemcausinlowlevelwhenlakelevelsareok.Canitbemeasured' Checkinsimulator.

Itisoninstrument LI-502on~I6D1.11.DidtheEALsadequately specifycontrols, instrumentation, operatoraides,procedures, etc.necessary toeffectively evaluatetheEALs'?~oaComments:

None12.DidtheEALshaveadequatedetailtobeeffectively evaluated'

~00Comments:

None.13.AretheEALsdevoidofexcessive detail?~00Comments:

None.3-3

OSSI92-402A-7 EAI.Valldatlon Procedure, Rev.0Attachment 3-Validation ExerciseChecldist Date:10793Checklist No.:1914.DidtheEALidentification schemeadequately supportlocationoftheEALcondition withintheclassification procedure?

YesNo~NAroaComments:

None.15.Additional Comments:

None.3-4

OSSI93-402A-10-NMP2 NMP-2EALVeriAcatlon

&Validation Report,Rev.0Attachment 6FAT.Validation CommentDatabase6-1

,

~~a~~a~~re~~~RecordNo.18Date9/2Q/93NameM.C.DausOriginating SiteSiteApplicability NMP-2QJAF0IP-30NMP-2C3GenericBWRHGeneral0IP-2CINMP-1CjGinna0GenericPWRImpact0NUMARC-007 0Procedure I]Verification QTrainingCjHardwareCJEALC]Technical BasesCIValidation ClDeviation C3NoneCat.N/ACommentGeneraldiscussion:

IC¹**No.**Emer.Class.**modebar-whatisit?whatdoeswhitevsgreymean?Tryincreasing colorintensity fromUEtoGEasmeansofhighlighting changesinclassification.

Resolution Modebardefinition isgiveninthelegendatthebottomoftheEALchart.Increasing colorintensity wouldoverusecolorsanddetractfromtheireffectiveness forseparating

--=~EALcategories.

tatus0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition OoClosedRecordNo.19Date9/2Q/93NameM.C.DausOriginating SiteSiteApplicability NMP-2CIJAFQIP-30NMP-2C3GenericBWR8GeneralClIP-20NMP-1QGinna0GenericPWRImpactQNUMARC-007 C3Procedure 0Verification ClTrainingClHardware0EAL0Technical BasesQValidation ClDeviation 0NoneCat.N/AIC¹**No.**Emer.Class.'*"CommentScenario1,question2:ItwouldbehelpfultolaminateEALmatrixanduseerasablemarkerssoEDcanmarkEALsreachedandthoseabouttobedeclared.

Resolution Agree.status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition OeClosed 0,

RecordNo.20Date9/2Q/93NameM.C.DausOriginating SiteSiteApplicability NMP-2CJJAFOIP-38NMP-2OGenericBWRQGeneralPIP-2PNMP-1QGinnaQGenericPWR ImpactC3NUMARC-007 CIProcedure 0Verification CJTraining ClHardwareC3EALC3Technical BasesC3Validation QDeviation QNoneCat.N/AIc¹**No.**Emer.Class.**CommentScenario1,question12:EAL1.4.2:specifychannel1with14A/B.Resolution Addedchannel1assuggested.

status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition OIClosedRecordNo.21Date9/2Q/93NameM.C.DauSOriginating SiteSiteApplicability NMP-2CIJAFQIP-3CINMP-2HGenericBWRQGeneralImpactPIP-2QNMP-1PGinnaQGenericPWR0NUMARC-007 C3Procedure 0Verification 0TrainingDHardwareQEALQTechnical BasesClValidation QDeviation QNonecat.N/AIC¹**No.**Emer.Class.**CommentScenario1,question4:EAL3.1.1leakratesmaybebetterlocatedunderRPV.That'swherethey'elocatedinTechnical Specifications.

ConsidermovingEAL3.1.2tounderRPValso.Resolution MovedEALsassuggested.

status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition OeClosed

NameM.C.DauSRecordNo.22Date9/20/93Orlglnatlng SiteSiteAppllcablllty NMP-2QJAFQIP-3HNMP-2QGenericBWRQGeneralQIP-2QNMP-1QGinnaQGenericPWRImpactQNUMARC-007 QProcedure QVerification QTrainingQHardwareQEALQTechnical BasesQValidation QDeviation QNonecat.N/AIC¹**No.*'mer.Class.**CommentScenario1,question13:EAL6.1.1:aredesignators fortransformers readilyunderstandable?

Iscommonterminology used?Resolution Yes.status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition 0ClosedRecordNo.23Date9/20/93NameM.C.Dausrlginatlng SiteSiteAppllcablllty NMP-2QJAFQIP-3gNMP-2QGenericBWRQGeneralImpactQIP-2QNMP-1QGinnaQGenericPWRQNUMARC-007 QProcedure QVerification QTrainingQHardwareQEALQTechnical BasesQValidation QDeviation QNonecat.N/AIC¹**No.**Emer.Class.**CommentScenario2,question11:EAL1.3.1,1.3.2,1.3.3:whenvaluesarereceivedfromNMP,shouldlisttheminTablesas2decimalplaces,scientific notation(e.g.,1.76E5).Resolution Agree.statusOeOpen0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition 0Closed

NameM.C.DauSRecordNo.24Date9/2Q/93Orlglnatlng SiteSiteAppllcablllty NMP-2QJAFQIP-3C3NMP-2QGenericBWRHGeneral0IP-2QNMP-1C]GinnaQGenericPWRmpactClNUMARC-007 ClProcedure 0Verification ClTrainingClHardwareQEALQTechnical BasesCJValidation C]Deviation QNonecat.N/AIC¹**No.**Emer.Class.**CommentScenario2,question12:EAL3.5.1:Pathwaytotheenvironment isconsidered toexistoncepastoutbdPCisolation becausedownstream valvesarenotleaktested.Wouldwanttoconsiderotherindications intheturbinebuildingsuchasvisualobservation ofsteamleak,ARMs,CAMs,etc.Resolution CKWAgree.Pathwaytoenvironment shouldnotbeassumedbecausedownstream valvesarenotleaktested.Otherindications shouldbeusedtosupportdecisionthatapathwaytoenvironment exists.status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition OeClosedRecordNo.25Date9/2Q/93NameM.C.Dausrlginatlng SiteSiteApplicability MP-20JAFC]IP-3IRINMP-2QGenericBWRC3GeneralImpactC3IP-2QNMP-1QGinnaQGenericPWR0NUMARC-007 QProcedure 0Verification CITrainingQHardware0EALClTechnical BasesQValidation 0Deviation 0Nonecat.N/AIC¹**No.*'mer.Class.**CommentScenario2,question13:EAL1.2.1shouldreadgreaterthanorequaltoDRMS(red).Resolution Agree.ChangedEALto">DRMSred".status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition OeClosed

NameM.C.DauSRecordNo.26Date9/2Q/93Orlglnatlng SiteSiteAppllcabillty NMP-2QJAFQIP-38NMP-2C3GenericBWR0GeneralCIIP-2C]NMP-10Ginna0GenericPWRmpact0NUMARC-007 0Procedure ClVerification ClTraining0HardwareQEALQTechnical Bases0Validation C3Deviation C3Nonecat.N/AIC¹**No.**Emer.Class.**CommentScenario5,question13:EAL6.1.3shouldnotinclude2XTS-XSN1 becauseitcannotbepoweredfromanyoffsitepowersources.Resolution Deleted2XTS-XSN1.

status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition OIClosedRecordNo.27Date9/2Q/93riglnatlngSiteSiteApplicability NMP-20JAFQIP-30NMP-2QGenericBWRHGeneral0IP-2QNMP-10Ginna0GenericPWRImpactClNUMARC-007 C3Procedure C1Verification ClTraining0Hardware0EAL0Technical Bases0Validation C]Deviation ClNonecat.N/AIC¹**No.**Emer.Class.**CommentScenario6,question4:Category7.2title"System"doesnotreallyfittheEALscontained intheCategory(e.g.,turbinefailure,controlroomevacuation).

Resolution 4CKW(needtodothisforNMP.doneforJAF.)Changedtitleto"SystemFailuresorControlRoomEvacuation".

status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition 0Closed

NameM.C.DauSRecordNo.28oate9/20/93Orlglnatlng SiteSiteAppllcablllty NMP-20JAFI7IP-30NMP-2C3Generic BWRgGeneralPIP-2QNMP-1PGinnaPGenericPWRmpact0NUMARC-007 0Procedure 0Verification CITraining0Hardware0EALQTechnical BasesCIValidation QDeviation 0NoneCat.N/AIC¹**No.**Emer.Class.**CommentScenario6,question12:Definitions ofclassifications areneededonEALmatrixatleasttohelpinterpretation ofCategory9.Resolution Category9embodiesthedefinitions foreachclassification.

status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition QIClosedRecordNo.29Date9/20/93NameM.C.Dausrlglnatlng SiteSiteAppllcablllty MP-2PJAFQIP-3PNMP-2QGenericBWR8GeneralImpact0IP-20NMP-1QGinna0GenericPWRClNUMARC-007 ClProcedure ClVerification OTraining CIHardwareQEAL0Technical BasesCIValidation DDeviation ClNonecat.N/AIC¹**No.'mer.Class.**CommentScenario6,question9:Modeapplicability:

isitnecessary todowngrade whenthemodeshiftsfrompoweropstocoldshutdown?

Resolution No.Thisisapolicyissue.Thechangeinmodeisnotamechanism toescalateordescalate.

NRCwillpromolgate inasoontobeissuedNUREGthataformaldeclaration neednotbemadeifonefindsthatinthepastacondition requiring escalation existedbutsubsequently passed.status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition 0Closed

NameM.C.DausRecordNo.30Date9/20/93Originating SiteSiteApplicability NMP-2PJAFPIP-3PNMP-2PGenericBWRHGeneralPIP-2PNMP-1PGinnaPGenericPWRImpactpNUMARC-007 pProcedure pVerification pTrainingpHardwarePEALpTechnical BasespValidation pDeviation pNonecat.N/AIC¹**No.**Emer.Class.**CommentScenario6,question15:SuggestchangeEbarto-E.Resolution EbarisusedbyIP2/3andwillbecontinued hereforconsistency amongEALs.statusOOpenOResolved/Awaiting Disposition OIClosed..RecordNo.31Date9/20/93NameM.C.Dausriglnatlng SiteSiteApplicability NMP-2PJAFPIP-38NMP-2PGenericBWR PGeneralImpactPIP-2PNMP-1PGinnaPGenericPWRpNUMARC-007 pProcedure pVerification pTrainingpHardwarePEALpTechnical BasespValidation pDeviation pNoneCat.N/AIC¹**No.*Emer.Class.'*CommentScenario7,question13:Takesystemdesignator 43outofTable1.1.Resolution Changedassuggested.

sta~usOOpenOResolved/Awaiting Disposition OeClosed

NameM.C.DausRecordNo.32Date9/20/93Orlglnatlng SiteSiteAppllcablllty NMP-20JAFQIP-30NMP-2HGenericBWRC3GeneralC3IP-2QNMP-1QGinna0GenericPWRmpactCINUMARC-007 CIProcedure C3Verification 0TrainingClHardware0EALClTechnical BasesQValidation C]Deviation 0Nonecat.N/AIC¹**No.**Emer.Class.**CommentScenario7,question3:Ifsprayandpressurecomesdownandcantherefore maintainlessthanscramsetpoint, doesAlerthavetobedeclared?

BelieveshouldhavedeclaredAlertassoonasEOPsteppassedthatpermitted useofspraystocontrolpressure.

Resolution Seedefinition of"cannotbemaintained".

Aslongaspressureisbelowthescramsetpointandpressurecanbemaintained belowthescramsetpoint.

ThisEALdoesnothavetobedeclared.

Notethat"...duetocoolantleakage"hasbeenaddedtothisEAL.status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition OeClosedRecordNo.33Date9/20/93rlglnatlng SiteSiteAppllcablllty MP-2j3JAFQIP-3IHINMP-2QGenericBWRC]GeneralQIP-2PNMP-1PGinna0GenericPWRImpactCINUMARC-007 QProcedure ClVerification CITrainingC3Hardware0EALC3Technical Bases0Validation CJDeviation 0Nonecat.N/AIC¹**No**Emer.Class.**CommentScenario7,question12:Perhapsusedrywellarearadiation andputRMScomponent numbersinEAL1.3.1,1.3.2,1.3.3.Doesradmonitornumberneedtobespecified?

Possibly.

Resolution Addedword"area".RMS/radmonitornumbersarenotneeded.status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition OeClosed

NameM.C.DausRecordNo.34Date9/20/93Originating SiteSiteApplicability NMP-2QJAFOIP-38NMP-2OGenericBWRClGeneral C]IP-2CjNMP-1QGinnaC]Generic PWRImpact0NUMARC-007 QProcedure 0Verification 0TrainingDHardwareDEALC1Technical BasesC7Validation C3Deviation CjNonecat.N/AIC¹*No.Emer.Class.**CommentScenario7,question11:EALsaysdrywellpressure, butEOPsaysprimarycontainment pressure.

Resolution Changedto"primarycontainment pressure" toagreewithEOP.status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition 0ClosedRecordNo.35Date9/20/93rlglnatlng SiteSiteApplicability NMP-20JAFC3IP-3ONMP-2OGenericBWRHGeneralHIP-2C7NMP-1C]GinnaC3Generic PWRImpactCINUMARC-007 0Procedure C3Verification ClTraining0HardwareCjEALC3Technical Bases0Validation 0Deviation C3NoneCat.N/AIC¹*No.**Emer.Class.**CommentScenario8,question11:EAL1.4.4:Wouldnothavearrivedatdeclaration of>8R/hrunlessaccesstoareawasrequired.

Resolution That'scorrect.statusOOpen0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition 0Closed

RecordNo.36Date9/20/93Originating SiteSiteApplicability NMP-20JAFQIP-38NMP-2QGenericBWRC]General0IP-2ClNMP-1ClGinnaQGenericPWRImpactC3NUMARC-007 CIProcedure QVerification C1TrainingCIHardwareC3EALClTechnical BasesQValidation DDeviation 0Nonecat.N/AIC¹**No.**Emer.Class.**CommentScenario9,question12:ARMs>100timessetpoint, whichsetpointalertalarmorhialarm?Shouldbe"hi".ThisisalsoaproblemwithotherEALs(e.g.,5.0,etc.).Justput"red"or"yellow"noteveninparentheses.

Resolution Changedtouse"DRMSred".status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition 0+ClosedRecordNo.37Date9/20/93NameM.C.Dausrlglnatlng SiteSiteApplicability NMP-2'QJAFQIP-3C]NMP-2C3GenericBWRgGeneralImpactQIP-2PNMP-1C3GinnaDGenericPWRC3NUMARC-007 C3Procedure QVerification IITrainingQHardware0EALQTechnical Bases0Validation C3Deviation 0Nonecat.N/AIC¹**No.**Emer.Class.**CommentScenario9,question10:EAL1.5.2:oneSROwouldhavecalledAlertwo/visual report,otherwouldhavewaitedforvisual.Resolution Declaration isrequiredifbundlewasnotspecifically seenuncovered.

Thiswillbecoveredintraining.

status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition OeClosed

NameM.C.DausRecordNo.38Date9/20/93Orlglnatlng SiteSiteAppllcablllty NMP-2ClJAFQIP-38NMP-20GenericBWR0GeneralPIP-2QNMP-1QGinnaQGenericPWRImpact0NUMARC-007 0Procedure 0Verification 0TrainingC3Hardware0EAL0Technical BasesC3Validation 0Deviation CINonecat.N/AIC¹**No.**Emer.Class.*CommentScenario10,question11:StackandRB/RWventeffluentmonitordoesnotgotoDRMS.Table5.1.1thefirsttwoinstruments willprobablynotreadlowenoughtoindicateUEandshouldprobablybelistedasN/AintheUEcolumn.Resolution ChangedfirsttwoentriesinTable5.1.1toread:Radwaste/Reactor BldgVentEffluent2xalarmMainStackEffluent2xalarm'tatus0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition OIClosedNameM.C.DauSRecordNo.39Date9/20/93Orlglnatlng SiteSiteApplicability NMP-2C3JAF[3IP-3ClNMP-28GenericBWR0General0IP-20NMP-1QGinnaQGenericPWRImpact0NUMARC-007 QProcedure 0Verification QTrainingQHardware0EALCITechnical BasesClValidation QDeviation ClNoneIC¹**No.*"Emer.Class.**cat.N/ACommentScenario11,question10:EAL1.4.2is10R/hr,EAL1.4.4is8R/hr.Shoulduseonevalueandbasisforit.Maybeshouldchangetechbasisdescription totalkaboutgettingstaffeduptobeabletodoactionsrequiredwiththeMSOradvalue.Resolution Agree,butthebasisfor8R/hrhasbeenestablished byNMPCcalculation.

Difference fromEOPMSOvalueshouldberesolvedinEOPprogram.status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition OeClosed

RecordNo.40Date9/20/93NameM.C.DausOriginating SiteSiteApplicability NMP-20JAFClIP-3QNMP-2gGenericBWRQGeneralQIP-2QNMP-1PGinnaPGenericPWRImpact0NUMARC-007 0Procedure 0Verification C]TrainingQHardwareQEALClTechnical Bases0Validation 0Deviation C]Nonecat.N/AIC¹**No.**Emer.Class.**CommentScenario11,question8:Table5.1.1use2xand200xalarmsetpointforUEandAlert,respectively.

Resolution Changedassuggested.

status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition OeClosedNameM.C.DausRecordNo.41Date9/20/93Originating SiteSiteApplicability NMP-20JAF0IP-30NMP-20GenericBWR8GeneralDIP-2QNMP-1C3Ginna0GenericPWRImpactC3NUMARC-007 0Procedure C3Verification QTrainingQHardware0EALQTechnical BasesC3Validation 0Deviation 0NoneCat.N/AIC¹'*No.**Emer.Class.**CommentScenario11,question13:EAL1.4.4replaceoneormorewithany.Checktheuseofoneormorethroughout thematrix.Resolution Changedassuggested.

status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition OeClosed

NameM.C.DausRecordNo.42Date9/20/93Orlglnatlng SiteSiteAppllcablllty

.NMP-2C3JAFQIP-3HNMP-2OGenericBWRgGeneral0IP-2QNMP-1QGinnaQGenericPWRImpactCINUMARC-007 C]Procedure 0Verification HTraining 0Hardware0EALOTechnical BasesC3Validation ClDeviation QNonecat.N/AIC¹**No.*Emer.Class.**CommentScenario12,question10:EAL7.2.3:Issueofbeinginhotshutdownandcan'tgettobelow212'F.ShouldonlybeaUE.Ifincoldshutdownbutcan'tstaythere,thenit'sanAlert.Shouldincludethisreasoning inTraining.

EAL7.2.3:Shouldbeusing200'Finsteadof212'F.Resolution Changed212to200'F.statusOOpenOResolved/Awaiting Disposition O>>ClosedRecordNo.43Date9/20/93Orlglnatlng SiteSiteAppllcablllty NMP-2OJAFCIIP-3DNMP-2OGenericBWR8GeneralOIP-2QNMP-1C3GinnaC3Generic PWRImpactCJNUMARC-007 ClProcedure QVerification 0TrainingQHardwareQEALC3Technical Bases0Validation PDeviation 0NoneIC¹**No.**Emer.Class.**cat.N/ACommentScenario12,question5:EAL7.1.1:Mode3isblockedoutandthisEALisnotrequiredinthismode.Becauseofaneventthatevolvesintime,leftmode1,mode2andwhentheLCOtimerunsoutyourinmode3whereEALdoesnotapply.PerNESP-007shouldincludemode3.Resolution Includedmode3.senatusOOpenOResolved/Awaiting Disposition OiClosed

NameM.C.DausRecordNo.44Date9/20/93Orlglnatlng SiteSiteAppllcablllty NMP-2C3JAFC]IP-3QNMP-2C]GenericBWRIHLGeneraleQIP-2QNMP-1QGinna0GenericPWRimpact0NUMARC-007 CIProcedure C3Verification 0Training0Hardware0EALQTechnical BasesQValidation CIDeviation QNoneCat.N/AIC¹**No.**Emer.Class.**CommentScenario13,question12:EAL8.3.5shouldreference "vital"table.Resolution Added"vital"totable.AddedtoEAL"...neededforsafeplantoperation".

status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition OeClosedRecordNo.45Date9/20/93rlglnating SiteSiteAppllcablllty NMP-2QJAFC1IP-30NMP-2CJGenericBWRgGeneral0IP-2ClNMP-1QGinna0GenericPWRimpactC3NUMARC-007 C3Procedure C3Verification QTrainingQHardware[7EALQTechnical BasesCIValidation QDeviation QNonelC¹**No.**Emer.Class.**cat.N/ACommentScenario13,question10:Table8.2and8.3shouldinclude"ControlBuilding".

Table8.2shouldnotinclude"CoolingTower"and"OilStorage".

TakeTable8.3areasoutofTable8.2toavoidconfusion overdifferences inlistedareas.NeedtothenchangeEALsreferencing Table8.2sothatitnowreferences bothTable8.2andTable8.3.Resolutfon Changedassuggested.

status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition QeClosed

NameM.C.DausRecordNo.46Date9/2Q/93Orlglnatlng SiteSiteApplicability NMP-2QJAFQIP-3QNMP-2QGenericBWR HGeneralQIP-2QNMP-1QGinnaQGenericPWRImpactQNUMARC-007 QProcedure QVerification QTrainingQHardwareQEALQTechnical BasesQValidation QDeviation QNonecat.N/AIC¹**No.**Emer.Class.**CommentScenario13,question10:EAL7.2.4shouldstatecannotbemaintained insteadofestablished.

"Within15minutesaftercontrolroomevacuation, adequatecorecoolingcannotbemaintained".

Resolution No.UsedwordingfromexistingEAL.statusOOpenOResolved/Awaiting Disposition 0ClosedNameM.C.DausRecordNo.47Date9/2Q/93rlglnatlng SiteSiteApplicability NMP-2QJAFQIP-3QNMP-2QGenericBWRHGeneralQIP-2QNMP-1QGinnaQGenericPWRImpactQNUMARC-007 QProcedure QVerification QTrainingQHardwareQEALQTechnical BasesQValidation QDeviation QNoneCat.N/AIC¹**No.*'mer.Class.**CommentScenario14,question10:EAL8.4.6shouldincludeword"sustained" toavoidtransient spike.Don'tincludeatimelimit.Metcomputerprovides15minuteaveragereadings.

Resolution Addedword"sustained".

sta~usOOpenOResolved/Awaiting Disposition OeClosed

NameM.C.DauSRecordNo.48Date9/20/93Originating SiteSiteApplicability NMP-20JAFC3lP-3IINMP-2C3GenericBWRpGeneralDIP-2QNMP-1QGinna0GenericPWRmpactCJNUMARC-007 CIProcedure 0Verification CITraining0HardwareQEALQTechnical BasesPValidation C3Deviation PNonecat.N/AIC¹**No.**Emer.Class.**CommentScenario14,question12:Table8.3needstohave"Security Building".

Resolution Addedsecuritybuildingtotable.status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition ClosedRecordNo.49Date9/20/93rlglnatlng SiteSiteAppllcablllty NMP-20JAF0IP-3CINMP-20GenericBWRIGeneralpIP-2pNMP-1pGinnapGenericPWRImpactC3NUMARC-007 C3Procedure C]Verification PTrainingQHardware0EAL0Technical Bases0Validation 0Deviation 0Nonecat.N/AIC¹**No.**Emer.Class.**CommentScenario15,question10:EAL8.1.3needstostatethattheareasofconcernarethosedefinedbySecurity.

Seemsthattheseareaswouldallrequirekeycardtoaccess.NeedtomakeitclearatSAElevelthatitisSecurity's call.lsSecuritypersonnel knowledgeable enoughtoknowthatitpertainstoanintrusion.

NMP2willcontactSecuritytoensuretheirwordsaresamemeaningasEALs.Resolution 11/9EALclearlystatesthattheconcerniswithaplantsecurityvitalarea.AwaitingNMPconfirmation thatsecuritywordsmeansameasEALintent.status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition 0Closed

NameM.C.Daus~RecordNo.50Date9/20/93Orlglnatlng SiteSiteApplicability NMP-2C3JAFC3IP-3C3NMP-2C3GenericBWRHGeneralC3IP-2C3NMP-1C]GinnaC3GenericPWRmpactC3NUMARC-007 C3Procedure C3Verification C3TrainingC3HardwareC3EALC3Technical BasesC3Validation C3Deviation C3NoneCat.N/AIC¹**No.**Emer.Class.**CommentScenario15,question12:EAL8.1.4:ShouldbeanANDnoOR.Changeto"Lossofplantcontrolfromthecontrolroom"becauseanRSPtakeovercouldtransferthecontrolroomcapability tocontroltheplant.Resolution Changedassuggested.

status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition 0IClosedNameM.C.DauSRecordNo.5IDate9/20/93rlglnatlng SiteSiteAppllcabllity NMP-2C3JAFC3IP-3QNMP-2CIGenericBWRgGeneralC3IP-2C3NMP-1QGinna0GenericPWRImpactC3NUMARC-007 C3Procedure C3Verification C3TrainingC3HardwareC3EALC3Technical BasesC3Validation C3Deviation C3NoneCat.N/AIC¹**No.**Emer.Class.**CommentScenario16,question14:Tofitdesk,sidebysidewouldbebest.Makethemportable.

Shouldbeoneboard.Resolution Agree.status0Open0Resolved/Awaiting Disposition 0Closed YE'

.,RecordNo.52Date9/20/93NameM.C.DauSOriginating SiteSiteApplicability NMP-2CIJAF0IP-38NMP-2C3Generic BWRQGeneralDIP-2PNMP-1PGinnaQGenericPWR Impact0NUMARC-007 CIProcedure ClVerification QTraining0HardwareQEALQTechnical BasesCIValidation 0Deviation 0Nonecat.N/AIC¹**No.**Emer.Class.**CommentScenario19,question19:Lowlakelevelis233.1ftforservicewaterpumpoperability basedonUSARlevelforintake.USARminimumlakelevelpreventseverreachingminimumintakelevel.Therefore, couldgotolakelevelinsteadoflowintakelevel?Canitbemeasured?

Checkinsimulator.

Itisoninstrument LI-502onpanel601.Resolution No.Couldhaveanintakeproblemcausinglowlevelwhenlakelevelsareok.Canbemeasuredincontrolroom.statusOOpenOResolved/Awaiting Disposition 0+Closed l~AVffIC OSSI92-402A-7 EALValldatlon Procedure.

Rev.0Attachment 3-VaHdation ExerciseChecMistDate:10793Checklist No.:1014.DidtheEALidentiQcation schemeadequately supportlocationoftheEALcondition withintheclassification procedure' YesNo~NASCl0Comments:

None.15.Additional Comments:

None.3-4

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